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ABSTRACT.
The utilization of foreign soldiers by the sovereigns of 
England is as ancient as the monarchy itself. The Anglo- 
Saxon kings employed their hu's'Carles, William the Conqueror, 
his Norman barons, and the later Plantagenets and Yorkists, a 
motley host of European adventurers, including Flemings, Bur­
gundians, Gascons, and Braba^ons, who almost invariably 
formed a sizeable, if not in fact the strongest, element in 
the English army.
The early Tudors were no different. Lacking standing 
armies, the foundations of which had been laid on the Contin­
ent during the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centu­
ries, these rulers were obliged when they made war to seek 
out foreign professionals in large numbers. Some of the 
alien warriors were auxiliaries, soldiers provided at no cost 
to the Tudors by gracious allies; others were mercenaries, 
soldiers of fortune with no national allegiance, whose sole 
business was war and the selling of their martial talents.
During the early Tudor period, from the accession o£ 
Henry VII until the death of Henry VIII, auxiliaries were ob­
tained most commonly from the Hapsburg Empire and Spain, 
since it was with these two powers that England normally 
threw her lot. Mercenaries, on the other hand, were hired 
in whichever quarter they were available. Italy provided
v
many; not a few were obtained indirectly from Greece and Al­
bania; some were acquired from Denmark; but the majority—  
used in the reign of Henry VIII— were drawn from the Haps- 
burg states of Germany, the bow Countries, and Spain, whose 
rulers, whether allied with the Tudors or not, found it im­
possible to prevent their soldier-subjects from taking employ­
ment with England.
Auxiliaries were rarely used within the realm itself, 
and mercenaries only sparingly so until the last years of 
Henry VIII. That it happened thus can be attributed to the 
stability of the first two Tudor regimes and to the weakness 
of England's island neighbors, Scotland and Ireland, neither 
of which possessed the political cohesion, financial re­
sources, or manpower needed to upset English hegemony in the 
British Isles.
It was only in competition with non-island foes that the 
weakness of Tudor armies revealed itself. On the Continent, 
a veritable revolution in which England played no part had 
transfigured the face of war. Spain, the Empire, and France, 
the most contentious of the European monarchies, had modern 
military establishments before which the strength of England 
paled. But, since it was against one of these powers, France, 
that England chose to compete for military laurels, it was 
found necessary by her sovereigns to recruit mercenaries and 
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INTRODUCTION
In conformance with the popular notion of history as the 
plaything of pedants and historians as students of micro­
scopic glosses, the idea for this present treatise was pro­
vided by nothing more than a single footnote in an intriguing 
study of the reign of England's short-lived Tudor sovereign,
Edward VI. The note in question, appearing in W. K. Jordan's
1Edward VI, the Young King, alludes briefly to the use of
German and Italian conscripts in the suppression of the West-
2ern or "Prayer Book" Rising of 1549. More to the point its 
author concludes, after insisting that the recruitment of mer­
cenaries "was relatively recent in England" and that it was the 
Duke of Somerset, uncle to Edward and Protector of the realm, 
"who really first employed them on a considerable scale," that 
the entire subject of foreign troops is deserving of more 
thorough investigation. Implied in this latter observation is 
a challenge, and what follows in the body of this work is an 
attempt within the framework of the reigns of Henry VII and 
Henry VIII to place in some kind of perspective the role of
K. Jordan, Edward VI, the Young King: The Protec­
torship of the Duke of Somerset (London: George^AXlen and
Unwin Lts., 1968), p. 466, n. 2. Hereinafter cited as Ed­
ward V I , the Young King.
2This rebellion, centering as it did in the counties of 
Cornwall and Devon, sprang from the fear of Edwardian Pro­
testantism and the new liturgy as contained in the first 
Book of Common Prayer.
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the foreigner in the English army of that time.
The choice of this period, extending as it did from 1485 
to 1547, has been made for good reason. First, it was the 
early Tudors who engaged these soldiers in the greatest num­
bers; second, there exists such a plethora of material on the 
subject that the problem for the researcher is not the lack 
but the superabundance of sources; and third, disregarding
3the fact that scholars have all but ignored these foreigners, 
in the context of Tudor history the bulk of military studies
4produced have been Elizabethan in their bias.
Inasmuch as a work of this sort is exploratory in nature, 
the narrative approach has been largely avoided in favor of 
the historical survey. The object is not to dissect cam­
paigns or analyze battles but rather to answer a number of 
fundamental questions respecting the origins, prevalence.
3A notable exception was the late Sir Charles Oman, who 
in his standard survey, A History of the Art of War in the 
Sixteenth Century {New York! E. P. Dutton ancT“Co., Inc.,
15371 recognized fully the importance of continental troops 
in Tudor armies. Hereinafter cited as The Art of War in the 
Sixteenth Century.
^Check, for instance, the sections on military history 
in any of the following bibliographies: Conyers Read, ed.
Bibliography of British History: Tudor Period, 1485-1603
(Ox'ford": Clarendon Press, 1959) ; Mortimer Levine, ed., Tu­
dor England, 1485-1603 (Cambridge: University Press, 1955);
C. G. Cruickshank, "Military Developments of the Renaissance," 
in A Guide to the Sources of British Military History, ed. 
Robert Higham "(Berkeley an3“ Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1971), pp. 65-8 3.
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availability, and competence of the alien element in early 
Tudor armies. Who, for example, were these foreigners; how 
wide-spread was their employment; which monarch most availed 
himself of their services; and why was it considered neces-i 
sary to engage them at all? Some unanticipated disclosures 
are hopefully in store. For one thing, to the reader who so 
far has been disconcerted by the infrequent use of the term 
"mercenaries," it may come as a surprise that not all for­
eigners were. Many at least in early Tudor armies were auxil- 
5iaries, that is to say allies provided at no cost by sympa­
thetic but nonetheless self-serving heads of state, who more 
often as not stood more to gain from such transactions than 
the Tudors themselves.
As is generally the case when new ground is broken, cer­
tain problems have been encountered which for the moment seem 
impossible of solution, the most frustrating being the absence 
in contemporary accounts of any substantial estimates of how 
well these foreigners performed in English service. That they 
did fight is incontestible, but precisely how they fought goes 
largely unrecorded in Tudor annals, so that to provide the 
reader with some assessment of the skills and accomplishments 
that made these men so desirable as recruits in English armies 
it has been necessary to resort to continental sources and
5Below, p. 44.
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military histories in order to trace their rise to prominence 
as experts in the profession of arms.
The ommission of such critical information from contem­
porary Tudor descriptions of particular actions in which mer­
cenaries and auxiliaries are known to have participated seems 
incomprehensible, since it appears somehow reasonable to ex­
pect amid the myriad battle-front despatches, eye-witness re­
ports, and published narratives that someone somewhere would 
have been sufficiently moved to provide for posterity an 
actual analysis of how, in a given engagement, these men 
helped to win the day or lose the field. Why early Tudor com­
mentators, who in most other respects were faithful recorders 
of military occurents, should have shied away from such ana­
lyses is a mystery unless, as this writer sometimes suspects 
the case to have been, it was deliberately done to avoid the 
inevitable comparisons in which the gross inadequacies of the 
English military establishment would have been revealed.
Plainly speaking, Tudor annotators had good readon for 
withholding information of this type since, for reasons made 
clear in Chapter One, mercenaries and auxiliaries made better 
soldiers than Englishmen. Further, not only were they better; 
they were also indispensible when it came to fighting in 
France where the most protracted campaigns of the period were 
waged. Such dependency would not be readily admitted by 
proud inheritors of a glorious military tradition, whose not
xi
so distant forebears had been esteemed for their warlike pro-*' 
ficiency.
Unfortunately, for early Tudor Englishmen the glory be­
longed to the past, and all that remained of the tradition was 
the wasted remnant of a medieval military organization which, 
if capable of intimidating primitive Scots and Irishmen, was 
hardly likely to survive without mercenary or auxiliary help 
on the Continent where wars were modern and the foundations 
of Europe's first professional armies had already been laid.
It is strange, considering the attention showered upon 
foreign soldiers in other eras of English history, that those 
who served the early Tudors should have been so far over-
6looked. Except for my own article on the German Landsknechte* 
the substance of which appears in Chapter Three, no in-depth 
investigation of this absorbing aspect of Tudor history has 
been attempted, with the result that, if mentioned at all, the 
foreigners have been afforded little more than a few short 
notices in the monographic and general literature of the 
period.
In seeking partially to fill the void the plan followed 
has been first to examine the state of the Tudor army itself 
with a view towards uncovering those factors which made the
^"The Landsknecht: His Recruitment and Organization,
With Some Reference to the Reign of Henry VIII," Military 
Affairs, XXXV (Oct., 1971), 95-99.
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enlistment of foreigners both desirable and essential. Chap­
ter Two reviews the history of mercenary and auxiliary war­
fare in the reign of Henry VII, while the remainder of the 
dissertation is devoted to a survey of the particular national 
"types" employed, their organization, recruitment, and mili- 
tary skills. As will become apparent, considerably more atr 
tention is devoted in the later sections to the reign of Henry 
VIII than to that of Henry VII. Chapters Eight through Ten, . 
for example, concentrate on the Boulogne campaign of 1544-46. 
For this the author makes no apology because it was Henry 
VIII who engaged mercenaries and auxiliaries on the grandest 
scale, and it was in the taking and subsequent defence of 
that town that the largest contingents were involved. No 
apology is made either for skirting clear of the Scottish 
campaigns, the Western Rising, of Kett*s Rebellion of the 
later Edwardian period; each is deserving of its own separate 
study. Besides, no auxiliaries were engaged in any of these 
endeavors, and of the mercenaries employed their strength 
pales before the numerically superior forces hired earlier 
for Henry VIII's wars in France.
The subject treated herein, despite its somewhat con­
stricted focus, is vast, and having chosen to concentrate 
mainly though not exclusively on its continental aspects, it 
is time to mention some of the working conventions observed 
in its writing. Full bibliographic information is provided
xiii
on the first mention of e work with, only a short-title nota­
tion thereafter. For those unfamiliar with certain of the 
more specialized references to manuscripts, calendered mater­
ials, and the like, a "Table of Abbreviations" is provided as 
likewise is a "Glossary" of technical terms. In most in­
stances in quoting original sources, spelling and punctuation 
have been modernized. Except for a few colorful phrases or 
passages incapable of literal translation quotes from foreign 
materials have been rendered in English.
xiv
CHAPTER X
THE EARLY TUDOR ARMY
Albeit that war is to employ men of divers 
quality; yet ought they only to be reputed 
soldiers that make profession of arms.
William Segar, Honor Military, and Civill, p. 8.
From the vantage point of the twentieth century, the
armies of the early Tudors appear unimpressive and puny, and
comparison with the numerically and professionally superior
1forces of England's chief rivals during the same period elic­
its a wonderment that she survived the era at all. Tudor 
troops might with confidence give battle to Scottish raiders 
and Irish rebels; for these foes ranked among the most back­
ward of adversaries. But even so, English success against
2them was never complete. Flodden Field, the most convincing 
victory of an English army between Agincourt and Blenheim, 
provided no more than a stopgap in Scottish troubles, while 
in Ireland, after years of exhaustive effort, the narrow 
coastal Pale between Dhblin and Dundalk remained the extent 
of Tudor authority.
1France, Spain, and the Holy Roman Empire.
2The battle was fought just below the Scottish border in 
Northumberland on September 9, 1513. Perhaps as many as ten 
thousand Scots were slain, including their king, James IV, 




On the Continent,, English. a,pins wejre hardly more impress 
sive. Every Tudor monarch between 1485 and 1558 sent armies 
to the mainland of Europe either to enlarge upon that remnant 
of empire remaining to England from the Hundred Years * War or 
to retain it. Henry VII*s success in 1492 gained a French 
pension but no territory, and given the circumstances of 
Charles VIII’s Italian ambitions and the Franco-Spanish ri­
valry, Charles’s award of the pension had every appearance 
of being more a bribe to an annoyance than a surrender to a 
real military threat. Henry VIII invaded France on three 
occasions: 1513, 1523, and 1544. On two of these forays,
without actually defeating the French, he succeeded in add­
ing to his continental holdings. Tournai was siezed in 1513^ 
and the fortress of Boulogne in 1544, but both triumphs were 
marred by an inordinate wastage of men and material, and 
both prizes were relinquished by treaty long, within the de­
cade after their occupation. Tournai was returned in 1519, 
and the sum of Edward V I 's military adventures was reflected 
in the surrender of Boulogne in 1550. Under Edward’s suc­
cessor, Mary, the lack of military accomplishment was simi­
larly reflected in the loss of Calais, originally the first, 
and then the last, hope of continental empire for the Tudors.
3For the Tournai campaign, see the recent study by C. G. 
Cruickshank, Army Royal: An Account of Henry VIIT1s Invasion
of France in 1513 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), Chaps. X,
XI. Hereinafter cited as Army Royal.
It is easy of course to be overly critical of the Tudor 
army. Foreign observers, who could be expected to be most 
harsh in their appraisal of the English military establish­
ment, were often lavish in their compliments. The author of 
the Italian Relation, an oft-quoted critique of English life 
written at the beginning of the sixteenth century, mentions 
the high esteem in which English soldiers were held. Accord­
ing to this anonymous onlooker, they had "a very high reputa­
tion in arms," one which, "from the great fear the French en­
tertain of them,'1 had to be justly acquired;^ and writing 
sometime later, the Venetian ambassador, Sebastian Giustinian, 
while regarding the Englishmen's insistence on regular pay 
and dislike of hardship as weaknesses, maintained that "when 
they had their comforts" they would fight unabated with a 
"valor that defied exageration.1 Even the cynical Ferdinand 
II of Aragon conceded that English troops had strength and 
courage, an attitude shared by his grandson, the great era- 
peror Charles V.
^Charlotte Augusta Sneyd, trans., A Relation, or Rather 
A True Account, of the Island of England (London: Camden
Society, No. XXXVII, 1847), p. 23.
5Rawdon Brown, et auL., eds., Calendar of State Papers, 
Venetian (9 vols.; London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1864-
98), II, No. 562. Hereinafter cited as Venetian Calendar.
^Pascual de Gayangos, et al., eds. Calendar of State 
Papers, Spanish (13 vols. and 2 supplements; London: H. M.
Stationery Office, 1862-1954), II, 94; VI, 506. Hereinafter 
cited as Spanish Calendar.
Nevertheless, even if it is accepted that the combative 
spirit of Tudor soldiers remained high and relatively con­
stant throughout the early sixteenth century, the conclusion 
that English armies were inferior to their counterparts on 
the Continent can scarcely be escaped. Basically, the root 
of the problem lay in the nation's unprofessional approach 
to war, the most obvious failing being that the Tudors lacked 
a standing military force. Elsewhere the foundations of the 
first professional armies had been laid. The pikemen of 
Switzerland had been building on their reputation as Europe's 
steadiest infantrymen since the fourteenth century, though 
they were fast being equalled, if not superseded, by the 
landsknechts of the Germanies. Spain, too, after the initial 
campaigns of the Great Italian Wars (1494-1559) had an envi­
able professional army, while in France experiments with per­
manent forces had been in progress since before the close of
7the Hundred Years' War.
The Tudors of course were not without some regular 
troops. Henry VII, the founder of the dynasty, had created 
by statute a body of archers, the Yeomen of the Guard, and 
his son, Henry VIII, raised by similar means a mounted con­
tingent, the "King's Spears," which he later reconstituted
7On these developments, see the works of Sir Charles 
Oman: A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages (2 vols.
London: Metheun and Company, 1924) and The Art of War in the
Sixteenth Century.
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as his Gentlemen Pensioners. Finally there were the garrison 
troops strategically placed at various critical points through­
out the Jcingdom and which from the standpoint of experience 
and preparedness came closest to fulfilling the requirements 
of a standing army. Dover, Berwick, Carlisle, and Calais had 
the largest contingents, though in all there were over one 
hundred such posts. However, the majority of them, unless 
directly threatened, were manned by no more than a handful 
of soldiers. In the 1530's for instance, when in the midst 
of Henry VIII's religious revolution fear of Catholic inva­
sion prompted a spate of defense building, the twenty-six 
fortified places between Portland and Gravesend contained
Q
somewhat less than 170 soldiers. In peacetime on the Scot­
tish. border, the frontier most regularly menaced by attack, 
if the major strongholds at Carlisle and Berwick are ex­
cluded, the typical tower or bulwark was garrisoned by no
9more than a constable or deputy and his household retainers.
The total strength of garrison troops in England did not ex­
ceed three thousand men, which number could have served as 
a strong nucleus around which to build a standing army; but 
such a move was out of the question, since any incendiary
OJohn Jeremy Goring, "The Military Obligations of the 
English People, 1511-1558" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univer­
sity of London, 1955), pp. 244-45.
9I b i d . , p . 241.
situation, such as rebellion or invasion which would have 
necessitated.the withdrawal of these forces from their posts, 
would have left the country more vulnerable than such deploy­
ment would have justified.
The Yeomen of the Guard, the other of the two remaining 
bodies of regulars, had been raised as a royal bodyguard, but 
its numbers fluctuated drastically. Two hundred at its incep­
tion in 1485, the Guard rose to six hundred in 1513, but there­
after fell away in subsequent economy moves to about three 
hundred in 1528, less than 250 in 1541, and somewhere near 
125 during the French war in 1545. Further, the military 
duties of the Yeomen varied as often as their complement; 
when not attending the king in person, many were assigned to
garrisons both at home and in France, and occasionally they 
10served at sea. However, first and foremost they were a
royal guard, not an army.
The third body of regulars, the Gentlemen Pensioners,
were originally established in 1510 under the title of the
"King's Spears." Fifty in number, each man was served by
11a retinue of three including an archer, a demilance, and
10Ibid., pp. 230-31.
11See Glossary.
12a custrel, . making in all a company of two hundred. The
initial contingent, the "King's Spears," was deactivated in
1515 again, as in the pruning of the Yeomen of the Guard, as
an economy measure, the liveries and expense being so great
in the estimate of one contemporary as "there were none of
them but they and their Horses were apparelled and trapped
in Cloth of Gold, Silver, and Goldsmith's work and their ser-
13vents richly apparelled also." After lying dormant for 
twenty-four years, the unit was resurrected in 1539 on the 
occasion of Henry VIII's marriage to Anne of Cleves, but this 
time as the "King's Honorable Band of Pensioners," each Pen­
sioner receiving &50 in wages per year "for the~maintenance
of themselves, two Horses or one Horse and a Gelding of ser- 
14vice." Recruited from among the cadets of noble households 
and from the upper grades of the gentry, these horsemen formed 
an elite corps perhaps in imitation of the French king’s pen­
sioners, the "gentlemen of the vingt escus,1 so named after 
the twenty crowns a month they drew, in wages, Henry’s "spears,
Ibid. On the evolution of the Gentlemen Pensioners, 
see Samuel Pegge, Curialia: Or An Historical Account of Some
Branches of the Royal Household ~(2 vols,; London: J. NicKols, 
1791-1806TV If pt. 2, 3. Hereinafter cited as Curialia«
13Edward Hall, The Union of the- Two Noble and Illustre 
Famelies York and Lancaster,- ed. Henry Ellis [London: J.
Johnson, et al., 1809), p. 512. Hereinafter cited as Hail’s 
Chronicle.
■^Pegge, Curialia, I, pt. 2, 4.
as they continued to be called, complemented the Yeomen of the 
Guard, since their principal function was the protection of 
the royal person; but moreover their unit assumed the impor­
tant secondary role of training future officers, becoming a 
"pool” from which, after having served an apprenticeship, re­
cruits could be deployed to various captaincies either in 
England or abroad.^
Nevertheless, by no stretch of the imagination could 
these miniscule detachments of "spears," Yeomen archers, and 
garrison troops be regarded as an army. Even at maximum 
strength and allowing for the impossibility that most of 
these professionals could be drawn together at one place at 
one time, somewhat less than four thousand regulars could 
hardly have been expected to accomplish much when confronted 
by the combination of internal and external dangers posed 
England in the early sixteenth century. At the very best, 
what few professionals there were could only furnish a lit­
tle continuity in military affairs, thereby linking what was 
in essence the last phase of medieval militarism in England 
with a British "Army," whose real beginning lay in the seven­
teenth century.
As has been noted, England was lagging far behind her 
continental neighbors in the development of permanent forces.
15Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English Peo­
ple, 1511-1558," p. 239.
Why this dculd have been so is not entirely explicable, espe­
cially when the most immediate result of the trend towards pro­
fessionalism had been the expulsion of the English from France, 
during the Hundred Years' War. England's insular position no 
doubt abetted her conservatism in military innovation and, 
moreover, there was the matter of national pride: generations
after the fall of the empire which Henry V had so manfully 
built in France the memory of Agincourt still blinded English­
men to the realities of the situation. No Tudor Englishman 
worth his salt believed that he was not a fair match for ten 
Frenchmen, and even in 1549 on the very eve of the surrender 
of Boulogne to the French, an Englishman could write that de­
spite the existence of a professional French army "we have 
been counted hitherto superiors in success through stoutness 
of our subjects only."16
A modern historian has written of the Tudors that their 
"progress towards a permanent professional army may have been 
hindered by accidents of g e n e t i c s . F o r  most of the six­
teenth century, England was without an active commander-^in- 
chief: Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth were all barred from
the battlefield, the first by age and the latter two by sex,
^John Hales, A Discourse of the Common Weal of This 
Realm of England, ed. Elizabeth Lamond (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1954), p. 95. Hereinafter cited as Discourse of the 
Common Weal.
•^Cruickshank, Army Royal, p. 189.
so that during the nearly sixty years of their combined 
reigns "the monarch had no personal professional interest in 
developing a standing army." But what of the first two Tudors 
Both Henry VII and Henry VIII were active commanders-in-chief, 
and together they ruled England for sixty-two years, Whyr 
therefore, during their reigns beyond the creation of the 
Yeomen of the Guard and the Gentlemen Pensioners was there 
no attempt at imitating the example that had established it­
self on the Continent?
In answering this question, it is necessary to consider 
the condition of England at the time of Henry VII*s accession. 
The country was still engrossed in the civil Wars of the 
Roses which feud had been sapping the patience and resources 
of the nation since the close of the French War in 1453; for 
the Tudor victory at Bosworth was not made secure until the 
defeat of the last Yorkist army at Exeter in 1497. After that 
time Henry was an assiduous practitioner of peace. War as an 
end in itself did not interest him, and though he accumulated 
the largest train of artillery in the realm he preferred 
statecraft to force, persuasion to military despotism. If 
Henry VII devoted few thoughts to a permanent army, it was 
not because he was not an innovator— that was far from true. 
Rather it was because it was not in his interest to create 
such a force. As the founder of a new dynasty barely fixed 
on the throne, Henry would have invited the charge of tyranny,
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a charge which for centuries past and centuries to come in 
England was equated with a standing army.
The position of Henry VIII was much the same. Only the 
second of his line and forever worried about a successor, he 
could not afford to antagonize his subjects by forcing on 
them the physical and financial responsibilities which a per­
manent army would have entailed. A permanent army was not 
wanted in Tudor England as the Discourse of the Common Weal 
makes amply clear: "God forbid," says the Husbandman in the
Second Dialogue, "that we should have any such tyrants amongst 
us." "Merry," agrees the Merchant, "I think that would be 
rather occasion of commotions to be stirred than to be 
quenched, for . . . the stomachs of Englishmen would never 
bear that." The Doctor in the Dialogue reinforces the argue- 
ment: the establishment of a professional army "for avoiding
of sedition among people" would, by curing the smaller ague, 
only cause a greater evil in that its creation would "bring
in a continual yoke and charge both to the king and his sub- 
18jects."
Among contemporaries it would appear that the yoke was 
as much feared as the charge; for the reputation of English 
soldiers in times of peace was far from honorable. Sir 
Thomas More was but one .of many who inveighed against the
18Hales, Discourse of the Common Weal, p. 95.
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disreputable lives led by discarded warriors, men who having 
no trade but war turned in peacetime to brigandage: "robbersf"
he wrote, "do not make the least active soldiers, nor do sol­
diers make the most listless robbers; so well do these two 
pursuits agree."
In France, a nation which seemed perennially at war and 
thereby served opponents of regular armies as an example to 
be avoided, permanent military garrisons were the scourge of 
the civilian population. There it was said that professional 
soldiers satisfied their every craving and paid nothing "ex­
cept it be an evil turn, as to ravish [a man's] wife or daugh- 
20ter for it."
The popular feeling against standing armies was backed 
by centuries of tradition and by the not entirely misplaced 
faith in existing arrangements; for while England lacked sub­
stantial bodies of regular troops, it would be a grave mistake 
to imagine her in the sixteenth century as void of defenders. 
The military organization of the state was such that in the­
ory at least England was a nation in arms, as from his medie­
val predecessors Henry VII inherited the remnant of feudal 
levy in its bastard form of noble retainers under contract
1 9Sir Thomas More, Utopia, ed. Edward Surtz and J. H. 
Hexter (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965),
pp. 63, 65.
20Hales, Discourse of the Common Weal, p. 95.
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and the posse commitatus, a national conscript militia based 
on quotas supplied by the counties, which in time of crisis 
could be quickly mobilized to produce "an enormous array of 
well-equipped bowmen and billraen, who would be capable of
21beating back any invasion or of overcoming any rebellion."
Of these two types of forces, those raised for the mili­
tia were of more ancient origin, having been utilized by the 
kings of England from Saxon times. Behind their service lay 
the principle of allegiance which bound all men to fight when 
called upon in war or civil emergency in defense of the realm; 
and though it is impossible to accurately gage the number of 
citizen-soldiers available for this duty, with England's pop­
ulation approaching four million, the estimate of the Italian,
Giacomo Soranzo, of one hundred thousand in 1554 seems plau- 
22sible.
21Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English People, 
1511-1558," p. 19.
22Venetian Calendar, V, No. 934, p. 547. Soranzo served 
as Venetian ambassador in England from 1551 to 1554. His pre­
decessor in that post, Daniel Barbaro, arrived at precisely 
the same estimate in 1551, though in a report to the Doge in 
1519, Sebastian Giustinian set the figure at 150,000. See 
ibid. , No. 703, p. 350, and J. S. Brewer, et al., eds.. Let­
ters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry 
VIII, 1509-1547 (21 vols. in 33 pts.j London: H. M. Station­
ery Office, 1862-1920) III, pt. 1, No. 402. Hereinafter cited 
as L. & P.
The machinery for exploiting this vast national reserve
23was ingeniously simple, as by law every able-bodied man 
between the ages of sixteen and sixty was obliged, according 
to his estate and degree, to furnish himself with arms and 
equipment and to keep himself in training and readiness for 
action. Supervision of this system was entrusted to Commis­
sioners of Array, local officials who within each shire were 
empowered to review the militia with an eye towards assessing 
the fitness cf the men, as well as enforcing all statutes that 
pertained to the possession and maintenance of weapons. It 
was their responsibility when the militia was levied for war 
to see that the fittest and most expert men were chosen and 
that these reached their destination in good order.
Only in the gravest emergency, however, was it likely 
that the entire militia would be called on to serve, as so 
large a muster "would have been quite unmanageable, would 
have robbed the land of its cultivators, and left the country 
undefended except at headquarters."^ Such practical consid­
erations required that only a percentage of the men eligible 
in each shire be raised, these being ideally not only the 
strongest and best armed but also the closest to the action)
23The principal authority was the Statute of Winchester 
of 1285.
24William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England 
in Its Origins and Development (3 vols.; Oxford:Clarendon 
Press, 1874-78), II, 283.
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for geography along with fitness and preparedness played a
crucial part in determining which units should be placed on
a war footing. As the Venetian ambassador noted in the reign
of Edward VI, it was customary for the English to muster the
southern counties when threatened by France and the northern
25counties when menaced from Scotland. This was a slight 
overstatement, but in general the formula held true, and for 
all practical purposes, with the River Trent as the line of 
demarcation, England was divided into two military, provinces, 
each respectively and roughly corresponding to the ecclesias­
tical jurisdictions of Canterbury and York. Scottish inva­
ders were therefore opposed by militiamen recruited predomi­
nantly from the northern shires beyond the Trent, while trou­
ble in the south was met by their counterparts below that
^ ^ 26 boundary.
The armed retainers under contract, the second source of 
fighting men available to Henry VII, were of more recent ori­
gin than the militia. Their initial appearance has been 
traced to the thirteenth century when written contracts in 
the form of indentures replaced the classical feudal obliga­
tion of knight's service as the customary mode of raising 
the aristocracy and the landed gentry.
25Venetian Calendar, V, No. 703, p. 350.
26Goring, ’The Military Obligations of the English Peo­
ple, 1511-1558,” pp. 53-55.
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In times past, between the Norman Conquest of the elev­
enth century and the introduction of indentures in the thir­
teenth, it had been incumbent upon the holder of a knight’s 
fee, the basic unit of feudal land tenure, to serve the king 
in full armor and on horseback for forty days in every year. 
Landholders who held several or even hundreds of knight's 
fees, as in the case of the greater magnates, were expected 
to provide a requisite number of deputies, so that in theory 
there was always a substantial body of heavy cavalry ready to 
answer the royal call to arms. In practice, however, this 
method of raising troops was far from efficient or even de­
sirable, since the knights' tour of duty was limited and
hardly conducive to long campaigning, and there was strong
27resistance to foreign service.
By the reign of Edward I the feudal host had ceased to 
have any practical importance, so that the crown, to ensure 
itself of that core of men-at-arms who formed the backbone 
of all medieval English armies, was obliged to develop a 
system of pay by awarding regular wages and granting annui­
ties to knights who would fight when summoned. Efforts to 
improve the system led to the evolution of indentures, for­
mal contracts which provided the leaders in both the Hundred 
Years* War and the Wars of the Roses with the larger part of
Austin Lane Poole, ed., Medieval England (2 vols.: 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), I, 137-38.
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their forces and set forth the precise terms of military ser­
vice, regulating the numbers of troops to be levied, their 
wages, equipment, length of enlistment, and rewards that
might be expected for satisfactory performance during the
28course of campaigns. Such a system was highly more pre­
ferable than the vagaries of feudalism, since the method of 
recruitment by indenture, one of the most important military 
innovations of the Middle Ages, proved a great boon to Eng­
lish kings, for by "including all soldiers as contracting 
stipendaries, lit’] made even the greatest dependent to a 
large degree on the crown, produced discipline and a quicker
response to orders, and led to an effective subordination of 
29commands."
In the,fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, after the per­
fection of indentures, the structure of the English military 
establishment experienced few changes. When in 1485 Henry
28Prom the standpoint of military organization the au­
thoritative works on indentures are N. B. Lewis, "The Organ­
ization of the Indentured Retinue in Fourteenth Century Eng­
land " in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th. 
series, XXVIT E. “Morris, Tne Welsh Wars of
Edward I (Oxford: University Press, .1901); and two articles 
oJt A, ET Prince: "The Indenture System of Edward III," in
Historical Essays in Honour of J.‘ Tait, ed. J. G. Edwards,
V. H. Galbraith, and FI JacoH (Manchester: University 
Press, 1933), pp. 283-97; and "The Army and Navy." in The 
English Government at Work, 1327-1336, ed. J. P. Willard 
and W. A. Morris ("Cambridge, Mass.: The Medieval Academy of 
America, 1940), pp. 332-^93.
oq Prince, "The Army and Navy,", p. 352.
18
Tudor stood poised to invade England, the army of his rival,
Richard XXI, was raised in traditional fashion by commissions
30of array and private indentures. Henry's triumph brought no 
change. His creation of the Yeomen of the Guard may indeed 
have marked a positive advance towards professionalism in 
the English armed service, but in every other respect he re­
tained the methods of his predecessors, relying for the secur­
ity of his realm on the militia and on the loyalty of his in­
dentured retainers.
Significant attempts to improve on the system did not 
come until after the accession of Henry VIII. In 1511, in 
the face of growing estrangement with France, the second 
Tudor took steps to tighten up the general obligations of 
those of his subjects who would be called upon to serve him 
in the wars. The first step had as its primary objective 
"the revival of the militia system which, though always
theoretically in force, [had] practically of late fbeeh]
31displaced by the baronial levies." More precisely, what
30For an example of the former, see Calendar of Patent 
Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office: Edward IV,
Edward V, Richard III, 1476-1485 (London: H. M. Stationery
Office, 1901) pp. 488-92"T For' an example of the latter, see 
The MSS, of His Grace the Duke of Rutland. Historical MSS. 
Commission, 12th. Report, Appendix IV (London: H. M. Sta-
tionery Office, 1888), p. 20.
O IA. D. Innes, England Under the Tudors (London: Methuen 
and Company, 1937), p. 47. Innes erroneously attributes this 
revival to Henry VII. On this point, see Goring, "The Mili­
tary Obligations of the English People, 1511-1558," p. 14.
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Henry VIII sought was the better enforcement of the provisions 
on which the militia was grounded, namely those set forth in 
the Statute of Winchester. Thus on July 5, 1511, writs were 
issued to the sheriffs ordering them to make proclamation 
"that every man have in his house armor for keeping of the 
peace according to his havior and substance, as they have
been and shall be ordered by the commissioners after the old
n32 assize.1
The re-issue of this statute, which was "translated out 
of French into vulgar tongue of English" and incorporated in­
to the proclamation for its better enforcement, marked possi-
33bly its first renewaT since the reign of Richard II. Since 
that time, particularly during the Wars of the Roses when 
heavier reliance had been placed on indentured baronial lev­
ies, the kings of England had not been overly concerned about 
the armament of their shire forces. The crown had been con­
tent as long as the militiamen had appeared with some arms 
and in sufficient numbers. Now in 1511, Englishmen were 
strictly charged to equip themselves as the law required;
^Public Record Office (hereinafter cited as P. R. 0.) 
C66/615, mem. 7d. See also L. £ P ., I, pt. 1, No. 1771.
33Arthur H. Noyes, The Military Obligation in Medieval 
England (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1930), p.27,
n. 26. The proclamation as issued in 1511 is reproduced in 
Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin, eds., Tudor Royal Pro­
clamations (3 vols.; New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1964- ), I, 85-93.
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for by this proclamation, as the original statute intended, 
future Commissioners of Array once again became the instru­
ments through which in peace and war the military obligations
34of the public sector were enforced.
Henry VIII also took steps in 1511 to tighten up the 
military obligations due from the private sector of the com­
munity, that "other half of the military system" comprised 
of his noble lords and gentlemen. On September 8, soon after 
the publication of the Statute of Winchester, letters issued 
under the Privy Signet were sent to various lords and gentle­
men commanding them to make their retinues ready for the wars 
with orders to submit their number to his secretary, Thomas 
Ruthall, Bishop of Durham, by November 1. This at first 
glance was but a continuance of the indenture system; how­
ever, included in the letters was the significant proviso 
which instructed the recipients to
neither prepare nor take any persons for the 
war but only such as be your own tenants or 
inhabitants within any office that ye have of 
our grant or of the grant of any other person 
or persons or commonality, not being tenants 
or officers to any other person or persons 
having semblable commandment.
34Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English Peo­
ple, 1511-1558," pp. 15-16.
35Historical MSS. Commission Report on the MSS, of Lord 
Middleton, ed. W. H. Stevenson (London: H. M. Stationery
Office, 1911), p. 126.
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This rendered the indenture system a blow from which it would 
36not recover. Heretofore an indentured captain could recruit 
where he wished; he had not been required to recruit among his 
tenants and dependents as henceforward he must.
This new manner of contracting with the chief landholders 
differed appreciably from the older indenture system which 
Henry VIII in effect abandoned by reemphasizing the ancient 
feudal prerogative which demanded military service as a right 
from those who held fees of their lord. As the system of re-
'* -Icruiting within the private sector/ it has been described by 
Dr. Jeremy Goring as quasi-feudal, "for it was a system under 
which the crown sent out writs of military summons to the 
principal landowners, and the principal landowners answered 
the call by taking steps to enforce the military obligations 
of their tenants.
By and large throughout Henry VIII1s reign the greater 
part of the English troops were raised by private individuals, 
and it was on the country gentry that the main burden of pro­
viding forces for the wars fell, particularly for the French 
wars. It was from that remnant of the feudal host, the quasi- 
feudal aristocracy, that the larger part of the troops for the
36The last indentures of the medieval type issued in Eng­
land appeared in 1512. See Goring, "The Military Obligations 
of the English People, 1511-1558," p. 17.
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381513 expedition were recruited. The same procedure was fol­
lowed in Suffolk's invasion of 1523 and for the Boulogne cam­
paign in 1544.*^
The practice of relying on private levies, as opposed to 
the militia, for service in foreign parts was sanctioned both 
by custom and law. Custom held that the militia could on no 
account be made to serve outside the realm, while by a stat­
ute of Edward Ill's reign it was stipulated that no man could
be compelled in the service of his king to leave his shire ex-
40cept to meet the threat of foreign invasion. Such contin­
gents as were necessary for the waging of war on foreign soil 
were by strict interpretation of the statute to be composed of 
volunteers or those tenants who owed knights' service. In 
practice, however, the crown successfully evaded such restric­
tions by "taking its stand on the ground of national emergency 
or the common law," doggedly holding to the precept that it 
was a subject's duty to serve his sovereign. Thus, while it
3 8Cruickshank, Army Royal, p. 198.
39Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English Peo­
ple, 1511-1558," p. 268.
^ 1  Edward III, c. 5. The pertinent phrase in the stat­
ute which was reissued in 1402 (4 Henry IV, c. 13) reads "that 
none shall be constrained to go out of their counties, but 
only for cause of necessity of sudden coming of strange ene­
mies into the realm." A. Luders, T. E. Tomlins, J. Raithby, 
et al., Statutes of the Realm (11 vols.; London: Record Of­
fice, 1810-28)„ I, 255.
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is true that the vast majority of the soldiers provided for 
the French wars in early Tudor times were supplied by individ­
ual lords and gentlemen, militiamen were never entirely ex- 
41empt. In fact, while quasi-feudal recruitment remained in
vogue through the reign of Mary, Goring notes that a decay of
the system can be observed as early as Henry VIII's last
French campaign:
Ever since 1544 the crown had been gradually 
abandoning it in favor of the national [i.e. 
militiaj system. The militia had become the 
principal fighting force in the realm, not 
so much because the .[Tudorsj had become strong 
enough to disregard the old custom that the 
shire levies must never be sent overseas, as 
because the national military system had be­
come efficient. The frequent issue of commis­
sions of musters in the years after 1535 had 
caused the gentry to become skilled in the 
machinery of the militia and the people to be­
come more conscientious in the fulfillment of 
their military obligations.42
Eventually, by the early years of Elizabeth's reign, the 
national militia system would prevail, although the quasi-feu­
dal system would continue in use at least through the reign 
of Charles I. Nonetheless, the regularization of the new
Militiamen served in all of Henry VIII's overseas cam­
paigns. One of the largest contingents, four thousand strong, 
was ordered across the Channel in July, 1544, to reinforce the 
army before Boulogne. See L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 292, 347, 
397.
^2Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English Peo­
ple, 1511-1558,'.' pp. 279-80.
24
office of Lord Lieutenant^ under Elizabeth, by creating "a 
truly effective local authority,” negated the value of pri­
vate commissions, with the result that they were rarely used 
and gradually disappeared. But these developments lie out­
side the scope of this study. Through the early years of 
the sixteenth century, private commissions were the means by 
which the predominant number of English troops destined for 
service outside the realm were levied.
From the purely military point of view, despite the 
praise heaped on them by foreign observers, the caliber of 
the forces raised by the first Tudor sovereigns left much 
to be desired. Whether recruited by private commission or 
shire levy the average conscript, even when most proficiently
43The office of Lord Lieutenant originated in 1539 as an 
emergency creation designed to meet the military exigencies 
of the time, namely the domestic unrest created by Henry VIII's 
religious reformation and the threat of invasion from Catholic 
Europe. Lieutenants were first appointed on a temporary basis 
over one or more counties, and in 1551 the system was made per­
manent. Their commissions gave them wide authority at the 
local level, but their main task throughout the Tudor period 
remained the control of the county militia. The Lord Lieuten­
ant's commission "gave him the right to call up the men of his 
county; to array, to try them out, and arm each according to 
his capability; to lead them against the enemies of the crown; 
and, still within the county limits, 'to repress, subdue, slay, 
kill and put to execution or death these enemies by all ways 
and means."1 C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (Oxford; 
University Press, 1966), p. 19. The fullest treatment of the 
office is provided in Gladys Scott Thomson, Lords Lieutenants 
in the Sixteenth Century (London:- Longmans, Green and Company, 
1923T7
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trained and armed, was at best a talented amateur. Intermit­
tent practice at the butts, the muster, or even the knightly 
lists was a poor substitute for actual combat experience.
To be sure, England was not without her veterans and native 
soldiers of fortune, but more often than not in the arts of 
war her rank and file were as unskilled as they were inexpe­
rienced.^ The same shortcomings permeated the of ficer ranks, 
particularly at the lower levels. In theory "only the most 
suitable gentlemen" were picked to command, but the complaint 
was rife during the reigns of the early Tudors that "captains 
be chosen in England by favor and not by worthiness;" hence 
if the quality of the English soldier was poor, it was be­
cause "his captain [was,] as ignorant as he and was made cap-
45tain ere ever he was a soldier."
To a great degree the situation reflected errors of omis­
sion rather than commission. The problem was not that the 
English high command was wilfully neglectful. Rather it op­
erated in the vacuum of its own limited experience, and for 
better or for worse that experience was medieval.
Allusion has already been made to the military record of 
the early Tudors. All these sovereigns were sufficiently
44Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English Peo­
ple, 1511-1558," p. 81.
45British Museum. Harleian MS. 309, f. 8. Hereinafter 
cited as (B. M.) Harl. MS.
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successful in stamping their authority on English rebels, in 
policing the Irish, and in defending the northern frontier 
against the Scots. However, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that this was so in large part because the apti­
tude for war of these troublemakers was somewhat less than 
that enjoyed by the Tudor state itself. From the point of 
view of military progress,the British Isles lagged sadly be­
hind the Continent. Inevitably then, if a true indication 
of England’s military worth is to be determined, her record 
on the Continent must be considered.
Though it is far from glorious, it is surprisingly not
a bad record. Technically, if the debacle of Calais at the
46end of the period is excluded, no Tudor army lost a war, 
but by the same token strong arguements can be brought for­
ward as to whether the Tudors ever waged a continental war, 
at least in the literal sense of what war had actually be­
come in that quarter.
In France, Spain, Italy, the Germanies, and not the 
least in Switzerland, military techniques and institutions 
were undergoing revolutionary change at a time when English 
military innovation was at a virtual standstill. Across the
^®It is difficult to attribute the loss of Calais to the 
defeat of an English army? the incompetence of the Marian 
government would be a better place to lay the blame. When 
the French Duke of Guise launched his attack in January, 
1558, the defenders of the principal garrison numbered only 
eight hundred.
Narrow Sea before the death of Henry VII the first series of 
modern wars, the Great Italian Wars of 1494-1559, were already 
in progress, and the first professional standing armies were 
already in their formative state. These armies were unlike 
anything Europe had yet seen. Everywhere, for the first time 
since the demise of the Roman legions, the emphasis was on 
infantry; not hastily raised militiamen or volunteers, though 
these were certainly employed, but highly drilled and well 
furnished veterans, whose expertise and specialization, as in 
the case of the pikemen and the newfangled arquebusiers or 
hand-gunners, made them the bane of the knightly class which 
had dominated European battlefields since the beginning of 
the Middle Ages. Even this latter class, unlike its English 
counterpart, was moving with the times, if only to preserve 
its position as first in war. The dense masses of unruly 
feudal horsemen were fast giving way before a more skillful 
heavy cavalry which now tended to be well trained and well 
paid, not by the great nobles as in the past but by their 
sovereigns as commanders-in-chief; and encased as they still 
were in steel from head to toe, the gendarmes "were 'profes­
sional* cavalry capable of tactical m a n o e u v r e . i n  cata­
loguing further changes across the Channel, the superiority
47Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509- 1̂970 
(London; The Penguin Press, 1970TT p.5.
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enjoyed by the continentals in tactics, organization, artil­
lery, small arms, fortification, and siegecraft could be men­
tioned. However, to critically appraise the developments in
each of these areas would be to restate that which is already
48common knowledge.
How then, if England was so woefully behind the times, 
did she escape disaster? Excluding fate, part of the answer 
lies in the premise suggested above that England simply did 
not wage war on a scale or with a proficiency great enough to 
merit the type of opposition that might have assured her de­
feat. The Tudors' interest in war was as transitory as their 
armies. While continentals waged continuous war and, as a 
result, provided themselves with permanent armies, England, 
when it so moved her to participate in the greater European
struggles, "only furnished expeditions" between which her
49forces were disbanded.
Her part in any of the campaigns thus far mentioned has 
a certain sideshow quality about it. Never were English ar­
mies forced to fight the main body of the enemy; nor were her
4 RThe best single-volume survey of military developments 
in the sixteenth century is still Sir Charles Oman's stand- 
ar<* History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, 
though it can be profitably supplemented by Frederick Lewis 
Taylor, Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529 (Cambridge: Univer­
sity Press, 1921).
^Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970, p. 16.
29
forces ever put to the test of a pitched battle like Marignano 
or Pavia. The reason for these seeming anomalies is not hard 
to find, since England's part in the military drama being en­
acted on the Continent was that of bit player. The starring 
roles belonged to the established protagonists: Valois France
on the one hand, and England's allies, Spain and the Holy Ro­
man Empire, on the other. That England's intervention on the 
side of the latter powers had some nuisance value cannot be 
denied; still, the main actions involved the major combatants 
and were always fought far from the theater of English partic­
ipation, as Italy in 1513 and 1523 or Italy and Champagne in 
1544. Neither Louis XII nor Francis I were ever foolish 
enough to ignore an Imperial or Spanish army for the privilege 
of defeating an inferior English force; for Tudor practice in 
war was sufficiently clear to France, exemplifying as it did 
"a pattern of thought and result long to be repeated in Bri­
tish military history: transient intervention by an army un­
fit to encounter and defeat a continental power's main body .
. . and intervention therefore without effect on the issue of 
the war."
Though England was not considered a threat sufficient 
enough to warrant the full attention of her Valois foe, the 
survival and even limited successes of her expeditionary
50Ibid., p. 12.
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forces were attributable to more than French preoccupation 
with the Tudors' more dangerous confederates. England might 
have lagged behind in military proficiency, but she was not en­
tirely unreceptive to the changes being made. For example, 
practical Henry VII stimulated the growth of a native iron 
industry in the Sussex Weald by ordering large quantities of 
shot and sponsoring experimentation in the casting of iron 
guns.^ However, of the early Tudors it was Henry VIII who 
demonstrated the keenest interest in military science. He 
was the first to break the monopoly enjoyed in England by 
the foreign merchants of modern military hardware, though he 
had to employ continentals to do it. Sizeable numbers of 
alien armorers and gunfounders were not only encouraged to
settle in England, but also beginning about 1515 "to form
52schools for the production of war material . . . ." A 
large colony of German armorers worked for a time in South­
wark. Other Germans, plus contingents from Milan, a princi­
pal center for the production of small arms, were maintained 
on a permanent basis at the Armoury at the Tiltyard at
Carlo M. Cipolla, Guns, Sails and Empires: Technolog­
ical Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion, 
1400-1700 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965}, p. 37^ Herein­
after cited as Guns, Sails and Empires.
Charles Ffoulkes, The Gun Founders of England (Cam­
bridge: University Press, 1937), p. 5.
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c oGreenwich. Later in the reign the Italian, Peter Baude,
"the best founder of bronze guns in the king’s service," pre­
sided over the production of cannon by a group of his fellow 
countrymen off Fleet Street in Salisbury Court, while in the
eastern London suburb of Houndsditch a group of French masters
54engaged in similar work. Henry VIII also served as patron 
of a nascent English gunpowder industry, but again the need 
was felt for foreign technicians and specialized skills, so 
that, as in the case of the manufacturers of firearms, native 
English craftsmen served their apprenticeship under continen­
tal instructors.
The king’s interest in moderization was not confined to 
firepower. "Alien military engineers and fortifiers were em­
ployed throughout the reign, but especially in the later
E Eyears when extensive work was done on the Scottish border."
Among the more noteworthy were the Mor a v i a n S t e p h e n  Von 
56Haschenberg, and the Italians, Archangel de li Arcane and
T. G. Wyatt, "The Part Played by Aliens in the Social 
and Economic Life of England During the Reign of Henry VIII 
(Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of London, 1952), pp. 
144-45. Hereinafter cited as Wyatt, ’Aliens."
54Ibid., p. 135.
55Ibid., p. 141.
56An excellent article detailing Haschenberg1s not alto­
gether happy work in England has been written by B. H. St. J. 
O'Neil, "Stefan von Haschenperg, An Engineer to King Henry 
VIII, and His Work,11 Archaeologia, XCI (1945), 137-55.
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57 . . .Girolamo da Treviso. Other alien artificers in the military
arts included French crossbow-makers, pike-makers, and harness- 
5 8makers, the latter no doubt practiced in the manufacture of 
the famous "almain rivets," suits of flexible armor which, un­
like the metal prison worn by men-at-arms, allowed for greater 
freedom of movement.
Early Tudor armies were therefore not completely devoid 
of the benefits of modern military science. However, at the 
expense of belaboring the obvious, the technological resources 
available to a Henry VIII pale before those available to lead­
ers like Francis I or Charles V: what were a few score gun-
founders and pike-makers in England by comparison to the thou­
sands of skilled armaments workers on the Continent?
Viewed from any angle England was a second-rate power. 
Domestic manufacture of war materiel never kept pace with need 
at any time during the early Tudor period, as evidenced par­
ticularly during times of trouble by the substantial orders 
placed abroad. A few random examples from the reign of
C*TFor some interesting details of Treviso's life, see 
A. E. Popham, "Hans Holbein's Italian Contemporaties in Eng­
land," The Burlington Magazine, LXXXIV (1944), 12-17; and 
Philip Pouncey, "Girolame da Treviso in the Service of Henry 
VIII," ibid., XCV (1953), 208-11. Girolamo or "Jeronimo," 
as he was known to the English, began his career as a painter. 
Examples of his artistic work, several in "the style of the 
Bolognese and Ferrarese imitators of Raphael," are on exhibi­
tion at Hampton Court, the Louvre, and in Bologna.
^^Wyatt, "Aliens," pp. 147, 148.
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Henry VIII will suffice to illustrate the point, Prior to
the French, crossing in 1513 special heavy; guns, including the
famous "Twelve Apostles," and an assortment of lesser caliber
were ordered from the foundries of Hans Poppenruyter in 
59Malines. For the same expedition Henry commissioned John
de Castro, a Spanish merchant, to supply him with eighty hand^
guns, while additional orders were placed for war furnishings
of all sorts, including arquebuses and thirteen thousand suits
60of almain rivets. More artillery was obtained from Poppen- 
ruyter for a raid in France in 1522 and the campaign there in 
1523. In fact, from Malines alone, within the first two dec­
ades of his reign, Henry received from Poppenruyter "at least 
140 bronze guns of all c a l i b e r s . T h e  invasion of France 
in 1544 and the subsequent efforts to retain possession of 
captured Boulogne produced the best equipped of Henry VIII1 s 
armies. Nevertheless, the forces employed, "the most formid­
able," in Oman's estimation, "which ever crossed the Channel 
during the existence of the old English monarchy" were par­
ticularly dependent on foreign suppliers of the necessaries 
of war: 1,050 suits of armor for horse and foot and fifteen
^^John Bowie, Henry VTII (London; George Allen and Un­
win Lts,, 1964) , ppl 54-55; ^ipolla, Guns, Sails and Empires 
p. 38,
60CB, M,> Stowe MS. 146, ffv 60, 61, 62, 65, 68, 
61Cipolla,' Guns,' galls' and Empires, p. 38.
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hundred arquebuses ordered from Brescia, 1544; five thousand
pikes and munitions from the Low Countries, 1545; saltpetre,
62glaives, and gunpowder from the Low Countries, 1546.
Certainly England's ability to wage war was not solely re­
stricted by the relatively depressed state of her armaments in­
dustry, for guns, munitions, and pikes were not her only lack. 
More basic to England's problem in time of war was her want of 
modern soldiers. Engrossed in domestic affairs since the 
close of the Hundred Years' War and only fitfully engaged in 
the wider quarrels around her, the nation's "military ideas 
had failed to progress beyond those of Agincourt." Bills and 
bows were still the order of the day, the bowyers' trade being 
specially protected in the law both by obligatory use of the 
weapon on the part of the subject and from export by foreign­
ers. The act of 1511 concerning "shooting in long bows" re­
quired that "every man being the :King’s subject not lame, de­
crepit, or mained . . . being within the Age of forty years, 
except to those men, spiritual men, Justices of the one bench 
and of the other, Justices of Assize, and Barons of the Ex­
chequer, do use and exercise shooting in longbows, and also
have a bow in his house and do use himself in shooting."
*
/TOHarold Arthur Dillon, "Arms and Armour at Westminster, 
the Tower, and Greenwich, 1547," Archaeologia, LI (1888), 229- 
30; L. & p . , XX, pt. 2, Nos. 131, 147; ibid., XXI, pt. 1, No. 
162. England even found it necessary to import bowstaves at 
this time. On this point, see Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 
p. 103.
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Fathers, guardians, "and rulers of such be of tender age" 
were instructed to raise their charges "in the knowledge of 
the same shooting." The statute likewise ordained that "Butts 
be made in every City, Town, and place . . . And that the In­
habitants and dwellers of every of them be compelled to make 
and continue such butts and to exercise themselves with long 
Bows in shooting at the same . . . ." Where necessary, Jus­
tices of the Peace were empowered to appoint bowyers for the 
making of bows "to serve the commonality," and aliens were
forbidden both to export or to use longbows without the king's
63 . 64license. This statute was made perpetual in 1515.
The use of modern weapons was actually discouraged. The 
act of 1515 bemoaned the fact that certain of "the King's sub­
jects daily delight themselves in shooting of Crossbows and 
hand-guns." To remedy the situation the government provided 
confiscation and stiff fines; "no person from henceforth 
[will] shoot in any Crossbow or any handgun upon pain of for­
feiture of the same bow and gun unless he or other to his use 
or use of his Wife have lands tenements, fees, annuities, or 
other profits to the yearly value of three hundred marks, And 
for every time so using to shoot in Crossbows or handguns to 
forefeit BIO for every time so offending." A similar act was
633 Henry VIII, c. 6, Statutes of the Realm, III, 25-26.
646 Henry VIII, c. 2, Statutes' of the Realm, III, 123-24.
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passed in 1541.
Small wonder that the early Tudors lacked modern infantry,
that every expedition mounted for service either against the
Scots at home or the French abroad was practically devoid of
modern armament, artillery excepted. At Flodden in 1513 the
most novel weapons employed by the English commander, the Earl
of Surrey, were a few light pieces of ordnance: his men had
no pikes, no handguns of any kind, and relied for victory on
66their conventional bows and bills. A few pikes and arque­
buses were utilized during the French invasions of 1513 and
jTC33 Henry VIII, c. 6, Statutes of the Realm, III, 832-35. 
At the time of the French war in 1544, for the only time dur­
ing the period, encouragement was given to the users of mod­
ern weapons when by royal proclamation "all and singular his 
majesty's subjects born within his grace's dominions being 
of age sixteen and upwards" were permitted to "shoot in hand­
guns and hagbushes [i.e. arquebuses]" without penalty. See 
Cruickshank, Army Royal, p. 81, who quotes the pertinent text. 
The proclamation was rescinded in 1546. As Cruickshank cor­
rectly perceives it, the proclamation of 1544 "was much too 
liberal for the time." Though "the danger of war had receded" 
— the reason given for the revocation of the proclamation —
"it seems likely that the change of heart was as much a 
social as a military decision. If too many people had guns, 
it would encourage lawlessness in a variety of forms; and in 
the long run it would put dissident groups into a position 
to challenge the authority of the crown."
Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 311, 
314, 320.
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671523; yet neither weapon figured conspicuously in English 
hands at any time during the first half of the sixteenth cen­
tury. Even in the French campaign of 1544 bows and bills pre­
dominated as of old, and of the twenty-eight thousand infan­
trymen of the army of invasion hardly more, and perhaps less,
6 8than one-tenth had modern weapons.
In the other military arm, the cavalry, much the same 
canker is found, namely the failure to keep abreast of the 
times. Heavy cavalry in particular was lacking in early Tu­
dor armies, in part because the tactics of the Hundred Years'
War and the Wars of the Roses had conditioned the English
69knightly class to fight on foot, a habit not easily overcome,
67Cruickshank, Army Royal, p. 68, makes mention of "pay­
ments for repairs to harquebuses" in the 1513 expedition, while 
on the eve of that invasion one English captain alludes to news 
that he was to be furnished, among other things, with pikes.
See L. S. P •, If pt. 2, No. 855. Similarly, see above, p. 33. 
Why would Henry VIII make purchases of small arms if he did not 
intend his soldiers to use them? No mention is made of English 
handgunners or pikemen in Suffolk's army in 1523, partly, one 
suspects, because the records pertaining to that affair are 
much scantier than those available for the earlier and later 
campaigns of the reign. However, in the autumn of 1523 fire­
arms were being purchased abroad. L. £ P ., III, pt. 2, No. 
3494.
6 8The elaborate preparations and the majority of the mus­
ter lists for the 1544 invasion are preserved in L. & P ., XIX, 
pt. 1, Nos. 271-76. A fair number of English infantrymen were 
armed with "sprinklers," that is a type of spiked club or 
cudgel. See ibid.. No. 275 (4), p. 164.
W. C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, A. D. 
378-1515. ed. John H. Beeler (Ithaca, N. Y.: Great Seal Soolcs,
1953), pp. 129, 134, 149-50. Hereinafter cited as Beeler, ed., 
The Art of War in The Middle Ages.
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the more so when it was recalled that such methods had won the 
day at Crecy and Agincourt. Unfortunately, what had been for­
gotten was that this self-same stratagem of fighting from the 
defensive with knights afoot interspersed with billmen and 
flanked by archers had resulted in the expulsion of the English 
from France, and that the Hundred Years’ War, which had begun 
so gloriously and ended so shamefully, had reversed the posi­
tions of the two most famous adversaries in northwestern Europe. 
England had emerged from the struggle a second-rate military 
power, while France had developed one of the best armies in 
Europe; and the strength of that army was built around perma­
nently employed companies of men-at-arms, the Compagnies 
d ’Ordonnance, in which each knight rode off to battle with a 
squire, valet, page, and two mounted archers to serve him. 
Mobile, numerous, and above all disciplined, the French' gen­
darmerie was generally acknowledged the best of its kind.
How contrary the English stituation. Writing to the Doge 
in 1519, Sebastian Giustinian observed that in England little 
use was made of men-at-arms, adding that "The real military
force of the country" consisted of its infantry whose prowess
70was in archery. The paucity of heavy cavalry in early Tu­
dor armies is made painfully clear by examining the personal 
retinue of Surrey at Flodden Field: of the five hundred men
70L. & P., Ill, pt. 1, No. 402.
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assigned to him, only one, Avery of Berwick, was a full-
71fledged man-at-arms. Heavy horse were singularly scarce
among the twelve thousand Englishmen recruited for Suffolk's
expedition in 1523, while at Boulogne in 1544, except for the
fifty Gentlemen Pensioners assigned largely to the person of
72the king, English men-at-arms were almost non-existent.
The early Tudors were somewhat better served by light
73 74 75cavalry: demilances, "prickers," mounted arquebusiers,
71Ibid., I, No. 4376.
72Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 289,
333.
73See below, pp. 109-10.
74"Prickers," utilized primarily as scouts and foragers, 
were also referred to as "northern horse" and were recruited 
largely from among the moss-troopers which infested the bor­
derlands with Scotland. Their principal weapon was a light 
spear or "chasing stave" shorter than the demilance and not 
unlike the boar spear which they may also have used. For a 
description of the boar spear, see Dillon, "Arms and Armour 
at Westminster, the Tower, and Greenwich, 1547," p. 238.
75These, of course, were not very numerous, appearing 
in the English army for the first time around the date of 
Henry VIII1s last French war. Patterned after the mounted 
arquebusiers with whom the English had come in contact dur­
ing their earlier forays in Scotland (which nation employed 
French auxiliaries) and in France, they were variously used 
as scouts, skirmishers, and protectors of convoys on the 
march. Their equipment, at least that which was most desired 
was described c. 1548: "The arquebusier shall likewise be
well mounted, and their armor shall be like unto [light horse­
men], except the head-piece: for they only shall have Morions
to the intent to see the better round about them, and to have 
their heads more at liberty, a sword by their side, a mace at 
the pommel of their saddles on the one side, and an arquebus 
in a case of leather on the other, which must be made fast 
that it stir not: which arquebus may be two foot and a half
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and archers on horseback. The Venetian, Barbaro, estimated
in 1551 that a levy en masse of the militia might produce as
76many as fifteen thousand light cavalrymen, but certainly 
no such mounted force of Englishmen was ever put into the 
field between 1485 and 1558.
How then, with such feeble and antiquated forces, did 
the early Tudors hope to win success in that martial cockpit 
which was sixteenth-century Europe? The answer is simple: 
they did not expect success, not if they had to fight a con­
tinental war alone; and the Tudors, with the exception of 
Henry VII, who took a calculated risk and won in 1492 but 
otherwise abstained from long-term military adventuring, 
never fought on the mainland of Europe alone. In 1513, Eng­
land campaigned in France as a member of the Holy League with 
Spain, the Papacy, the Holy Roman Empire and, at least for a
or three foot long or rather more, so [long as] it be light." 
Paul Ive, trans., Instructions for the Warres. Apply, learn­
edly, and politiguely discoursing the method of Military Dis­
cipline . Originally written in French by . . . Monsieur 
William de Bellay, Lord of Langey . . . (London: Thomas Man
and Tobie Cook, 1589) , p. 62. This work was in fact written 
by Raymond de Beccarie de Pavie, Sieur de Fourquevaux. For 
a modern edition in French and an explanation of the confu­
sion regarding the authorship, see G. Dickinson, ed., Instruc­
tions sur le Faict de la Guerre of Raymond de Beccarie de 
Pavie, Sieur de Fourquevaux (London: The Athlone Press,
1954). Hereinafter cited as Fourquevaux, Instructions sur . 
le Faict de la Guerre. Dickinson's edition provides a use­
ful Introduction in English which analyzes the French army 
under Francis I.
7 fiVenetian Calendar, V, No. 703, p. 350.
time, Venice and Switzerland as allies, while the armies of 
1523 and 1544 fought in partnership with Spain and the Empire.
Nevertheless, despite well laid plans and good intentions 
the French wars waged by England and her confederates were 
never truly coordinated affairs. Each member of any partic­
ular alliance had its own general staff, its own objectives, 
and its own strategy, with the result that concerted action as 
a team was out of the question and never attempted. Never did 
an early Tudor army combine with the main body of an allied 
army in joint action, for that main body was always elsewhere 
generally engaging the principal array of the enemy's forces; 
but herein lay the military value of continental alliances 
to the Tudors. Only when France was distracted in other quar­
ters could England's substandard soldiery dream of battle hon­
ors beyond the Channel.
However, the first Tudors could never afford the luxury 
of overconfidence; for even if France could not commit her 
full strength to repelling English intruders, it was inevi­
table that she would resist and that whatever forces she
77Since 1519 both Spain and the Holy Roman Empire had 
enjoyed the same ruler, Charles of Burgundy, grandson and 
heir of Ferdinand the Catholic (d. 1516) and of Maximilian I 
(d. 1519). As Charles I he ruled Spain until 1556, in which 
year he resigned in favor of his son, Philip II. As Charles 
V, the title by which he is more commonly remembered, he 
ruled the Holy Roman Empire until 1558, abdicating a few 
months before his death that same year in favor of his 
younger brother, Ferdinand I.
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could spare in that endeavor would be representative of her 
best. Therefore, to assure themselves of at least a chance of 
victory the early Tudors were obliged, when fighting on the 
Continent, to retain in their service foreign mercenaries and 
auxiliaries, dedicated professionals who could hopefully coun­
ter the stratagems of an equally professional foe. It is to 




I do affirm 'tis not money (as common 
opinion will have it) but good soldiers 
that is the sinews of war; for money can­
not find good soldiers, but good soldiers 
will be sure to find money.
Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Bk. 11.
Before proceeding further some attempt at a definition of 
terms must be made, specifically with regard the meaning of 
"mercenaries" in sixteenth-century parlance and the difference 
between them and auxiliaries. Fortunately, there is no need to 
be original, as the most famous contemporary student of the 
art militaire, Niccolo Machiavelli, provides the answer. It 
is manifest from his chapters in The Prince and the Discourse 
on the First Decade of Titus Livius which explicitly treat of 
these two kinds of soldiers that mercenaries were free lancers, 
owing allegiance first, to themselves, second, to their offi­
cers, and third, and sometimes only incidentally, to their em­
ployers. Mercenaries were the lineal descendants of the "free 
companies" of the Middle Ages, transient bands of rugged
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci (New 
York: The New American Library, 1964), chaps. XII, XIII. Here­
inafter cited as The Prince, trans. Ricci. Allen Gilbert, 
Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others (3 vols.: Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1965), I, 381-83. Hereinafter cited as 
Machiavelli, Chief Works. The term "free lance" was itself a 
contemporary euphemism for mercenary.
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individualists, professional warriors temporarily recruited 
from among all nations, and held together by leaders of strong 
personality. While nnot entirely indifferent to the claims of
honor and legality or to the interests of their country of ori-
2gin,1' they were motivated principally in the exercise of arms 
by their desire for financial gain. Consequently, whichever 
prince's purse was fullest, he it was who could expect to at­
tract them in the greatest numbers.
Auxiliaries were a somewhat different breed. These were 
troops, to use Machiavelli's phraseology, who were borrowed 
from and, more importantly, paid for by an ally: "When one 
asks a powerful neighbor to come to aid and defend one with 
his forces," he noted in The Prince, "they are termed auxil­
iaries;"^ they are soldiers "who are sent to you by a prince .
. . under his own officers, under his own ensigns, and who 
are paid by him . . . . "^ Potentially more troublesome than 
mercenaries, since they were united in their allegiance to 
the ruler who lent them, auxiliaries were nevertheless em­
ployed in considerable numbers by the early Tudors, being 
acquired from Prance by the uncrowned Henry VII and from 
Spain and the Empire by Henry VIII.
Anthony Mockler, Mercenaries (London: Macdonald and
Company, 1970, p. 23.)
3Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci, p. 77.
4Machiavelli, Discourse on the First Decade of Titus 
Livius, in Chief Works, I, 382.
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However clear their differences in theory, .it is not air­
ways possible to distinguish between mercenaries and auxilia­
ries. Both were foreign; both were professional; both served
5under alien officers; and both were impelled to a greater or 
lesser degree by hope of material reward; for even auxiliaries, 
though drawing no pay from the ruler in whose cause they fought, 
could hope, like mercenaries, for pensions, booty, ransoms, and 
similar extraneous emoluments. In addition, it was relatively 
simple to switch roles, to play the part of auxiliary one day 
and become a thoroughgoing mercenary the next. If, for exam­
ple, as frequently happened, an auxiliary’s natural prince 
chose to withdraw from an alliance, there was little more than 
moral censure to prevent him from continuing in the service 
of his foreign master; and in an age when patriotic national­
ism was still in its infancy, such censure had little effect 
provided wages remained sufficiently attractive.
The retention of mercenaries and auxiliaries by English
sovereigns was nothing new; hence the practice was not, as
6has recently been suggested, a Tudor innovation. On the con­
trary, employment of foreign soldiers by the rulers of England
cThough mercenaries did serve under their own officers, 
the units which they formed, unlike those comprised of auxil­
iaries, were incorporated directly into the army of their 
employer and as such were subject to his dictates and the 
orders of his subordinate commanders.
6Above, p. . vii.
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is as old as the military history of the nation itself. 
Tacitus speaks of the Batavi, the Tungri, and the Usipi, Ger­
man auxiliaries who assisted Agricola in the conquest of Bri- 
7tain. The Venerable Bede, writing some three hundred years 
after the fact, recounts the not implausible tale that the 
first Anglo-Saxons were invited to Britain as mercenaries, 
that they were awarded grants of land "on condition that they 
protect the country."®
Modern students of military history are no less cogni­
zant of the importance of foreign arms in England's develop-
Qment: C. Warren Hollister, in two recent studies, devotes
10a chapter in each to the mercenaries and auxiliaries who 
served the earlier dynasties of English kings. Mercenaries
^H. Mattingly, trans., Tacitus on Britain and Germany:
A Translation of the "Agricola" and the Germania" (Balti­
more: Penguin Books, 1965), pp. 77, 86.
QBede, A History of the English Church and People, trans. 
Leo Sherley-Pnce (Baltimore: Penquin Books, 1965), p. 55.
9C. Warren Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions 
(New York: Oxford Press, 1962), and The Military Organization
of Norman England (New York: Oxford Press, 1965).
10Hollister does not in fact distinguish between merce­
naries and auxiliaries, classifying both as stipendarii, i.e. 
"soldiers who served for pay." However, from the examples 
he cites, it is plain that many of the troops would better 
fit the description of auxiliaries. For instance, the 
great barons from France and the Low Countries who, from 
time to time, served the Anglo-Normans Were often independ­
ent rulers in their own right and were frequently committed 
to the kings of England by treaty. When wars were waged in 
a common cause, some troops provided for English use must 
occasionally have been auxiliaries.
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comprised "the elite corps" of the Saxon fyrd, the forerunner 
of the national militia, while under the Normans, "the most 
significant military expense" was the outlay for hired sol­
diers. Hollister quotes no figures on the probable strength 
of these foreigners, but he makes it clear that they played 
a substantial part in pre- and post-Conquest warfare: "per­
haps the similarities between Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman 
mercenaries outweigh their differences. The most startling 
similarity is the very fact that mercenaries were important 
to the military structures of both societies in an age when 
they were relatively rare elsewhere in Europe."11
John Schlight's study of the eleventh and twelfth centu­
ries advances the more controversial thesis that it was mer­
cenaries rather than the baronial levy which "constituted a
12dominant institution in feudal society." The unreliability 
of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy in the performance of it mil­
itary obligations "led . . . to a mercenary policy" on the 
one hand, while preventing "the operation of an effective
11Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions, p. 19.
12John Schlight, Monarchs and Mercenaries: A Reappraisal
of the Importance of Knight Service in Norman and Early 
Angevin England (Bridgeport, Conn.: University of Brrdgeport,
1968), vii. Schlight does not distinguish between mercenaries 
and auxiliaries either, though again examples could be cited 
demonstrating that certain of the stipendarii were probably 
auxiliaries, receiving pay from their own princes rather than 
from the kings of England.
13system of knight-service" on the other. Other authors of 
more standard works dealing with almost any period pre-dating 
the Tudors could be quoted with the same effect. Representa­
tive of these is the late Sir Charles Oman, an authority with 
few equals in the field of early military history, who in a 
simple sentence sums up in general terms what was common prac­
tice: "From the time of Stephen onward, we perpetually find
the feudal levies of the realm supplemented by great bodies
14of professional soldiers, nearly all foreigners." Merce­
nary and auxiliary troops, therefore, have a long, if not al­
ways distinguished, career in the service of England.
As regards the Tudors, foreign troops figure prominently 
in the very foundation of their regime. Henry VII, while yet 
Earl of Richmond and fugitive in France, received from the 
Yorkist-hating government of Charles VIII money, ships, artil­
lery, and auxiliaries in quantities sufficient to secure a 
beachhead in the kingdom whose crown he claimed. Philip de 
Commines, French councillor-historian and witness to the 
events surrounding the successful invasion of 1485, placed 
the number of auxiliaries at between three thousand and four
13Ibid., p. 75.
140man, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages,
I, 368.
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15thousand, though modern estimates favor a figure closer to 
16two thousand. Little is known of these Frenchmen, though
Commines states plainly that they were Normans, "the loosest
17and most profligate persons in all that country." Writing 
sometime after the fact, the blind poet Andre, a chief apol­
ogist of the first Tudor, tells of horsemen and foot and 
identifies their leader as Philibert de Chandee.18
Concerning this man, some few details do survive. He was
1 C Andrew R. Scoble, ed., The Memoirs of Philip de Commines . 
. . Containing the Histories of Louis XI and Charles VIII,
Kings of France and of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy . .
. {2 vols.; London: Henry G. Bohn, 1855-56), I, 397. Herein­
after cited as Commines, Memoirs.
16See Wilhelm Busch, England Under the Tudors, King Henry 
VII, trans. Alice M. Todd (Reprint, New YorJTi 3urt Franklin, 
n. d.), p. 19; Sir Charles Oman, The History of England from 
the Accession of Richard II to the Death of Richard III 
(London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), p.491;
and Paul Murray Kendall, Richard the Third (New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., 1956), p. 410. Busch sets the figure at some­
thing less than two thousand. Oman, who interestingly enough 
refers to the foreigners as both mercenaries and auxiliaries, 
puts it at 1,800. Kendall stipulates precisely two thousand.
17Commines, Memoirs, II, 65. See also J. D. Mackie, The 
Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952),
p. 51. Mackie indicates that a small Scots contingent may 
have fought at Bosworth on Henry's side.
18 /Bernard Andre, Historia Regis A Bernardo Andrea
Tholosate Conscripta; Necnon Alia Queadam Ad Eundem Regem 
Spectantia in Memorials of King Henry the Seventh, ed. James 
Gairdner (London: Longmans, Brown, Green, Longmans, and
Roberts, 1858), p. 25. Hereinafter cited as Historia Regis.
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apparently a Breton by birth and may have counted among his
19relations the powerful Dukes of Savoy. At the initial
landing at Milford Haven, prior to the advance through Wales
and the English Midlands, Chandee was knighted, presumably
by Henry himself. How he and his men performed at Bosworth
has not been recorded, but their assistance must have been
invaluable. The exact size of the contending armies has long
been a subject of debate, as no reliable contemporary account
of the battle was ever produced. Nonetheless, the consensus
of modern scholarship places the number of troops brought to
the engagement by Henry at approximately five thousand or
six thousand, while Richard III may have had twice that 
2 0amount. Thus Chandee1s command comprised a third or more 
of the pretender's array before it was joined, late in the
fray, by the additional five thousand or six thousand men of
21the phlegmatic Stanleys, who fortuitiously chose that
19G. E. Cokayne and Vicary Gibbs, eds., The Complete 
Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain and the 
United Kingdom Extant, Extinct or Dormant (13 vols.; London: 
The St. Catherine Press, 1910-40), II, 15 and n.
20One of the best and most readable accounts of the bat­
tle of Bosworth is to be found in Kendall, Richard the Third, 
Chap. XI.
21Lord Thomas Stanley, Constable of England under Rich­
ard III, was Henry Tudor's step-father, being the third hus­
band of Henry's mother. Lady Margaret Beaufort, Countess of 
Richmond. Lord Stanley's brother, Sir William, also held 
high office in Richard's government, holding— among other 
things— the Chief Justiceship of North Wales. Both Stanleys
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August day for reasons best known to themselves to gamble on 
the prospective rather than the actual king of England.
Evidence of Henry's satisfaction with the performance of 
his auxiliaries manifested itself within three months of his 
October coronation. On January 6, I486, in an action with­
out precedent in Tudor annals, the Breton adventurer, Phili­
bert de Chandee, was created Earl of Bath with 100 marks
22yearly out of the issues of Dorset and Somerset. This was 
the stuff of which the dreams of soldiers of fortune were
had pledged themselves to defend King Richard, but at Bos­
worth they refused to commit their forces until Richard had 
committed himself in person to attacking the Lancastrian 
lines. This done, the Stanleys betrayed their trust; they 
attacked Richard from the rear, enveloped him, and brought 
about his death. For details of the Stanleys' treachery 
see ibid.
2 2 The preamble to the letters patent, in which Chandee 
is styled 11 consanguinem nostrum" is reproduced in William 
Campbell, ed., Materials for A History of the Reign of Henry 
VII from Original Documents Preserved in the Public Record 
Office (2 vols.; London: Longmans and Co., Trubner and Co.,
1873-77), I, 246. A darker aspect of the history of the 
Norman auxiliaries is related by William Hutton, The Battle 
of Bosworth Field . . . (Birmingham: Pearson and Rollason,
1788), p. 17: the auxiliaries were "charged with bringing
over that dreadful scourge called the sweating sickness." 
From all accounts this unknown malady appeared towards the 
end of September, 1485, a month after Henry's triumph. It 
first appeared in London and spread from there through most 
of the realm. Symptoms included a foul-smelling sweat, high 
fever, and thirst. Highly contagious but of short duration, 
epidemics of sweating sickness were frequent in England until 
c. 1551, when the disease seems to have made its last appear­
ance. For further information see Busch, England Under the 
Tudors, King Henry VII, pp. 24, 323.
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made: a guaranteed income and, above all, that most signal 
honor, a peerage, both won on the strength of a good sword 
arm. Somewhat abruptly, though, the name of Philibert van­
ishes from view. He functioned briefly as ambassador for
Prance and was in residence for some undetermined length of
23time at the court in Greenwich in the winter of 1486-87. 
After that, nothing further is known, his title presumably 
becoming extinct at his death.^
Foreign soldiers figure prominently in the military
23Campbell, ed., Materials for A History of Reign of 
Henry VII, II, 193, 194, 195.
24 .A second possibility suggests itself. Chandee may
have forfeited his peerage. His native Brittany was an in­
dependent country, but at that time, it was involved in a 
losing struggle to prevent its absorption by France. Henry 
VII, despite his obvious debt to the government of the lat­
ter, was intent on aiding the Breton cause. Francis, Duke 
of Brittany, had been the first on the Continent to grant 
him sanctuary; but more to the point the fall of Brittany 
meant the extension of French power in a quarter most threat­
ening to England. Brittany, flanking the mouth of the Chan­
nel and jutting ominously towards the west, was as much a 
pistol aimed at the heart of England as ever were the Nether­
lands .
All Bretons did not, however, share Duke Francis' pas­
sion for freedom. There existed within his duchy a strong 
French party. Philibert de Chandee, since he was appointed 
French ambassador, must be presumed to have been a member of 
that party. Similarly, since Henry VII's active assistance 
on behalf of Breton independence began in 1487, it must again 
be presumed that his friendship with Chandee was of short 
duration. It was, as noted above, in the early days of 1487 
that mention of the new Earl of Bath ceases. For diplomatic 
relations and problems during the period, see R. B. Wernham, 
Before- the Armada: The Growth of English Foreign Policy,
1485-1558 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966), Chap. II. Herein-
after cited as Before the Armada.
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annals of the remainder of the reign, though curiously, fol­
lowing Henry’s success at Bosworth, the new dynast appears 
to have made but sparing use of them; for when mercenaries 
or auxiliaries are mentioned, they are almost always in the 
employ of the opposition, the supplanted Yorkist faction of 
the deceased Richard III.
Bosworth did not end the Wars of the Roses; rather it 
marked the beginning of the last phase of that civil conflict, 
the fortunes of which had oscillated back and forth in favor 
of one side and then the other for over thirty years. This 
fact was appreciated by the Yorkists, who almost immediately 
set to work in an attempt to win back that which had been 
wrested from them. Their hopes normally would have lain 
with a principal member of their house, either Elizabeth of 
York, daughter of Edward IV, or Elizabeth's cousin, the ten- 
year-old Earl of Warwick, son of Edward's brother, the Duke 
of Clarence. But Henry VII, to strengthen his own position, 
had, on taking the crown, married Elizabeth and placed War­
wick in the Tower. The Yorkists' ploy, since they lacked 
access to actual candidates of the first blood, was to manu­
facture them.
The first imposter was Lambert Simnel, a joiner’s son 
and the twelve-year-old prodigy of an Oxford priest named 
Symonds. Lambert was groomed to play the part of Warwick, 
who rumor had it had been privily murdered by Henry after
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the manner of Edward IV's heirs, the boy-king Edward V and
pChis brother, Richard of York. The plot was inspired by 
three staunch Yorkists, John de la Pole, Earl of Lincoln, 
Francis, Lord Lovell, and Margaret, widowed Duchess of Bur­
gundy and vengeful sister of the dead Richard III. Her dowa­
ger 's court in the Low Countries was probably where the Sim­
nel conspiracy was hatched, and it was certainly Margaret 
who served as broker in the hiring of the German captain, 
Martin Schwarz, and his two thousand landsknechts, who were 
sent to aid Simnel in the late spring of 1487.
Of this Schwarz little is known except that he was a
native of the free Imperial city of Nuremberg, a former shoe-
26maker, and a mercenary leader of some reputation. Certain
English commentators erroneously describe him as a Dutchman 
27of a Fleming, and Polydore Vergil, a native of Urbino and
25These two boys, better known perhaps as "the little 
princes in the Tower," were presumably dispatched in 1483 by 
their uncle, Richard of Gloucester, afterward Richard III.
This theory is still generally adhered to in historical cir­
cles, though two fascinating books, Kendall's Richard the 
Third and Josephine Tey's critically acclaimed "detective 
story," The Daugher of Time (London: The Macmillan Co.,
1952), have done much to rehabilitate the character of the 
last Yorkist king, while at the same time raising the possi­
bility that the first Tudor may have had a hand in the murders.
2 6Hans Delbruck, Geschichte der Kriegskunst (7 vols.; 
Berlin: G. Stilke, 1900-36), IV, Io7
27C. L. Kingsford, ed., Chronicles of London (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1905), p. 1947 Richard Turpyn, The Chronicle 
of Calais in the Reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII to the 
Year 1540, ed. John C. Nichols (London: Camden Society, XXXV,
1846), p. 1, Hereinafter cited as Chronicle of Calais.
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official historian to Henry VII, while emphatically stating 
that he and his men were German, makes the interesting obser­
vation that the latter were "rugged men of the mountain,"
thus raising the very real possibility that some at least 
28were Swiss. Whatever the case, these mercenaries sailed 
from the Netherlands to that hotbed of Yorkist affection, Ire­
land, where in May they joined Simnel and Symonds in Dublin, 
and from whence, strengthened by an undetermined force of wild 
rebel Irish, they spearheaded an invasion of England in early 
June.
The Yorkist host landed in Lancashire where it was met
by the retinue of a notorious sympathizer, Sir Thomas Brough- 
29ton, and from thence it proceeded to Yorkshire, the home of 
the cause, in the hope of rallying more to the standard. Few 
men came: Henry VII, long aware of the trouble brewing, had
already made a number of arrests, and the real Warwick had 
been paraded in London, revealing to the world the futility 
of the sham being attempted. But the Yorkist leaders, unde­
terred by their limited following and buoyed by the presence
2ftDenys Hay, trans. and ed., The Anglica Historia of 
Polydore Vergil, A. D. 1485-1537 (London: Camden Series,
LXXIV, 1950), p. 23. Hereinafter cited as Vergil, The 
Anglica Historia. One cannot be positive where Schwarz re­
cruited his troops on this occasion, but he generally drew 
on Swabia and the neighboring Swiss cantons for his men.
See Delbrtick, Geschichte der Kreigskunst, IV, 10.
29Vergil, The Anglica Historia, p. 23.
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of the mercenaries in their midst, pressed southward, resolv­
ing "to try the fortunes of war, recalling that two years 
earlier Henry, with a smaller number of soldiers, had conquered 
the great army of King Richard."^
The two armies met near Stoke on June 16. Almost nothing 
is known of the tactics employed or of the disposition of the 
combatants, though the official summary of the fight indicates
that the strength of the government troops was such that only
31one of Henry's three divisions or "battles" was sent into 
action: "For some time the struggle was fought with no advan­
tage to either side, but at last the first line of the king's 
army (which was alone committed to the fray and sustained the 
struggle) charged the enemy with such vigor that it at once 
crushed those hostile leaders who were still resisting."^2
The mercenaries and the Irish fought with desperate cour­
age. The latter under their captain, Lord Thomas Fitzgerald, 
were armed so lightly, having only knives and spears and no 
body armor, that they were fitter "to move wonder than to op­
pose good defenses and well ordered troops." Employed essen­
tially as skirmishers, they were the first to be overwhelmed. 
The Germans, as Vergil indentifies them, proved more resolute
See Glossary.
^2Vergil, The Anglica Historia, p. 23.
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"and yielded little to the English in valor . . * Kn They 
stood their ground, but in the end, their ranks decimated by 
hails of arrows and artillery fire, they too went down, fight­
ing fiercely almost to the last. What few of the enemy re­
mained fled the field, only to be ridden down and killed or 
captured: "of their leaders, John, Earl of Lincoln, Francis,
Lord Lovell, Thomas Broughton, the most bold Martin Schwartz, 
and the Irish captain, Thomas Geraldine were slain in that
o  *5place." As for Lambert Simnel and his mentor, Symonds, 
they were taken alive; but their lives were spared, the boy 
because he was held too young to bear the responsibility of 
his treason, Symonds because he was a priest.
After Stoke foreign troops next receive attention in 
connection with the second imposture of the reign, that of 
the Fleming, Perkin Warbeck. This young man was discovered 
at age seventeen by Yorkist partisans in Ireland, wither he 
had gone in 1491 in the service of a Breton merchant. Ap- 
proached by the mayor of Cork, he was persuaded after some 
initial hedging to impersonate Richard, Duke of York, young­
est of the murdered sons of Edward IV.
Warbeck was from the outset a more dangerous threat 
than Simnel had ever been. Handsome, aristocratic in bearing
33Lovell's corpse was never identified, giving rise to 
the conjecture that he somehow escaped the field. A skele­
ton found in a hidden room at his manor house at Minster 
Lovell in Oxfordshire in the eighteenth century may have 
been his.
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and possessed of a keen intelligence he successfully sustained 
the role of legitimate king of England for five years. Much 
of Europe fell under his spell , and at one time or another he 
was befriended by all the many troublesome princes who desired 
an end to Tudor rule. The Earls of Kildare and Desmond susr- 
tained his cause in Ireland,, until in the spring of 1492 he 
was invited with all the honor befitting his deception to 
France. There Charles VIII intended to use him as a counter
A  a
to the support then being supplied Brittany by Henry VII,
but the hazard to England was averted when, following Henry's
35invasion of France and the investiture of Boulogne, peace
3^See above p. 52, n. 24.
^ T h e  attack on France, such as it was, was not under­
taken until late 1492. Henry did not disembark in Calais 
until October 2, and he and his army of twenty-six thousand 
spent two weeks in further preparation before moving on 
Boulogne, which fortress was not attacked until the 22nd. 
Under normal circumstances the investitute of Boulogne would 
have been considered an act of the gravest provocation. How­
ever, the lateness of the season, the lukewarmness of the 
siege operations, and the fact that both sides had been seek­
ing a settlement since February served as proof that Henry's 
warlike notions were intended solely as a goad to peace.
The demonstration had the desired effect. Charles VIII, his 
Italian schemes looming ever larger on the horizon, agreed 
to Henry's principal demands, including payment of an indem­
nity of almost 1159,000 and the abandonment of Warbeck, and 
the Treaty of Etaples was signed on November 3, twelve days 
after the commencement of the siege. For bibliography re­
garding operations see Busch, England Under the Tudors,
Henry VII, p. 333. There is little at all to suggest the 
employment of foreign troops in this brief campaign except 
for reference to a payment of BIO earlier in the year to one 
Jacob van Walthuysen, a Dutch captain of 155 "men of war of 
Holland." See James R. Hooker, "Notes on the Organization
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was arranged at Etaples and Warbeck was expelled from the 
country ,
It was a frustrating setback for the counterfeit Duke 
of York, but at this juncture hardly critical. Across the 
frontier in Flanders, Margaret of Burgundy had everything in 
readiness, and Warbeck was publicly received as her nephew, 
son indeed of her dead brother, Edward IV. Through the dow­
ager's good offices a more dangerous champion was gained in 
the person of the emperor, Maximilian I. As an enemy of 
France and sometime ally of England during the Breton affair, 
Maximilian looked upon Henry V I I 1s negotiation of the Etaples 
agreement as a betrayal, so that he was more than eager to 
use Warbeck to repay the slight to his dignity. Money was 
found to outfit an expedition , and in midsummer, 1495, four­
teen ships and a small army led by the pretender sailed for 
the Kentish coast.
Few particulars survive regarding this operation. War- 
beck appeared off Deal on July 3 with a mixed following of 
English renegades, Imperial auxiliaries, and a few hundred 
mercenaries led by French and Spanish captains: "Here were
all nations and conditions of men, bankrupts, sanctuary men, 
thieves, robbers, vagabonds, and divers servants of
and Supply of the Tudor Military under Henry VII, "Hunting­
don Library Quarterly, XXIII (1959-60), 23.
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dishonest rebellion,"*^ Six hundred of these desperados were 
set ashore, while Perkin remained safely aboard ship. Cau­
tious to the point of indecision, a weakness fatal to would- 
be usurpers, he had high hopes of being welcomed as Richard 
IV: but his flight of fancy was short-lived. The mayor of 
Sandwich, having been alerted in advance of the landing, had 
the local militia in readiness and compelled the invaders to 
fight, slaying or capturing above a third of their number 
before the survivors made it back to their ships. Of those
siezed eight were captains, among them four or possibly five 
37Englishmen, one Frenchman, and two Spaniards, Don Fulano
38de Guevara and Diego el Coxo. Francis Bacon describes 
how the prisoners, yoked liked horses in harness, were drag­
ged to London where they were sentenced and afterwards exe­
cuted at divers spots along the southeast shore, their re­
mains being used "for seamarks or lighthouses to teach
■^Thomas Gainsford, The True and Wonderful History of 
Perkin Warbeck (London: E. G . , 1618), in The~Harleian
Miscellany: A Collection of Scarce, Curious, and Enter­
taining Pamphlets and Tracts . . . Selected from the Li­
brary of Edward Harley, Second Earl of Oxf ord . . . ., ed. 
Thomas Park (10 vols.; London: White and Co., et al., 1808-
1813), VI, 568.
37James Gairdner, ed., The Paston Letters, 1422-1509 
(6 vols.: London: Chato and Windus, 1904), III, 937.
38Spanish Calendar, I, No. 98. El Coxo ("the Lame") 
was the derisive name given Diego by his captors.
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OQPerkin's people to avoid the coast." Special attention 
was given the principal captains, the Englishmen no doubt, 
as well as one of the Spaniards and the Frenchman: they
were drawn and quartered at the beginning of September and 
their heads impaled on London Bridge.^®
Meanwhile, Warbeck had sailed for Ireland where the 
fiasco at Deal was completed. Part of his squadron, dis­
persed in a panic-stricken flight through the Channel, aban­
doned him, and an attempt to take Waterford in Munster was
repulsed with further serious losses among his international 
41recruits. After this defeat the pretender momentarily 
disappeared, only to resurface in November at Stirling in 
Scotland as the protege of James IV.
To Henry VII, Warbeck in Scotland constituted as grave 
a threat as Warbeck either in Ireland or on the Continent. 
The latter's benefactor, the king of Scots, was young, able, 
impetuous, and above all wedded to the goal of increasing 
Scottish influence in European affairs. The hegemony of 
England in the British Isles naturally rankled so ambitious
q gJ Francis Bacon, History of the Reign of King Henry VII 
in the Works of Francis Bacon, ed. Basil Montagu (3 vols.; 
Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1848), I, 355. Hereinafter
cited as Bacon, Works.
40Busch, England Under the Tudors; Henry VII, p. 96.
41A. F. Pollard, ed., The Reign of Henry VII from Con­
temporary Sources (3 volb.; London: Longmans, Green, and
Co. Ltd., 1913-14), III, 278.
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a monarch, with the result that no opportunity was lost by 
James in impressing upon Henry how far Warbeck's presence 
north of the Tweed could be used to suit Scottish interests.
Plans for an attack on England were laid almost immedi­
ately, with James in the role of allied and, therefore, aux­
iliary commander. He agreed to provide Warbeck with an army 
at Scots' expense^2 on the written understanding that when 
Perkin was victorious the town and castle of Berwick would be 
surrendered into Scottish hands and that "for the costs made 
on him" 50,000 marks would be delivered to James within two
A Oyears of his accession. Simultaneously, appeals for mili­
tary aid were lodged in France, the Empire, and the Nether­
lands, as clearly Warbeck and James hoped to mount a grand 
campaign; but sadly their pleas fell far short of expectation. 
Charles VIII had already embarked on his Italian adventure 
and had no intention of chancing an English attack on his un­
protected western front. A canvass of the Imperial court and 
the Netherlands provinces produced the same negative reaction, 
for the months immediately following the collapse of the Deal 
expedition had brought an almost complete reversal of the
Though it brought small return, James levied a charge 
on his subjects for the maintenance of Perkin's cause. Busch, 
England Under the Tudors, King Henry VII, p. 104. See also 
William Croft Dickinson, Scotland from Earliest Times to 1603 
(London and Edinburgh: Nelson, 1965), p. 244-45.
43Pollard, The Reign of Henry VII from Contemporary 
Sources, I, 138-39.
attitude of these states toward England. Each for its own 
purpose now sought to conciliate Henry VII, the emperor be­
cause he was committed with Venice, Milan, Spain, and the 
Papacy to a new Holy League to drive the French from Italy,
the Netherlands because of the crippling economic sanctions
44imposed on her trade in 1493.
In the end, in a skillful exercise of give and take, the 
continentals placated the English king by leaving James and 
Warbeck to their own devices, denying them the massive sup­
port in mercenaries, auxiliaries, and military supplies that 
they had hoped would be theirs for the asking. By the terms 
of the Intercursus Magnus, a commercial agreement signed in 
February, 1496, trade was resumed with the Netherlands in re­
turn for which that government agreed to in no way sustain 
Henry's enemies and to insist on the stringent enforcement of 
these provisions in the lands of the dowager duchess. It was 
not specifically mentioned in the treaty, but all knew that 
Warbeck and his confederates were encompassed in its language.
Maximilian was less inclined to forsake his former client 
nonetheless, the needs of the hour forced him to be practical.
44Because of the moral support given Warbeck by the 
Netherlands and the Empire and the mercenaries and auxil­
iaries provided him through the Flanders ports, Henry VII 
had prohibited all trade with the Low Countries. This had 
proven extremely damaging to the Imperialists, but more par­
ticularly to the Flemish cloth industry whose chief supplier 
of unfinished woollens was England.
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He had neither the men nor the means to spare for subsidising
Warbeck. Habitual wars had insured a chronically empty Haps-
burg purse, and in the end good common sense persuaded him
that France, not England, was his real enemy. In exchange
for Henry VII's adhesion to the Holy League which Henry joined
45xn September, 1496, Maximilian grudgingly abandoned Warbeck.
Characteristically, even though all hope of foreign back­
ing was gone and his councillors raged against the stranger 
in their midst, the chivalrous James stood by his undespair- 
ing guest. The king of Scots may have genuinely believed War­
beck to have been the authentic Duke of York, for in truth he 
treated him well. James gave him a yearly pension of £1200 
and married him to his own kinswomen. Lady Catherine Gordon, 
daughter of the Earl of Huntly.
The long-awaited campaign against England was finally 
gotten underway in mid-September, 1496. Needless to say, it 
fell considerably short of the great crusade envisioned dur­
ing the planning stages of the past winter and spring. The 
whole people and baronage of Scotland were opposed to the 
enterprise, with the result that the army, if such it can be 
called, which James and Warbeck mustered at Ellam Kirk within 
ten miles of the borden consisted of scarcely fourteen
—
For the background of events leading up to the sign­
ing and Maximilian'is part in the proceedings see Busch, Eng­
land Dnder the Tudors, King Henry VII, pp. 124-27.
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hundred men "of all manner of nations but chiefly of poorly 
disciplined borderers and a few Yorkist Englishmen who had 
followed Perkin into Scotland. Of the non-British element, 
only one company can be identified, that of Rodyk de la Lane,
who came "out of Flanders with two small ships" and sixty Ger-
46mans. It was hardly a force with which to conquer a king­
dom, though undeniably its leaders were disposed to think 
that once in England a popular rising on Warbeck's behalf 
would sweep Henry from his throne. No such rising material­
ized, and except for the foreign component in the army, there 
was little to set apart the undertaking from any other fron­
tier raid. It was over in three days; Warbeck and James quar­
relled over the excessive depredations of the Scots auxilia­
ries, who distinguished themselves in burning and looting be­
fore recrossing the border well in advance of the four thou­
sand English troops sent north from Carlisle to intercept
47them.
It was not appreciated at the time, but this impudent 
and miserable incursion into English territory proved War- 
beck's undoing. Henry VII, safe in the friendship of his 
continental neighbors, was free at last to concentrate his
Pollard, The Reign of Henry VII from Contemporary 
Sources, I, 136, 138, 140.
^James Gairdner, Henry the Seventh (London and New 
York: Macmillan and Co. , 1892) , pp. 117-18.
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considerable energies on ending the threat from Scotland.
On September 25, four days after the invaders had recrossed
the Tweed, he issued a proclamation declaring that a state of
war now existed between the two kingdoms; £>120,000 in taxes
and £>40,000 in loans were voted for its prosecution; and two
armies, one by land and the other by sea, were ordered to be
48made ready for an offensive in the summer of 1497.
In the interim, the collection of supplies in England
proved hardly popular. Among the men of Cornwall there were
murmerings "that for a little stir of the Scots soon blown
49over" they were being ground down by payments. Led by 
Michael Joseph, a blacksmith, and Thomas Flammock, a lawyer, 
the West Countrymen decided on a demonstration rather than a 
rebellion and marched, fifteen thousand strong, in May, 1497, 
towards London to demand exemption from their taxes and re­
moval of those ministers who had so evilly advised the king.
It was a dangerous situation, more so as the Scots themselves 
were girding for the war which had been declared against them.
Henry had been caught unaware by the Cornish outbreak, 
but he could not afford to parley with contumacious subjects 
in arms. With internal security and the safety of the
^H ,  A. L, Fisher, The History of' England- from the' Ac­
cession of Henry VIT to the' Death: of'' Henry VIII (.London: 
Longmans, Green, and Co,T 1913), pp. 68-69, Hereinafter 
cited as' History of England.
49Bacon, Works, I, 360.
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northern frontier at stake, he quickly concentrated an over­
whelming force about London. An army, already enroute to the 
north, was recalled, and the gentry of the home counties were 
mustered. Finally, on June 16, as the protestors lay below 
the city of Blackheath, Henry launched a sudden attack which 
overran their defences. Two thousand West Countrymen died in 
the onslaught, while the captured survivors were held to ran­
som by the victors. Of their leaders, Joseph, Flammock, and
50James, Baron Audley, were executed. Henry pardoned the re­
mainder, moved perhaps by the slaughter on the heath or, as 
Bacon would have it, because "he made a great difference be­
tween people that did rebel upon wantonness and them that did
51rebel upon want."
With the West Country restored to obedience, attention 
was once more riveted on Scotland where with untoward slowness 
James IV and Warbeck prepared to exploit the Cornish trouble 
with one last assault on Henry's throne. For this purpose War­
beck was sent into Ireland where it was expected he could 
rally a force for the White Rose and lead it into England.
James, meanwhile, would try to coordinate the landing by lead-
52ing another army of auxiliaries across the border.
50Audley was a desitute peer whom Flammock and Joseph had 
recruited during their passage through Somerset.
51Bacon, Works, I, 363.
52 .......Busch, England Under the Tudors, King Henry VIX-, p. 144.
68
It was another grand scheme doomed to failure, for al-
ready it would seem that the Scottish king was at pains to be
rid of this pensioner on whom he had showered so much atten­
tion at great expense and for such small return. There were 
rumors that all was not well between the two troublemakers, 
and it is to be suspected that when Warbeck took ship for
Cork at the beginning of July, James was not sad to see him 
53go. Everywhere enthusiasm for the "Duke of York" had waned,
even in Ireland where the imposter found there were few Irish­
men to be had. Kildare and Desmond, the rebel earls who had 
befriended him at the beginning of his odyssey, had gone over 
to Henry, and Sir James Ormond, the turbulent war chief who
had solicited his coming on this occasion, was dead, slain in
54a brawl with the feuding Butlers.
How many men joined Warbeck in Ireland is uncertain. In 
two dispatches Rairaondo de Soncino, the Milanese envoy in Eng­
land, makes mention first of "eighty savage Irishmen" and 
later of "about three hundred persons of various nationali­
ties," 55 among whom was a Spanish veteran of wars in the Low 
Countries, Don Pedro de Guevara, who might well have been
53Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, p. 144.
54 .Gaxrdner, Henry the Seventh, pp. 130-^31.
55 ......Allen B. Hinds, ed., Calendar of State Papers' and Manu­
scripts,' Existing in the Archives and Collections of Milan 
(London; H. M. Stationery Office, 1912), Nos. 325, 327. 
Hereinafter cited as Milan Calendar.
the brother of that Pulano de Guevara who had died in London
56for his part in the Deal landing of 1495. If this be the
case, Don Pedro and the other foreigners, who are described
57as having "followed [Perkin] for some time before," may have 
been the remnant of that mercenary and auxiliary force with 
which, after the repulse at Deal, Warbeck had attacked Water­
ford, and which on the latter defeat had been stranded in Ire­
land. Whatever the case, Warbeck's reception in Ireland was 
poor: a price had been placed on his head, and he and his
retinue had to be surreptitiously smuggled out of Kinsale har-
C Obor aboard three Spanish merchantmen lest the inhabitants 
of the district cut their throats and claimed the bounty on 
their skins. A course was set for Cornwall, and on September 
7, nearly two months after leaving Scotland, Warbeck and his 
company put ashore in Whitesand Bay.
The delay in Ireland cost Warbeck dearly. He had gained 
no army; but more hurtful, he had frustrated his only worth­
while confederate, James IV, in the latter1s attempt at a simul­
taneous demonstration in the north. As agreed at Warbeck's
"^Concerning Don Pedro, see Busch, England Under the Tu­
dors, King Henry VII, p. 115; see also Spanish Calendar, I,
No. 98.
^  Milan Calendar, I, No. 327.
58Busch, England Under the Tudors, King Henry VII, pp. 
115^16. There is some question as to the nationality of these 
vessels. Busch describes them as Spanish merchantmen, while 
Mackie,' The Earlier Tudors, p. 144, refers to one as a Breton 
pinnace.
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departure, James had waited some weeks, and then, when he
might reasonably have expected his ally to be ready to take
the field, he advanced on Norham Castle in the East March
59while his scourers laid waste the countryside. Forced to 
retreat before the superior army of the Earl of Surrey, his 
kingdom was invaded, and many strong towers and castles be­
tween Coldstream and Ayton were pulled down, all before War­
beck had made his move. Small wonder that James withdrew his 
support: negotiations for ending the war with England were
immediately begun and were successfully concluded by the sign­
ing of a seven years' truce on September 30.6^
Left to his own devices in Cornwall and deprived at last 
of foreign aid, Warbeck's luck soon ran out, though one final 
merry chase was needed to bring him to bay. The West Country, 
still chafing under the exactions of Henry's assessors, had 
enough dissidents to risk their lives again in a cause which 
held out the possibility of financial relief. Eight thousand 
rallied for an attempt on Exeter, but as with Warbeck's pre­
vious military undertakings, his demonstration was contemptible 
in the extreme. Two days of shouting at the defenders and
CQBacon, Works, I, 363; Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, 
p. 147. “
60Fisher, History of England, p. 73. The initial agree­
ment was extended on December 5 to the lifetime of the two 
sovereigns, and in July, 1499, "until one year after the death 
of him who should survive the longer."
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prying at the gates of the city with crow bars accomplished 
nothing/ and with four hundred dead he marched off to nearby 
Taunton towards which loyalist forces were hurrying in relief. 
At this place his courage failed him. On the eve of the in­
tended attack on the town he rode secretly from camp and in a 
vain attempt tried to reach the coast. Tracked to Beaulieu 
Abbey in Hampshire by the horsemen of the king, he surrendered, 
throwing himself on Henry's mercy. A public confession and 
Henry's generosity saved his life, but only for the moment.
Held under easy house arrest for almost a year he attempted to 
escape in June, 1498, after which he suffered stricter con­
finement in the Tower. A second try for freedom involving the 
still imprisoned Earl of Warwick sealed his fate, and on No­
vember 23, 1499, he was hanged, drawn, and quartered a week 
after his public trial at Whitehall.^
Warbeck was twenty-five years old when he died. He had 
been a cunning and resourceful challenger for Henry's crown 
but, as the record shows, too timid a leader to have ever made 
a success of the charade he attempted. While the forces at 
his disposal, in particular the mercenary and auxiliary levies
®^For good accounts of the operations at Exeter, Warbeck's 
flight, and his subsequent capture, see Bacon, Works, I, 365-70, 
and Busch, England Under the Tudors, King Henry VII, pp. 116-21. 
Sad to say no mention is made of the fate of the foreigners, 
though one must assume that if they fell into loyalist hands 
they were executed, as this had been the end reserved for those 
taken in 1495. See above, p. 60.
supplied by the Imperialists and the Scots, were not numerous 
or for that matter proficient, more able men in similar circum­
stances had achieved their purpose with less. On the question
of foreign troops some writers have queried Warbeck1s wisdom
fi 2in utilizing them at all. The implication is that he would 
have been more readily supported had he forgone their use en­
tirely and relied wholly on his appeal to the English. Such 
reasoning is but empty rhetoric, since it confers on the pre­
tender a popularity far in excess of that which he actually 
enjoyed. Similarly it ignores what was, and long has been, 
common practice among usurpers of the English crown, namely 
that from Hengist to Henry VII those who would make themselves 
king had accepted relief from whatever quarter it could be 
obtained.
It is strange, however, that after Bosworth instances of 
foreign soldiers in Henry VII's service are both hard to find 
and difficult to substantiate. There is no question that he 
used them, but apparently only sparingly and as specialists.
The instance of the Dutch captain, Jacob van Walthuysen, and 
his band of 155 men of war has already been cited; and 
Andre, in an obscure passage of his Historia Regis, relates 
that in August, 1508, there was a band of Germans in the
®2Bacon, Works, I, 354; Fisher, History of England, p. 68.
See above, p. 58, n. 35.
country and that they were sent on some unknown errand by the 
king. Unquestionably the Dutchmen were mercenaries, but the
status of the Germans is less clear since Andre provides no
64clue. Most probably they too were mercenaries, though the 
possibility exists that they were merely transients blown 
ashore, as were so many wayfarers, in that age of sail; for
certain it is that in 1508 Henry VII had little need of for­
eign troops. England was at peace with herself and the world. 
Only in Italy, where Pope Julius II was urging the destruction 
of Venice, were war clouds threatening.
That the first Tudor should in fact have shied away from 
the use of alien conscripts is understandable. He had, after
all, campaigned at Bosworth as king of England, and his Eng­
lish subjects could not have been expected to take kindly to 
policing by continental hirelings. On the other hand, it is 
too much to presume that a progressive monarch like Henry 
would have dispensed with foreign soldiers entirely. He there­
fore did maintain a few mercenaries from time to time, if only
65like the French gunfounders he employed in the Weald, to
64Andre, Historia Regis, p. 27. The pertinent text reads 
as follows: "Rex autem magnum Teutonum numerum, nescio quorsum
hujus mensis initio misit cum apparatu bellico, Hevetiorum more
A number of these have been identified in an illuminat­
ing article by H. Schubert, "The First Cast-Iron Cannon Made in 
England," The Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, CXLVI 
(1946), 131~40, among tHem Patrick de la Mote, an appointee of 
Richard III. Not only was la Mote retained by Henry; he was
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serve as an example and an inspiration to native practitioners 
of the military arts.
Nonetheless, it is with the reign of his son and succes­
sor, Henry VIII, that one finds the first mass exploitation 
of mercenaries and auxiliaries by a Tudor. The second Henry, 
the most remarkable man, in Pollard's estimation, who ever 
wore the English crown, came to the throne in April, 1509, 
just two months prior to his eighteenth birthday. He ruled 
England for thirty-eight years, during which time he engaged 
in three wars with France, wars which in their sterility and 
high expenditure bankrupted the nation and marred an other­
wise brilliant reign. In none were England's essential in­
terests ever served, while in each, as is universally conceded,
Henry was used as a cat's paw to secure advantages for his
• 66 principal allies, Spain and the Hapsburg Empire.
promoted to the office of chief "'canoner' or master founder 
and surveyor and maker of all the King's cannon in the Tower 
of London and elsewhere." Two other Frenchmen, Theobald 
Ferrount and Gland Pyroo were assigned to him as assistants, 
while shortly after 1490 three of their countrymen, Pierre 
Roberdes and Simon and Blasius Byllard, "gunners of the Tower 
of London," were employed as founders in and around the Ash­
down Forest in Sussex. Another Frenchman, John Stile, oper­
ated a forge near Hartfield to the north of Ashdown, and it 
was near Newbridge within the forest itself that the first 
iron cannon were cast in 1508 by yet another Frenchman, 
Pauncelett Symart, who remained at his foundry in the Weald 
until 1511.
The best military history of the reign is still the 
brief summary provided by Oman, The Art of War in the Six­
teenth Century, pp. 285-357. The French aspect of Henry 
VIII's first French war has been admirably covered by
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Contrary to the recent assertion that the second Tudor
6 7made only modest use of alien troops , the fact is that Henry
VIII enlisted foreigners by the thousands. True, most were
used on the Continent, and none were employed in England or
against Scotland, France's pugnacious ally, until 1545; but
the impressive revalation is that in all of Henry VIII's wars
"the only engagements during his reign at which they were not
present were . . . Flodden and Solway Moss," both of which
6 8were fought with makeshift northern levies. Five hundred
German mercenaries, the first foreign troops ever to serve the
second Tudor, accompanied the Marquis of Dorset on the ill-
69fated Spanish expedition in 1512. From that time up to the 
end of the reign the numbers of "soldiers strangers" utilized 
by Henry increased until for the defence of captured Boulogne 
and the intimidation of the Scots he sought to retain them by 
the tens of hundreds at a time.
Those mercenaries and auxiliaries obtained at the begin­
ning of the reign were almost exclusively landsknecht pikemen
Cruickshank, Army Royal. No monographs have yet been attempted 
on the later wars, though the accounts of Fisher, History of 
England, Chap. IX and pp. 454-71; Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, 
pp. 267-85, 402-10; and Wernham, Before the Armada, Chaps. VIII 
and XII can be read profitably.
a 7See above, p. 45 and n. 6.
6 8Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 288.
69On their recruitment see L. & P., I, pt. 1, No. 1146.
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and heavy cavalry; but for his last military foray Henry showed
keen interest in supplementing these with arquebusiers and
light cavalry. Pikemen and men-at-arms were recruited mainly
in the Germanies and the Low Countries, while light horsemen,
acquired initially in the same territories, were increasingly
sought following the siezure of Boulogne among the bands of
Italian and Spanish free lancers and among the exiled Albanian
70and Greek stradiots. Those soldiers equipped with firearms
were invariably Italians or Spaniards, though in consequence
of the changing tactics in the Great Italian Wars of which
Henry's continental jaunts were but extensions, each company
of landsknechts contained a definite quota of arquebusiers,
71the figure increasing as the reign progressed.
The employment of such specialists attests to the obvious 
deficiencies of Henry's own national force. The English army 
lacked pikemen; it lacked handgunners; and it was almost to­
tally deficient in heavy horse. As to the actual numbers of 
foreigners utilized by Henry VIII, the sources, while not en­
tirely satisfactory, fairly bulge with information. The Eng­
lish army which invaded France in 1513 totalled about twenty- 
four thousand men. These were joined by approximately seven
^®These were the famous "Albanoyes horsemen" on whose 
history see below, pp. 169 ff.
71The rise and development of the landsknecht is re­
counted below, Chap. III.
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72thousand mercenaries, of which six thousand were "Almain 
pikemen” and the remainder "Burgundian horse," that is, heavy 
cavalry raised in the Netherlands patrimony of the Hapsburg 
dukedom of Burgundy. Seven thousand mercenaries out of a to­
tal force of thirty-one thousand can scarcely be termed a mod­
est number, considering the size of early Tudor armies. Rela­
tive to total strength, in 1513 foreigners comprised between 
one-quarter and one-fifth of that English army which forced 
the surrender of Therouanne and Tournay and which drove the 
chivalry of Prance from the field in the farcical Battle of 
the Spurs.
Henry's second war with France, "one of the most purpose­
less and unnecessary contests" in which England ever engaged, 
began in 1522, the major thrust coming in 1523 when the king's 
brother-in-law, the Duke of Suffolk, led an invasion force as 
far as Montidier. This was the deepest incursion into French 
territory by an English army since the close of the Hundred 
Years' War, so it is unfortunate that there is much less reli­
able information about this exercise than the earlier and 
later expeditions of the reign. Nevertheless, the strength 
of the invaders, including contingents from the garrisons at
^Dr. John Taylor, the king's chaplain and clerk of Par­
liament, left a diary of this campaign. He placed the number 
of mercenaries at eight thousand. See L. &, P ., I, pt- 2, 1058.
^3Fisher, History of England, p. 240.
6
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Hammes, Guisnes, and Calais, can be safely fixed at around 
fourteen thousand, which host, in accordance with an agreement 
signed by the Imperialist commissioners at Valladolid, was sup­
plemented by three thousand auxiliary foot and a similar number 
of auxiliary horse provided at the expense of Margaret of Savoy,
mm «
Governess of the Netherlands. Suffolk would have had several 
thousand more had not his ally, Charles V, diverted them for 
the use of the French rebel, Charles of Bourbon, whose failure 
to effect a juncture with the English led to the demoralization 
of the invaders and the abandonment of the campaign. Six thou­
sand men out of a combined strength of twenty thousand: hardly
75an awesome figure but almost a third of the allied army.
The great undertaking of Henry VIII.'s last years was the 
aborted "Enterprise of Paris," an overly ambitious scheme aimed 
at nothing less than the destruction of France. Attempted in
^Margaret of Savoy was the daughter of Maximilian I and 
aunt of his successor, Charles V. The treaty against France 
which placed upon her the burden of providing these troops is 
outlined in L. £ P ., III, pt. 2, No. 3149.
75During the previous year, in 1522, an undetermined num­
ber of foreigners participated in the Earl of Surrey's vicious 
but inconsequential raid through the French district of Picardy. 
One veteran of this and the later French campaigns, in alluding 
to those foreigners who served in 1522, leaves no doubt that 
they too were auxiliaries; for he writes of them that "the King 
of England did not have to pay any of the cost . . . ." Elis 
Gruffyd, "Suffolk's Expedition to Montdidier," trans. M. B. 
Davie?,Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Fouad I University,
VII (1944)”, 437
the summer of 1544 in conjunction with Charles V, the project 
called for a simultaneous invasion of France, the Imperialist 
forces to drive west through Champagne, the English forces 
south through Picardy. Both monarchs in accord with the sched­
ule worked out between them were to effect a meeting on the 
Marne and then make a combined assault on the Franch capital 
where the spoils of war were to be divided between them,
French Burgundy to Charles and the remainder, including the 
French crown, to Henry. In the end, since neither monarch 
advanced more than a few miles inside French territory, the 
trophies obtained fell considerably short of the heady claims 
of the confederates. The emperor withdrew from the war by 
the September Peace of Crepy, renouncing in the process all 
title to Burgundy and engaging with the French king, Francis 
I, to unite in defending Christendom against the Turk. Mean­
while Henry, to assuage his martial pride, satisfied himself 
with the useless conquest of Boulogne, which fortress he com­
mitted himself to defend until a face-saving formula allowing
7 6for its eventual return to France could be worked out in 1546.
During those two years of ruinous war, from the first in­
vasion to the cessation of hostilities, England assembled 
what was certainly the largest and most cosmopolitan army ever
76sy the terms of the Treaty of Ardres or Camp, as it is 
variously known, Henry agreed to return Boulogne to France in 
1554 in return for 2,000,000 crowns.
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raised by a Tudor. Forty-two thousand men participated in 
the initial operations resulting in the taking of Boulogne.
Of these fully ten thousand were foreigners, the largest con­
tingents being auxiliaries, six thousand foot and horse sup­
plied by the Imperialists, The bulk of these were employed 
in the subsidiary siege of neighboring Montreuil, an almost 
theatrical affair which served to cover Henry*s main offen­
sive at Boulogne, and as anticipated, all were recalled to
the Netherlands within days of the emperor’s entente with 
77France.
The loss of the auxiliaries cut deeply into English effec­
tiveness, and the withdrawal of the Imperialists could have 
proved fatal, as France was now free to concentrate all her 
resources against the invader. But the over-caution of Fran­
cis I and the availability of mercenaries combined to pre­
serve at least the illusion of victory for Henry. No precise 
estimate of these latter troops is possible for the last 
phase of this war, though it was far in excess of the four 
thousand or so involved in the capture of Boulogne. In truth 
between October, 1544, and the Treaty of Camp which ended
77The part played by the mercenaries and auxiliaries 
during the Boulogne campaign is treated in detain below, pp. 
256 ff.
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78formal hostilities in June, 1546, so many were retained,
both for service in France and against the Scots, that there
were times, as in the summer of 1545, when express orders
79were issued that no more should be hired.
In the quest for mercenaries Henry's agent scoured all 
Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, Few, if any, of 
their spawning grounds were missed: Denmark, the Hanse towns
of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck; the duchies of Mecklenberg, 
Luneburg, Cleves, Wurttemberg, and Brabant; the counties of 
Flanders, Artois, and Hainault; Friesland, Holland, Gelder- 
land; and a score of Imperial cities, chief among them Aachen, 
Cologne, Frankfurt, and Metz, In addition Henry had his 
special agents in Italy, the best known being the Englishmen, 
Edmund Harvel, who doubled as ambassador to the Venetian Doge. 
Four others were Italian condottieri, among them the notorious 
bravo, Ludovico da l'Armi, nephew of one cardinal, Lorenzo
Despite the terms of the peace, the agreement of Camp, 
at least as regards Boulogne, was hardly honored, and the gar 
rison there was under almost constant threat of attack until 
1550 when the fortress was ceded to the French for 400,000 
crowns.
79 (B. M.) Harl. MSS. 283, f. 305.
80Campeggio, and terror of another, Reginald Pole,, detested
cousin of Henry. VIII, opponent of the English Reformation,
81and supporter of Catholic orthodoxy.
As will be shown in the analysis of Henry’s last French 
war, the which will be used to illustrate the extent of Eng-' 
land's reliance upon foreign troops, the hunt for soldiers 
of fortune was not always successful. Contracts made with 
rapacious captains were easily broken; princes in distant cor- 
ners of Europe were reluctant to grant passports for the tran- 
sit of unruly men of war through their dominions; and in the 
case of auxiliaries, allies were as easily lost as won. Fi­
nally, England hardly had a monopoly on war: competition for
the hire of mercenaries was rife, for despite the Hapsburg- 
Valois reconciliation the Boulonnais was not the: only battle­
ground in the West. In the Germanies alone, even before the 
signing of the Treaty of Crepy, a dozen petty conflicts raged, 
as Lutherans and Catholics sparred for advantage in a series 
of preliminary bouts that were to culminate in the Schmalkaldic
8 0Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggio had sat in judgement on 
Catherine of Aragon at the initiation of Henry's divorce pro­
ceedings in 1528. He incurred the wrath of the king by post- 
poning a decision, thus allowing the case to be translated to 
Rome where it was eventually decided, though too late, in 
Catherine's favor.
81On the extraordinary career of da l'Arrai' see below, 
pp. 344-52 and Appendix B.
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82War, Nevertheless, even in the face of such impediments, 
Henry's liberality attracted stipendiaries in droves, with the 
result that around Boulogne and the Calais Pale he had in his 
army "many depraved brutish foreign soldiers from all nations 
under the sun— . . . Scots, Spaniards, Gascons, Portingals, 
Albanians, Greeks, Turks, Tartars, Almains, Germans, Burgun­
dians, Flemings"— all of whom, in the estimate of one dour 
Welshman who was forced to serve with them, came "to have a
good time under the king of England, who by nature was too
83hospitable to foreigners."
This was a harsh, though entirely justified, indictment. 
Henry VIII did, as a rule, treat mercenaries far better than 
his native conscripts; and for good reason. In the absence 
of a standing army and without reliable allies, he was depend 
dent upon them, since beyond his Yeomen of the Guard and Gen­
tlemen Pensioners they were the only professionals constantly 
available to him. Besides, any man like Henry VIII, who in­
dulged in the fancy that by waging war he could be the arbiter 
of Europe, was in need of all the help he could muster,
82The Schmalkaldic War (1546-1555) was the first of the 
several wars of religion which, with little pause, kept Eu­
rope in turmoil until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
83Elis. Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," 
trans. M. S. Davies, .Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Fouad I 
University,- XII (1950) , p, 14-15*,
CHAPTER III
THE LANDSKNECHT: ORIGIN, RECRUITMENT, AND ORGANIZATION
A landsknecht thrown out of paradise 
cannot get into hell because he would 
make the devil afraid.
Sixteenth-century French proverb.
Of the mercenaries and auxiliaries who served Henry VIII, 
the overwhelming majority were Germans, and of these the pre­
ponderant number were landsknechts. This fact says much for 
the veritable revolution which had transformed the face of 
continental warfare even before the beginning of the Tudor 
century. For a thousand years following the collapse of Rome/ 
battlefields in the West had been dominated by the aristocra­
tic and heavily armored knight on horseback. But during the 
late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that domination had 
been ended, as first the Swiss and later the German peasant 
had unleashed on an unsuspecting nobility the dreadful power 
of the phalanx reborn, an infantry formation against which no 
cavalry in Europe could prevail.
While the origin of the Swiss pikeman has been carefully 
documented,1 the genesis of his counterpart, the German lands­
knecht, is somewhat obscure, though it is generally agreed
1For a brief but solid account see Beeler, ed., The Art 
of War in the Middle Ages, Chap. V.
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that the latter was ultimately the creation of that famous
King of the Romans and later Holy Roman Emperor,. Maximilian I,
Hardly a consistently successful commander r-in«chief, Maxir*
milian was nevertheless capable of learning from his enemies..
This he demonstrated early in his career when, as acting-Duke 
2of Burgundy, he adopted the Swiss tactics of the Netherlands 
ish rebels to defeat them.
Heretofore, Hapsburg armies had been the laughing stock 
of Europe. Now a new army was born, the soul of which was 
formed of infantry pikemen recruited in the Hapsburg domin- 
ions in south Germany. In 1486, Maximilian had two regiments 
skilled in the Swiss tactics in the field, each numbering be^ 
tween three thousand and four thousand strong. They had been 
trained by a Swiss captain, and significantly in this year, 
for the first time, the name Landsknechte appeared to describe 
them. They were not "lance soldiers;" nor were they "servants 
of the land," as some have called them to distinguish them from 
the Swiss Gebirgsknechten or "servants of the mountains."
What percisely was originally understood by the term
Maximilian was not elected emperor until 1493. He had 
become ruler of Burgundy in 1477 by his marriage to Mary, 
daughter of Charles the Bold. However, the title of duke 
automatically devolved at birth on their son, Philip the Hand­
some, and on Mary's death in 1482 a struggle developed be­
tween Maximilian and his opponents in the Netherlands for 
control of the regency.
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3Landsknechte is still a subject of considerable debate, . but 
what is certain is that before the end of -the fifteenth cen^ 
tury it was employed exclusively to describe those soldiers 
who were trained and fought after the manner of the Swiss*
In copying the arms and to some extent the organization 
of the Swiss, Maximilian laid the foundation of that awesome 
German infantry which did such effective service in Italy 
and elsewhere for his grandson, Charles V* Yet the creation 
of the landsknechts was not without its disadvantages * Once 
they had achieved the efficiency of the Swiss, they like the 
Swiss found themselves in great demand. They adopted the 
mercenary habits of the Swiss and frequently took, service 
with the enemies of their country* Too, the recruitment of 
landsknechts was never the sole privilege of the emperor, as 
in fact, except when there was an Imperial pronouncement to 
the contrary, those subjects who held directly of the emperor 
claimed the right, by ancient custom and the constitution of 
the Reich, to enter foreign employment and to recruit unlimited
3Delbriick, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, IV, 9-10, points 
out that the word Landsknechte was not new to the German vo­
cabulary , that it had been inuse in both High and Low Germany 
from at least the beginning of the fifteenth century and 
could be variously translated to mean bailiff, marshal, court 
messenger, or policeman. He further suggests that Maximilian 
deliberately chose a confusing term to obscure his real pur­
pose, the establishment of a military force which would 
strengthen his position as King of the Romans.
4numbers for the same service. But Imperial pronouncement
or no, the mercenary predilection of the landsknechts was
such that wherever war was waged they were invariably found
in the ranks of the belligerents.
More than the Swiss, their most serious competitors in
the mercenary market, the Germans lacked a permanent politic
5cal commitment. At least the Swiss, after 1516, tended to 
serve but one master, France. The landsknechts, however, re« 
mained free agents, bound to no one in particular and to all 
who could afford them. As Germans they were tied perhaps to 
a particular territory but not to a political community, for 
unlike the Gebirgsknechten they were "singularly indifferent 
about their nationality:" "We care little about the Holy 
Roman Empire," runs a line from one of their ribald songs.
4Friedrich Blau, Die Deutschen Landsckiechte (Gbrlitz:
C. U. Starke, 1882), p. 14.
CThe year 1516 marked the signing of the "perpetual 
peace" of Freiburg, concluded some months after the battle 
of Marignano in which the Swiss suffered terrible losses at 
the hands of the French. This agreement created a special 
relationship between Switzerland and France which lasted un-r 
til after the French Revolution. Gabriel Daniel, Kistoire 
de la Milice Franpoise (2 vols,; Paris: Jean-Baptiste Coig-
nard, 1721), II, 287-90, traces in broad outline the early 
history of this relationship. Sir Sibbald Scott, in his 
history of The British Army (3 vols.; London: Cassell, Petter, 
and Galpin, iS’68-̂ 80) , I"J TZ4, includes a quote from the Revue 
Militaire Swiss (June 1856) which states that between 1477 
and 1830 "750,000 Swiss fought and spilled their blood" in 
the service of France. More recently Mockler, Mercenaries, 
p. 103, makes the claim that "Over a million Swiss served in 
the French army from the time of Louis XI to that of Louis XVI.
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g"Whether it perishes today or tomorrow is all the same to us."
Only in unusual circumstances, such as in civil war, did 
the Swiss take up arms against each other; for it was the pol­
icy of the confederated cantons that their troops never be
7contracted to both sides in any conflict. Time and again 
Maximilian and Charles V decreed that landsknechts would not 
take service abroad, and those who ignored the ban and were 
unlucky enough to be caught suffered, and expected to suffer, 
the supreme penalty. Nevertheless, throughout the sixteenth 
century the lure of foreign gold proved forever irresistible. 
But in the landsknechts' defence let it be said that their 
lack of national conscience was but a mirror of the state of 
things in Germany, a country which at this time was among the 
most heterogeneous in Europe. Rent by political faction and 
divided in faith, it was both unwilling and unable to provide 
a place for the landsknechts as national soldiers. Small 
wonder then that their ultimate commitment was generally to 
themselves.
As the mercenary habit was so deeply ingrained in the 
landsknechts, it was comparatively easy, providing resources 
were available, to recruit them. In fact any sixteenth-cen­
tury ruler engaged in war could expect to be deluged by
^Quoted in Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 99.
7 William Robertson, History of the Reign of Charles V 
(2 vols.; London: George Routledge and Co., 1857), I, 266.
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offers to provide troops from German captains who were either 
unemployed or dissatisfied with their current assignments. 
Typical was the letter received by Henry VIII in 1545 follow­
ing the occupation of Boulogne:
Henry, Lord of Duren, esq., offers His Ma­
jesty the King of England, Prance, and Ireland 
etc. to lead in His Majesty's service six hun­
dred fighting horsemen, men of war and of service, 
which he will levy in the country of Ostland and 
surrounding districts upon such letter of re­
tainer as His Majesty had given the horsemen in 
the charge of Christopher van Prysborch [Press- 
burg?] and other commanders before Boulogne dur­
ing His Majesty's last war . . . .
Furthermore, the said Lord Henry, with the 
aid of Captain William van Dinther, who was one 
of the five captains under the command of Mons. 
the Count of Buren in the service of His Majesty, 
offers four thousand good landsknecht footmen, 
men of war and of service . . . which he will 
levy in the countries of the Duchy of Gelders 
and Ostland upon such letters of retainer and 
terms as His Majesty of whosoever will agree to g 
with the said Lord Henry and William van Dinther.
During the struggle around Boulogne, Henry VIII's court in Eng­
land and his agents on the Continent attracted mercenaries in 
droves, not all of them Germans by any means; for as has been 
noted Henry had under contract soldiers from many lands. True 
were the words of Sebastian Frank, the contemporary Swabian 
chronicler and despiser of mercenaries: "Whenever the devil
offers pay, then there is a humming and crowding together like 
of flies in the summer, so that you will be completely baffled
8 (P. R. 0.) s. P. 1/212, f. 173.
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and wonder where . . . this swarm came from and how it survived 
9the winter."
The first step in hiring landsknechts or for that matter 
any mercenary band was to find a leader, one in whom the even­
tual recruits could place their trust. Not any man would do; 
and ideally the mercenary captain was an experienced warrior, 
a man of some reputation and accomplishment. This leader, 
after he had been found, entered into negotiations with his 
prospective employer to agree upon the terms of service.
Once these had been mutually approved a contract was drawn up 
in the form of a "letter of articles" or "capitulary" in which 
the obligations of both parties were set forth.^
If several companies, otherwise known as ensigns or stand­
ards,. were contracted for, the normal procedure was for the 
ruler to appoint their leader his colonel. However, if the 
contract called for but a single company, the officer who 
supplied it normally had to be content with the rank of cap­
tain. This business out of the way, the ruler next issued a
letter patent authorizing his new placeman to raise the num-
11ber of troops specified in the contract.
If he were to earn his pay the mercenary leader had his
Quoted An Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechts, p. 13.
"^For an example of a landsknecht contract see Appendix F.
11L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 438.
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work cut out for him. First, to be on the safe side, he ob­
tained written permission and passports from the princes in
12whose territories he planned to recruit. This was only good 
business practice, for if he were to retain his contract he 
had to convince his employer that he was capable of delivering 
the promised men; and what better way than to be- able to dem­
onstrate that he had the goodwill and cooperation of the au­
thorities from whose states his men would be drawn and through 
whose lands they would have to travel before reaching their 
prearranged destination.^
Once a landsknecht colonel had obtained permission to re­
cruit from the Emperor and the local magnates his next step 
was to choose, usually from among his acquaintances, his senior 
officers. A lieutenant-colonel was appointed second in command, 
and beneath him the requisite number of captains. This done, 
the actual recruitment of the rank and file could begin, which 
function was the primary responsibility of the captains, each
1 9Refusal of these passports by Charles V after his sepa­
rate peace with France in 1544 caused considerable strain on 
Anglo-Imperial relations. See lb id., No. 471; XX, pt. 1, 
xii-xiii, and pt. 2, No. 2857"
13This is not to say that mercenary captains always 
sought the cooperation of local officials, Henry VIII*s cor- 
respondence during war years, 1544-46, is full of complaints 
from European heads of state inveighing against the depreda­
tions of his hired bands. See ibid., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 860,
941; XX, pt. 2, Nos. 124, 287; Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 147, 
and VIII, No. 151.
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14of whom was delegated the task of raising his own company. 
After the countryside had been informed in advance they set 
off with fife and drum and copies of their commissions in 
search of volunteers. Their efforts were rarely disappointed, 
and one can imagine the desperate characters which such calls 
to arms attracted: "unchristian, God-forsaken folk," robbers, 
burners, slayers, gamers, "who delight in wine-bibbing, whor-
*] Cing, blaspheming, and in making widows and orphans. " Faced 
with an assemblage like this, it took a hard man with a vet­
eran's aptitude to select wisely.
Fortunately, entrance into a mercenary company was never 
automatic. Certain rules, specified in the contracts, existed 
which governed the arming and condition of the men. This sim­
plified the captains' task. In the letter of articles agreed
upon in 1544 between Henry VIII and Maximilian, Count of 
X 6Egmont-Buren, it was stipulated that his two thousand
14The strength of landsknecht companies could vary con­
siderably. Generally, however, those contracted for by Henry
VIII numbered four hundred.
■^Quoted in E. Belford Bax, German Society At the Close 
of the Middle Ages (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1894), 
p. 158.
^Buren, besides raising mercenaries, was also entrusted 
as Charles V's lieutenant-general in the Low Countries with 
the leading of four thousand auxiliaries which the emperor 
had agreed to lend Henry. The bulk of the count's troops, 
both mercenaries and auxiliaries, served with the Duke of 
Norfolk at the siege of Montreuii. Below, pp. 274-75.
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footmen be "well disciplined and equipped for war . . . .  And 
that for each ensign there will be so many pikemen, halberdiers, 
and small shot up to the number of four hundred." Buren's cap­
tains in this particular instance were charged to sign on no
more than fifty of sixty arquebusiers, "up to thirty halberdiers,
17and the rest pikemen."
Naturally/ a monarch like Henry VIII was not likely to take 
for granted that his admonitions would be complied with in a 
foreign land by foreign soldiers who were as quick as ever he 
was to turn a situation to their own profit. Therefore/to pro­
tect his interests and to oversee the proceedings surrounding 
the recruitment of mercenaries he appointed native English com­
missioners of the musters who served as intelligence agents, 
his eyes and ears. Their finely detailed instructions were 
designed to prevent any misunderstanding or misconstruction of 
the letters of articles. Note for instance their charge re­
grading the mustering of the eight thousand landsknechts of 
Friedrich von Reiffenberg:
They shall first diligently see that every Stand­
ard be furnished with four hundred of good per­
sons sound and able, and to muster out of them 
those that be crooked, lame, or faulty, and to 
see that their furniture of harness, weapons, etc., 
be according to their covenants, and the whole 
ensign be well appointed and in good order . . . 
they shall not muster nor let pass any that is 
reported to be a strifemaker, wrangler, or quar- 
reller, or that is of any inordinate fashion.
17(P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/185, f. 142.
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They shall also refuse them that be wounded 
and especially in the hand . . . diligent 
heed shall they take that in Mustering one 
Soldier not borrow any other Soldier1s har­
ness, weapon, Morris pike, or gun.-*-®
From these instructions it is obvious that the type of man to 
be entertained by the captains should be experienced, physi­
cally fit, properly armed, and conformable to discipline.
This ideal was not always possible to fulfill, but even un­
scrupulous officers like Reiffenberg, who in the end managed 
to escape his obligation completely, seem to have done their 
best to select good men.
If a landsknecht met the requirements of a recruiting 
captain, his name, place of birth, age, and speciality^® were 
entered on a tentative muster roll. He was then given a sum 
of money, "conduct money," informed of the place of assembly 
of the regiment, and instructed to be there by a specific date. 
After he and his follow recruits had been assembled, the
18 CB.. M.) Add. MS. 6362, ff. 8-9. Reiffenberg, a subject 
of the Protestant Landgrave of Hesse, agreed to serve Henry
VIII with eight thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse. This 
force was supposed to enter France through the Ardennes Forest 
and march to the relief of Boulogne which in 1545 was being 
threatened by the French army. In the end, having extorted 
three months pay from the English commissioners, Reiffenberg 
was bought off by the French, and in 1546 entered the service 
of the Landgrave, who with other Protestant princes in Ger­
many, was arming for the impending Schmalkaldic War with the 
Catholic Imperialists. For the trials and tribulations of 
the English commissioners appointed to negotiate with him 
see below, pp. 367 ff.
^That is, halberdier, arquebusier, pikeman, etc.
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20actual mustering of the troops took place under the watchful 
eye of the regimental muster master, the Musterhernn, and the 
English commissioners of the muster, who were the final asses­
sors of how well the captains had done their duty in selecting 
the men.
In an open place where all the prospective hirelings
could be gathered, a gateway was constructed "by planting two
21halberds into the ground and laying a pike across them. "
The landsknechts were then ordered by the muster master to 
arrange themselves by companies in double ranks facing each 
other behind the gate. Next the men filed through the gate 
singly, their persons and weapons subjected to a last inspec­
tion. Unscrupulous captains were the order of the day, and 
fictitious names for non-existant men meant extra pays in 
their pockets. Therefore/in accord with the letter of arti­
cles and the instructions of the English commissioners, great 
care was taken that the full compliment of each company was
provided and that no weaklings or cripples were recorded in
22the final muster book. Every man was sharply watched that
^From the Old French monstre, to show or "pass inspec­
tion ."
21J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (13 
vols.; London: Macmillan and Co., 1910-19), I, 86.
22The names of those chosen to serve were entered in 
the muster book by the muster master's assistants, the clerks 
of the muster. There were several of these in each regiment, 
ideally one for each ensign. Within the ensign each clerk
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he might not pass muster twice or pass through with deficient 
weapons or weapons borrowed from a fellow landsknecht.
On completion of the muster the men were called together 
as a regiment for the first time. They formed a circle around 
their colonel, who read aloud the letter of articles in which 
were defined the conditions of service. Also, agreement was 
reached on the common points of discipline, for in a war com­
munity rules and regulations governing the soldiers' conduct 
in the field, on the march, and in camp were essential. Loy­
alty to the king and the officers serving him was expected.
The violation of women, clerics, and churches was forbidden; 
cowardice and desertion were punishable by death; private 
feuds were to be laid aside until the completion of the cam­
paign; quarrelling with fellow landsknechts or allied troops
was prohibited, as was gambling, drunkedness, the selling of
23spirits during divine service, and womanizing. It was an 
unfulfilled hope, particularly when large numbers of merce­
naries were involved, that the men would bring with them none
was responsible for the bulk of the paperwork that needed to 
be done. Not infrequently these men were multir-lingual, 
since they often acted as liasons between the company comman­
ders and the foreign commissioners of the muster.
For these and a multitude of other prohibitions not 
infrequently imposed for the sake of good order, see Blau, Pie 
Deutschen Landsknechte, pp. 16-20.
24but their legitimate wives,.
Following the reeding of the letter of erticies end agree
ment upon discipline an oath was administered, binding the mer
cenaries to obey that which they had heard and to which they
25had given their consent. Finally, the principal officers of
O ASo onerous was the problem of camp followers and hang­
ers-on that a special officer with the rank of captain was 
often appointed to keep them in line. He was known by the 
colorful title of Hurenweibel, the sergeant of the whores.
See ibid., pp. 27-28, and Fort.escue, A History of the British 
Army, I, 89. I have not been able to find mention of this 
oFficer in any of the foreign bands employed by Henry VIII, 
though there is every reason for believing that his peculiar 
talents could have been put to good use, especially by the 
English commanders at Boulogne. During the English occupation 
Henry's troops proved no less lusty than the landsknechts: 
"Adultery was frequent among them, for scarcely one lived with 
his married wife, but kept a mistress or two . . . numbers of 
shameless prostitutes came at every tide from England . . . .  
These descended on Boulogne dressed as gallently as they knew 
how in velvet and silk of the finest cloth, and the soldiers 
took them up so that no one could call himself worthy without 
a whore or two following him from every house like the sheath 
after the dagger." Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 
to 1550," pp. 13-14.
^ A  copy of such an oath to be administered to the "cap­
tain strangers in the marches of Calais" in 1545 is to be 
found in (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/198, f. 50a. It reads as follows: 
"You will swear to be [a] good and loyal servant of 
the King, our sovereign Lord, and that you will serve His 
Majesty well and loyally against all his enemies.
The things that will be entrusted to you [to do] on 
the part of His Majesty, His Majesty’s Governors or Cap­
tains you will handle and conduct according to the best of 
your ability and understanding and will keep secret so far 
as will be necessary and meet.
You will be obedient and attentive in all things to 
the orders of His Governors and in all that will be good 
and will touch the office and profession of good soldier­
ing and accordingly will govern those under your charge^
In no way will you consent to any treason or mutiny,
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the regiment were introduced and the company standards en­
trusted to the ensign-bearers, the latter swearing a special 
oath to defend their flags unto death.
This concluded the common business of the regiment. The 
community of warriors separated, each company gathering round 
its captain to be presented to the men whose appointments 
formed part of his patronage and would assist him in the man­
agement of the company. A lieutenant, chaplain, company quar­
termaster or harbinger, and surgeon were introduced in that 
order. Then followed the election of the non-commissioned of­
ficers by the landsknechts themselves, which election was pre­
sided over by the colonel's appointee, the Feldweibel or ser- 
2 6geant. Under his direction voting took place for two
but you will produce in evidence the authors and all others 
who will do anything improper so as to be punished as may 
be required.
And to do all you possibly can to maintain all and 
singular the rules, orders, and laws which have been made 
or hereafter will be made and ordained by the King, our 
said Lord, or by the Lords of His Great Council or other­
wise by the Lieutenant-General for the war.”
^ H i s  principal function was the drilling and training 
of the men and their arrangement in battle.
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27 28 29corporals, a conductor, . arid a furrier, Finally, the eiir
sign was divided into twenty rfive files of sixteen, each, file
electing its own leader, the- Rottmeister,^^ whose election
completed the company hierarchy*
However, at regimental staff level another hierarchy ex^ 
isted, comprised of a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, bailiff, 
watchmaster, regimental quartermaster, paymaster, master of 
supplies, and provost. In a memorandum entitled "precautions
31to be taken by [King Henry VIII] in retaining German soldiers," 
the recommendation made is that "these high officers . . .  must 
be men highly experienced in the art of war." The colonel, as 
commander of the regiment, bore chief responsibility for the 
performance of his troops, which responsibility devolved on the
27The corporals or Gemeinweibels acted as assistants‘to 
the Feldweibel and as liaison agents between him and the rank 
and file,
3®He served as a type of scout or reconnoiterer, seeking 
out the best routes on the march.
29Known on the Continent as fouriers, these officers 
served as assistants to the company quartermasters; among 
their duties was the assignment of living quarters in camp.
30These men enjoyed no special privileges except that m  
crowded conditions, if a bed were available they were entitled 
to it. They would seem to have been responsible for the dis­
tribution of food and, if the men of their file were arque- 
busiers, ammunition.
31{P, R, O.) S. P. 1/212, f. 171.
32lieutenant-colonel during his leader's absence. The bailiff 
was a man skilled in martial law. Known to the Germans as the 
Schultheiss or Justi zamptmann, he was expected to be a seasoned 
soldier; for when the martial law was contravened his was the 
duty to select the jury, appoint the officers of the court mar­
tial, and pronounce sentence on the accused. The master of 
the watch "was in charge of the proper ordering of guards . .
. rounds and patrols," while the regimental quartermaster, trav­
elling in advance of the troops, was accountable for finding 
lodgings for the men on the march. The paymaster, assisted by 
a staff of clerks, was in charge of the financial business of 
the regiment and acted as chief banker. All wages and debts 
incurred on behalf of the regiment were paid out of his trea­
sure chests. The master of supplies or Proviantmeister, aided 
by the company harbingers, had the task of securing and dis­
pensing victuals. Lastly, police power was exercised by the 
provost, an officer whose functions broadly paralleled those 
of an English justice of the peace. He had the power to ar­
rest and prosecute offenders of the law and to establish mar­
kets and fix prices of the goods sold in camp. It was a most 
lucrative post, for he was entitled to demand a fee from every 
prisoner released from his jail, and in return for the protec­
tion granted to the sellers in his market and for the rating
^^Otherwise, except for the fact that he drew extra pay, 
the lieutenant-colonel exercised no more authority than an 
ordinary captain.
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of foodstuffs he levied a share* The tongue of every slaugh^- 
tered animal was his, and from every cask of wine or barrel 
of beer he drew a liter or two.33
The principal weapon of the landsknecht was the pike, 
though the complexity of the developing art of war necessi- 
tated that he be proficient in several others, notably the 
halberd and arquebus. The pike, like much else in the lands­
knecht's arsenal, was borrowed from the Swiss. It was an 
eighteen foot long ashen shaft to which was fitted a spear­
head of steel. Sir Charles Oman, following Blaise de Mont- 
luc's commentary on the battle of Ceresole (1544), gives an 
account of how differently the weapon was employed on that 
occasion by the opposing German and Swiss forces:
. . . the difference between the landsknechts 
and the Swiss is that the former hold the pike 
very low down [towards the blunt end of the 
shaft] and always keep the point down, which 
is much better in 'push of pikes' when the 
staves are crossed . . .  I presume that the 
advantage was that when the two pike-columns 
had clashed men whose points were held high 
were likely to find them shoved up well over 
the heads of the enemy, while those whose 
points were down would get a better chance of 
thrusting at the body of an opponent.34
Whatever the advantage or disadvantage of holding the ipike^
point up or down, that weapon, before the perfection of
33All these officers and their duties are described at 
length in Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, pp. 24-27, 37,
34Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p p . 
76-17. ------------------------------
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firearms , was the surest defence aginst heavy cavalry, and in
massed formations against infantry armed with less, the shock
of the pike charge was near invincible.
The second most useful weapon of the landsknecht was the
halberd. In fact, before the development of the pike, the
halberd had been the favorite weapon of the Swiss, It was a
combination short pike and battle-axe. About eight feet in
length, it was tipped by a sharp stabbing point beneath which
was a blade like a hatchet. A curious feature was the iron
hook attached to the blade, which hook could drag a horseman
from his saddle or his mount to the ground. "If the enemy
succeded in checking the onset of the pikemen, it was [the
halberdiers1] duty to pass between the front ranks . . . and
35throw themselves into the fray."
The arquebus or hackbut was relatively new to the bat­
tlefields of Europe. It made its first appearance around the 
middle of the fifteenth century, and, from the first lands­
knecht companies included a certain proportion of handgunners
O £in their ranks. ° Arquebusiers were utilized as skirmishers
^Beeler, ed., The Art of War in the Middle Ages, p. 78.
3 6Since England lacked sufficient handgunners in the 
early sixteenth century, the letters of articles agreed to by 
Henry VIII with mercenary captains are quite specific about 
the numbers to be recruited. The agreement with the Count of 
Egmont-Buren in 1544 stipulated fifty or sixty arquebusiers 
per ensign. See above, p. 93. Friedrich von Reiffenberg*s 
articles in 1545 called for one hundred arquebusiers per
and to protect the flanks of their units in retreat or on the 
inarch. In massed formations they were interspersed with the 
pikemen and their firepower used to thin the ranks of the ad­
vancing enemy.
Almost without exception German infantry confronted their 
foes in defence and offence in solid bodies of enormous depth. 
The usual formation employed by the landsknecht in battle ar­
ray was the gevierte Ordnung or square, which formation had 
been copied from the Swiss and which in prototype was trace­
able to the Macedonian phalanx. Whole regiments, some of 
them containing as many as ten thousand men, are known to 
have been arranged in this fashion, though the Swiss tactic 
of dividing the regiment into three divisions or battles in 
echelon was more commonly adopted. Discipline was the key
to success, as "victory could only be won if submission to
38the unit was perfect, if the advance was resistless."
ensign or fully one-quarter of his eight thousand foot. (P. 
R. 0.) S.P. 1/203, f. 18b. In a separate agreement govern­
ing the 1,500 horsemen he was to recruit, Reiffenberg prom­
ised that 450 would be mounted arquebusiers, that is, 150
per troop of 500. (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/203, f. 15.
37Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, p. 47. The type of 
terrain and the nature of the obstacle to be overcome could
result in a variety of formations.
O QJOGunter Franz, "Von Ursprung und Brauchtum der Lands­
knechte ,H Mitteiiungen des Instituts fur Osterreichische 
Geschichtsforschung, LXI (1951), 97.
1Q4.
Failure to act in concert invited disaster/ and for this rea^
son cowards and deserters were cut down with impunity by their
fellow landsknechts.
The square or hedgehog (Igel), as it was sometimes calledf
was formed by arranging the men at regular intervals in equal
39numbers of ranks and files. Around it, guarding the four
sides exposed to the enemy, were ranged three rows of the best 
40armed pikemen, weapons extended and with gaps between into 
which could step the reserve or "rear-rank men" in the event 
of casualties. Behind the wall of pikes in special units 
stood the men with shorter weapons, the halberdiers, arque­
busiers, and the wielders of the terrible Zweihanders, great 
two-handed swords which in the press of the pikes were em­
ployed in hacking the way into the enemy ranks.
If it were possible before a fight, the chaplains led 
the men in prayer and, in the case of Protestant landsknechts, 
in the singing of hymns, a custom which the Italian historian, 
Jovius, foolishly attributed to the landsknechts' fear of
oq•^Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, p. 49.
 ̂°Ibid. Allusion is made to the two different grades of 
pikemen in the "Articles Somair" of Reiffenberg which pertain 
to the recruitment of his twenty ensigns of foot: "Firstly,
Friedrich von Reiffenberg promises that each ensign must be 
four hundred head, having 150 well armed men carrying pikes, 
one hundred arquebusiers or a little less, and the rest 150 
pikes, according to the order of war." These latter pikemen 
are presumably the "rear-rank men" mentioned in Blau. See 
(P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/203, f. 18b.
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cannonballs. This done, the men performed a more primitive 
rite: they shook the dust from their doublets or scooped up
clods of earth and threw them over their shoulders in an act 
of symbolic purification, dedicating themselves to death and 
the gods of war.4^ The landsknechts were now ready to give 
battle.
The widespread use of landsknechts and other mercenary 
and auxiliary troops in the sixteenth century demonstrates 
two obvious facts. First, the success of armies during the 
period relied upon the skillful combination of a variety of 
arms, and second, no single government had the resources in 
manpower and quality to provide that variety. Only by hiring 
mercenaries or by engaging allies to lend auxiliaries could 
these drawbacks be overcome. It would be wrong, however, to 
assume that foreign troops were recruited as mere cannon-fod­
der. With some duplication and overlapping of talents each 
national group was able to provide a certain type of unique 
service of which it was the recognized master. Thus, in the 
early sixteenth century the French men-at-arms were adjudged 
the best heavy cavalry in Europe; Spaniards and Italians made 
the best handgunners; Gascons were the best crossbowmen; and
41Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, p. 49; Franz, "Von 
Ursprung und Brauchtum der Landsknechte," p. 90. The origin 
of this ceremony is by no means clear. It would not appear 
to be of Christian derivation and was probably a holdover 
from the pagan past.
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the Albanian stradiots, until towards the middle of the cen- 
tury northern Europeans learned to imitate them, made the 
best light cavalrymen. To this list one may add the lands- 
knechts, who, with the Swiss, ranked as the finest foot sol" 
diers in Europe. They had done something which no other in" 
fantry had been able to do; namely, they had combined shock 
with mobility. In these troops were united the attributes 
which had made the mounted knight the prince of medieval bat- 
tlefields. The compact mass and serried pikes of the lands" 
knecht regiment gave it the solidity and weight heretofore 
only enjoyed by men-at-arms. Coupled with this was rapidity 
of movement, the ability to execute maneuvers coolly, and, 
most importantly, discipline. The pikeman's competence in
meeting and defeating heavy horse had established his reputa"
42tion, and it was this singular skill which had first brought 
him into favor with the paymasters of Europe.
Unfortunately perhaps for the landsknecht, who bore the 
brunt of many a brave fight, it was not fully appreciated 
that by the middle of the sixteenth century his supremacy as 
the most effective infantryman was being successfully chal­
lenged by a new power, the infantry of Spain. The father of 
this force was the "Great Captain," Gonsalvo de Cordova, who
4^This reputation had first been made by the Swiss in 
their national wars against the chivalry of Austria and Bur­
gundy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
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during the initial stages of the Great Italian Wars developed
the rudiments of the tactics which were to end forever the
43 'paramountcy of the pikeman. To do so he not only followed
Maximilian's example by including landsknechts in his format
tions; he increased the mobility of his foot soldiers by arm**
ing them with shorter weapons. For defence he issued them
shields, and to increase their firepower he added more hand*'
gunners. Half of his infantry was armed.with pikes, one-sixth
with firearms, and the remainder, after the fashion of the Ro-
44man legionnaires, with short thrusting swords and bucklers * 
Except for a few bodyguards attached to principal officers, 
the halberd was not adopted, so that in comparison with German 
and Swiss contingents a far larger portion of Spanish infantry** 
men carried weapons that were more manageable. This meant that 
in close fighting pikemen and halberdiers were at a disadvan** 
tage. The instant a breach was made in a German or Swiss 
square the great length of their weapons became their undoing. 
Without shields they were at the mercy of the sword and buck­
ler men, and their only hope of safety was in flight.
4^The development of Spanish tactics is treated at some 
length in F. L. Taylor's Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529 
{Cambridge: University Press, 1921), chap. VI and passim.
^Towards the latter part of Henry VIII's reign sword 
and buckler men began to be discarded in the Spanish array in 
favor of increased numbers of arquebusiers, and eventually 
the percentage of pikemen and handgunners came to be about 
even.
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Given these developments one might ask why the pike was
not abandoned* The answer is simplei ,Kthe sword was not
suited for repulsing a cavalry charge, [and] the pike contin^
ued to be used for that purpose [until] the invention of the
45bayonet at the end of the seventeenth century.11 Even
Machiavelli, who had little confidence in pikes or in the men
who handled them, was obliged to concede that for those ideal
armies, for whose instruction he intended his art of War,
46large numbers of pikemen had to be retained. As has been 
noted, this was the view of the Spaniards, who were to suc’- 
ceed the landsknechts as Europe1s most admired infantrymen. 
Therefore, as long as the need for pikes existed, there were 
Germans to use them.
45Beeler, ed,, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, p. 110. 
46Machiavelli, Chief Works, IX, 625.
CHAPTER IV
THE SPANISH INFANTRYMAN: NATIONAL SOLDIER
AND SOLDIER OF FORTUNE
War is my country, my harness, my house;
I am ready at all time to fight for a sous,
Francois de la Noue, The Politicke 
and Milltarie Piscourses, p . 118,
Of the many turbulent foreigners who fought as mercenar­
ies and auxiliaries in English causes during the early Tudor 
period, none were more deserving of their reputation as pro­
fessional soldiers than the Spaniards whom Henry VIII engaged 
in the taking of Boulogne and in his concurrent war with the 
Scots. Employed mainly as infantrymen, their unique talent 
was in the use of the arquebus, which weapon they had adopted 
late in the fifteenth century on the formation of their na­
tional army, and for which they had devised the tactics that 
had made them along with the German and Swiss pikemen the 
most feared foot soldiers in western Europe.
The foundations of Spanish greatness were laid during the 
reigns of the Catholic Sovereigns, Ferdinand II of Aragon and 
Isabella I of Castile. Their marriage in 1469, while it had 
produced no actual union of the Christian kingdoms of Spain,1
'j'Each ruler enjoyed sovereign power only within his own 
dominions, being allowed a mere courtesy title within those of
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did result in the establishment of a common policy which 
achieved among other things the centralization of the two ad­
ministrations , the creation of royal absolutism, and the ex­
pulsion of the Moors from Granada. Prom the military point 
of view this latter accomplishment is particularly noteworthy, 
since it was during the Granadan War of 1481-1492 that the 
Spanish army began the transformation which before the end of 
the Great Italian Wars would make it the most proficient na­
tional force in the Renaissance world.
To fully appreciate the vast changes in recruitment, arm­
ament, and tactics that occured within this relatively short 
span it must be understood that at its outset the Spanish army 
operated in the best of feudal tradition. Much more deeply 
ingrained in the Spanish character than in the English was the 
obligation of personal service, for in Spain in the fifteenth 
century the noble who could not afford the cost of a horse 
and arms lost his status and with it his immunity from taxa­
tion. As in the majority of late medieval states, when the 
sovereigns made war the bulk of their soldiery was provided 
by vassals whose contingents varied in size in accord with
the other. As for the official union of Aragon and Castile, 
that had to await the succession of Charles of Burgundy, bet­
ter known to history as the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V.
As grandson and heir of Ferdinand, he succeded to the throne 
of Aragon on the latter's death in 1516, assuming shortly 
thereafter the administration of Castile from his mother, 
Joanna la Lo'ca (d. 1555) , who had become queen of that state 
on Isabella's death earlier in 1504.
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their wealth and the extent of. their estates. Lords generally 
commanded their levies in person, but might on account of age, 
infirmity, or royal dispensation be permitted to provide some 
other leader. Conscripts raised on crown lands were brought 
into the field by adelantados, provincial governors whose 
broad civil and military powers were reminiscent of the later 
Elizabethan Lords Lieutenant. Municipal militias were sent 
under their own captains or entrusted to corregidores, royal 
officials who supervised the affairs of the locally elected 
town councils.^
Once a Spanish host had been marshalled it was divided 
like any medieval army into numerous companies, ranging in 
size from a few hundred to several thousand mixed horse and 
foot. There was little rationale behind this organization, 
companies customarily being formed by grouping together troops 
from the same locality. This inevitably led to disparities 
among these units, for not only were they "unequal in numer­
ical strength and solidity," but also was there no proportion 
between the different arms: "one [company] was stronger in
cavalry, another in infantry, all according to chance or the 
whims of the l e a d e r s . Yet, despite its feudal appearance
2Jean Hippolyte Mariejol, The Spain of Ferdinand and 
Isabella, trans. Benjamin Keen (New Brunswick,' to. J . R u t -  
gers University Press, 1961), p. 193.
3Ibid., pp. 192-93.
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the Spanish army was already experimenting with, new methods 
of organization and recruitment which quickly lent themselves 
to its modernization.
Hernando del Pulgar, secretary to Isabella and chroni­
cler of the war in Granada in the early part of the joint 
reigns, speaks of the existence of regular troops, native pro 
fessionals paid by the crown. One such body was permanently 
maintained in Castilian Galicia, while another patrolled the 
southern frontier against the Moors. The same author des-
scibes a royal guard of heavy and light horse, its members,
4one thousand strong, trained from youth to serve the king. 
Finally, adding to this air of nascent professionalism, was 
the presence in Spain of numerous foreign volunteers and mer­
cenaries. These, drawn from such militarily advanced states 
as France, Germany, and Switzerland, taught their employers 
much by their example. This was true even of the backward 
English, for at the second siege of Loja in 1486, when the 
three hundred followers of Sir Edward Woodville dismounted 
to fight the enemy with sword and axe the Spanish knights
4Roger Bigelow Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire 
in the Old World and in the New {3 vols.; New York: The Mac­
millan Co., 1918-25), II, 156 (hereinafter cited as The Rise 
of the Spanish Empire); William H. Prescott, History of the . 
Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella the Catholic (3 vols.; Boston: 
American Stationers' Company, 1839, I, 395.
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5were astounded at the destruction they wrought. However, of
the foreigners in Granada it was the hardy Swiss pikemen who
made the greatest impression. Their reputation having been
so recently established, they were held in complete awe, and
as a mark of respect to their notoriety, the corps which they
6formed was assigned to fight under the royal standard.
The high esteem in which the Spaniards held the Swiss 
was largely due to the increased reputation won by infantry­
men in general during the fighting in the south, for the 
Granadan War, unlike some of the earlier phases of the Moor­
ish crusade, was not essentially a cavalryman*s war. Granada, 
a land of rugged sierras and highland fortresses, was unsuited 
for widespread mounted operations, so that inevitably there 
were few pitched battles and many long sieges in which infan­
try and artillery predominated. This is indeed significant, 
as henceforward the foot soldier remained the mainstay of the 
Spanish army, so much so that fifty years later, with a French 
army hovering on the frontier, less than two thousand horse
7of any kind could be raised for the defence of the kingdom.
5The story, as told by the Audalusian chronicler, Peter 
Martyr, is related in Prescott, History of the Reign of Fer­
dinand and Isabella the Catholic, I, 397-98.
6Ibid., p. 396.
7Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, II, 68; Oman,
The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 62.
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IBehind this development, which had its parallel in Eng-
g
lish history, one can perceive the wily machinations of 
Ferdinand and Isabella, who saw in the war to crush the Moors 
an opportunity of wresting control of military affairs from 
the barons. In 1495, three years after the conquest of Gra­
nada, the serious attempt at the organization of a non-feudal 
force was begun with the issuance of an ordinance requiring 
all subjects to provide themselves with arms proportionate 
to their wealth. This was followed by a census, and in Feb­
ruary, 1496, a second ordinance decreed that of every twelve 
able-bodied men between the ages of twenty and forty-five, 
one would be taken to serve the state both "at home and 
abroad." These conscripts were not regular troops, as they 
were mobilized only in the event of war, "but they were paid 
by the crown from the day on which they entered active ser­
vice, and their employment may be justly regarded as a long
9step towards the formation of a standing army."
The Great Italian Wars into which Spain plunged in 1495
®Due to severe losses of stock in both the English Wars 
of the Roses and the Granadan War and to a contemporaneous 
decline in good breeding practices, there was a severe short­
age of heavy horses in both countries, which shortage produced 
a natural reduction in the numbers of men-at-arms. On the 
Tudor aspect of this problem, see H . C . B . Rogers, The Mounted 
Troops of the British Army, 1066-1945 {London: Seeley Service
and Co. Ltd., 1959), Chap. II.
9Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, II, 156-57.
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revealed certain deficiencies in the system, chief of which 
was that irregularly trained militiamen did not make good 
soldiers when forced to fight on foreign soil. Still, all 
things considered, these new wars, coming so close on the 
heels of the last, accomplished the end desired in that pro­
tracted service through several campaigns made professionals 
of the very recruits who sought to avoid the taint. By the 
close of the fifteenth century war had become a way of life 
in Spain, and since the central government controlled con­
scription the days of mustering feudal levies soon passed for­
ever. Yeh the reorganization of recruiting procedures did 
not of itself create a modern army; the first encounters with 
the French in Italy demonstrated that tactics and armaments 
had to be improved to complete the transformation.
With this originative phase the name of the Great Captain, 
Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordova, is inseparable. The younger son 
of a Cordovan nobleman, he had better than twenty years' ex­
perience as a leader of men behind him when at the age of 
forty-one he commanded the expeditionary force which crossed 
to Calabria in support of Ferrante II, ruler of the Aragonese 
kingdom of Naples.10 Gonzalo's effective strength did not
l°The kindgom of Naples passed into the hands of Alfonso 
V ("the Magnificent") of Aragon in 1443 after a twenty-three 
year struggle with the last Angevin rulers of the realm. On 
Alfonso's death in 1458 he divided his inheritance, bequeath­
ing Naples to his illigitimate son, Ferrante I (1458-94), and
116
exceed 3 , 1 0 0 mainly sword-and-buckler men supported by arba­
lesters, some pikemen, a few arquebusiers, and six hundred 
horse of which only one hundred were men-at-arms. The re­
mainder of the cavalry, and the arm on which he initially de­
pended, were jinetes, a type of light horse of ancient origin 
that apparently developed in Castile and bore a marked resem­
blance to the Moorish light horse of Granada. These troops 
took their name from the jennets or small coursers they rode 
and from the jinetas or javelins which they carried in pairs 
and were their characteristic weapons. The rest of their 
gear was not unlike that worn by Albanian and Turkish light 
horse, as for their protection they wore steel helmets and 
mail shirts and carried huge shields. Swords were used in
close fighting, albeit only after their javelins had been ex-
11pended or the enemy taken unawares. Useful troops for light­
ning raids and ambuscades, they were hardly the equal of the 
heavy gendarmerie and mercenary pikemen of France who swept 
them from the field at Seminara in Gonzalo's first Italian 
engagement in June, 1495.
the remainder, including Aragon and Sicily, to his brother, 
John II (1458-79), father of Ferdinand the Catholic. Fer­
rante II, the grandson of Ferrante I, succeeded to the throne 
of Naples in 1495 on the abdication of his father, Alfonso II 
(1494-5).
^George T. Denison, A History of Cavalry from Earliest 
Times (London: Macmillan and Company, 1877), p. 243. See
also Oman's description of the "genetours" in his History of 
the Art of War in the Middle Ages, II, 180-81.
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This defeat proved to be the Great Captain’s first and 
last in the Italian wars, as in the years following he set 
himself the task of adapting Spanish infantry methods to meet 
the threat of the French and Swiss military systems as he 
found them there. His immediate problem was the terrain oyer 
which he fought, relatively open country which favored the 
shock tactics and close formations of the enemy, while it 
placed his own forces at a definite disadvantage. Raised es­
sentially as guerillas to fight in mountain fastnesses they 
excelled in stealth and agile movement, but were helpless 
without cover against couched lances and long pikes. None­
theless, their very flexibility and speed "were precious as­
sets which could not lightly be cast aside; the problem was 
to preserve them and gain needed stability at the same time." ̂
In solving the dilemma Gonzalo de Cordova reacted in a 
number of ways: pitched battles were temporarily avoided,
while the Roman art of entrenchment was revived in an effort 
to force upon the enemy the burden of attack. The proportion 
of arms rapidly changed, the ratio becoming fixed in Gonzalo's 
army at one-half pikes, one-third swords-and-bucklers, and 
the remaining sixth firearms of the most portable variety.
In the matter of pikes and small arms the influence of the
■^Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, II, 157-58.
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13Swiss and landsknechts is most perceptable, though Gonzalo 
did more than borrow from these men he so admired. The foot­
men on whom he came to rely so heavily were protected with 
more body armor than their northern counterparts, their pieces
4 A
being morions, gorgets, cuirasses, and tasses, the which 
combined to preserve freedom of movement and give the men a 
decided advantage in close action.
Since new harness alone was unlikely to win battles the 
modifications in arms and equipment coincided with a simulta­
neous reorganization of tactical formations. The company, 
the basic unit in the Spanish army as in all others at the 
time, had proven too weak to be of value in the early fighting 
in Naples, so that to increase the strength of his army in 
action Gonzalo experimented with new groupings by combining
l c  1 Cseveral companies under the "regiment" of colonels. The 
number of companies combined to form a colonelcy or squadron, 
as the new formation was variously labelled, fluctuated con­
siderably, but was eventually fixed by Gonzalo at twelve.
^ I t  is a fact that the Great Captain recruited many 
landsknechts in Italy, and it can be safely assumed that they 
were employed to instruct the Spaniards in their methods as 
well as to fight. See Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494- 
1529, pp. 16, 37.
14For these and similar terms see Glossary.
15On the origin of this term see Glossary.
16Ibid.
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Each company contained five hundred men, so that in theory at 
least the first Spanish regiments totalled six thousand men.
Of the twelve companies, ten consisted of pikemen, sword-and- 
buckler men, and arquebusiers in equal proportions of two hun­
dred, two hundred, and one hundred respectively, the two re­
maining companies being formed of pikemen alone. The squad­
ron thus formed was commanded by a colonel, each company by a 
captain, and every one hundred men by a company chief or cabo 
de batalla, who was assisted by ten cabos de diez, non-commis­
sioned officers corresponding in rank to our present-day cor­
porals, Finishing out the complement were a standard-bearer, 
two drummers, and a fifer.
Mariejol relates that a regiment on the march was led 
by pikemen, behind whom in order came the sword-and-buckler 
men, the arquebusiers, and several additional rows of pikemen 
bringing up the rear. Six hundred cavalrymen, a meager con­
tingent for so large a body of foot, comprised of genitours
and men-at-arms, were generally attached to each colonelcy
17under their own captains, their small number indicative of 
the rapid changes being effected in the sixteenth-century mode 
of waging war. Infantry was fast eclipsing the mounted
17Mariejol, The Spain of Ferdinand and Isabella, p. 206. 
The size of these infantry units was > reduced to one thousand 
effectives sometime during the first decade of the sixteenth 
century, perhaps by Ferdinand's renovations in 1505. On this 
point see Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 
56-57.
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service as the indispensible component in Renaissance armies,
and before Gonzalo's death in 1515 Machiavelli could write
that infantry was "the substance and sinew" of any army, "that
X8part of it which ought constantly to be most considered."
This maxim was in part inspired by Spanish example, and it is 
instructive to note that in 1505 King Ferdinand divided his 
whole military force into twenty colonelcies of pikemen and
handgunners with a proportion of sword-and-buckler men in
, 19 each.
To his everlasting fame Gonzalo de Cordova created a pro­
fessional infantry which soon came to equal and finally sur­
pass the pikemen of Switzerland and Germany. What gave the 
Spaniards their eventual margin of superiority was the adapt­
ability of their formations and their refusal to be wedded to 
a single tactical system. Swiss and Germans made formidable 
opponents in the field, but their method of war had definite 
limits. When fighting over broken terrain or in narrow con­
fines they either left gaps in their ranks or were unable to 
form the phalanx in which lay their power. Stubbornly they 
refused to adjust to changing conditions and occasionally 
refused to participate in sieges, so that a generally held 
reproof was that while Swiss and landsknechts had no superiors
Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 322.
190man, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 56.
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on open ground they were very little esteemed when used in
20the defence or storming of fortified positions.
The conservatism which sapped the reputation of Europe's 
most famous infantrymen did not afflict the Spaniards, who by 
a continuing process of observation and experimentation con­
stantly modified their tactics and became the most innovative 
soldiers of the day. As has been intimated above, the experi­
mentation began promptly after Gonzalo de cfcrdova's lone set­
back at Seminara. Pikemen were increased to provide the 
steadiness necessary to meet alike the serried masses of 
French horse and mercenary Swiss. Arquebusiers,too, were em­
ployed in greater numbers to tear breaches in the enemy ranks; 
and into these, to paraphrase Machiavelli1s colorful descrip­
tion of the Spaniards in action, poured the sword-and-buckler 
men who could nimbly rush in with their shorter weapons and 
make great slaughter in the hand-to-hand combat which inevi­
tably followed.^
The Spanish manner of fighting at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century was reminiscent of the victories won by the 
Roman cohorts of Aemilius Paullus over the Macedonian
20Niccolo Machiavelli, "Portraits of the Affairs of 
F r a n c e i n  Niccolo Machiavelli' and the United States of Ame­
rica, ed. Anthony J . Pansini (Greenvale, N . Y . ; Greenvale 
Press, 1969), p. 640.
^Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 600-01.
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22pezataeri in the second century B.C, In the former as in 
the earlier contest, the thrusting sword proved superior to 
the long pike. Even Spanish body armor recalled a likeness 
to Roman equipment, but Gonzalo, in contrast to many of that 
epoch, was no slave to the past in that he supplemented the 
lessons taught by the ancients by adding a few nuances of his 
own.
This was particularly true of his exploitation of the 
tactical potentiality of small-arms fire. He discovered 
early in Naples that he could defend extensive frontages and 
outmaneuver numerically superior French forces by deploying 
arquebusiers in Roman fashion behind field fortifications.
In April, 1503, Gonzalo won the first major truimph fought 
on these precepts at Cerignola in northern Apulia. The French 
and their Swiss hirelings, induced to charge the hillside vine­
yard in which the Spanish had entrenched themselves, were cut 
down by withering arquebus-fire, their commander, Louis d 1 
Armagnac, Duke of Nemours, being among the slain. "Cerignola 
was a battle of small political significance, and small armies 
were engaged; but in the history of warfare it was a major 
turning-point. Gonzalo de Cordova had raised the infantry 
soldier armed with a handgun to the status of the most impor­
tant fighting man on the battlefield— a status he was to
2^see Glossary.
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23retain for over four hundred years."
For the remainder of the century the infantry tactics of 
the Great Captain received more than acceptance; they were 
built upon by the commanders of Spanish troops who succeeded 
him, Pedro Navarro, Prospero Colonna, and the Marquis de 
Pascara.
Navarro was a superior leader of infantry, though he was 
famed largely as an engineer whose achievements in a long ca­
reer were legendary. As Gonzalo's captain in Greece against 
the Turks in 1500, he devised "the first mine that was pre­
dominantly explosive in character," while as commander of the
Spanish infantry in 1512, he introduced a version of the
24Hussite war-wagon in Ferdinand's losing cause at Ravenna. 
Captured in that fight, he transferred his allegiance to 
France when his pecunious master refused to ransom him and 
ended his days in 1528 as the trusted advisor of Francis I.
Prospero Colonna, one of the most resourceful of the 
Italian condottieri, also combined the engineers' craft with 
soldiering. Like Navarro, with and against whom he served 
in several campaigns, he was a master of siege warfare
23Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, A His­
tory of Warfare (Cleveland and New York: The World Publish­
ing Company, 1968), p. 219.
24A portable wagon filled with arquebusiers which was 
designed to check the shock of charging cavalry. For no­
tices on the career of Navarro, see Taylor, The Art of War 
in Italy, 1494-1529. pp. 87-88, 137, 145.
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in which the Latins, both Spaniards and Italians, excelled. 
Fighting "with his brains more than his sword," he earned the 
title Cunctator for his conquest and successful defence of the 
Milanese for Charles V in 1521-2 by "accept[ing] battle only 
when it was needful and when he had placed all advantages on 
his own side."^ His crowning triumph was Bicocca, during 
Charles V's first war with Francis I, when he led the Spanish 
arquebusiers to victory over the French and the Swiss. Like 
Gonzalo de Cordova he entrenched himself in a strong defen­
sive position in a garden fronted by a sunken lane, flanked 
on the left by a marsh and on the right by the main road to 
Milan.
He built up the bank on the garden side into a 
rampart, mounted some artillery on it, disposed 
his arquebusiers four deep to man the rampart, 
and in the rear of them placed continous units 
of pikemen. As the Swiss pikemen advanced a- 
cross the fields they were mown down first by 
artillery and then by arquebus fire. Those who 
succeeded in pressing forward to jump down into 
the lane found themselves trapped in an abattoir 
and were slaughtered by the arquebusiers who 
were so high above them that the Swiss pikes 
could not even touch them.26
The contribution of Fernando de Avalos, Marquis de Pes­
cara, was no less an outgrowth of Cordova's tactics. At
2^Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 175.
26Montgomery, A History of Warfare, p. 220. It is not 
without significance that Colonna's success at Bicocca has­
tened Henry VIII's decision to join with the Imperialists in 
their war with France. See Fisher, History of England, p. 240.
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Bicocca this man, who became the most famous Spanish general
after the Great Captain, evolved the method of firing in ranks
27by volleys on command, and at the rout of the Sesia two 
years later, a refinement of this system won for him a vic­
tory as yet unparalleled in the history of warfare. The bat­
tle was preceded by an auspicious Imperial offensive designed 
to clear north Italy of the invading French, who under William 
de Bonnivet, Admiral of France, were threatening Milan. The 
decisive engagement, the Sesia, matched the retreating French 
against a mobile force of light cavalry and infantry directed 
by Pescara, and when the battle was joined arquebusiers sup­
ported by pikemen poured in on the striken foe on foot, on 
horseback, and on the cruppers of the Italian light horse. 
Withering volleys wounded Bonnivet and destroyed his Swiss 
who bravely tried to stem the tide, and the Chevalier Bayard, 
the knight "sans peur et sans reproche,11 died in agony from a
stone shot which shattered his spine while trying to mount a
28counter-attack.
Before this time handgunners had sniped at will from be­
hind breastworks and natural cover preliminary to the push of 
pikes. Henceforward, after the Sesia, in what became the
^Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, pp. 51-52.
28 Ibid., p. 54; Joseph Jay Deiss, Captains of Fortune; 
Profiles of Six Italian Condottieri {New York: Thomas Y. Cro­
well, 1967), pp. 273-74. Hereinafter cited as Captains of 
Fortune.
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pattern for Spanish units, arquebusiers maneuvered indepen­
dently, with pikes, formerly the pivotal arm, operating in 
relief. This did not mean that the longer weapon had been 
superseded. On the contrary: pikes were still essential to
shield arquebusiers from the shock of attack and to protect 
them while they recharged their heavy pieces, some of which 
weighed in excess of thirty pounds.^9
Although this function was defensive, the pikes 
served also to deliver the counterstroke. The 
eighteen-foot shaft, weighing ten pounds, ap­
peared a fearsome thing to foemen awaiting the 
oncoming thicket of steel points. The arquebus 
in contrast seemed no more than a harassing wea­
pon. After its work had been done, then came 
the turn of the iron-clad pikeman to advance 
shoulder to shoulder . . . .30
This was Pescara's tactic at Pavia, "the most decisive victory
of that generation,"^1 when after his arquebusiers had broken
the French formation by an enfilading fire along its flanks
p QDudley Pope, Guns: From the Invention of Gunpowder to
the 20th Century (New York: Delacorte Press, 1965), p. 52
and passim. Hereinafter cited as Guns. See the excellently 
illustrated Chaps. IV and V on the development of gunpowder 
weapons during the first half of the sixteenth century.
30Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages (New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1960), p. 213.
31This battle, fought on Charles V's twenty-fifth birth­
day on February 14, 1525, resulted in the capture of Francis I 
and gave the Imperialists the preponderant influence in Italy. 
Though Francis, after his release in 1526, and his successors 
attempted to reassert themselves, no Frenchman succeeded in 
controlling Italian affairs until Bonaparte made his appear­
ance in the peninsula.
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they were joined at close quarters by pikemen and cavalry to 
render the coup d'grace.
Throughout the first quarter of the century the European 
military phratry had marvelled at, but largely ignored, Span­
ish inventiveness; but the havoc reaped by Imperial firepower 
at Pavia shocked it into the realization that a new era was at 
hand. Not surprisingly the French, who formerly complained 
that Spanish tactics were "against all laws of war and the 
order of battle," were the first to react, and when in 1534
Francis I sought to reform his infantry with a view towards
3 2avoiding the hiring of mercenaries, the numbers of arque­
busiers were vastly increased. Contemporaneous trends can be 
detected in other quarters, notably among the landsknechts, 
who raised their ratio of handgunners from sixteen per hun­
dred men at the beginning of the century to roughly twenty-
33five per hundred by 1544. Even in England where conservative
Fourquevaux, Instructions sur le Faict de lâ  Guerre, 
pp. xxxii, xliii. Handgunners in the French army up to this 
point were something of an aberration, and there was a defin­
ite antipathy towards them on the part of those commanders 
raised in the older medieval tradition. Blaise de Montluc, 
later to be a Marshal of France, wrote of firearms that he had 
"seen brave and valiant men killed with [them] in such sad num­
bers, and it generally happened that they were struck down by 
those abominable bullets which had been discharged by cowardly 
and base knaves, who would never have dared to have met true 
soldiers face to face and hand to hand." Firearms, he con­
cluded, were definitely the Devil's invention.
33Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 41;
(P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/203, f. 18b
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tradition and government policy eschewed "the newfangles and 
wanton pleasure" obtained from "shooting in handguns," the 
frequent attempts to limit the use of firearms by statute and 
proclamation^ indicate, despite the absence of precise figures, 
a steady increase in their popularity. Cavalry troops also 
took to handguns more readily after Pavia, and imaginative 
tactics were devised for them; but no Renaissance state ever 
relied upon small arms more heavily than Spain.
Despite the acceptance of the handgun, the years follow­
ing Pavia generally witnessed a return to military conserva­
tism, a period distinguished by cautious advances, hurried 
withdrawals, and battles avoided. The reaction which set in 
had its roots in myriad causes, not the least of which was a 
healthy concern for costs. The wars in Italy had been fought 
with little pause for over thirty years, and the consumption 
of men and material had been horrendous. Peace, the obvious 
answer for ending the drain, was never seriously contemplated, 
for the emperor's victory at Pavia had been too complete.
■^In the reign of Henry VIII, between 1523 and 1546, 
three parliamentary statutes and at least five proclamations 
prohibited the possession or use of firearms, excepting only 
those "persons having lands, tenements, fees, annuities, or 
other yearly profits in his own right or in his wife's to the 
yearly value of 1100." 14 Henry VIII, c. 7. Permission to
"shoot in any handguns, hackbuts, or other guns" was extended 
in 1546 to all Englishmen who obtained the king's license 
under the Great Seal. For the pertinent proclamations see 
Hughes and Larkin, eds., Tudor Royal Proclamations, I, Nos.
107, 121, 171, 194, 2 7 1 . ------------------------ ---
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With Francis captive in Spain, it seemed to the lesser Euro­
pean princes that they soon stood to share the same fate.
And so they drew together in self-defence, the Pope, the Vene­
tians, the Florentines, and Milan, with encouragement from
Henry VIII, concluding with France the Holy League of Cognac 
35in 1526.
The scene was set for the revival of hostilities, but 
the subsequent campaigns were unlike those of the past gener­
ation. Gone were the dash and daring of frontal assaults, or 
pitched battles between contending arrays willing to risk 
their all. The only contest in the later stages of the Haps- 
burg-Valois rivalry "in which both sides met with a fixed in­
tention to fight" was at Ceresole in Piedmont which, fought
*3 gin 1544, postdated Pavia by almost twenty years.
Wastage of manpower and treasure does not alone account
for such temerity, so that other operational factors need to
be considered: the unreliability of mercenary and auxiliary
troops, who continued to constitute the backbone of the con-
37tending armies; the near impossibility of provisioning men
CThe alliance was actually signed on May 22, four months 
after Francis' release. Henry VIII's dealings with the League 
are recounted in Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 142-46.
Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 229.
37In 1536 at the commencement of the third war between 
Charles V and Francis I, the breakdown of troops in the Span­
ish army, totalling 65,153 effectives, was as follows:
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and beasts through long campaigns in unfriendly territory; 
and, not the least, the expertise of thel military engineer, 
who in the science of fortification between 1525 and the end 
of the Great Italian Wars in 1559 more than held his own 
against the artilleryman.^**
For whatever reasons, war after 1525 became more defen­
sive, albeit if the tactics of caution replaced those of con­
quest, Spanish superiority in small arms firepower remained
Spaniards of all arms, 12,160; German cavalry, 2,060; Italian 
cavalry, 950; German infantry, 24,080; Italian infantry, 
25,903. Ibid., p. 61.
■3 0 The sixteenth-century revolution in fortification was 
in part inspired by Gonzalo de Cordova, who pointed the way 
by his return to the Roman practice of entrenching. Artil­
lery weapons, though they failed to keep abreast of the rapid 
development of small arms, achieved such destructive power in 
the earlier part of the century due to the increased caliber 
of cannon that towering defences of medieval design were use­
less against them. High ramparts gave way to walls that were 
lower and thicker, both to inhibit breeching and accomodate 
defensive artillery. Triangular outworks, called bastions by 
contemporaries, were built into walls, allowing additional 
guns to cover the approaches to the stronghold. Ditches were 
deepened and widened to discourage subterranean mining, and 
in a further attempt to keep besiegers at their distance, a 
counterscarp was constructed on the exterior slopes of the 
ditches beyond which light artillery could be positioned to 
play on the attackers. Lastly, downward and outward sloping 
glacis were devised of the earth excavated from the ditch, 
thus reinforcing the defensibility of the counterscarp by 
shielding its defenders from direct fire. Though most of 
these aforementioned developments were manifest before Pavia, 
their full worth was not realized until the last three-quar­
ters of the century.
This account of the developments in sixteenth-century 
fortification is based largely on the summary appearing in 
R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of 
Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present (London: Mac­
donald, 1970), pp. 453-4.
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unchallenged, with few changes discernable. However, in the 
matter of armament and organization two important modifications 
deserved mention.
First, for motives that are by no means clear, sword-and-
buckler men were gradually phased out of the Spanish formations.
39They performed well at Ravenna in 1512 and were present at
Pavia in 1525; yet in 1534, when larger infantry units were
40fashioned out of the older colonelcies, the swordsmen had 
given way completely to increased numbers of handgunners. The 
new units were tercios, forerunners of the modern regiments. 
Each had a strength of over three thousand and was composed of 
anywhere from ten to twelve companies of some 250 men, the 
companies being equally divided between pikemen and arquebus­
iers. Company officers included a captain, an ensign or 
alferez, a sergeant, a quartermaster, and ten corporals. At 
the staff level the tercio was commanded by a colonel or 
maestre del campo, who was assisted by a descending hierarchy 
of officers including a major, an adjutant, a staff captain, 
and his lieutenant. Halberdiers, so prominent in the German 
and Swiss armies, were all but excluded by the Spaniards, 
there being only eight in each of the three original tercios 
commissioned by Charles V, all of whom served as orderlies or
^9E. N. Lloyd, A Review of the History of Infantry (Lon­
don: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1908), p. 87.
^See below, p. 119, n. 17.
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bodyguards, to the colonel. The spiritual needs of all ranks 
were ministered unto by thirteen chaplains, an inordinate num­
ber for a single regiment when it is considered that of med-
41ical personnel there were only three.
A physician, a surgeon, and an apothecary. For the ma­
terial on the tercio I have relied heavily on the description 
provided by Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 
59-61. No such large Spanish corps ever served the early Tu­
dors. However, in the spring of 1545 a daring experiment may 
have been attempted when Pedro Gamboa, a Madrilenian captain 
recently hired by Henry VIII with some eight hundred or a thou­
sand of his countrymen for service against the Scots, was made 
’'Captain General" of all the Spaniards in the king's service.
To the English, who had no well defined command system at that 
time, the title conveyed the meaning of "senior captain." 
However, to continental observers familiar with Spanish mili­
tary organization it is obvious that they considered Gamboa's 
command to be a colonelcy and his rank to be that of colonel, 
for as such they refer to him in their dispatches. See Span­
ish Calendar, VIII, Nos. 186, 193, and passim. The circum­
stances surrounding Gamboa's appointment are related in M. A.
S. Hume, trans., Chronicle of King Henry VIII, Being A Con­
temporary .Record of Some of the Principal Events of the Reigns 
of King Henry VIII and Edward VI {London: George Bell and
Sons, 1889), p. 124. Hereinafter cited as Chronicle of King 
Henry VIII. If indeed Henry empowered Gamboa to serve him as 
colonel-in-chief of his Spanish mercenaries, this would make 
Gamboa the first officer to function with that rank in Eng­
land, as no native English colonels were created until circa 
1572. Cruickshank, Elizabeth1s Army, p. 53. At least two 
other foreign soldiers served in early Tudor England as colo­
nels, both like Gamboa against the Scots. One was the German 
knight, Conrad Pennink, who was hired initially with what 
amounted to a regiment of landsknechts some three thousand 
or four thousand strong in January, 1546, and who was later 
reemployed with something less than three thousand of the 
same by Edward VI in 1549. (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/123, ff. 151-
52; E 101 531/39, mem. 16. The other was an Italian, "Coro- 
nall" Malatesta, about whom little is known except that he 
led a body of men^at-arms at the battle^ of Pinkie in the Duke 
of Somerset's invasion of Scotland in 1547. (P. R. O.) E
351/43, mem. 10; Jordan, Edward VI: The Young King, p. 253.
On the further history of Gamboa and Pennink, see below, pp. 
355-56, 358-59 and Appendix C.
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The striking feature about the new infantry organization 
was the high percentage of arquebusiers. Fully half of the men 
were armed with handguns, a higher proportion than could be 
found in any other army of that day. In the very year that the 
tercios made their appearance it is recorded that in a French 
army of forty-two thousand only twelve thousand served with 
firearms, while in 1544, ten years after the Spanish reform, 
Henry VIII felt himself well served if his German captains 
could, in their companies of four hundred men, provide him 
"more or less" with fifty handgunners.42
Esprit de corps and its adjunct, good discipline, were 
other hallmarks of the Spanish soldiery, while among the offi­
cers and men there persisted a comradeship atypical of other 
national armies. In disparaging his own countrymen for their 
lack of spirit, Francois de la Noue, the celebrated French 
Huguenot who fought against the Spaniards many times, sought 
to uphold his enemies as an example to be emulated:
I wish they [the French infantrymen] would practice 
some of the Spanish customs which in my opinion are 
very good. One is that when any new Soldier cometh 
into their bands, the old do instruct him in his 
duties: if he transgresseth they reprove him: and
if he be meanly apparelled they help him, lest he 
should be a dishonor to their nation: and he like­
wise taketh these admonitions as courteously where 
we do the contrary . . . .  Secondly, among the
4 2R„Coltman Clephan, "The Military Handgun of the Six­
teenth Century," The Archaeological Journal, LXVII, n. s. 
(1910), 115; (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/185, f. 142.
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Spaniards ye shall not have a brawl in six months: 
for they disdain quarrellers and delight in mod­
esty: so as if any do happen, they endeaver dil­
igently to take them up: and yet when they cannot
be ended without blows they discharge themselves 
honorably . . . .  Thirdly, if a Soldier among 
them be hurt, he that hath but one crown will give 
him half. Fourthly, if any one do any notable act, 
all his companions will praise and honor him, and 
seldom do they through envy conceal any virtue.
This likewise is good in them that in their mili­
tary commandments even the bravest Soldiers and of 
greatest military calling will obey a simple Ser­
geant; so pliable are they to their officers . . . 
Finally, in the body of their guard they will not 
suffer any insolency, but the same are as Schools 
where their ordinary talk is of the duty of Sol­
diers, Captains, Honor, and such like matter con­
cerning Arms . . . these be no customs of Monks, 
as the proverb goeth, but of excellent Soldiers.
La Noue's picture of the Spanish army as a seedbed of 
honor, virtue, and discipline must not, however, be taken too 
literally. Professional as that establishment was, it can 
scarcely be said to have been free of those defects which 
perenially plagued less practiced military establishments.
Like armies everywhere the Spanish army too often functioned 
as the refuge of malefactors and violent men for whom military 
service afforded an opportunity to slake their thirst for plun­
der and carnage. That nation, wrote Bartholomew Sastrow, no­
tary in 1544 to the Margrave Ernst of Baden, was "greatly ad­
dicted to pilfering;" its soldiers were worse brigands than
43Fran£ois de la Noue, The' Politicke and Militarie Dis­
courses, Trans. E. A. (London: Printed for T. C. and E. A.,
1587), pp. 174-75.
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44landsknechts; and they were guilty of unspeakable atrocities. 
Arrears in wages were no more tolerated by Spaniards than by 
Germans or Swiss, and mutinies, though perhaps more rife in the 
second half of the century, were not unknown, as witnessed in 
the brutal sack of Rome by the Imperial army in 1527.
Yet,when all is said and done, Spaniards made exceptional 
soldiers. Competency more than atoned for their shortcomings, 
and in studying the documentary and published literature which 
pertains to these men, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that at all times Spaniards in the field, whether in the ser­
vice of their king or in the pay of some foreign potentate, 
esteemed themselves professionals, eminently superior to mere 
citizen-soldiers or mercenaries.
Nonetheless, however much they may have resented the epi­
thet Spanish fightingmen did hire out for wages, and in the 
capacity of mercenaries, like all of that stamp, they were 
rarely discriminating in their choice of paymasters. Spain's 
foremost national rivals were, of course, France and the Otto­
man Empire. Notwithstanding, Spaniards served both with zest. 
Five hundred genitours accompanied Francis I in the recovery 
of Milan in 1515, and eight years later, subsequent to the 
battle of Pavia, when the same king invaded Italy six thousand
44Albert D. Vandam, trans., Social Germany in Luther1s 
Time, Being the Memoirs of Bartholomew Sastrow (Westminster: 
Archibald Constable and Company Ltd., 1902), pp. 161, 168, 
192-93, 206.
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4 5Spaniards marched in the French rearguard. Spaniards sold
their talents in Italy and Denmark; they fought side by side
with Lutherans against their coreligionists in Germany; and
among the least of their accomplishments, they graced the
46hollow triumph of Henry VIII at Boulogne.
The first Spanish mercenaries to fight in an English cause 
in Tudor times postdated the Boulogne affair by some fifty 
years. It has already been remarked that Perkin Warbeck em­
ployed at least three, two of whom, Fulano de Guevara and 
Diego el Coxo, were captured at Deal in 1495, while the third,
Pedro de Guevara, sailed with the pretender from Kinsale to
47Cornwall in 1497. From that year until Charles V's with­
drawal from Henry VIII*s third French war in 1544, nothing 
further is heard of Spanish mercenaries in English pay, though 
in 1523 brief reference is made to Spanish auxiliaries, a 
small but indeterminate band of infantrymen who served with 
the Burgundian contingent of Floris d*Ysselstein, the emperor's 
Captain-General in Flanders, in Suffolk's energetic drive 
across the Somme. They appeared to have been competent troops 
and distinguished themselves during the struggle for Bray,
45Fourquevaux, Instructions sur le Faict de la Guerre, 
pp. xlv, xlviii.
4'fiSee below, pp. 285, 286.
4’7See above,pp. 60, 68.
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4which town was taken preparative to the descent on Montdidier.
In all, however, the .1523 war presents a perfect example 
of the futility of joint operations in the sixteenth century. 
The Anglo-Imperialist strategy, agreed upon in advance of the 
campaign, called for a vigorous triple attack converging on 
poorly defended Paris, the emperor with a Spanish army advanc­
ing from the south, and his pensioner, the Constable Bourbon 
with ten thousand landsknechts subsidized by Henry from the 
east, both in support of Suffolk, who alone of the partici­
pants fulfilled his assignment by striking inland from Calais. 
The English general executed his charge in admirable fashion 
by advancing to within eleven leagues of the French capital in 
the face of the most alarming difficulties. Virtually every 
promise made him by his confederates went unhonored. While 
Bourbon vascillated and eventually bolted for Italy on the 
desertion of his troops, Charles and his Spaniards, after a 
weak probe towards Guienne, withdrew behind the Pyrenees; the 
Imperial commissariat set up in Flanders to supply the English 
broke down; and Burgundian and German auxiliaries meant for Suf 
folk were siphoned off in an unsuccessful attempt to reinforce 
the army of Bourbon. It was, as the Calais recorder so aptly
48L. & P., Ill, pt. 2, No. 3462. One of the better ac­
counts of this poorly documented campaign is given in Hall1s 
Chronicle, pp. 601 ff. A brief outline of Suffolk's move­
ment from Calais to Montdidier is given in L. & P., Ill, pt.
2, No. 3516.
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49put it, "an evil journey for the Englishmen," In the end, 
harassed by smallpox, destitute of pay, of powder, and above 
all of the Imperialist reinforcements they had daily looked 
for, they turned their backs on Paris when "grey bearded win­
ter began to show his face in black cold frost" so intense 
that among the indolent or those too weak to properly care for 
themselves "the nature of the flesh was unable to strengthen
the blood to give natural warmth to the members which had been
50overcome by the cold, wherefore they were lost . . .
The 1523 campaign was unfortunate when viewed in the light 
of Henry VIII's martial ambitions which were eternally blighted 
To be king of France was a puerile fancy which recurrently tor­
mented him, and he may, on the return of Suffolk's emaciated 
company, have pondered his Chancellor's prediction that never
would he have "such or like opportunity . , . thereafter far the
51attaining" of that prize. Self-serving allies once more had 
played him false, but in this regard Henry VIII unlike his fa­
ther failed to profit by experience, remaining to the end of 
his days an easy mark for scheming princes who would use his
49Turpyn, The Chronicle of Calais, pp. 33-34.
50Gruffyd, "Suffolk's Expedition to Montdidier," pp. 40- 
42. This account of the campaign has been largely ignored 
by historians.
^State Papers of Henry VIII (11 vols.; London: H. M.
Stationery Office, 1830-52), I, 143. Hereinafter referred to 
as State Papers.
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adolescent enthusiasm for war to meet their own ends.
Twenty years elapsed before Henry again had use for for­
eign troops, Spanish or otherwise, though he considered offen­
sive action on the Continent on several occasions during the 
interim. Most always the intended victim was France, albeit 
once, in a fit of real megalomania, he audaciously declared
war on Charles V only to think better of the idea and tender 
52his apologies. When continental war did come again it was 
with Francis I, a monarch whose love of self and military 
aspiration ranked scarcely above Henry's.
This conflict, the most herculean undertaking in early
 ̂The declaration was made on January 21, 1528 at the in­
itiation of his divorce or "great matter.11 Having separated 
from his first wife, Catherine of Aragon, the previous summer, 
he desired the pope, Clement VII, to grant him an annulment, 
but the anti-imperialist Clement, who had joined with France 
in the League of Cognac, was now, since the occupation of 
Rome by Charles' Lutheran and Spanish troops in 1527, the 
pawn of the emperor; and the emperor was the English queen's 
nephew, his mother, Joanna la Loca, and Catherine being sis­
ters. The declaration was probably not seriously intended to 
lead to an Anglo-Imperial rupture, though Henry hoped that if 
he could persuade the League to act on his behalf Charles 
might be encouraged to support the annulment. On both counts, 
however, Henry was soon disappointed: the forces of the League
were decisively defeated on June 20, 1528/at Landriano near 
Genoa, and in the year following the pope composed his quarrel 
with the emperor, with the result that in July, 1529, the di­
vorce case which had opened in England was ordered transferred 
to Rome where it was eventually decided in 1534 in Catherine's 
favor. As for the war between England and the Empire, except 
for some mutual interference with shipping and trade, nothing 
came of Henry's bellicose posturing. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, 
p. 199.
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Tudor military annals, involved a capital outlay far exceeding
any previous expenditure, an army, the largest which had passed
53out of the realm in a hundred years, and the engagement of 
mercenaries and auxiliaries in quantities unheard of since the 
close of the Hundred Years' War. Among these latter forces 
none were to be more prized than the companies of Spanish arque 
busiers utilized first in the capture of Boulogne and later in 
the desultory and collateral brawling with the Scots.
The words are those of Thomas Wolsey (d. 1530), Car­
dinal and Chancellor of England, who used them euphorically 
in describing the puny command of less than thirteen thou­
sand with which Suffolk crossed to Calais in 1523. See L. 
&P . ,  Ill, pt. 2, No. 3281.
CHAPTER V
THE COM DOTTIER!: THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND MANNER OF WARFARE
The Italian soldiers are spirited and courageous, 
but proud and insubordinate. They are so badly 
paid by their Commanders that they have often 
been driven to mutiny and to seek for better mas­
ters and more reasonable terms.
Bernardo Navagiero, Address to the Doge and 
Senate of Venice, p. 460.
Among the more renowned mercenaries to ply their trade 
for English gold in the early sixteenth century were the Ital­
ian condottieri, who not unexpectedly most closely conformed 
in style and technique to the Spaniards. Sixty years of di­
rect exposure in the Great Italian Wars to such as Gonzalo de 
Cordova, Pedro Navarro, and the Marquis de Pescara‘S could 
scarcely have failed to leave its mark, though in point of 
fact Spaniards, more so than Italians, were deemed the stead­
ier troops.
Francesco Guicciardini, the Florentine statesman and his­
torian, in describing the military forces in Italy on the eve 
of the French invasion of the peninsula in 1495 wrote of them 
that they were unreliable and treacherous, driven by ambition
■̂ On these commanders' contributions to the art of war 
see below, pp. 115ff.
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2and greed, faithless in any cause. The major determinant of 
these contemptible flaws in character was of course Italy it­
self. Like the Germany of the landsknechts that region was 
but a geographical expression, an agglomeration of sometimes 
powerful but petty states which viciously competed as politi­
cal and commercial rivals. Since Italian armies were almost
exclusively mercenary they suffered from "the instability of
3changing masters," and "many men-at-arms, peasants of common 
citizens were subjects of other rulers and entirely dependent 
on captains with whom they agreed to serve and who were re­
sponsible for recruiting and paying them, so that neither by 
nature nor circumstances had they any special incentive to
4give good service.11
The way of the Italian condottieri was an ancient and 
time-honored one, dating in its then current form from the 
twelfth century, though the impetus which had given it birth 
was somewhat older. The years 1000 to 1300 had brought the 
revival of Mediterranean trade, destroyed in the chaos attend­
ing the collapse of the old Roman Empire. With the revival
2Cecil Grayson, trans., Guicciardini: History of Italy
and History of Florence, ed. and abr. John R. Hale (New York: 
Washington Square Press, 1964), p. 154. Hereinafter cited 
as Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence.
A contemporary term often used to denote ordinary foot 
soldiers.
^Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence, 
p. 154.
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came the growth of towns, some of which, like Milan and Genoa,
developed as republican communes, self-governing city-states
which resisted alike the overlordship of nobles, popes, and
emperors. However, as proficiency in arms was not a pursuit
happily engaged in by capitalistic merchants and struggling
tradesmen, it became necessary for them to hire others to do
their fighting. Thus in Italy the profession of mercenary
5came into being.
Machiavelli explained the emergence of the condottieri in
less delicate terms:
. . .  as soon as the empire began to be repudi­
ated in Italy and the Pope to gain greater re­
putation in temporal matters, Italy was divided 
into many states; many of the principal cities 
took up arms against their nobles, who, favored 
by the emperor, had held them in subjection, and 
the Church encouraged this in order to increase 
its temporal power. In many other cities one of 
the inhabitants became prince. Thus Italy hav­
ing fallen almost entirely into the hands of the 
Church and a few republics, and the priests and 
other citizens not being accustomed to bear arms, 
they began to hire foreigners as soldiers.®
The title of the Italian mercenary was functional, a 
condottiere being the leader of a free company who engaged
£JA recently published study of the medieval Italian com­
mune is Daniel Waley, The Italian Ci ty-Repub 11 cs (New York: 
McGraw Hill Book Co., 1969).
6Machiavelli, The Prince, trans., Ricci, p. 75. The term 
* foreigner' as employed in the above passage does not neces­
sarily mean just the hordes of non-Italians who swarmed into 
Italy as soldiers of fortune in the late Middle Ages, but also 
men from one city-state who contracted to fight for another.
his band by a written contract or condotta to serve an em­
ployer. The condotta, of which there were several variations, 
specified, like Edward Ill's indentures, "length and terms of
service, number of men, pay, and so on" and was carefully
7drafted by lawyers representing both parties. Anthony Mockler 
lists three of the more typical types of condotte in Use in 
fifteenth-century Florence: the condotta a soldo disteso
which bound the condottiere and a fixed number of his men to 
active service under a native-born commander; the condotta a 
mezzo soldo which was less restrictive in that it allowed the 
mercenary leader his own command with freedom to harass the 
enemy more or less at will; and the condotta in aspetto which 
was "basically a retainer paid to condottieri in time of 
peace in order to keep their loyalty.11® Whatever the shades 
of difference between them, these instruments of hire were 
calculated business ventures in which both employer and wage 
earner hoped to gain, the former, if nothing else, the uncer­
tain comfort that his adversaries had been denied the good 
offices of his client, the latter, the equally uncertain prom­
ise „ of regular pay, without which his mercurial recruits 
would melt away in search of a more circumspect agent through 
which to peddle their highly saleable wares.
^Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 44. 
8Ibid.
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In the fifteenth century the major subscribers to, and
hence the most liberal rewarders of, mercenary labor in Italy
were the Papacy, Florence, Milan, Venice, and the kingdom of 
9Naples, and the condottieri they employed were as numerous
as their quarrels. A conspicuous case in point was Venice,
whose army at least through the Renaissance, was exclusively
mercenary, her citizens barred by law from military service
10even as officers.
Through the greater part of the later Middle Ages the 
condottieri, first non-Italian captains like the Essex-born 
adventurer, Sir John Hawkwood, and subsequently native cap­
tains like the lowborn Francesco Bussone who won fame as the 
Count of Carmagnola, gained international reputations of
^Deiss, Captains of Fortune, p. 21.
^Machiavelli, Chief Works, II, 586, 924.
11The careers of Hawkwood and Bussone demonstrate respec­
tively how remunerative and dangerous the lives of soldiers 
of fortune could be. The former was a native of Sible Heding- 
ham, Hinckford, Essex. A veteran of the Hundred Years' War 
and organizer of the famed "White Company" of mercenary free­
booters, he entered Italy in 13 62 and successively served the 
Marquis of Monferrato, the Republic of Pisa, the Visconti 
Dukes of Milan, and various other masters before ending his 
days in 1394 as an honored pensioner of the Florentine govern­
ment. As a soldier of great renown, his remains at the re­
quest of Richard II were presumably returned to England and 
are thought to rest in the chantry erected to his memory in 
the parish of his birth.
Bussone, the son of a shepherd, was born at Carmagnola, 
which name he assumed as his own, in the Piedmont in 1390.
A soldier by trade, he rose by dint of his own ability to com­
mand the army of the last Visconti duke of Milan, Filippo
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sorts, and their contemporary, the humanist scholar and edu­
cator of princes, Piero Paolo Vergerio or Vergerius, as he 
styled himself, could write that Italy was "the best possible
school of warfare" and that those who had not fought there
1 2were "of no military use anywhere." Yet less than a cen­
tury later, on Charles VIII’s invasion in 1494, the Italians 
were found to be peculiarly ineffective as soldiers, permit­
ting the French, who "scarce considered [them] men," almost 
free passage to Naples.i3
What had happened in the intervening years was that Italy 
had become, at least from the standpoint of military progress, 
a closed community. Too intensely involved in her own inter­
necine struggles, she, like England, had marked time, while 
such states as France, Switzerland, the Germanies, and Spain 
had passed her by. In contrast to them Italy was singularly
Maria, in 1424. Shortly thereafter he passed into Venetian 
service, and as Captain-General of the republic's forces de­
feated the Milanese army in 1427. However, in ensuing cam­
paigns against his former employer, Duke Filippo, he was de­
feated for which he was treacherously siezed and executed in 
1432. For brief accounts of the careers of both Bossone and 
Hawkwood, sjee Deiss, Captains of Fortune, Chaps. Ill and IV.
1 2See his instructions "Concerning Training in the Art 
of War," part of his essay De Ingenius Moribus in William 
Harrison Woodward, Vittorino da Feltre and Other Humanist 
Educators (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University,
1963), pp. 112-161! Hereinafter cited as Vergerius, De 
Ingenius Moribus.
i3Coramines, Memoirs, II, 164.
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uninfluenced by the military revolution that was about to en­
gulf her. As in Vergerius' time the chief reliance of the 
condottieri was on cavalry,^ the footsoldier being still de­
spised: "He skirmished in open order with his crossbow,"
leaving the important fighting to the knight on horseback;
"he was unacquainted with the halberd. Firearms were regarded 
as a novelty of very doubtful value, [and] many rulers still 
encouraged the practice of archery on appointed days."15
Machiavelli somewhat exaggerated the faults of the con­
dottieri at whose door alone he laid the blame for Italy1s 
shameful performance at the opening of the Great Italian Wars. 
Nevertheless his endless diatribes, if considered objectively, 
against the background of his personal experience, have a cer­
tain ring of truth that are worth considering.
It is in The Prince that he most eloquently berates the 
condottieri: "the present ruin of Italy is the result of no­
thing else than her reliance upon mercenaries for a stretch 
of many years. For some princes they gained real advantages, 
and they seemed valiant against each other; but when the for­
eigners came they showed what they were, so that Charles, the
14Vergerius, De Ingenius Moribus, p. 115.
15Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, pp. 34-35.
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16king of France, was allowed to take Italy with chalk,'1
Their employment, along with auxiliary troops, whom 
Machiavelli considered no better than condottieri, was to be 
utterly avoided:
The mercenary and the auxiliary are useless 
and dangerous; if a prince continues to base his 
government on mercenary armies he will never be 
either stable or safe; they are disunited, ambi­
tious, without discipline, disloyal; valiant 
among friends, among enemies cowardly; they have 
no fear of God, no loyalty to men. Your ruin is 
postponed only as long as attack on you is post­
poned; in peace you are plundered by them, in war 
by your enemies. The reason for this is that they 
have no love for you nor any cause that can keep 
them in the field other than a little pay, which 
is not enough to make them risk death for you.
They are eager indeed to be your soldierj^as long 
as you are not carrying on a war . . . .
As for their manner of giving battle, Machiavelli mercilessly 
lampoons it: "these men," he writes in his History of Flor­
ence, "made among themselves a compact and understanding . .
. by which they turned war into a technique for so wasting
Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 47. The reference to 
chalk originated with Commines, Memoirs, II, 153. In allud­
ing to the faint hearts of the Italians, Commines had this to 
say: "though they beheld the storm afar off, yet had they
not courage or wisdom enough either to resist or avoid it.
For, except the castle of Naples, there was not one place 
which stopped the progress of the king's arms for one day, 
which occasioned Pope Alexander VI to say that the French 
came into Naples with wooden spurs and chalk in the harbin­
gers 1 hand to mark out their lodgings which they took up with­
out any more trouble . . . .  In short, this expedition into 
Italy was performed with so much ease and so little resis­
tance that our soldiers scarce ever put on their armor . . . ."
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time that when two states made war both of them generally
lost."18 How this was accomplished is described in The Prince;
First, in order to give reputation to their own 
forces, they took away the reputation of the in­
fantry. They did this because, being without 
territory and dependent on their employment, a 
few infantry did not give them reputation, and 
for a large number they were unable to provide 
pay. Hence they turned to cavalry which, with 
manageable numbers, brought them income and 
honor. And things came to such a state that in 
an army of twenty thousand soldiers there were 
not two thousand footmen. Besides this they 
used every effort to rid themselves and their 
soldiers from hardship and fear, not killing 
one another in their combats but taking one 
another prisoner without asking ransom.^ They
1 8Ibid., III, 1079.
19This practice is supported by the independent testimony 
of an eyewitness, Commines, Memoirs, II, 127, who reports that 
in a skirmish in the Piedmont in 1494 at the beginning of the 
Great Italian Wars, when Charles VIII's'ally, Ludovico Sforza, 
Duke of Milan, took some prisoners they "were stripped to 
their shirts . . . and dismissed . . . for in Italy that is 
the law of arms." As to be expected, however, the condottieri 
did not long continue in this custom and quickly adopted the 
more remunerative North European habit of ransoming their pri­
soners .
In the early Tudor army foreigners, like native English 
conscripts, were constrained by martial law to turn over "all 
dukes, counts, captains, generals, sovereigns, high officers" 
and princes of the blood royal to the king or his principal 
commander, with the understanding that the captor would re­
ceive adequate compensation for his pains. All other prison­
ers could be ransomed by their captors at pleasure and for 
whatever sums they could bring, except that before such trans­
actions could be initiated permission had to be obtained from 
the company commander and, in the case of foreigners, from the 
English commander-in-chief. (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, f. 16.
In reward for the capture of "Monsieur Dostanges, French gen­
tleman, whom they took prisoner at Broughty Crag" on the 
estuary of the River Tay during the Duke of Somerset's
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did not fire on cities at night, and the mer­
cenaries in the cities did not fire on tents; 
around their camps they did not provide either 
stockades or ditches; they did not campaign in 
the winter. And all these things that they al­
lowed among their military customs they are said 
to have devised in order to escape hardship and 
dangers— with the result that they conducted [an
a n u  xiii.aiujr •
History of Florence recounts at least three battles 
in which no single casualty resulted from hostile action. One 
in 1424 involved the defeat of the Florentines at Zagonara by 
Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan. The contest was fought in a 
rainstorm, and "in so great a defeat, reported everywhere in 
Italy, nobody died except Lodovico degli Obizzi with two of 
his followers; these three, falling from their horses, were 
drowned in the mud." At Anghiari in 1440, "In this great de­
feat and long fight lasting from two until six o'clock, not 
more than one man died, and he perished not from wounds or 
any honorable blow, but by falling from his horse and being 
trampled." Finally, in the war between Florence and Venice in
invasion of Scotland in 1547, Gualtero Bergamo and Bernardo 
Piezon da Lodi, two Italian arquebusiers, received 35200.
(P. R. O.) E 351/43, mem. 10. The rules and regulations gov­
erning the ransoming of prisoners of war by the soldiers who 
fought for Henry VIII in France in 1513 were set forth in a 
proclamation of that year and have been included in Hughes 
and Larkin, eds., Tudor Royal Proclamation, I, 116-18. For 
further details on the subject consult Cruickshank, Army 
Royal, Chap. IX.
Italy to slavery
^Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 51.
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1467/ in the battle of Molinella "which lasted half a day with­
out either side yielding . . . nobody was killed; merely some 
horses were wounded and some prisoners taken . . ."21
Machiavelli's casualty lists are not to be taken too seri­
ously, and other historians, both contemporary and modern, have
22criticized his too harsh assessment of the condottieri. None­
theless, the concensus of scholarly opinion still holds that in 
the fifteenth century Italy's mercenary captains had made of 
war a kind of game in which maneuver and selfish pecuniary in­
terest took precedence over obligations to employers or the 
hazardous verdict of arms. But all this came to an abrupt end 
owing to the invasion of the French, who according to Guic­
ciardini turned everything "upside down as if by a sudden 
storm . . . .:" states were conquered "in less time than it 
used to take [the condottieri] to occupy a villa;" cities fell 
"not in months, but in days and hours. Battles became savage 
and bloody in the extreme. In fact states were now saved or
21Ibid., III, 1192-93, 1280, 1363.
22See, for example, Oman, A History of the Art of War in 
the Middle Ages, II, 309, for the appraisal of the sixteenth- 
century historian, Ammirato, of the battle of Molinella, and 
Denys Hay, Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries 
(London: Longmans, 1968), p. 185. Machiavelli himself heaps
praise on any number of condottiere whom he regards as atypi­
cal because they fought to win. Francesco Carmagnola was 
such a captain, as was Castruccio Castracani ("Dog Castrator"), 
who served as the subject of Machiavelli's biographical study, 
The Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca. This work in 
translation is included in the Chief Works, II, 533-59.
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ruined, given and taken, not by plans made in the chancery,
23but by feats of arms in the field." .
A similar pragmatic approach to war attended Spain's en­
try into the conflict on behalf of the king of Naples in 1495,
and like the French, Gonzalo de Cordova held the Italians in
24considerable contempt. Nonetheless, to the credit of the 
condottieri, after the initial shock of scorched earth and 
war to the knife had abated, they adjusted their thinking and 
quickly imbibed of the lessons the foreigners had to teach.
The condottieri, in assessing the strengths of the latter, 
had much on which to reflect. In almost every practical as­
pect of campaigning the Italians had been out-matched: their
tactics of delay and maneuver had failed miserably against 
the more direct approach of the French; their cavalry, mainly 
through lack of support from other arms, had been ineffective; 
and as was to be expected of a people who had long regarded 
infantry as next to worthless, they had been embarrassed by 
their lack of sufficient numbers of foot soldiers and the ob­
solescent weapons with which they had been armed.
23Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence,
p. 2 0 .
24Prescott, History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isa­
bella the Catholic, II, 305. Rather than trust his Sicilian 
and Calabrian auxiliaries to defend the strongholds which 
still held out against the French, Gonzalo detached "a con­
siderable part of his Spanish forces to garrison these places."
153
25Of tactics and cavalry something has been said elsewhere, 
but the deficiencies' of the Italian infantry were rapidly rec­
tified by simply conscripting more men and training them in the 
methods of their adversaries. In 1497, within two years of 
Gonzalo's first triumpts in Naples, Vitellozo Vitelli, a con- 
dottiere later murdered by Cesare Borgia, drilled native 
troops in the "ultramontane fashion" of the Swiss and led
them to victory, albeit on behalf of Charles VIII, at Soriano
26in central Italy. Borgia himself used similar troops in 
his wars in Romagna, while Machiavelli* s attempt at forming 
an efficient Florentine militia based on a combination of Ro­
man, Spanish, and Swiss methods is so famous that it is best
27read elsewhere.
As for the Italian aversion to firearms so prevalent in 
the fifteenth century, that too was amended, though grudgingly 
perhaps in some quarters. In his Art of War published in 1521, 
Machiavelli could still describe the arquebus as "a new weapon,"
2RAbove, Chap. VI, passim.
26Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence, 
p. 345. For the manner of Vitelli's death consult the "De­
scription of the Method Used by Duke Valentino In Killing 
Vitellozo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Ferrao, and Others" in Machi­
avelli, Chief Works, I, 163-69. The "execution," as Cesare 
called it, took place at Senigallia, near Fano, on the 
Adriatic at the end of December, 1502.
27One of the more scholarly accounts is rendered by 
Pasquale Villari, The Life and Times of Niccolb Machiave 11 i, 
trans. Linda Villari” (2 vols.: New York: Greenwood Press,
Publishers, 1968), I, 392-99 and passim.
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useful for terrorizing raw levies in that the noise of "one 
arquebusier [could] frighten them more than twenty other armed 
men." Obviously the philosopher-statesman-historian put lit­
tle faith in firearms, and if the arquebus was chiefly useful 
for making noise, artillery, he felt, was of no value at all,
particularly in the field, where the heavy guns obstructed an
28army's view of the enemy by their smoke. For these reasons 
Machiavelli preferred for his model infantrymen the swords and 
bucklers of Spain, while of artillery he would have limited 
its use to sieges.
There were others, Guicciardini for instance, who consid­
ered gunpowder weapons a "great pest," but among the condot­
tieri these were a minority. Gone were the days when such 
men as Gian Paolo Vitelli, who during an illustrious freelanc­
ing career unflinchingly tore out the eyes and cut off the 
hands of captured arquebusiers because it offended his sense
of honor that gentlemen on horseback should be struck down by
29common infantrymen. Instead, on the outbreak of the Great 
Italian Wars the use of handguns rapidly increased in Italy. 
About 1510, when the ratio of arquebuses to other arms in the 
landsknecht companies stood at one in sixteen, the proportion
28Machiavelli, Chief Works, II, 607, 625, 637, 654.
29Deiss, Captains of Fortune, p. 25. Gian Paolo (d.
1499), the brother of Vittelozzo, was executed by his Floren­
tine employers who feared he might make himself their lord.
See Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 49, 166.
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in Italian armies was as high as one in ten, and in 1527, in 
the Duke of Urbino's command, more, than one-third, all of them 
Italians, were arquebusiers. Even that great skeptic, Machi­
avelli, felt constrained to bend to the bias of his times by 
recommending that one-sixth of all infantry units be provided 
with firearms.
The later history of the Great Italian Wars demonstrates 
only too well how completely the condottieri assimilated the 
instruction of the foreigners, as names like Prospero Colonna, 
Giovanni de'Medici, and Piero Strozzi fairly leap from its 
pages. Each of these men were notable commanders of Imperial 
and Valois troops, and none of them, the foremost condottieri 
of their age, were content to simply imitate, so that the 
Italian military genius applauded by Vergerius a century ear­
lier reasserted itself through them. It was Colonna the care­
ful practitioner of Fabian strategy and meticulous entrencher
who expelled the French from Milan in 1521 and destroyed the
31army sent to retake it at Bicocca. His systematic sapping 
during the siege of Padua in 1513, though it failed for lack 
of laborers, was the first instance of a besieging array mov­
ing on a citadel "with its artillery by means of zigzag 
trenches," while his field fortifications before Milan in
o n Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1495-1529, pp. 41,
47; Machiavelli, Chief Works, II, p. 601.
^Above, pp. 123-24.
156
1521 were considered by Guicciardini "as the finest military
32work of the age."
Giovanni de*Medici, better known to his compatriots as 
Giovanni delle Bande Mere from the black accouterments of his 
followers' harness, was a highly talented cavalry officer 
whose exploits will be recounted more at length in a subse­
quent chapter, but who in a short but meteoric career devel­
oped a force of mounted arquebusiers, thereby enlarging upon
33the infantry system of Gonzalo de Cordova.
The house of Strozzi bulks large in the annals of six­
teenth-century Italy. The founder of the family's fame was 
the Florentine, Filippo, who amassed a fortune in various 
mercantile enterprises before his death in 1491. His son, 
Filippo II, acquired considerable status as the husband of 
Clarice de'Medici, neice of Leo X, who first as cardinal and 
later as pope restored the Medicis to control in Florence
34after a brief republican interlude between 1494 and 1512. 
Unfortunately, Filippo II's ill-considered attempt to force 
the overthrow of Cosimo I, Duke of Tuscany, led to his undo­
ing in 1537, when as one of the leaders of an army of French 
and Italian mercenaries he was captured and either took his
3^Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, pp. 143, 149.
33Below, pp. 182-84.
34G. F. Young, The Medici (New York: The Modern Library,
1930), pp. 268 ff.
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own life or was murdered after excruciating tortures in one of 
Cosimo's dungeons.̂  ̂
It was with his son, Piero, that the family reputation 
was restored* An able leader and condottiere, he entered the 
French army, having made himself persona non grata in Florence
by his involvement in his father’s treason, and after distin­
guishing himself in a score of hostile actions died a Marshal
36of France at the siege of Thionville on the Moselle m  1558.
As an innovator, Piero was intimately associated with the adop­
tion of the musket, a new weapon which by the close of the cen­
tury displaced the arquebus as the predominant type of infantry 
handgun in Europe. While in the service of Francis I he is 
credited with having devised the drills by which the first
picked units of French infantrymen learned to handle this un- 
37wieldy piece.
The condottieri contributed towards the development of
35Ibid., pp. 552-53, 554.
36Ibid., p. 578.
37Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 225. 
The musket, introduced in its original form in the Great Ital­
ian Wars, perhaps as early as 1521, "was six feet long and 
fired bails weighing two ounces. Its weight necessitated the 
use of a fork-shaped rest, but its unwieldiness was compen­
sated for by its greater killing power— its ability to bring 
down two armored cavalrymen with one shot.” Taylor, The Art 
of War in Italy, 1494-1529, pp. 46-47. Oman suggests 1527 
as the date of the musket's origin and gives 1584 as the year 
in which the weapon is first mentioned in an English company.
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the soldier's art in another and perhaps more unique fashion 
by being the first of the modern practitioners to approach 
the study of war as a science. Vergerius, about 1404, refer­
red to training in arms as second to none among the Liberal 
Arts and recommended as an educator and tutor of princes the 
cultivation of the broader aspects of war, namely, "the prin­
ciples of generalship, strategy and tactics, discipline, sup-
38plies, and the ordering of camps and winter quarters."
Later, condottieri founded military schools, those of Fran­
cesco Sforza, who succeeded Filippo Maria Visconti as Duke of 
Milan in 1450, and Braccio Fortebraccio, who contemporaneously 
made himself master of Umbria in central Italy, being among 
the most renowned. The scuola sforzeschi excelled in the 
teaching of tactics and maneuvering; the graduates of the 
scuola braccesca were feared for the ferocity of their attack; 
and virtually all of the leading condottieri at the outset of 
the Great Italian Wars were products of one or the other of 
these institutions, some of them no doubt hired by Catherine 
Sforza, granddaughter of Francesco, for her son Giovanni de' 
Medici.^
As Taylor so clearly points out, the study of warfare as
38Vergerius, De Ingenius Moribus, pp. 114-15, 116. He 
actually refers to military training as a "scientific" under­
taking .
39Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 70; Young, The Medici, p. 535.
159
a theoretical discipline was in no small way due to the unique 
mental and political climate of Renaissance Italy, Its "in­
tense intellectual life" and "the aggregation of a number of 
competing states within a small area" combined to provide 
"both the atmosphere and the soil for fostering this new 
branch of knowledge." In the military schools teachers and 
students were not unlettered peasants, but more usually lords 
and gentlemen to whom the benefits of neo-classical education 
had been made available, with the result that in the lengthy 
sessions on tactics and strategy masters and pupils could be 
expected to fortify "their arguments with citations from the 
Greek and Latin classics." Such military dilettantism una­
voidably contributed to the type of opera bouffe set-pieces 
that Machiavelli so sharply inveighed against, "but this de­
generation should not obscure the fact that the condottieri 
were the medium through which the Renaissance, both as a 
classical and as a scientific movement, influenced the develT 
opment of the art of war in Europe."4^
It is,however, in their capacity as mercenaries and aux­
iliaries rather than disseminators of culture that the con­
dottieri are of most concern herein. Materialists at heart, 
they were easily tempted by foreign pay, and if in the early 
sixteenth century the majority of them remained in Italy
40Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 7.
where war between Valois and Hapsburg and signory and republic 
reached epidemic proportion, not a few were enticed to try 
their luck beyond the Alps where their long experience and 
exceptional virtuosity were assets readily saleable to norths 
ern princes such as Henry VIII, whose own armies were defi­
cient in both professionalism and specialization.
CHAPTER VI
THE MILITARY REVOLUTION AND EARLY SIXTEENTH CENTURY CAVALRY
There ought nevertheless to be some cavalry . . . 
because for scouting, for raiding and laying waste 
hostile country, for keeping an-enemy harassed and 
worried and under arms all the time, for cutting 
off his provisions, they are necessary and very 
useful. But as to the battles and encounters in 
the field that are the chief thing in war and the 
end for which armies are organized, cavalry are 
more useful for pursuing the enemy when he is 
routed than for any other service in battle; they 
are much less efficient than the foot soldiers.
Machiavelli, The Art of War, Book 2.
Professionalism and specialization are indeed correct 
terms to utilize in describing the metamorphisis which trans­
figured the face of war during this period. To briefly sum 
up what already has been said, the first half of the six­
teenth century saw the coterminous existence in Europe of 
several battle-hardened infantries which by exceptional mas­
tery of their art ranked far above their less vocationally 
oriented counterparts in other armies. Only the French, among 
European states not previously assayed, came close to approxi­
mating the high reputation for infantry gained by Germans, 
Swiss, Italians, and Spaniards; nonetheless, French commanders 
exhibited such a distinct preference for mercenary foot sol­
diers, notably landsknechts and Swiss, that contemporaries 
were led on occasion to complain that without foreign
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conscription there would have been no French army at all.
Of considerably more significance,' however, was the fact 
that in the early sixteenth century among the various national 
infantries available for hire a universally recognizable "type 
was beginning to evolve as a consequence of their repeated en­
counters in Italy. By a combination of self-preservation and 
cultural osmosis each of the combating forces liberally bor­
rowed from its rival those special weapons or tactics which 
provided their competitors with an advantage: thus the Ger­
mans adopted the Switzers' pike, which weapon was soon appro­
priated by the Spaniards, who made restitution be demonstrat­
ing to the Italians and the world at large the value of small 
arms firepower. The general outcome of such diffusion was 
that, while each protagonist retained their regional flair and 
never completely relinquished control of those skills on which 
they had built their fame, the German, Swiss, Spanish, and 
Italian infantrymen emerged from their struggles as the proto­
types of the first modern European foot soldiers.
This was no mean accomplishment, considering that, since 
the early Middle Ages, Europe had persisted in regarding only 
the mounted knight as worthy of the appellation, "professional
On the French reliance on German and, more particularly, 
Swiss infantry see Fourquevaux, Inst r uctions sur le Faict de 
la Guerre, p. 5 and passim, and Daniel, Histoire de la Mi'l'xce 
Frangoise, I, 257; II, 287 ff.
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Opinion was slightly modified in the aftermath of such four­
teenth-century debacles as Cr^cy, Poitiers, Laupen, and 
Sempach, when hardy yeomen armed with longbow and halberd 
crushed the pride of Europe's haughtiest gendarmerie. Yet it 
took twenty-five years of slaughter, culminating in Francis 
I's impulsive charge at Pavia, to convince the sixteenth-cen­
tury votaries of medieval warfare that the day of the heavily 
armored horseman had all but run its course.
It must not be presumed, however, that after Pavia cav­
alry either vanished from battlefields in the West or that 
mounted service became obsolete. Rather, earlier experience 
in the Great Italian Wars had taught that cavalry, if it were 
to be viable and effective in operations, had to adapt itself 
to meet the challenges in tactics and weaponry with which the 
new infantry had armed itself. Fortunately, like their infan' 
try counterparts, commanders of horse soldiers responded well 
to the problems posed them and experimented successfully with 
any number of stratagems which insured their service1s con­
tinued usefulness.
There were o f course many kinds of cavalry, and Gervase 
Markham, the celebrated Elizabethan horseman and breeder, 
categorized the principal troops of horse as they existed 
"In the old Wars" of the generation which preceded his own 
as men-at-arms, demilancers, and light horse. Men-at-arms, 
because of the expense of maintaining their equipment, were
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invariably noblemen or at the very least gentlemen:
they were armed with defensive Arms at all pieces.
Cap a. pie, from head to foot; that is to say with 
close Casks on their heads, Gorgets about their 
necks, fair Breastplates of Arquebus proof,2 and 
Backpieces of less proof for their bodies; Pould- 
rons for their shoulders; Vambraces for their arms, 
Gauntlets for their hands, Taces for their belly, 
Cuisses for the knee, and Greaves for the legs and 
feet, and about their waists rich Bases of Velvet, 
Satin, Silk and other stuff, and Girdles and Hang­
ers. For offensive Arms they had fair gilt Swords 
and Daggers, strong Lances headed with Steel, and 
[a] Cask of short Pistols, with priming box. Flask 
key, and Bullet bag, a well armed Battle-axe, and 
a strong pair of Spurs . . . with long necks and 
long Rowels.
As described, the horses for these heavy cavalrymen were 
"strong, well shaped, of great courage, and thoroughly [man­
aged] and ridden." Of "lusty age," they were stoned "(because 
tiring hurts them not) . . . and fair t r o t t i n g a n d  of these 
mounts in Markham’s estimation the Neopolitan were the best, 
followed by the Greeks, the Spanish, the English, "the Almain 
or the French." In action such horses were as heavily armored
as their riders, their breasts and flanks protected either by
3bards of steel or caparisons of the toughest bend-leather.
The heads of the animals were enclosed in steel headpieces or 
chamfrons, and their reins were "of broad leather" lined with 




and a decorative saker for the tail completed the outfitting 
of the horse for war.4
The second type of horsemen common to all the armies of 
western Europe are called by Markham "demilancers," a word 
which everywhere seems to have been unknown in the sense em­
ployed here except in England. Elsewhere, as in France for 
instance, demilancers were classified as chevaux legers, li­
terally "light horse," a generic term indiscriminately applied 
throughout Europe in denoting all cavalry troops other than 
men-at-arms. Why the English, who eschewed the greater part 
of the technical jargon arising from the military revolution, 
should have been alone in finding a name for these troops is 
a mystery; but that a kind of cavalryman recognizable as a 
demilancer existed on the Continent is attested by the records 
of the payments made to them by the English muster masters who 
hired them. In 1549, for example, Jacques Jermigny, a Vene­
tian captain, led more than 150 demilancers and other assorted 
cavalrymen, both "gunners" and men-at-arms, against the West 
Country rebels in the Prayer Book rising of that year, while 
in 1550 Petro Sanga, an Albanian, served in the same theater
4Gervase Markham, The Cavallarie, or the Formes and Man­
ner of Trayning of Horse, as it hath beene received from the 
latest and best experienced Armies (London: I. D., 1625), pp.
38-39. Hereinafter cited as The Cavallarie.
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5 mwith a contingent of 134 .demilancers. The heaviest type of 
light horsemen, they were wholly armored like men-at'-arms, ex­
cept that from the knees down they substituted long leather 
boots for cuisses and greaves, which picture roughly coincides 
with the description of the "three thousand demilances, whole 
armed . . . except the legs," referred to in the estimate of
g
needs prepared for Henry VIII in 1512. Their offensive wea­
pons were the lance, a battle-axe, a sword and dagger, and 
towards the middle of the century a case of pistols, and as 
they were more lightly accoutered then gendarmes, they rode 
smaller mounts which were themselves less encumbered. Markham 
specifies that the horses were strong, "well ridden for the
field," and equipped with steel saddles and breastplates, but
7without the barding and caparisoning of the destrier.
Of the third sort of "ancient Horsemen" called light 
horse, Markham relates that "they were armed for defense with
OBurgonets or steel caps, Gorgets, Cuirasses or Plate coats. 
Gauntlets or Gloves of Mail." Their offensive arms consisted
5 (P. R. 0.) E 351/43, mems. 5, 7. Other foreign demi­
lancers in English service are mentioned in (P. R. 0.) E 101 
531/39, mem. 26.
6L. &.P., I, pt. 1, No. 1412.
7Markham, The Cavallarie, p. 40. Destrier or "great 
horse" was the name applied to the mount of the men-at-arms. 
There were many breeds, as the passage above (p. 164) indi­
cates, all of them raised specifically for war.
QSee Glossary.
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of a light spear or "chasing Staff," a sword, and a dagger to 
which arsenal was later added a pistol or two. Their horses, 
furnished with headstalls, breastplates, and leather saddles, 
"were nimble light Geldings, fair trotting, and well ridden,"
As light cavalry employment was the least prestigious of the 
mounted services, those drafted normally came from the lowest
Qsocial grades. Such were the "prickers"* who rode for the
10Tudors, the genitours of Spain, and the argoulets of France, 
"handsome Yeomen or Serving-men," Markham calls them, "light 
timbered and of comely shape," who like "little David (many 
times) puts down the greatest Goliath."1 *̂
Markham of course compressed a great deal of history into 
a very few words. His categorization of early sixteenth-cen­
tury cavalry troops is accurate, and allowing for a few sec­
tional idiosyncrasies, his generalizations regarding the of­
fensive and defensive habilments of men and beasts is admir­
able in its economy and exactitude. What he failed to say is
^Above, p . 39, n . 74.
10Argoulets, possibly raised for the first time by Louis 
XII (1462-1515) in 1499, were a native French light cavalry 
trained in imitation of the Albanian stradiots (for whose his­
tory see below, pp. 112 ff.). They fit Markham's stereotype 
perfectly, being "armed with a light cuirass and cabasset to 
protect the head. They had as offensive weapons the sword, 
the mace, the crossbow, and afterwards the [wheel-lock pistol]." 
Denison, A History of Cavalry, pp. 242-43.
■^Markham, The Cavallarie, p. 40,
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that, except for heavy cavalry which remained the mainstay of 
European armies until the inception of the Great Italian Wars, 
no other regular standing bodies of horse were to be found any­
where in the West.^ put in other words, before the opening 
of the Hapsburg-Valois struggle for the mastery of Italy,
Europe had no professional light cavalry. Obviously light 
cavalry forces existed; but whereas the gendarmerie in the 
course of a millenium had acquired the character and prestige 
of an international institution, light cavalry up to the be­
ginning of the sixteenth-century was everywhere underdeveloped, 
indisciplined, and held in the lowest respect.
A major restriction on the progress of light cavalry had 
always been that it had functioned in conjunction with heavy 
cavalry; it had no independent existence of its own. By medi­
eval convention,the untitled light horseman usually served the 
man-at-arms as an ancillary both on and off the field, as is 
easily demonstrated by examining the "lance" or, as the 
French termed it, lance fournie, the basic tactical and admin­
istrative unit into which most cavalries in the later Middle 
Ages came to be divided.
By definition,a lance consisted of a single man-at-arms 
and a variable number of light cavalry auxiliaries. In
exception may be made of Spain where by 1494 the 
genitours recruited for royal service had begun to be organ­
ized as distinct units. Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 
1494-1529, p. 69.
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France, in the reign of Charles VII (1403-1461), this unit con­
tained a knight, his armor-bearer or coutilier, three mounted 
archers, and a page. The coutilier doubled as serving-man
and fighter, while the page, whose domestic chores were many,
13functioned as horse tender when the unit fought on foot. A
similar dichotomy of purpose can be detected among the Italian
and English light horsemen. In the Italian lance the capo-
lancia or chief was served by a squire, one mounted archer,
and a page, while in 1509 each of the Gentlemen Pensioners
created by Henry VIII was assigned a demilance, an archer,
and a custrell, the latter being simply the Tudor counterpart
14of the French coutilier.
As in the Middle Ages, during the early phases of the 
Great Italian Wars light and heavy cavalry were sent into ac­
tion in mixed formations. Only with the introduction of a 
new type of light cavalry did commanders begin to perceive 
the advantages that could be had by utilizing the more mobile 
horsemen as specialized forces with particular responsibilities.
13H. C. B. Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British 
Army, 1066-1945 (London: Seeley Service and Co., Ltd., 1959),
p. 31. The coutilier took his name from the Old French 
coustille, the long poinard with which he was armed.
14Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the' British Army, 1066- 
1945, p. 35. On the organization of the Italian lance see 
Deiss, Captains of Fortune, p. 18, and Taylor, The Art of War 
in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 69. According to Deiss, on long cam­
paigns the Italian page or ragazzo might expect to be used as 
a woman.
17Q
The new light horse in question were the "Albanians," a 
predatory and mercenary host of Balkan warriors who must rank 
among the foremost cavalry troops of their or any other age. 
Principally Albanians and Greeks among whom perhaps mingled 
an occasional Croat or Rumanian, they were Christian emigres 
who chose exile in the West, settling in large numbers in 
Sicily, Naples, Venice, and Calabria, rather than submitting 
to Moslem rule which was fastened on their homelands during 
the inexorable advance of the Ottoman sultanate in the late 
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.
It was the Venetian authorities who initially exploited 
the mercenary predilections of the Albanians, organizing 
them before the close of the fifteenth century into what al­
most certainly were Europe's first regular corps of light cav­
alry. "Stradiots"15 was the name devised to describe these 
colorful horsemen, and as Venice was one of Italy's great 
mercenary markets, it was not long before the Albanians came 
to the attention of other western powers.
15Gabriel Daniel (d. 1728), the French priest who was 
among the first to attempt to unravel the history of the 
stradiots, erred it would seem in deriving their name from 
the Greek stratiotus (soldier). Their name in fact comes 
from the Italian strada (road or way), signifying "wanderers," 
persons of no fixed abode. See Konstantinos N. Sathas, Docu­
ments ine'clits relatifs a 1 * histoire de la Grece au moyen. age 
CB vols.: Paris! Maisonneuve et Cie., Editeurs, 1888), IV, 
p. lx. Hereinafter cited as Documents inedits. What is per­
haps the most comprehensive collection of stradiotic materials 
is contained in volumes VII, VIII, and IX of this series.
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The earliest reference made by the historians of north 
Europe to the Albanians is found in the history of Commines.
He relates that at the battle of Fornova, during Charles VIII,s 
withdrawal from Italy in 1495, the French troops were terri­
fied of these men because in their appearance and manner of 
fighting they were like nothing the French had ever encoun­
tered.^^ Regardless, Louis XII, Charles' successor, had two 
thousand Albanians in his service when he punished the revolt­
ing Genoese in 1507, and six years later when the English army
of Henry VIII laid siege to Therouanne, it was stradiots whom
17the French employed in a vain attempt to revictual the town.
The Albanians had now entered the mainstream of western Eu­
rope, and having found their way across the Alps, they became 
in the process a permanent feature on the battlefields in the 
West for almost the duration of the sixteenth century.
Stradiots not only figured prominently among the merce­
nary troops hired by France. They were introduced early to 
Spain, where like the native light cavalry they too were 
dubbed jinetas. In 1534 many thousand late-comers from 
Greece, fleeing before the continuing Turkish advance, were 
granted sanctuary in the Italian dominions of Charles V, and
16Commines, Memoirs, II, 205, 207.
^Daniel, Histoire de la Milice Francois, I, 231; Hall's 
Chronicle, pp. 543, 548.
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18in gratitude they entered his service en masse. Stradiots 
fought in Germany and in 1545 were hired for the first time 
by the English, whose Albanian captains led bands of "Pelopon­
nesians" against the Scots and brawled with the French in the 
Pas-de-Calais and around the fortress of Boulogne which had 
fallen to Henry VIII in the previous year.19
This wide-spread employment of stradiot troops is an in­
dication of their worth as fighters. Likewise, it is an indi­
cation that they filled a particular need, and where the Tu­
dors are concerned what that need was is manifestly revealed 
in the exceptionally detailed reports prepared for the Vene­
tian government by its accredited representatives at the Eng­
lish court.
In a word, the Venetians judged English cavalry to be 
entirely insignificant during the early Tudor period. Sebas­
tian Giustinian doubted in 1519 whether a hundred men-at-arms
or a thousand light horsemen could be raised in the entire 
20realm. The latter figure is almost certainly too low; yet 
thirty-five years later> Giacomo Soranzo, Venetian ambassador
^William Miller, The Latins in the Levant: A History
of Frankish Greece, 1204-1566 (London: John Murray, 1908) ,
p. 506. Hereinafter cited as The Latins in the Levant.
19 /Sathas, Documents inedits, IV, lix, and below, pp. 356,
378 ff.
20L. & P., Ill, pt. 1, Mo. 402.
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to Edward VI and Queen Mary f though, placing the number of Eng­
lish. light horse at fifteen thousand, hastened to add that it
21was "not good for war," an opinion sustained by his succes­
sor, Giovanni Michele, who in 1557 laid the blame for this de­
ficiency squarely on the shoulders of the English horse 
breeders:
As to the cavalry (I speak of light cavalry), if 
it were but a good description, it might be very 
numerous as that island produces a greater number 
of horses than any other region of Europe; but 
the horses being weak and of bad wind, fed merely 
on grass, being like sheep and all other cattle 
kept in field or pasture at all seasons . . . 
they cannot stand much work, nor are they held in 
much account, but nevertheless as they are mettled- 
some and high couraged, most especially if they
chance to be Welsh, .. . .they would do much bet­
ter were they better fed. ^
The Albanians labored under no such handicaps, both they 
and their swift Turkish mounts being noted for their tenacity 
and endurance in war. Guerillas on horseback, they special­
ized in sudden attacks and weakened their enemies by frequent 
skirmishing. Their peculiar offensive weapon was the assagai, 
a twelve-foot javelin equipped with a stabbing steel point at
both ends. At their side they wore a scimitar, and from their
saddlebows hung a heavy club which they employed after the
^ Venetian Calendar, V, No. 934.
22Quoted in Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British 
Army, 1066—1945, pp. 41-42, According to Soranzo's predeces­
sor, Daniel Barbaro, the English light cavalrymen used "any 
sort of horse."
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fashion of a mace. Their principal defensive weapon was a 
targe or shield, and for armor they wore a type of cuirass 
with sleeves and gloves of mail, over which was worn a padded 
sleeveless jerkin. Commines described them as he saw them in 
1495:
These Estradiots are of the same nature with the 
Genitours; they are horse and foot, and habited 
like Turks, only they wear no turbans upon their 
heads. They are hardy people, and lie abroad 
all the year round with their horses; they were 
all Greeks from the places which the Venetians 
possess in those parts, some of them from Nauplia 
[in] the Morea, others from Albania and Durazzo.
Their horses are all Turkish and very good; the 
Venetians employ them often in their wars and put 
great confidence in them . . . they are stout, 
active fellows and will plague an army terribly 
when they once undertake it.23
These were the warriors who at their first encounter terrified 
the French in northern Italy, who "with short stirrups, bea­
ver hats, small spears, and swords" harassed the English be-
24fore Therouanne in 1513, and who later fought to save be-
25leaguered Boulogne for Henry VIII in 1545.
The functions which light cavalry carried out in the six­
teenth century fell roughly into two categories— those of a 
combative nature which involved actual fighting and those of
23Commines, Memoirs, II, 201.
^ HalT1 s Chronicle, p. 543.
25Below, pp. 356, 378 ff.
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a non-combative nature which encompassed the more-or-less 
routine activities connected with military life* In the first 
category it was the task of light horsemen to reconnoiter the 
enemy and when ordered cause confusion in his ranks by haras­
sing him on the march or while encamped. Once an army had 
been attacked and routed, the light cavalry elements divided 
into small squads to pursue the retreating foe, the primary 
object being to complete the victory by slaying or taking pris­
oner as many of the defeated enemy as possible. Such work was 
generally beyond the endurance of men-at-arms, who with their 
barded chargers, if they had taken part in the main action, 
were now exhausted. As for routine duties, light cavalry was 
the obvious choice for patrols, the escourting of small con­
voys, and foraging. Albanians were admirably suited to per­
form all these functions, but it was as fighters they distin­
guished themselves.
The-manner in which Albanians fought was strange by west­
ern standards. In action their primary weapon was the assagai, 
that spear with a point at both ends. It was often wielded 
with both hands, so that at close quarters in hand-to-hand 
combat the wielder could defend himself or maim an enemy on 
two fronts by rapid thrusts either fore and aft or from side 
to side. While the assagai was normally employed as a cav­
alry weapon, it could be used when circumstances demanded as 
an infantry weapon against superior numbers of attacking
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2 6horse. Perhaps in imitation of the Swiss, whom they first
encountered in the Great Italians Wars, the Albanians were
27known to use their javelins as pikes.
Their scimitars provided their adversaries with another
cause for concern, for once a foe had been vanquished it was
their not uncommon practice to behead him, and if he had been
a foe of some distinction, to carry away his severed head on
the end of their spears. This it would seem was but one of
several traits acquired from the Turks. After Fornova the
heads of Swiss mercenaries were sold to the Venetians for a 
28ducat apiece.
Savage and bold though the Albanians were they had their
weaknesses. They are spoken of as vain, and while they may
have collected the bloody heads of their victims for bounty
money, the sound of artillery so terrified them that they were
29reputed to have carried amulets to protect them from it.
They are said to have been "fonder of booty than of battle," 
and at the Battle of the Spurs in 1513, in the only continen­
tal action involving an English army during the early Tudor
2 6This would perhaps explain Commines1 description of 
the stradiots as "horse and foot." He is the only author of 
the many consulted to suggest that Albanians served as any­
thing other than cavalrymen.
27Daniel, Histoire de la Milice Francoise, I, 231. 
^Commines, Memoirs, II, 201
29Ibid.; Sathas, Documents inedits, IV, lvi.
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period to approximate a pitched battle, it was the collision
of the stradiots with the French heavy horse which triggered
30the headlong flight of the Gallic chivalry. However, other 
authors have gloried in their triumphs. Indeed, their most 
ardent publicists came from within their own ranks, and a con­
siderable body of their literature has been preserved, much 
of it poetry which was composed in a dialect analogous to 
that now spoken Calabria.33* Stradiotic literature reflects 
the intense love these exiles had for their subjugated home­
lands, the common theme running through much of it being their 
rabid hatred of the Turks and a longing to return to the Bal­
kans. The stradiot, however, was mightier with the javelin 
than with the pen. Unfortunately, the thrusts he gave were 
rarely struck for his lost patria, and the heads he collected 
were rarely Turkish heads, his victims being more often fel­
low Christians against whom he had no real quarrel.
In the end the stradiots went the same way as the merce­
nary pikemen, though perhaps quicker. Like the landsknechts, 
unable to keep abreast of the ever-changing, habits or war, 
they became redundant. The last Albanians in English service 
appear to have been discharged in 1550 when on the overthrow
^^Hall1s Chronicle, pp. 530-31.
"^Sathas, Documents inedi'ts, IV, lvii, Volumes VII, VIII, 
and IX of this series contain a number of poems representative 
of the best in stradiotic literature.
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of the Protector Somerset peace was arranged with France and 
32Scotland, and while they lingered longer on the Continent, 
they vanished everywhere in the West before the close of the 
sixteenth century, their principal north European employers, 
the Valois kings of France, recruiting them for the final 
time shortly before Courtras in the final stages of the reli-
O Qgious "War of the Three Henries."
It is difficult to assess the influence of the stradiots 
on the development of sixteenth-century warfare; for while 
there is a considerable amount written about them in western 
histories, it is largely superficial, so that it provides lit­
tle insight into any impact they may have had. Nevertheless, 
it is incontestable that in the development of light cavalry 
tactics in the West the Albanians exerted a powerful influence, 
if for no other reason than that they themselves proved the 
worth of, and the need for, such well organized forces at a 
time when the greater part of Europe was without them. Daniel 
may have been correct in refuting BrantSme's contention"^ that
"^(P. R. 0.) E 101 531/39, mem. 2b, lists among the sun­
dry foreign captains who served Edward VI in the French and 
Scottish wars John de Lanciano and Andreas Rennzor, Albanians, 
who according to this accounting drew their last month's wages 
on June 28, 1550, four months after the formal cessation of 
hostilities.
33Daniel, Histoire de la Milice Francoise, I, 231.
A Pierre de Bourdeilles, Seigneur de Brantome (1540-1614), 
was a native of Perigord in northern Guienne. He served in
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it was upon the model provided by the stradiots that regular
35companies of French light cavalry were formed, but certainly 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these strange men 
from southeastern Europe helped germinate the idea.
One thing is certain; the example set by the stradiots, 
first in the opening rounds of the Great Italian Wars, and 
second in the related and subsidiary campaigning north of the 
Alps, encouraged the more enlightened commanders to venture 
upon the training of light cavalry for independent action.
The Spaniards, who previously had made some headway in this 
area, used their genitours to good effect in expelling the 
French from Naples, and it was actually these troops who after 
a night ride and the fording of a river secured Gonzalo de 
Cordova's first victory, the capture of Laino in Calabria in
numerous armies under many famous commanders, fighting in 
Malta, Italy, Africa, Hungary, and against the Huguenots in 
the religious wars in France. On his retirement from active 
duty about 1594 he began to write his memoirs. In one pas­
sage in his famous Vies des Grands Capitaines he says that in 
the time of Louis XII "one did not speak of French light cav­
alry," only of the gendarmerie "which surpassed all the others 
in the world . . . .  But the French made use of the so-called
'Albanois,' who brought to us the form of the light cavalry 
and the method of making war like they did. The Venetians, 
who wore us down at Fornova, called them their estradiots; 
they also called them Croats because of their nation. The 
Spanish called them genitours." Ludovic Lalanne, ed.,
Oeuvres Completes de Pierre de Bourdeille, Seigneur de 
Brant6me (11 vols.; Paris; Chez Mme. Ve. Jules Renouard, 
1864-82), II, 410.
■^Daniel, Histoire de la Milice Frangoise, II, 436.
3 61496. About this same time other bodies of light cavalry
began to appear as separate units, heralding the beginning of
the abandonment of the lance system in both Prance and Italy.
In 1495 the condottiere, Camillo Vitelli, routed a sizeable
formation of landsknechts at Lucera in Apulia with mounted 
37bowmen, a type of horse which heretofore had acted only in 
conjunction with heavy cavalry. Henceforth, until the whole­
sale adoption of firearms by cavalrymen towards the middle of 
the sixteenth century, mounted archers would rank among the 
most common of regular light cavalry troops in the West.
Every army had its share; the Italian, the Spanish, the 
French, and the English, though the latter's bowmen, except 
for those few assigned to garrison duty, could hardly be
looked upon as regulars; nor were they organized independently,
38but rather like those attached to the Gentlemen Pensioners 
submerged in a lance system which was retained at least through 
the end of the early Tudor period. The argoulets, two thou­
sand of which were raised for the French army in 1499 in
^Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence, 
p. 322.
37Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 70. 
Brother to Paolo and Vitellozo Vitelli, Camillo was killed in 
the following year while attempting to storm the fortress of 




39imitation of the Alhanian light horse, . provide the typical
archetype of this widely adopted service. Only the German
states seem to have lacked them in substantial quantities, a
phenomenon which might be accounted for by the unpopularity
40of the lance system in that part of the West, and if German 
knights did not utilize mounted ancillaries, then there were 
no bowmen to organize into independent companies.
After the initial enterprise of the Albanians and Span­
iards, Italians next emerged as the most venturesome promotors 
of professional light cavalry. Camillo Vitelli, the same con- 
dottier e who launched the experiment with regular companies
of mounted archers, was among the first to use regular bands
41of mounted arquebusiers, a logical stratagem considering the 
accelerated dissemination of firearms among infantry. The 
practice was maintained by his brother, Vitellozo, who had 
three hundred gunners on horseback in his pay in 1502, as
■^Below, p. 167, n. 10.
40According to Machiavelli, the lance system was not in 
vogue in Germany. Criticizing Italian practice, he says in 
his Art of War that "each man-at-arms has four horsemen in 
his service; but to allow it is an abuse, for in Germany the 
man-at-arms is alone with his one horse [i.e., with but a 
single mount] . . . ." Chief Works, II, p. 625. It was com­
mon where the lance system flourished for the man-at-arms, and 
sometimes his entire retinue, to maintain several mounts.
^Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1495-1529, p. 70.
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42opposed to fifty for his nemesis, Cesare Borgia, and by the 
end of the second decade of the century the practice of arm­
ing light horsemen with firearms had become so widespread that 
even Machiavelli, who preferred the crossbow, advised the con­
scription of at least a few cavalry handgunners, if only to 
frighten the opposition.43
It was left to another condottiere, Giovanni de'Medici, 
to fully exploit the potential of this new cavalry by combin­
ing its rapidity of movement with the massed broadsides of in­
fantry firepower. Giovanni's reputation as a soldier was al­
ready well established when, on April 22, 1522, he and his 
storied Black Band of Tuscan light horse were swept from the 
field at Bicocca by the precisioned volleys of Pescara's foot­
men and the hedge of German pikes. Though scarcely twenty- 
four, this veteran, who at eighteen had been awarded his first 
command by his uncle, Pope Leo X, pondered his defeat and de­
vised the tactics which became the foundation of all future
^2Niccolb Machiavelli, Legazione al duea Valentino 
(Torino: Boringhiere, 1959), XI, docs. 44, 85. Francesco
de Luna, the leader of Borgia's arquebusiers, sounds suspi­
ciously like a Spaniard. See Rafael Sabatini, The Life of 
Cesare Borgia (New York: Brentano's, n. d.), p. 349.
^Machiavelli, Chief Works, II, 625. Machiavelli's 
preference for the crossbow is not to be ridiculed, for 
among his contemporaries the older weapon was more popular.
It was less expensive, easier to handle and maintain, and 
less susceptible to the elements. The intricate mechanical 
parts of handguns tended to foul if not meticulously cleaned, 
and damp weather caused rust and spoiled the powder.
1S3
operations involving mounted arquebusiers. His solution in 
coping with infantry handgunners and pikemen was ingeniously 
simple: following Bicocca he drilled a proportion of his
lancers as foot soldiers, so that in battle they could dis­
mount and fight like infantry when required. The men of the 
Black Band were all Italians and Albanians, the latter being 
chosen because they rode Turkish horses, a breed preferred by 
Giovanni. Their armor was light and conducive to high mobil­
ity; their weapons were of the highest quality; and discipline 
was rigidly enforced. The men wore no beards and their hair 
short "to save time and discourage lice." They even wore a
uniform of sorts, a black harness ’'without bright colors, rib-
,,4 4bons, plumes, and ornaments.
Two years after Bicocca, Giovanni's efforts were richly
rewarded when, this time in conjunction with Pescara on whose
side he fought, his mounted infantry, the precursors of
Oliver Cromwell's dragoons, pursued and destroyed the French
45rear-guard on the banks of the Sesia River west of Milan.
This martial disquisition, so proficiently synchronizing the 
tactical advantages of missile weapons and cavalry, was not 
wasted on either side. Mounted arquebusiers henceforth be­
came a permanent feature in Imperial armies, and in the autumn
44Deiss, Captains of Fortune, pp. 263, 274.
45Above, pp. 124-25.
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of 1524 when the French, seeking to recoup their loss, reen­
tered Italy, Giovanni was retained by Francis I and added to 
his general staff. Significantly, however, native French 
arquebusiers a cheval remained few in number and of indiffer­
ent worth until after 1537 when Piero Strozzi brought one of
his companies to France and instructed the king in its proper 
46deployment.
As always, the Tudor English were much slower to benefit 
from the military experiments on the Continent, and few if any 
English gunners on horseback can be found before the end of 
the reign of Henry VIII, when even on the eve of that sover­
eign's last French war in 1544 they, were still a comparative 
rarity, probably the weakest in terms of numbers of any of 
the English light cavalry services which included in addition
demilancers, "javelins," "light staves," "chasing staves,"
47and archers. One of the largest commands of horse troops, 
that of Sir Anthony Browne, Constable of Calais, Master of 
the Horse and standard-bearer to King Henry VIII, contained
48514 light cavalrymen of whom only forty-six were arquebusiers, 
while the "main battle," that largest of the three divisions 
of the royal army and the one in which Henry served in person,
4®Brant6me, Ouevres completes, II, 268-70; VI, 72-79.
47L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1, No. 275 (1).
48Ibid., No. 275 (3).
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departed Calais for the siege of Boulogne with only fifty
mounted arquebusiers in a total force, excluding foreigners,
49of some fourteen thousand. To the king's credit, nonethe­
less, the deficiency had been anticipated and was soon reme­
died: shortly after Henry's arrival in the English camp be­
fore Boulogne he was jointed by fifteen hundred German cavalry,
50whereof one third, an entire ensign, were gunners.
While the evolution of the mounted arquebusier was no 
mean accomplishment, that service was not without its problems, 
chief of which was the unwieldiness of the weapon on which it 
most relied. The arquebus, even when used by infantry special­
ists, was difficult to manage, since it required both hands 
for priming and firing. Powder in reasonably exact quantities 
had to be poured into the barrel and a touch pan which carried 
the flash into the chamber, and a bullet, also dropped into 
the barrel, had to be rammed home. The weapon was then aimed
4 9Ibid., No. 275, 2. The number of horsed arquebusiers 
in specifically mentioned in the order of march published in 
Thomas Rymer, Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae, et cujuscunque 
generis acta publica inter reges Anglia et alios quosvis 
imperatores, reges, pontifices, p r m c e p s , vel communitates 
(17 vols., The Hague, 1739-45), VI, pt. 3, 120” Hereinafter 
cited as Foedera.
50In addition to the fourteen thousand English and fif­
teen hundred Germans, the invaders were joined at Boulogne by 
five hundred Flemish foot and a hundred horsemen from Cleves. 
Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
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51from the chest or shoulder, and a "slow match" applied to 
the touch pan by means of a matchlock trigger. It was a dif­
ficult process for the foot soldier and certainly a prodigious 
feat for a horseman, who might prefer to dismount but was of­
ten forced to fire from the saddle.
It was left to German ingenuity to devise a less cumber­
some firearm which could be managed with one hand. The new 
invention was the pistol, a word derived, not from the Italian 
town of Pistoia where the first models were wrongly believed 
to have been manufactured, but from the Bohemian pistal, mean­
ing "pipe" or "arquebus." Its chief advantage, besides its 
lighter weight, was the wheel-lock, a mechanism which produced 
a spark similar to that of a cigarette lighter thus eliminat­
ing the need of a slow match. As explained by Pope,
The lock consisted of a steel wheel with a milled 
edge attached to a spring and chain so that it 
could be wound up. When the trigger was squeezed, 
the pan cover opened and the wheel spun round.
Its serrated edge, pressing against a piece of 
iron pyrite . . . struck sparks which fell on the 
priming powder exposed in the pan.52
51This was another awkward feature of the arquebus, a 
slow match being a fuse of cotton or hemp, so-called because 
it was impregnated with saltpetre or other chemicals to make 
it burn slowly. The match was lit before the soldier went in 
to action and fitted to an 'S1-shaped clamp or matchlock at­
tached to the side of the gun. "To fire, the gunner pulled 
back the lower part of the "S," and the serpentine or upper 
part arched over and pressed the glowing match against the 
pan." Pope, Guns, p. 55.
52Ibxd., p. 73.
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Early attempts by infantry troops to afix the wheel-lock 
to their longer, heavier weapons were adandoned for the most 
part, as the mechanism was highly sensitive to rough handling, 
the end result being that the matchlock gun remained the pri­
mary firearm of European infantries until its displacement by 
the flintlock in latter half of the seventeenth century. How­
ever, despite its frailty, the wheel-lock in the form of the 
pistol proved in every way the superior firearm for cavalry­
men. Capable of being wielded in one hand, weighing between 
four and five pounds, and with a barrel of about one foot in 
length, it was easy for horsemen to carry several, all of 
them loaded and ready to fire in rapid succession.
Because the pistol was a lighter, smaller weapon that 
lacked the power of the arquebus and was only effective at 
close range, special tactics were required to exploit it fully. 
Once again it was the Germans, its inventors, who devised them, 
their most characteristic manoeuver being the "snail" or "car­
acole," a practice specifically intended to smash compact 
squares of infantry. Charging in deep formations, the pisto- 
leers delivered their fire in successive ranks at point-blank 
range, each rank after its discharge filing to the rear to re-
COload. Developed during the religious wars in the latter 
half of the reign of Charles V, these Schwartzreiters, or
^Delbrdck, Geschichte der Kriegkunst, IV, 147-49.
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cuirassiers as they soon became known, found employment outside
of Germany and were present in the pay of all the combatants
in the French invasion of 1544. One thousand one hundred and
twenty under 117 captains accompanied the emperor on his march
54through Champagne; Francis r recruited an indefinite number 
through his agents along the Rhine; and Henry VIII, in raising 
his bands of Burgundians, required "of every man of arms hav­
ing eight horses belonging unto him to have a 'kouritzer,* for
which person he should have by the month, besides his own
55wages, twelve philips.”
Ensheathed from head to knee in black armor to heighten 
the effect of their formidable demeanor, the Schwartzreiters 
were equipped with three or four pistols, a sword, and a 
light spear, and except for their firearms they were not un­
like the English demilancers, who themselves adopted the pis-
56tol and the name "cuirassier" in Elizabeth's reign. As the
Ferdinand Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees 
Fran^ais des Guerres d 1Italie aux Guerres de Religion, 1494- 
1562 (Paris: Services d 1Edition et de Vent des Productions
de l'Education Nationale, 1962), p. 98. This exploratory 
volume, written by one of France's greatest historians, was 
published posthumously. Hereinafter cited as Recherches sur 
les Effectifs des Armees Franyais.
^(B. M.) Lansdowne MS. 155, f. 356b. Hereinafter cited 
as (B. M.) Lansd. See also' L. £ P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 752.
The philip or philipus guilder, a common unit of currency in 
the Netherlands which varied in value from 3s. 1 l/2d. to 3s. 
3d. between c. 1544 and 1546. (B. M.) Add. MS. 5753, ff.
179b, 190, 191.
56Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British Army, 1066- 
1945, p. 44.
heaviest of light cavalry troops, in their own countries,
Schwartzreiters and demilancers gradually replaced men-at-arms
whose barded horses, lances, and full armor fast became super-
flous in a gunpowder age. By 1600 only Spain and Italy among
European states retained large bodies of gendarmes, whereas
elsewhere, including Tudor England, the first and principal
57cavalry troops were pistoleers.
Still, throughout the first half of the sixteenth century 
heavy cavalry was as yet several generations away from obsoles 
cence; for as Markham noted of this period the handgun, which 
resulted in the evanescence of the armored knight, had not at­
tained that height of excellence to which it would soon arrive 
True enough, the proportion of heavy horse in most armies had 
been dwindling at the expence of increased numbers of light 
horse and infantry since before the initiation of the Great 
Italian Wars. Charles VIII had thirty-four hundred lances in 
the Piedmont in 1494; at Pavia in 1525 Francis I operated with
roughly thirteen hundred; while at Ceresole in 1544 Enghien,
59the French commander, had less than one thousand. The same 
process can be noted in Spanish army "which began to reduce
57Markham, The Cavallarie, p. 41.
58Ibid.
59 The Renaissance. Vol. I of the Cambridge Modern His­
tory , eds. A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, Stanley Leathes (13 
vols,; Cambridge: University Press, 1902-26), 112; Oman,
The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 289.
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6 0its proportion of cavalry before 1494," and in England, 
where throughout the Tudor era the scarcity of heavy horse 
was endemic, a similar trend is detectable. In the three ex­
peditions sent into France by Henry VIII, the numbers of Tudor 
men-at-arms are so inappreciable as to defy even an approxi­
mate reckoning, thus lending support to Oman's observation 
that the English aristocracy had lost the art of fighting on 
horseback in the fifteenth century "and had not recovered the 
habit."61
The gradual subordination of the gendarmerie to the other 
services seems logically to lead to the conclusion that the 
military revolution of the sixteenth century produced at the 
least a partial eclipse of heavy cavalry. As demonstrated, 
when dealing in mere arithmetic such a generalization is eas­
ily sustained. There is no question that in general infantry 
outstripped cavalry, both heavy and light, in the race towards 
modernity, and in consequence, abetted by the defensive guise 
which war assumed as the century progressed, the mounted arm 
was relegated to a subordinate and supportive role. Neverthe- 
lessf the importance of that role can be deduced from the pro­
fessional air assumed by the new light cavalries and the still 
considerable squadrons of men-at-arms that continued to be
60Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 61.
^Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 289. .
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conscripted.
Until firepower definitely established itself as the pri­
mary adjudicator of battles, the steel-clad knight remained 
the unequalled weapon of shock. Obviously, as Taylor insists, 
the horseman's tactics could easily be neutralized by the lands­
knecht's pike or the engineer's entrenchments; but the latters1 
stratagems were no substitute for the former. No troops but 
heavy cavalry could produce such driving power. "Consequently
fT 2the man-at-arms remained essential in every battle" and is
63known to have decided a few on his own account.
The annals of every European nation are replete with ac­
counts of the prowess of their fighting men-at-arms, but in 
the sixteenth century the highest reputation for discipline 
and professionalism belonged to the gendarmes of France, "la 
vraie ecolle de la discipline militaire, la deffense et bou- 
clier du Royaume." Originally raised as regular companies by
Charles VII, they were not only a standing but also a national
64force which enjoyed a continous history dating back to 1445.
The number of companies, in which service was voluntary, was
62Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 62.
63Heavy cavalry, largely Burgundian and German auxilia­
ries, won the Battle of the Spurs for Henry VIII in 1513;
Francis I, who personally led twenty-five charges, credited 
his men-at-arms with the victory at Marignano in 1515; and 
Philibert Emmanuel of Savoy destroyed the French before St. 
Quentin in 1557 with his heavy horse.
64Denison, A History of Cavalry, p. 221.
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highly variable, rising in war, declining in peace. Most such 
units were assigned within France to frontier and garrison du­
ties, but when offensives abroad were undertaken the majority
were mustered as the nucleus around which the French army was
, ... 65built.
From the first, the organization of these compagnies d' 
ordonnances was grounded in the lance system. Forty to 
eighty "furnished lances," each by the reign of Francis I con­
sisting of a man-at-arms and four light horsemen who fought 
independently under their own banner, made up a normal company. 
"Captain" was the usual rank of the company leader, and under 
him served a lieutenant, an ensign, a guidon, and a marechal 
des logis or sergeant.^ Every heavy cavalryman was of gentle 
birth, and captains were appointed for life. Death by hang­
ing was the punishment for desertion, and the enlistment of
67foreigners was discouraged. French men-at-arms, wrote 
Guicciardini,
were nearly all from the King's subjects, and no
^Fourquevaux, Instructions sur le Faict de la Guerre, 
p . xxvi.
Ibid., pp. xxxvi, 24. According to Fourquevaux, "the 
Men of arms should follow the Ensign: and the Light Horse,
Stradiots [i.e. the argoulets attached to the lances fournies], 
and Arquebusiers a Cheval should follow the Guidon.” The func­
tion of the sergeant was to find and prepare lodgings for the 
company.
6 7Ibid., pp. xxxvi, lv, lx, lxix.
19 3
common people but gentlemen, not just taken on 
or laid off at the wish of the captains, and as 
the companies were paid, not by them, but by the 
King's ministers, they not only had their full 
numbers, but were well set up and well provided 
with horses and arms— not being unable through 
poverty to equip themselves— and all competed to 
serve best from the instinct of honor which noble 
birth breeds in men1s breasts as well as from the 
hopes they had of rewards for courageous deeds 
both inside and outside the service, which was 
arranged so that they could be promoted through 
various ranks up to captain. The captains had 
the same incentives, being nearly all barons and 
lords, or at the least of very noble birth, and 
nearly all subjects of the King of Prance. When 
they had their full complement of lancers . . . 
they had no other ambition than to earn their 
King's praise; so that there did not exist among 
them either the instability of changing masters 
out of ambition or greed or rivalries with other 
captains . . . .68
Such was the devotion of French men-at-arms: except in times
of peace,few were ever found on the side of their country's
enemies, and with no such horsemen of their own, sovereigns
like Henry VIII, who picked quarrels with the kings of Prance
were obliged to find gendarmes in the Netherlands and Germany,
the two regions which produced heavy cavalry of comparable
value.
The reputation of the Netherlands men-at-arms was, as 
might be expected, almost as high as the French, because be­
ginning in 1471 they had been organized on the same model as 
the compagnies d 'ordonnances by Charles the Bold.
68Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence, 
pp. 153-54.
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"Burgundians" is tlie name by which, they were called in the six-**
teenth century, being raised within the Circle of Burgundy,
that administrative district comprising the Netherlands and
Franche-Comte created by the imperial Diet in 1512. Excellent
troops when led by competent officers, they were the Empire's
69first line of defence in the Low Countries, which region, 
with the neighboring German states, served as England's chief 
entrepot for mercenaries and auxiliaries.
The estimate of the worth of German men-at-arms underwent 
a drastic transformation in the early decades of the century.
In 1512, Machiavelli, who four years earlier as head of a 
Florentine legation to the emperor at Innsbruck had occasion 
to observe them, judged these troops to be greatly inferior 
to the French, whom he rated the best. German knights, though 
numerous and warlike, were lightly armored and poorly equipped. 
Their horses were hard to manage and for lack of barding
fiQIn 1544 there were thirty compagnies d 1ordonnance, to­
talling seven thousand horse, in the Army of the Low Countries. 
Of these, three thousand were assigned to Charles V for the 
invasion of France? two thousand were retained at home for 
the defence of garrisons and frontiers; and the remaining two 
thousand, with four thousand landsknechts, were sent at the 
emperor's expense as auxiliaries under the Count of Buren to 
join the English. Buren was separately commissioned by Henry 
VIII to raise additional forces of mercenaries, both horse 
and foot. Concerning the number of the latter, see below 
pp. 274 ff. Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des' Armees 
Fran^aise, p. 8 8.
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70vulnerable to disabling wounds, and according to the Vene-
71tians, they in no way cooperated with other troops in battle. 
Yet, in 1544 the English commissioners at Aachen near the Lux­
emburg frontier described the German "gentlemen" with whom 
they were sent to bargain as "wondrously well armed as men of
arms," well mounted, and "such a goodly company . . .  as they
72have seen the like nowhere." Outwardly, then, little distin­
guished the cavaliers of Germany from those of other countries; 
but if, as the Venetian ambassador to the Imperial court re­
ported in 1546, they were clad in steel and carried a sword 
73and lance, there were differences in their organization and 
mode of making war that were unique.
The style of fighting in which the German men-at-arms 
had been trained since the fifteenth century required them to 
charge in compact bodies many ranks deep. Some of their for­
mations involved as few as nine ranks, but one military manual
^Niccol'b Machiavelli, Portraits of the Affairs of Ger­
many, in Niccoib Machiavelli and the United States of America, 
ed. Pansini, p. 652.
^Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 64.
72L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1, NOS. 6 6 6 , 713.
73Relatione del Charissimo M. Bernardo Navagiero, ritor- 
nato Ambasciatore d 'Alemagna da Carlo Quinto Imperator, "Tr 
anno MDXLVI nel mese di Iuglio in Correspondence of tKe Em­
peror Charles V and His~ Ambassadors at the Courts of England 
and France, ed. William Bradford (London: Richard Bentley,
New Burlington Street, 1850), p. 456. Hereinafter cited as 
Navagiero, Relatione.
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of 1532 recommended the ordering of six thousand horsemen in
74no less than eighty-three. This was in complete contradis­
tinction to the French and Burgundians, who operated with 
shallower formations, the former preferring to range their 
heavy cavalry en haye along a broad front in no more than two 
lines of battle, the latter favoring a narrower front with 
four lines.^
Another trademark of the Germans was the deliberate and 
comparatively slow pace of their attack. Most heavy cavalries 
in delivering an assault rushed their adversaries at full tilt, 
an excellent tactic only when the whole body charged home.
Too often, though, men arrived at the shock in loose order,
the more impetuous having raced ahead to claim the first coup,
77
76the cowards having held back or left the field. The Germans,
however, sacrificed speed for good order, advancing at a trot,
74Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 82- 
83; Delbrdck, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, IV, 141.
75E. H. Wickham, trans., The Influence of Firearms Upon 
Tactics (London: Henry S. King, 1976), p. 9. The word "haie"
is retained in the modern French language with the meaning 
of "hedge" or "row of troops."
76See La Noue's remarks in Fortescue's History of the 
British Army, I, 102.
77Navagiero, in his Relatione, p. 456, describes this 
peculiar gait in the following terms: Just as the lands­
knechts "have a peculiar style of march," so also do the 
men-at-arms, who "are mounted on horses which have a partic­
ular pace of slow trot." The horses of the German pistoleers
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relying on the weight of their deep masses to push their way 
through the defences of their opponents.
Such fearlessness under fire was an asset that could 
hardly be wasted, and considerable effort was expended by the 
emperors in efforts to ensure themselves of their horsemen's 
loyalty. But like landsknechts, the habits of the German cav­
alry were entirely mercenary. Of all the nations employed by 
the Empire, it was argued that "the best paid and the least 
available was the German." Their insolence was insufferable; 
they were pious towards God and cruel towards their neighbors. 
In war they turned churches into stables, and whenever their
arose among them a scarcity of money or provisions they aban-
7 8doned their commanders "without any chance of remedy."
But if German men-at-arms displayed little patriotism or 
faithfulness they were at least amenable to new ideas, so that 
when, in the middle years of the reign of Charles V, the em­
peror sought to increase their efficiency by regulating their 
formations and standardizing their tactics they cooperated.
Charles is cited as being the first to organize his cavalry
79into squadrons, those principal units into which before the
were trained similarly. According to Navagiero, who accompa­
nied Charles V to France in 1544, these latter troops carried 
"a small arquebus and have a sword and a boar spear hanging 
at their sides and attached to their saddle."
78Ibid.
79Denison, A History of Cavalry, p. 237.
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disappearance of the horse soldier modern cavalry regiments 
were divided. These bodies, three or sometimes four to a reg­
iment, retained the deep order of the medieval German horse
but formed up in squares, forsaking the pointed formation or
80Spitz which had gained ascendancy in Maximilian's day. The
strength of squadrons varied, as did the number of ranks; but
uniformity of sorts was gained by matching ranks with an equal
number of files, so that the whole body was as great in depth
81as in breadth of front. As regards the organization of
squadrons, the chief officer or Rittmeister was a captain,
whose deputy, a lieutenant, had under him an ensign and a
quartermaster. Pre-eminent among non-commissioned officers
was the sergeant or Wachtmeister, who as the mounted equiva-
R?lent of the landsknecht Feldweibel was responsible for all 
matters pertaining to drill and the arrangement of the
80Wickham, trans., The Influence of Firearms Upon Tac­
tics, p. 9.
HiThough the square formation was typical, a rectangular 
battle order was not unknown. In fact there were times when 
the "broad square" was preferable, as for instance against a 
numerically superior force which would find it easier to en­
velop a square than a rectangle.
82Below, p. 98, n. 26. Besides the above-mentioned per­
sonnel it was not unusual to find attached to each squadron 
a surgeon, blacksmith, chaplain, and trumpeter. Just as the 
footsoldier was trained to respond to the beat of the drum, 
so likewise was the horse soldier trained to respond to the 
call of the trumpet. Markham, The Cavallarie, p. 60, lists 
the six "Soundings" of the trumpet "which are most necessary 
for the Soldier's knowledge."
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horsemen in battle.
That the squadron system was effective is attested by 
the fact that it was adopted by all the Imperial cavalry, 
light as well as heavy, before 1544. Francis I experimented 
with the new formation but soon abandoned it, the French gen­
darmerie continuing to fight en haye until utterly routed by
the Imperialist squadrons at St. Quentin and Gravelines in
831557 and 1558 respectively. In the meantime the English
stuck to the lance system and the mixed companies of light
and heavy horse which it produced. At best, however, it was
an unsatisfactory solution, if only because of the extreme
shortage of Tudor men-at-arms. In the French war of 1544,
for example, if the muster rolls are to be believed no more
than two or three hundred heavy horse were mobilized, and of
these the only professional unit was the Gentlemen Pensioners,
seventy-two of whom under the leading of Sir George Carew
84were told off against the main battle. Other than the 
"Spears" the remaining men-at-arms appear indiscriminately 
and in small numbers: six in the company assigned to the
Master of the Horse; four to guard the king's "tents, hales, 
and pavilions;" four in the retinue of John Dudley, Viscount 
Lisle, after his appointment as Lord Lieutenant of Boulogne
^Denison, a History of Cavalry, p. 237.
84L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 275 (1, i).
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85in October, 1544. Needless to say men-at-arms were particu­
larly necessary to ward off the French gendarmerie , and it was 
the threat of annihilation by Europe's chief exponents of 
heavy cavalry warfare which drove Henry VIII to enlist as many 
German and Burgundian knights as he could procure.
The choice of these latter horsemen by the English is in­
structive, because of the states drawn on for foreign troops 
Germany and the Netherlands were alone in their ability to 
supply them in quantity. Spain by way of illustration had few 
heavy cavalry. As in England, poor breeding habits had led to
the diminuation of great horses, so that among the Iberian gen-
8 6try mules were the commonest mode of transportation. More­
over, the Granadan War had developed light cavalry, and the 
success of Gonzalo de Cordova's reformed infantry had removed 
much of the stigma attached to that service. The grandest 
hidalgos now competed with the humblest peones for the command 
of foot soldiers, and even the emperor on occasion was not 
above shouldering a pike or carrying a musket. Of the thir­
teen thousand Spaniards in Italy at the commencement of 
Charles V's third war with France in 1536, only 580 were men- 
at-arms, and two years later with a French army operating in
85Ibid., No. 275, pp. 163, 165; pt. 2, No. 799.
®®Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British Army, 1066- 
1945, pp. 41-43; The Renaissance. Vol. 1 of The New Cam­
bridge Modern History, ed. 6 . R. Potter (Cambridge: Univer­
sity Press, 1957), 279.
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87the Pyrenees a mere 961 were mustered in all of Spain.
Like the early Tudors, the emperor relied on his Germans
and Burgundians for the bulk of his heavy horse, and with the
88exception of the Duke of Albuquerque, who was loaned by 
Charles to the English council of war in 1544, not a single 
Spanish man-at-arms can be found under either Henry VIII or 
Edward VI, the two Tudors who most heavily drew on Spaniards 
for military support. Hundreds of Iberians did serve these 
monarchs on horseback, but always as light cavalrymen and in­
variably against the Scots, who to their great discomfort at
Pinkie in 1547 were almost certainly subjected by them to
8 9the first caracole ever performed in the British Isles.
Much more numerous was the Italian gendarmerie, but here, 
as in Spain, light cavalry and infantry service experienced 
a steady increase in popularity at the former's expense. At 
Fornova in 1495, before the lessons of the military revolu­
tion had been fully accepted, the whole pride of the Italian
87Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp.
61-62.
8 8Beltran de la Cueva, third Duke of Albuquerque.
8 9William Patten, The Expedition into Scotland of the 
Most Worthily Fortunate Prince Edward, Duke of Somerset m  
Tudor Tracts, 1532-1558, ed. A. F. Pollard (New York:
Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1964), p. 123. Hereinafter 
cited as The Expedition into Scotland. See also Sir Charles 
Oman, "The Battle of Pinkie, Sept. 10, 1547,” The Archaeo­
logical Journal, XC (1933), 14-15.
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army lay in its men-at-arms, Forty-nine years later in 1544, 
after the French and Imperialists had divided the allegiance 
of the peninsula between them, not one Italian gendarme par­
ticipated in the summer fighting in France, and in the prelim­
inary struggle at Ceresole in April of that year, in one of
the rare pitched battles of the last three-quarters of the
90sixteenth century, less than two hundred were engaged.
Some few may have fought for Henry VIII in the taking and
91subsequent defence of Boulogne, but the first Italians in
Tudor livery identifiable as men-at-arms do not appear until
September, 1547 in the reign of Edward VI, when the colonel,
92Malatesta, led a band of undetermined strength against the 
Scots at Pinkie under the standard of the Lord Protector,
^Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran- 
caise, Chap. VI; Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Cen­
tury, pp. 231, 232-33.
91Large numbers of Italian foot and light cavalry were 
retained for these undertakings. In February, 1546, for ex­
ample, the garrison at Boulogne contained six companies of 
Italians, nearly all of them arquebusiers, totalling 696 sol­
diers, while in Calais and other strongholds kept by the Eng­
lish there were a thousand Albanian and Italian horse. S. P. 
1/214, ff. 177-78; State Papers, XI, 60.
Q nIt is unfortunate that this soldier of fortune cannot 
be more adequately identified since the house of Malatesta 
was famous for its condottieri. For an abridged history of 
the family which sank into obscurity in the second quarter 
of the sixteenth century see Orville Prescott, Princes of 
the Renaissance (New York: Random House, 1969), Chaps. XVI-
XVIII.
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93Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset. Later in Edward's reign, 
during the Prayer Book rebellion in 1549, twenty-nine men-at- 
arms served in the company of the Italian adventurer, Jacques 
Jermigny, while in the following year at Sheen, after the 
nuptials of John Dudley, Lord Lisle, and the Lady Anne Sey­
mour, the wedding party was entertained by the king's pen­
sioner, Count Pallavicino Rangone, who with three of his
countrymen "ran with all the gentlemen four courses and after
94ward fought at tourney."
No more than in England or Spain the scarcity of Italian 
heavy cavalry was in part caused by the lack of good mounts. 
Machiavelli thought that Italian stockmen were more accus­
tomed to breeding calves and mules, and "for the sake of a 
large supply of horses" he advised those princes who would 
raise armies to distribute mares of good blood throughout 
their rural estates, so that husbandmen might gain experience 
in raising colts. In recommendations suggestive of the Eng­
lish legislation under Henry VIII, he proposed that men be 
denied the right to keep mules if they did not also keep 
horses and that no one be permitted to dress in silk if he
93Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 359; 
(P. R. O.) E351/43, mem. 10.
94W. K. Jordan, ed., The Chronicle and Political Papers 
of King Edward VI (Ithaca, N. Y . : Cornell University Press,
1966), p. 33.
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95did not own a horse.
The main cause of the decline in heavy cavalry was of 
course only coincidentally related to unscientific breeding 
practices, for at the root of the matter lay the changing 
nature of war. Since sieges and skirmishes came to be pre­
ferred over pitched battles fewer men-at-arms were needed, 
and as the cost of armor proofed against shot increased in 
proportion to the effectiveness of small arms fire, gentle­
men of meager means with a penchant for soldiering were eas­
ily persuaded to set aside the lance and take up other wea­
pons. Many young French and Spanish nobles served their mas­
ters as infantrymen, and the Italian condottieri, some of 
whom occupied the leading posts in the Imperial army, distin­
guished themselves as quartermasters, artillerymen, and
^Machiavelli, Chief Works, II, 720-21. In 1542 the Eng­
lish Parliament passed a "Bill for Great Horses" in which all 
persons of means were required to maintain a prescribed num­
ber of stallions: archbishops and dukes, seven; marquesses,
earls, and bishops, the value of whose bishoprics was B1000, 
five, viscounts, barons, and bishops with a 1000 marks a 
year, three; lords spiritual and temporal with 600 marks a 
year, two; and those spiritual persons with incomes less 
than 500 marks, one. The novelty of the act was that it de­
creed that "all and every other person temporal not afore­
mentioned whose Wife . . . shall wear any gown of silk or 
whose Wife shall wear any French hood or bonnet of Velvet, 
with any habilments past or egg of gold, pearl, or stone or 
any chain of gold . . . shall, after the Feast of St. Michael 
. . . have, find, keep, sustain, and maintain . . . one 
stoned trotting horse" on pain of a fine of B10. Judges of 
assize, justices of the peace, and sheriffs were authorized 
to proceed against offenders. (33 Hen. VIII, c. 5), Stat­
utes of the Realm, III, 83 0-31.
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96captains of light horse. In England too, where only the
greatest lords appeared regularly in full armor, a similar
trend is detectable. For Henry VIII*s first invasion of
France in 1513 not a few of the gentry enrolled as "spears
afoot," while of the 389 captains assigned to the leading of
the companies in the army of 1544 only 52 were appointed to
mounted units in which for lack of heavy cavalry light horse
97elements predominated.
Though new strategy, new weapons, lack of strong coursers, 
and rising costs militated against men-at-arms and brought 
about a steady decline in their supply,they remained a tac­
tically indispensible branch of all armies in this age of 
transition. Until the evolution in the seventeenth century 
of a new type of cuirassier, who abandoned the caracole and 
was trained to charge home with the sword after discharging 
his pistol, men-at-arms were essential in every action where 
the utmost momentum was required in an assault. Their pres­
tige, though somewhat tarnished by the materialization of 
professional infantry and light cavalry troops, remained the 
highest of any service, but no longer could the view be up­
held that they were the most important levy in war. In fact 
in the sixteenth century, so far did the waging of war depart
^Navagiero, Relatione, pp. 451-52, 453.
97L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, NO. 273 (6).
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from the medieval ideal that no sector of the military could 
claim supremacy. The best commanders were those who relied 
on a combination of arms, fully cognizant of the advantage 
that might be theirs if the enemy did not.
Nothing better indicates the arrival of an age of sol­
dierly professionalism than the fact that in the sixteenth 
century functions and duties became more clearly differenti­
ated. Men-at-arms divested themselves of their light cav­
alry ancillaries; these in turn were grouped as independent 
units for the carrying through of specialized operations; 
highly mobile arquebusiers evolved to support the less agile 
pikemen; and victory went to the side in which these dispar­
ate yet complimentary elements could most skillfully cooper­
ate. Shock and missile power were mutually supportive, and 
disaster awaited the army which favored the one at the ex­
pense of the other. Pike columns were most easily disposed 
of when deficient in shot, hackbuteers when unprotected with 
pikes. As for cavalry, it could not go everywhere since ter­
rain dictated its movements. More difficult to maneuver, 
more easily disordered in violent action, it was, though best 
equipped to check the advance of infantry bodies over open 
ground, useless unless artillery and missile fire could be 
brought to bear on the stationary target which its flanking 
charges had created.
In the light of these particulars an absolute essential
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in sixteenth-century armies was the creation of some sort of 
balance between the power of missile and shock, infantry and 
horse. However, for individual governments the capacity to 
provide this balance through exclusively domestic conscrip­
tion was a cherished but unrealizable goal. As has been 
fully demonstrated, no particular nationality or single re­
gion produced soldiers skilled in all the aspects of war. 
Burgundians and Frenchmen alike shone as cavalrymen but were 
unsteady on foot; both Italians and Spaniards excelled in de­
fending and attacking fortifications, but in the open for the 
press of pikes Germans and Swiss were preferred; the best the 
oreticians were perhaps the Italians; but whereas Germans 
ranked among the best gunfounders, the foremost artillerymen 
were French. And so the list of superlatives may be extended 
to include as well the English, who though military progress 
had passed them by still retained something of their past re­
putation as formidable bowmen.
The simple fact is that in Europe in the sixteenth cen­
tury there was no such thing as a militarily self-sufficient 
state, as no country could from its own citizens provide that 
combination of arms which military convention and necessity 
dictated, so that every warring nation was constrained to 
hire mercenaries and to seek out allies. France, Spain, and 
the Empire were easily the most voracious consumers of for­
eign professionals and auxiliaries, for as these were the most
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9 8aggressive states, being almost continually at war, their 
need of specialists and manpower was greatest. England by 
comparison was only a moderate employer of foreign troops, 
and within the narrow limits of her own geographic setting a 
case could be made for her self-sufficiency. Protected by 
the sea which acted as a potent deterrent to invasion, she 
had little need of mercenaries or auxiliaries, as long as 
her government remained aloof from continental campaigning. 
Nondescript as Tudor forces were, Englishmen knew them to be 
superior to the half-wild levies of their island foes, the 
Scots and the Irish. It was only when Tudor sovereigns sent 
their armies out of the kingdom, across the Channel, and into 
Europe at large that military superiority was lost. Fortun­
ately, few appreciated this better than the Tudor monarchs 
themselves. All of them were aware of the limitations of 
English troops, and in part for that reason every Tudor govern­
ment save one strove with some degree of success to avoid pro-
99tracted military entanglements abroad. Of his line only
Q OIn addition to the Imperial and Spanish campaigns 
against the Turks in eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean, 
the Hapsburg-Valois struggle provided at least one war per 
decade between 1494 and 1559.
9 9Neither Henry VII nor his granddaughters, Mary and 
Elizabeth, ever sought to extend their dominion beyond the 
frontiers of England and Ireland, and though Edward VI in­
herited the forward policy of Henry VIII, it was abandoned 
by the Northumberland regime when its objectives, the reten­
tion of Boulogne and the conquest of Scotland, proved imprac­
tical.
Henry VIII craved battle honors. Yet it is inconceivable 
that he, who was thrice enticed to send armies to France, 
would have dared to stir himself without strong assurances 
of mercenary and auxiliary support. Henry knew the cardinal 
maxim of war: on the Continent no army survived without
foreign assistance. Barring miracles, if that maxim held 
true for the most militarily advanced states, it could hardly 
be less applicable to England.
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THE BACKGROUND OF THE FRENCH WAR OF 1544-46.
Who that intendeth France to win,
With Scotland let him begin.
Sixteenth-century English proverb.
In 1541 when Henry VIII resolved for the last time to 
pursue an aggressive policy in Europe no English army had 
fought on the Continent since the Duke of Suffolk's with­
drawal from Montdidier nearly twenty years before. During 
the interim, except for her brief flirtation with the League 
of Cognac,^ the full thrust of England's diplomatic and mil­
itary efforts had been of necessity defensive, since the in­
ternational situation created by the king's divorce from 
Catherine of Aragon and the resultant breech with Rome had 
raised the spectre of invasion by Catholic powers bent on 
forcibly returning the nation to papal allegiance.
The gravest threat to English security in the early and 
critical stages of the Henrician Reformation came from Char­
les V, who as Catherine of Aragon's nephew seemed most 
likely to lead his Hapsburg aggregate of Spain, the Nether­
lands, and the Empire to his aunt's defence. Between the
1Above, p. 139, n. 53.
210
211
calling of Henry’s "Reformation Parliament" in 1529 and the 
death of his unfortunate first queen in 1536 the fear of Im­
perialist attack was constant, as is witnessed by the manner 
in which the emperor’s enemies were carefully cultivated. 
Conversations were opened with the Lutherans, with Denmark, 
and the German Hanse; peace was renewed with the Scots, and 
in 1532 a league was concluded with France which bound the
Most Christian King to assist Henry with a fleet and fifteen
2thousand auxiliaries should Charles decide to invade.
Fear of Imperialist intentions produced a plethora of 
protective measures at home during the same period, particu­
larly during the summer of 1533, when following the king's 
marriage to Anne Boleyn and the framing of the papal bull of 
excommunication invasion appeared especially imminent. Notes 
were drafted "To remember the king for the reparation of his 
navy;" "for granting money for the fortifying of the fron­
tiers;" "for repairing the fortifications;" and "for the re­
pair of ordnance and the provision of munitions for war;" 
while from the Council commands were issued ordering a sur­
vey of the works at Calais and the building of blockhouses
3against the risk of an Imperialist descent.
Twelve months passed with little diminishment of tension,
2Wernham,~ Before' the Armada, pp. 124, .129, Fisher, His­
tory of England, pp. 358-62.
3L. & P., VI, Nos. 997, 1381, 1460, 1487.
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but in the following year there occured an event which tem­
porarily relieved the pressure. In October, 1535, the death 
of Francesco Sforza, the childless Duke of Milan, led immedi­
ately to a quarrel between France and the Empire over who
. 4would succeed him. By April, 1536/the French had overrun 
Savoy and Piedmont, and the third war between Francis I and 
Charles V had begun. Well did Henry receive the news, for 
by his own admission he feared no enemy "so long as there 
was not perfect amity between the Emperor and the Christian 
King."5 But his jubilation was short-lived: Francis' mer­
cenary Swiss failed to take Milan, and Charles' counter-in­
vasion of Picardy and Provence ended in stalemate. Tempo­
rary armistices ended hostilities in all theaters by Novem­
ber, 1537, while through the intercession of Pope Paul III 
the truce was extended for ten years by the signing of an 
agreement at Nice in June, 1538. A month later the same in­
termediary effected a formal reconciliation of the two mon- 
archs at Aigues Mortes,^ the ancient port-city from which 
had been launched the sixth and seventh Crusades.
For England it seemed an ominous portent confirmed by 
word from Rome that the sentence of excommunication, held in
^Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, III, 263.
5L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 1197.
6Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, III, pp. 
265-67.
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abeyance from 1533 in the hope that Henry would recant, had
at last been promulgated and that at Paris and Madrid, Paul's
agents were urging a new crusade for the extirpation of that
7"most cruel and abominable tyrant," the king of England.
That the full weight of Catholic Europe would soon fall on 
England appeared certain when on January 12, 1539, Charles 
and Francis met in Toledo and set their names to a treaty 
which bore all the earmarks of a preliminary declaration of 
war. By it the parties agreed to make no compact with Henry 
without the consent of the other, while in London speculation 
was rife that the ambassadors from France and the emperor
gwould be recalled.
England assumed the aspect of an armed camp, as the ex­
pectation of some sudden assault goaded the nation to extra­
ordinary efforts of defense preparedness. During the winter 
of 1538-9 and in the ensuing spring, men, women, and even 
children turned out in places with shovels to fashion bul­
warks and trenches, and down the coast from Berwick to Lizard 
Head the chain of seaboard forts begun in 1533 was extended
9to discourage attack from the most obvious quarter, the sea. 
Elsewhere musters were taken; ships and mariners were readied
^Spanish Calendar, VI, No. 33; L. & P ., XIV, pt. 1, No. 36. 
8L. & P., XIV, pt. 1, Nos. 62, 345, 365.
9Pollard, Henry VIII, pp. 300-01.
for action; and coastal patrols constantly circled the king­
dom “in order to explore and to correspond . . .  by fires
with those who watch by night . . .  so that no foreign vessel
10could show itself without the country being warned." But 
the fires were never lit. In spite of England's fears no at­
tack was ever launched, as the secular rivalry of the Haps- 
burgs and the Valois proved more divisive than any unity that 
might have sprung from their common Catholicism.
Though outwardly cordial, relations between Charles and 
Francis were unlikely to produce lasting peace so long as the 
latter was predisposed to have a share in the governance of 
Italy. Milan lay at the heart of their difficulties: ruled
by Charles as an Imperial fief, it was claimed by Francis as 
his rightful inheritance through his descent from Valentina, 
heiress of the Visconti predecessors of the Sforzas and wife 
of his illustrious ancestor, Louis, Duke of Orleans {d. 1407). 
The disposition of the duchy proved the main stumbling-block 
to a genuine Franco-Imperialist detente, and after two years
of intense negotiations failed to effect the compromise that
12the emperor hoped would assuage Valois pride, Charles
10L. & P., XIV, pt., No. 770.
11Francis1 claim was hardly valid, as in the investiture 
of the duchy females were excluded.
12Among the solutions proposed by the Imperialists was 
that Francis' youngest son, Charles, marry the emperor's .
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turned his back to Francis in October, 1540, by installing 
his son, Philip, as duke. Twenty months elapsed before the 
renewal of war, but in the certain knowledge of its inevita­
bility the two parties began at once their preparations which 
meant, among other things, a scramble for allies, including 
bidding for the support of the heretic king, Henry VIII, who 
was only too willing to receive their offers and fashion 
their dilemma to suit his own design.
What precisely Henry VII!'s design was in 1540 is not 
entirely clear. However, it is at least arguable that the 
dissolution of his fourth marriage to the German princess, 
Anne of Cleves, effected on July 7, may be taken as an indi­
cation that after more than a decade of bad relations his 
mind was beginning to turn back towards a realignment with 
his Catholic Majesty, Charles V. For Anne had been a bride 
of convenience, a tangible symbol and the binding tie in what 
had originally been intended as a grand anti-imperialist and 
anti-papal alliance between England and the Lutheran states
eldest daughter, Mary, with Milan as her dower, on the under­
standing that the duchy would remain in the gift of the Em­
pire. Alternately it was proposed that if Francis would 
withdraw his garrisons from Savoy and Piedmont, renounce his 
claims in Italy, and relinquish control of the Duchy of Bur^* 
gundy, Mary's dower would be the Netherlands. Merriman,
The Rise of the Spanish Empire, III, 268 and n, 1; Wernham, 
Before the Armada, p. 14V.
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13of Germany designed to discourage invasion from Europe and 
no doubt to provide Henry with a full storehouse of Protes­
tant auxiliary and mercenary support in the event the dread 
popish offensive had become a reality.
The treaty of marriage had been hastily concluded in the 
fall of 153 9 hard on the heels of the war scare of the pre­
vious spring and amid reports that the emperor, preparing to
crush rebellious Ghent, would be allowed passage through
14France and consultation with the French king in Paris. But 
if the union of Henry and Anne had been conceived as a defen­
sive measure it proved unnecessary since, as Charles could 
not be cajoled into yielding Milan and prepared to confer it 
upon his son, the revival of the Hapsburg-Valois feud was as 
certain as the abrogation of any Franco-Imperial plan for the 
invasion of England.
Once the uselessness of the Cleves alliance was ascer­
tained Henry felt no compunction in setting aside his German
13Though neither Anne nor her brother, Duke William of 
Cleves, were Lutherans they had strong ties with the Schmal- 
kaldic League, their sister, Sibylla, being wife to John, 
Elector of Saxony, who with the Landgrave Philip of Hesse 
shared supreme command of the forces of this Lutheran asso­
ciation.
14The Itinerary of the Emperor Charles V, pp. 512-15, 
included in Bradford, ed., Correspondence of the Emperor 
Charles V, contains some interesting details of Charles' 
journey through France. The emperor, who entered France on 
November 27, 1539, did not arrive in Paris until New Year's 
Day, 1540.
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consort. Only expediency and self-preservation had held him
to the match; but with Anne pensioned off, as indeed she was
with a yearly income of £500 and the manors of Richmond and 
15Bletchingly, the king was free to pursue what seems to have 
been one of the overriding goals of his life, namely the per­
formance of some "notable enterprise" in France. But before 
turning on the French Henry complicated matters, at least for 
modern-day historians, by turning on their allies, the Scots, 
whom he feared might violate the safety of England as they 
had done in 1513 while the elite of his forces were committed 
to the fighting on the Continent.
Unfortunately,because of this determination to settle 
first with the Scots, it has become a commonplace of Tudor 
history to assign as the major cause of Henry VIII's French 
war of 1544-46 that monarch's resolution to complete his lord­
ship of the British Isles by fastening his rule on Scotland, 
that part of the islands which alone had preserved its inde­
pendence of English control. The northern kingdom, so runs 
the theory, was seen by Henry in his last years as the chief 
threat to his country's security, a figurative back-door 
through which any partisan of the Stewart government might
1 CThe details of the divorce are presented in Scaris- 
brick, Henry VIII, pp. 371-73.
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16enter England unmolested* To bolt that door he sought
first by fair words to lure the Scots into England's orbit;
but when fair words failed, as they did in 1541 when his nep-
17hew, James V, failed as promised to meet with him at York, 
he resorted to the more forceful approach of war which un­
luckily drove James back upon the "auld alliance" with 
France and compelled Henry, whose desire to control north 
Britain remained fixed, to mount a secondary attack upon 
France to prevent the latter1s support of the Scots.
It is an attractive thesis and not without merit. Ruled
in the French and Catholic interest by James, whose own 
father had been done to death by the English at Flodden in 
1513, Scotland was hardly friend to the schismatical south­
ern king, who had ever shown himself the enemy of her people
and more recently the betrayer of her religion. Scotland
then did pose a threat to England, but at this juncture,
with Francis I, the sheet anchor of her defence, willing to
offer Henry "carte blanche for an alliance" against the
16The idea that Scotland and not the war in France was 
the main object of Henry's desire was popularized in Tudor 
historical circles through the medium of Pollard's classic 
biography of the great king. See his Henry VIII, Chap. XIV, 
passim,
17Henry's attempts to win over James are highlighted in
A. J. Slavin, Politics and' Profit: A Study of Sir Ralph
Sadler, 1507-1547 (Cambridge: University Press, 1966),
Chap.V and passTm.
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18emperor, it is safe to say that the threat was more poten-
tial than real and would have remained so but for the Tudor
king1s decision to abandon his neutrality apropos the strug^
gle that was shaping up on the Continent. In actual prac-
19tice, as Henry's earlier campaigns bear witness, Scotland 
posed a genuine danger only at such times as Henry had made 
war in France, and it was probably his resolution to do so 
again rather than any farsighted policy to unite the British 
Isles which led him in August, 1542, to show his preference 
for the Imperialists by openly breaking with James by send­
ing a raiding party led by the warden of the Middle March,
20Sir Robert Bowes, into Teviotdale.
The timing of the raid, which led to undisguised war^- 
fare, is significant in that it followed by a month Francis
9 1I's July declaration of hostilities against the emperor.
1 8L. & P ., XVII, No. 124.
19There are no adequate studies of Henry's Scottish 
wars. The best accounts are to be found in the following:
P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland (3 vols.; Cambridge: 
University Press, 1908-09); Fisher, History of England; and 
Mackie, The Earlier Tudors.
20L. &_ P ., XVII, Nos. 650-51, 661. The raid actually 
resulted in the defeat and capture of Bowes at Haddon Rig, 
but prompted the more savage incursion of the Duke of Nor­
folk, who invaded Scotland with an army of several thousand 
in the last week of October. Ibid., Nos. 994, 996.
2-^Francis declared formal war on July 10, six weeks and 
three days prior to Bowes* capture on August 24.
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Adherents of the Pollardian view see in this sequence of 
events proof of Henry’s broad vision and confirmation of 
their contention that Scotland, not France, was foremost in 
his mind: with the two titans of Europe again at loggerheads,
the time was ripe for weaning the Scots from their French 
dependency and for permanently closing the back-door into 
England; otherwise the Franco-Scottish combination would have 
ended any possibility of a British Empire. That Henry even­
tually failed in his objective and managed solely to stiffen 
Scottish resistance to the idea of union with England is at- 
tributed to bad luck and the poor management of his political 
and military overtures. His aim, however, is represented as a 
noble one since he sought "not mere military glory" but the 
creation of a United Kingdom which "was the real objective
9 9of his last war with France."
Again the argument has much to recommend it, not the
least of which is the fact that it is upheld by virtually
23every major historian of the Tudor period. Nevertheless 
as Elton pointed out a decade ago, the evidence rests on lit­
tle more than "a story so slanted as to support the interpre­
tation," Pollard "never argued his case," but like those
22Pollard, Henry VIII, p. 328.
23One of the more resourceful and ingenious restatements 
of Pollard’s view is to be found in Wernham, Before the Ar­
mada, Chap. 12.
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24who have since clung to it "he assumed it" in part perhaps 
because there is a certain irresistible logic in the idea 
that a great king like Henry would have been able to per­
ceive the mutual benefits to be gained from a merger of the 
two crowns. But precisely how obsessed with obtaining Scot­
land was Henry? Hardly at all, according to J. J. Scaris- 
brick, the only scholar in better than seventy years to seri­
ously challenge the Pollardian position:
we may be . . . skeptical about the farsighted­
ness of royal dealings with England's northern 
neighbor. It is very arguable that concern for 
Scotland during the last years of his reign was 
secondary to his preoccupation with France and 
that, as in 1513, he looked to the North only 
because he was about to plunge into the Conti­
nent . . . .  The assault on Scotland, far from 
springing from any long-term design for the 
British Isles, was a concomitant of a new up­
surge of ancient belligerence and ancient dy­
nastic ambition against the king of France,^5
Scarisbrick spends little time in substantiating his 
view, though the weight of the documentary evidence is cer­
tainly in his favor. As early as April 2, 1542, four months 
in advance of the eruption of the Scottish war and nearly a 
year before the formal resumption of friendly relations with 
Charles, Henry revealed his true mind by confiding in Chapuys, 
the Imperial ambassador, his plans for an attack upon France,
24G. R. Elton, "Henry VIII: An Essay in Revision," The
Historical Association General Series No. 51 (1962), p. 6 .
^Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 425-26.
the invasion of which he promised to lead in. person if Char?^
les would do the same and assist him in the procurement of
2 6foreign cavalry.
That Henry was serious at this juncture cannot be doubted 
since before the end of June his commissioners with the emr 
peror in Spain had agreed in principle to a league offensive 
and defensive that when concluded in February, 1543, would 
bind the two sovereigns to attempt a joint conquest of 
France.27 Meanwhile, before the rupture of the Hapsburg- 
Valois peace by Francis on July 10, to increase his credit 
with Charles, Henry dallied with the notion supplied him by 
Chapuys of sending an English array to cooperate with Adrien 
de Croy, Grand Master of Flanders, in a surprise assault 
upon the town of Montreuil. Located deep in the Boulannais 
on the banks of the River Canche it was a chief supplier of 
victuals and war material to the French strongholds in west­
ern Picardy and a potential threat therefore to the success 
of any future Anglo-Imperial operations in that sector.
From June through August, in anticipation of this feat 
the already substantial detachments within the English Pale 
at Calais, Hammes, and Guisnes were increased by several 
thousand, Guisnes, the foremost outpost against the French
26Spanish' Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 124.
27E, & P., XVII, NOS. 446-47.
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frontier, receiving the largest contingents, including the--
promise of three hundred arquebusiers for the training of
28the garrison troops in firearms. Eighty pieces of artil­
lery and an undetermined number of gunners were despatched 
to Calais; offers from certain mercenary captains of the 
Netherlands were considered in London; while in the Thames
ten great ships of war laden with campaign necessaries rode
29anchor at the ready.
Nothing, however, came of the Montreuil enterprise due 
mainly to the hesitation of the imperialists who balked at 
the aid demanded of them for the undertaking. Ten thousand 
auxiliaries was Henry's price for the capture of the town 
which was to remain in English hands after it had been won, 
and three thousand horsemen of the Low Countries were to be
made available to him as often as necessary for the victual-
i • j: - 4. 30 ling of it.
In the interim, as English and Imperial functionaries 
haggled over these terms in Spain, Flanders, and London, 
Henry's enthusiasm for the project waned when in mid-July 
the French, siezing the initiative, robbed him of the
2 8Ibid., Nos. 559, 740.
2 9Ibid., Nos. 405, 415, 532 (p. 307), 559.
^8Ibid., No. 447. In addition to the three armies sent 
against1 the Low Countries the Dauphin, Henry, led a fourth 
which on August 25 initiated an attack on Rousillon. The 
Itinerary of the Emperor Charles V, p. 533; State Papers, IX, 
101.
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element of surprise by striking with unexpected fury at the 
ill-prepared Netherlands defences of his prospective ally.
31Luxemburg, Brabant, and Artois were invaded in short order,
and on August 1, as an added deterrent to any attempt on Mon-
treuil, the suspicion was raised by Sir John Wallop, captain
of the castle at Guisnes, that the French troops mustering
for the war in Artois were in reality intended for an incur-
32sion into the Pale.
Clearly, as Henry perceived, with so much of France in 
arms it was not an auspicious summer for continental cam­
paigning. The idea of taking Montreuil was immediately 
shelved, for even though the Imperialists mounted a success­
ful counter-offensive and in September drove the French from 
the Low Countries, the season was too far advanced, and Fran­
cis, forewarned that Henry essayed some spectacular feat be­
yond the Channel, was on his guard. Nevertheless, the Eng­
lish king's mind was set: the build-up of arms around Calais
continued, and though Henry utterly refused Charles' every 
request for military cooperation, he steadfastly pursued the 
satisfactory consumation of that alliance that would commit 
them both to the invasion of France. Henry would have his 
war with the Valois, if not this year then at some later date
31L* XVII, Nos, 503, 533 (2), 534.
3 2 Ibid., No. 561.
225
of his own choosing; but for the moment it was best that he 
pretend neutrality.
Accordingly, on August 8 , Chapuys and Marillac, the
French ambassador, were summoned to Windsor where the Duke
of Norfolk, speaking for the king, begged them to excuse to
their masters any alarms which Henry's warlike preparations
might have caused. It was, said Norfolk, his sovereign's
wish to live in peace; but as Henry "was resolved to endure
no wrong," and since Francis and the emperor had assembled
great armies to the prejudice of his subjects both on and
beyond the Narrow Sea, he "had decided to make such prepa-
33ration that he could prevent and [resist] any attack." 
Chapuys who had been briefed in advance of this attempt to 
propitiate the French made suitable reply: he had already
forwarded an account of Henry's doings to Charles and was 
certain that neither the emperor nor the Netherlands author­
ities would misconstrue the king's intentions. Marillac 
tendered a similar rejoinder, though the transparency of 
Henry's dissemblings did not escape him. In his report of 
the Windsor interview to Francis he indicated his conviction 
that beneath the sweetness of Norfolk’s words there was 
"much poison hidden," noting ominously that in revealing 
their preparedness by land and sea to preserve their
33Ibid., No. 601,
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neutrality the English were in fact announcing their resolu­
tion to make war, if not immediately against Francis then 
against his ally, Scotland, warning that to hurt France "in 
the future they must either overthrow or greatly enfeeble
the Scots in order that, while occupied elsewhere, the Scots
34should not be able to harass them." No more succinct anal­
ysis of what in fact Henry now proposed could have been made. 
With Francis and Charles locked in struggle and the easy cap­
ture of Montreuil beyond his grasp, he would turn to smite 
the Scots to secure their quiescence before confronting the 
French.
From its beginnings, therefore, the Scottish war was en­
visioned as preventative rather than punitive with no thought 
of conquest in mind, a fact which Pollard himself seems to 
have come to accept some eight years after the appearance of 
his monumental biography:
Such conquests were beyond the military capacity 
of the sixteenth century; popular indifference 
to foreign masters which had facilitated the con­
tinental exploits of Edward III and Henry V had 
passed away; and the growth of national feeling 
imposed upon invaders tasks with which they were 
as yet ill-equipped to deal. Wars were border 
affairs and were never fought to the finish . .
. . All that Henry VIII sought to do in Scot­
land was to make himself so unpleasant that the
34Ibid., No. 770.
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Scots must needs prefer his friendship to that 
of the French,
But in that hope he never succeeded, if only because Celtic
pride proved mightier than Sassenach coercion.
As in most Anglo-Scottish clashes, the bulk of the honors
were won by the English, though considering the strategic re-
suits they were hardly worth the exertion. After the initial
mauling of Sir Robert Bowes* party by the Gordon Earl of
Huntly at Haddon Rigg on August 24, the Duke of Norfolk with
perhaps ten thousand militiamen crossed from Berwick into
Scotland on October 22 and for six days spoiled the country
as far north and west as Kelso, burning that town and a
36score of lesser places in the east and middle marches. Ex­
cepting a few Scots "pensioners," thieves and other desper­
ate sorts recruited from within the "Debatable Ground" which 
formed the border between the two nations, no foreigners 
served on the English side. Requests for Germans sent
through Mary of Hungary, sister of the emperor and Governess
37of the Netherlands, were apparently spurned, while the 
offer of the Parmesan count, Ludovico Rangone, to lead a
35A. F. Pollard, The History of England from the' Acces­
sion of Edward VI to the Death of Elizabeth- (London: Longmans,
Green, and Co., 1911), p. 10.
3®(B. M.) Add. MS. 10,110, f. 237 consists of a brief 
account of the Norfolk campaign.
37Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p. 434, states that Norfolk 
was accompanied by a few mercenaries recruited in the Low 
Countries, but I have been unable to verify this.
company out of Italy arrived too late to be acted upon.
Considering the horrendous capital outlay which for this
39expedition amounted to something in excess of £60,000,
Henry was lucky to escape the added expense of providing for 
mercenaries. At 8d. the day, the going rate for German and 
Italian infantrymen, the cost could have been substantial, 
the more so as half the army was retained in winter quarters 
on the frontier. However, as the sequel to Norfolk's raid 
proved, Henry needed no foreigners to contain the Scots: his
objective which might normally have been expected to take 
months to achieve was attained in a single day when on Novem­
ber 24 in Cumberland, between the Rivers Esk and Sark at Sol­
way Moss, three thousand Englishmen destroyed a Scottish army 
six times their number and accomplished at a stroke the neu­
tralization of Scotland as a military power.
The battle, if it could be called such, was a Scottish 
disaster of major proportion. Hardly of the same magnitude 
as Flodden Field, the humiliation of the defeat was neverthe­
less greater in that the invaders refused to fight. Panicked 
by the sight of the northern "prickers" they broke ranks be­
fore first contact and fled back towards the border only to
38Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 6 6 ; L. & P., XVII,
No. 978. ~ “
& P., XVII, NO. 718.
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be caught by the inrushing. tide flowing up the Solway. Many
drowned in the sea or in the swollen torrent of the Esk;
twelve hundred, including two earls, five barons, and five
hundred gentlemen, were made prisoners; and among the other
trophies counted by the English were three thousand horses,
twenty-four cannon, four cartloads of spears, ten pavilions,
40thirty standards, "and all flags among the footmen."
The enormity of Solway Moss was not wholly realized until 
some three weeks later when James, the Scottish king, died, 
as it was said, of the shame of it. He had not actually 
been present at the rout itself, but lurking six miles away 
on Burnswark Hill in Dumfriesshire he had witnessed the van 
of his broken army straggle back across the border. Heavy 
in spirit and with many evil words he had ridden off by way 
of Tantallon Castle and Edinburgh to Falkland beyond the 
Forth where on December 6 he took to his bed. On the eighth 
his French consort, Mary of Guise, gave birth to his heir, 
and a week later he died, vacating his throne to the infant 
Mary, Queen of Scots.41
If ever it had been Henry VIII's aim to make himself 
ruler of the northern kingdom, the moment of truth was
40■ Ibid., No. 1142 (2); (B. M.) Add. MS, 32,648, f. 156; 
Add. MS, 289, f. 17.
£  P . , XVII, Nos. 1142, 1193, 1214; XVIII, pt. 1,
No. 44 Tp. 29); (B. M.) Add. MS. 32,648, ff. 207, 218.
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surely at hand. The bitter combination of Solway Moss and 
James' death had rendered Scotland as vulnerable as at any 
time in her tragic history; yet because he had only aspired 
to bar his back door before striking at France the golden 
opportunity was allowed to pass without so much as a minor 
demonstration. In fact, as it did not seem to Henry's honor 
"to make war upon a dead body or a widow or a suckling, her 
daughter," all raiding across the "Debatable Ground" was im­
mediately suspended, and the Duke of Suffolk in his capacity 
as lieutenant-general in the north was sent to the frontier 
to treat of peace.^
Only now, with his reputed chief adversary prostrate be­
fore him, did Henry think to take Scotland, but not by con­
straint. In his instructions to Suffolk the king commanded 
the duke to seek a lasting concord with orders to propose 
terms for the marriage of the queen of Scots and her cousin, 
the English heir apparent, Edward, Prince of Wales. If,there­
fore, Henry were to have Scotland it would not be directly; 
and the establishment of any Tudor sovereignty of the British 
Isles would have to await his passing since the union of the 
two kingdoms could hardly take effect until Edward’s acces­
sion.
Nevertheless,-the marriage in itself was a worthy goal
42 (B. M.) Add. MS. 32,648, f. 224; L. & P., XVIII, pt. 1, 
Nos. 7, 96.
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towards the fulfillment of which a formal abstinence from war
43was declared on Henry's part in February, 1543. English 
garrisons along the border were reduced as a gesture of good 
will, and on March 3 word came out of Scotland that ambassa­
dors would soon be sent to initiate the nuptials and conclude
44a peace perpetual. The Scottish commissioners arrived in
London in May, signed the necessary documents at Greenwich
on July 1, and were sent back to Edinburgh with many thanks
45before the end of the month. Scotland it seemed had been 
made submissive: the back door into England appeared to be
tightly shut, which meant that the side-door through Calais 
into France could now be forced.
Though the affaire d'Ecosse had seemed at times to engulf 
everything,the romantic obsession of personally leading an 
English army into France had never left Henry's mind. The 
date in fact had been tentatively fixed even before the com­
mencement of the interim truce with the Scots when on Febru­
ary 11, 1543, the long considered closer amity with the em­
peror became a reality on the signing at Westminster of an
46Anglo-Imperial alliance. The chief clauses of the agreement
43L. & P ., XVIII, pt. 1, Nos. 139, 173.
44Ibid., Nos. 198, 237, 239.
4 5Ibid., Nos. 570, 804, 908.
46A transcript of the treaty as it appears in Rymer, 
Foedera, appears in Ibid., N o . 144.
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established peace and free intercourse between the subjects 
of the two princes; provided for the joint defence of the 
other's territories should either be invaded, the invader to 
be proclaimed the common enemy of both; and committed Henry 
"within two years" to the prosecution of war against Prance 
with an army of twenty-nine thousand, including two thousand 
landsknechts and two thousand Burgundian horse provided at 
the emperor's expense. Lest such auxiliary support be con­
sidered insufficient, free rein was given the English to re­
cruit mercenaries within the emperor's dominions, but for 
this their king scarcely needed encouragement.
Henry had been seeking to cultivate friends among mercen­
ary leaders for some time. Word to this effect had come 
from France in June, 1542. In August of that same year Sir 
Thomas Seymour, Henry's operative in Vienna, was instructed 
to keep an eye out for likely captains who might be able to 
get troops through to Calais, while in December "wishing to 
be prepared for war" the English king, acting through Seymour, 
tried unsuccessfully to procure two thousand horsemen and 
three thousand foot under the Brandenburg baron, George von 
Heideck. The sticking point was costs: for five months pay
and pensions for his officers Heideck's estimate was nearly 
642,000, a sum considered excessive by Henry. It was perhaps 
a wise decision if the baron was in any way like his brother, 
who was dismissed from French service for drawing wages for
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almost double the landsknechts he had under contract.47 Be­
sides, there was no lack of soldiers of fortune, and further 
to his chagrin the "notable enterprise" in France which Henry 
had intended for the summer of 1543 had to be postponed for a 
year by the revival of troubles in Scotland. Mercenaries 
were therefore considered at this juncture an expensive and 
unnecessary luxury. He had chastened the Scots in the past 
without foreign assistance: he would husband his finances by
doing so again; or so at least he hoped.
At the heart of the new imbroglio in the north lay the 
marriage treaty between Mary Stuart and Prince Edward. Though 
Henry had yielded on the main points, that the queen was to 
remain in Scotland until her tenth birthday and that in the 
event of the union of the two crowns the ancient liberties 
of her nation were to be preserved, the Scots remained sus­
picious and hostile, remembering his initial stance in the 
weeks following their discomfiture on Solway. Claiming the 
right as suzerain of Scotland he had demanded immediate pos­
session of Mary's person and an end to the "auld alliance."
Though in consequence of the Scots willingness to negoti­
ate Henry’s position had softened, his original terms still 
rankled thereby strengthening the hands of the pro-French 
party in the north championed by the dowager queen, Mary of
47L. &.P., XVII, Nos. 701, 1246; XVIII, pt. 1, Nos. 29,
42.
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Guise, and her chief supporter, David Beaton, Cardinal-Arch- 
bishop of St. Andrews, who soon after the Greenwich treaties 
were ratified at Holyrood was freed from the close confine­
ment he had been subjected to at Henry's connivance, rein­
stated as Chancellor, and with the queen mother admitted to 
the council of regency which governed the realm. The rever­
sal of policy was almost immediately felt when on December 11 
the Scottish Parliament annulled the peace and the contract
of marriage with England and renewed the old alliance with
48France with whom Henry was now officially at war. Thus, as 
regards Scotland, did the year end, everything in smoke and 
confusion, the high hopes of the previous summer dashed be­
yond repair with the nation thought so secure in Henry1s 
thrall more defiant and hostile than ever.
The diplomacy of conciliation might yet have worked had 
the king been willing to forego the quest for glory abroad, 
but the Tudor's pride would not admit that possibility.
Hence in the winter of 1543-44, while ships, guns, and men 
were gathered for the satisfaction of his obligation to 
Charles, the Duke of Suffolk, Henry's commander in the 
marches, was employed in devising a plan for a spring inva­
sion of the Scottish lowlands. As with Norfolk's incursion
^sDickinson, Scotland From Earliest Times to 1603, 
316-17.
235
49in 1542, what was intended was a raid rather than a con^
quest. Having suffered a loss of face liy the repudiation of
the treaties of Greenwich, Henry by thrashing the Scots again
would accomplish the double purpose of restoring his honor
and insuring their quiescence during his absence, in France
The foray, as finally approved by the king, was, like all
previous Tudor set-tos with the Scots, a wholly English af-?'
fair. Henry, fearful that Francis might interpose with pror-
fessional mercenary and auxiliary support, did try with an
offer of 20,000 ducats for the emperor's war in Italy to in^
duce Charles to lend him a thousand Spanish arquebusiers for
the venture, but the request was denied on grounds that the
Spaniards were needed for the defence of Luxemburg and the 
50Low Countries. More to the point, as is clear from the 
secret instructions drawn up for Don Ferrante de Gonzaga, 
Viceroy of Sicily and special emissary to London, Charles was 
anxious lest Henry become so carried away with Scotland that 
the Imperialists would be left to fight the French single-
^ See Suffolk's letter to Henry, L, s P,, XIX, pt., 1, No. 
136, in which the duke, indicating his preference for an ex­
pedition by land, estimates that the English army "might be 
in Scotland by April 14 and back by May 15." For details of 
the various proposals submitted by Suffolk to Henry see also, 
ibid., Preface, xi-ii; Nos. 71, 83, 95.
KflSpanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 272; VII, Nos, 17, 22.
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51handed. He need not have trouhled himself: the Earl of
Hertfordr whom Henry appointed to smite the Scots , accom­
plished his task within two weeks. Sailing into the Firth 
of Forth on May 3 with an army of ten thousand reinforced by 
four thousand more from the east and middle marches, Hert­
ford by his own account cut such a swath of destruction that 
"the like devastation hath not been made in Scotland these 
many years." Faithful to Henry's command, that the upper
stone should be the nether and not one stick left standing 
52by another, the earl systematically burned Leith, Edinburgh, 
Holyrood House, and the entire country as far south as the 
border across which he passed into Berwick on May 18. Having 
read this grim lesson to the Scots the earl returned to Lon­
don to aid the king in the invasion of France, the largest 
military undertaking any English sovereign had contemplated 
on the Continent, and one which involved the greatest numbers 
of mercenaries and auxiliaries ever to serve a Tudor.
51Ibid., VI, pt. 2, No. 269.
52M. St. Clare Byrne, ed., The Letters of King Henry VIII 
(London: Cassell and Company Lt., 1936), p. 346. A rather
full contemporary account by an anonymous participant in the 
expedition is provided in The late expedition in Scotland, 
made by the King1s Highness1 army, under the conduct of the 
. . . Earl of Hertford contained in Pollard, ed., Tudor Tracts, 
1532-1588, pp. 38-47.
CHAPTER VIXI
THE INITIATION OF THE FRENCH WAR OF 1544^6
It followeth of strangers, who are rather brought in by 
custom than reason, yet tolerable necessity urging it: 
So that the Countrymen be the body and Strength of the 
Army and Strangers but a part and member thereof. For 
they are unfaithful and shake off both right and law 
for greater pay. They are stubborn and love to do 
what them liketh. They are Runaways in the very Con­
flicts, And Spoilers of the Country & people . . . .
Anonymous, "Brief Collection of Excellent Instruc­
tions to be Observed in the Excercise of Military 
discipline." (B. M.) Harl. MS. 444, f. 121.
By modern standards it is sometimes impossible to un­
cover the true reasons for war in the early sixteenth century, 
the problem being, as Elton phrased it, that "the most obvi­
ous feature of the age was the near-absence of any coherent 
set of principles against which policy could be measured," 
that "the era of Charles V," to whose name might be added
that of Henry VIII, "had difficulty even in finding words
1for its hypocrisies."
No war was ever initiated, at least by the early Tudors, 
without "defiance," that is to say without an ultimatum or 
ritualistic preferring of charges by the aggressor. The Eng­
lish, wrote Chapuys, were so grounded in this procedure that 
they held it a point of honor not to begin hostilities
■*"G. R. Elton, Reformation Europe, 1517-1559 (London: 
Collins, 1963), p. 79.
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2without defiance. The intended victim was allowed a fixed 
period of time in which to consider the charges and make 
amends. If satisfaction was not forthcoming on the expira­
tion of the deadline a state of belligerency was held to 
exist between the two states.
The origin on this gentlemanly convention is perhaps as 
old as war itself, but in its sixteenth-century style it was 
medieval, the rules and regulations governing its use having 
been set during the high age of chivalry whose legalists in 
the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries had 
evolved the theory of the "just war," the sole form of legit­
imate warfare countenanced by them. Lawfully, by the six­
teenth century such wars "could only be waged by sovereigns," 
that is by heads of state who in their own right and within 
their own dominions were supreme: "only he who has no supe­
rior can declare a just war," wrote the lawyer Bartolus of 
Sassoferrato; or again according to Nicholas of Tudeschi,
"wars which are not declared by a prince are not properly
..4wars."
The just war of course required just causes, and these 
too had been fairly well delimited by the end of the Middle
2L. £  P., XVIII, pt. 1, No. 288.
M. H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 246.
4Ibid., p. 69.
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Ages. "Wars are defined as just when their aim is to avenge 
injury, that is when that people or city against whom war is 
to be declared has neglected either to redress injuries done 
by its subjects or to restore what they have wrongfully seized:" 
so ruled St. Augustine in his City of God. Later jurists were 
more precise, so that in general by the Renaissance the grounds 
on which wars could be justifiably fought were universally re­
cognized as in support of the Christian religion, to avenge 
the dishonoring of a prince or his state, self-defence, and as
a last resort to obtain rightful possession of some desired
5object wrongfully withheld.
It is patently obvious, however, that just causes were not 
necessarily the actual reasons why in the sixteenth century 
princes went to war. Just causes more often as not were mere 
pretexts utilized to clothe aggression and ambition in legal 
garb. The murderous raids of Norfolk and Hertford into Scot­
land in 1542 and 1544, though made in the name of honor to 
avenge respectively the disgrace of Sir Robert Bowes * defeat 
and the breach of the Greenwich marriage contract, were both 
intended to enfeeble the Scots and render them harmless. The 
Most Christian King claimed honor as his justification for
ghis resort to arms in July, 1542. The previous summer his
^Ibid., pp. 66-67.
gByrne, ed., The Letters of King Henry VIII, pp. 355-56.
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ambassadors, Antonio Rincon and Cesare Fregoso, had been mur- 
dered by Imperialist agents in the Milanese. It made no dif­
ference that they had been on a secret mission to further an 
alliance with the infidel Turks against a fellow Christian, 
the Catholic emperor, or that Rincon was a Spaniard born and 
therefore a traitor to his king: the satisfaction of honor
was a sacred duty. It was also a convenient guise under which 
to wage legitimate war for the recovery of Milan, war which 
by juristic definition was the exclusive right of princes.
The just causes and the just wars which they provoked 
were in a sense so much play acting. When on May 28, 1543, 
Christopher Barker, Garter King of Arms, was despatched to 
Francis I to offer Henry VIII*s defiance, the list of griev­
ances it contained reeked of righteous indignation but "had
glittle to do with the actual fighting." Francis was charged 
to end his unholy alliance with the Turks; cease his depreda­
tions against the emperor; pay the arrears of Henry's annual 
pension promised by the treaty of 1532 of which for nine years 
past he had not been paid a penny; "and deliver in security 
for the pension in the future the towns of Boulogne, Ardres,
^Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, III, 269.
QLucey Baldwin Smith, Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), p. 154. As safe-
conduct was denied Barker by the French, Henry's ultimatum 
was actually delivered to Francis through his ambassador in 
London. See L. P ., pt. 1, No. 754 (1).
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Montreuil, Therouanne, and the county of Ponthieu." The 
French king was further instructed to abstain from practicing 
with the Scots; liberate all English subjects wrongfully im­
prisoned; and deliver into Henry's hands all rebels to his 
government, including a demented Yorkist, a cobbler's son, 
who called himself "la Blanche Rose." Finally, "for the quiet 
of Christendom," Francis was to unite with Henry and Charles 
in driving the Turks from Europe. His tres chr^tien Majeste 
was apportioned twenty days in which to perform these feats, 
at the end of which if he had failed to act Henry would de­
nounce war against him, adding for good measure his demands 
for "the realm of France, the duchies of Normandy, Gascony, 
the Guienne," plus all the lands which Francis and his ances­
tors were held to have usurped from him on the Continent.^
It would be easy, as most Tudor historians have found, 
from "such an imaginative array of international grievances" 
to isolate the Scottish question as the "true" cause of 
Henry’s ire; but the fact of the matter is that in his de­
fiance there is no "true" cause at all: "the entire chal­
lenge was window-dressing, merely a formal recognition that 
a 'just1 war could only be waged between sovereign princes. 
The true cause of the French war of 1543, as in Henry’s case
^State Papers, IX, 388; Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2,
Nos. 163-64.
^Smith, Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty, p. 155.
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it always had been, was glory. He would fight in France
again, not for political gain or economic aggrandizement
but, as Vergil had perceived at the beginning of his reign,
to "create such a fine opinion about his valor among all men
that they could clearly understand that his ambition was not
merely to equal but indeed to excel the glorious deeds of
11his ancestors." Through him the halcyon days of English 
chivalry would live again. With Edward III and Henry V he 
would tread the sacred battle-ground of Picardy: "A single
town added to the Calais foothold, a hundred acres of terri­
tory trod by the heroes of Agincourt and restored to Eng-
12land, was worth all the lochs and moors of Scotland."
At its roots the romantic justification for Henry's 
last reentry into the continental lists might have been medi' 
eval, but it was an incontrovertible verity that in Europe 
the fight into which he proposed to plunge himself was mod­
ern and that the troops employed there were professionals.. 
According to a Spanish informant whose information is said 
to have come from Francis I's own secretary, the French in 
1542, excluding garrison troops, had some seventy thousand 
men in arms against the Imperialists in Italy, the Low Coun­
tries, and Rousillon. Among these the preponderant number
-^Vergil, Historia Anglica, p. 161.
12Smith, Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty, p. 199.
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came from the most advanced military races of Europe; forty- 
three thousand Swiss and German pikemen; four or five thou­
sand Italians, arquebusiers and heavy cavalrymen,- two thou­
sand Clevelander horse; an assortment of Basque jinetes and 
Albanian stradiots; not to mention the native French forces, 
including "four thousand old soldiers formerly in Piedmont, 
the best troops in the world;" and a vast collection of up- 
to-date artillery of varied caliber.^ A year later, in Oc­
tober, 1543, for the relief of Landrecies in Hainault, Fran­
cis is said to have raised almost as large an army: fifty
thousand foot and fifteen thousand horse, the majority again
14mercenaries from Switzerland, Italy and the German states.
The military strength of the emperor was if anything 
greater. The mind boggles at the thought of the potential 
forces available to him: the soldiery of Spain, Naples,.the
Milanese, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and when it was 
not engaged against the Turks that of his brother, Ferdinand 
I, king of Hungary and Bohemia, heir-designate of the Holy 
Roman Empire. In Italy alone at the opening of his third 
war with Francis I in 1536 he had in excess of sixty-five 
thousand men of all arms, the bulk of them being mercenaries
13Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 23; L. P ., XVII, 
Nos. 517 (3), (4), (5)f 528, 554.
14L. & P., XVIII, pt. 2, No. 321 (2).
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and auxiliaries recruited to supplement his permanent Span-
15ish tercios in Lombardy, Naples, and Sicily, Conserva­
tively speaking, considering the many fronts on which the em­
peror might at any time be engaged, Charles probably had at
his command and in his pay in excess of one hundred thousand 
16men, nearly all of them professionals, either mercenaries, 
as were the majority of his Italians, or veterans of standing 
units like his Spanish tercios, the Netherlands bandes 
d 'ordonnance, or the various military orders like the Teu­
tonic Knights, whose Grand Master, Wolfgang Schuzbar, led a
contingent of "cavaliers" for the emperor during the Anglo-
17Imperial invasion of France m  1544.
150man, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 59,
61.
"^Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish 
Road, 1567-1659 (Cambridge: University Press, 1972), p. 6 ,
places the number of Charles' effectives in 1552 at one hun­
dred-fifty thousand.
l^Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran- 
caises, pp. 87, 98. The Grand ̂ Masterships of the three great 
crusading orders of Spain— Alcantara, Calatrava, and Santiago- 
-were conferred upon Charles by Pope Adrian IV in 1523. Merri- 
man, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, III, 192. Don Sancho 
Bravo de Mardones (or Lagunas), commander of the Order of 
Alcantara, served on Charles' general staff during the French 
war of 1544. Founded in the twelfth century during the Span­
ish reconquest of Castile, these military-religious societies 
acquired great wealth and property in the years of fighting 
against the Moors. By Adrian's bull their assets were united 
with the crown, but to satisfy his creditors Charles was 
obliged to relinquish control of the administration of those 
assets to the Augsburg banking house of Fugger.
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The military establishment of the early Tudors is so 
weak by comparison that one must consider them audacious in­
deed for ever having so much as contemplated war outside of 
their own bailiwick, the British Isles, except that it is to 
be remembered that no large-scale operation was ever consid­
ered on the mainland without at least the promise of support 
from either Spain, the Empire, or both. Henry VII, though 
in the end he had to go it alone, had invaded France1 in 1492 
on earlier assurances of cooperation from Ferdinand of Aragon,
and so likewise had it been arranged by the treaty signed
18between Henry VIII and the emperor in February, 1543: in
conjunction with Charles V the second Tudor, using the spe­
cious and time-worn claim of his ancestors to the French 
throne, would hazard the possible humiliation of defeat, the 
security of his realm, and the bankruptcy of his government 
for the satisfaction of a bellicose urge. The eighth Henry 
was "a prince of royal courage;1' therefore, in the words of 
the late Chancellor, Cardinal Wolsey, everything and any­
thing would be risked "rather than he [would] miss or want 
part of his appetite."1^
^ See above, pp. 231-32.
19George Cavendish, The Life and Death of Cardinal Wol­
sey in Two Tudor Lives, ed. Richard S. Sylvester and Davis 
P. Harding (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1962), p. 183.
The risk to England probably appeared slight at the be" 
ginning of 1543. Scotland, recovering from the debacle of 
Solway Moss, was properly submissive; the French offensives 
of the previous year had been beaten back by the Imperial­
ists; and by the end of the summer, after the deliverance of 
Henry's defiance to Francis and the signing of the Greenwich 
treaties in July, things augured well for Charles' success. 
Another attack on the Netherlands by the French and their 
confederate, Duke William of Cleves, after some anxious mo­
ments had been repulsed. In March the duke, who disputed
the claim of the emperor to the reversion of the duchy of 
20Gelders, had invaded the county of Juliers, invested Heins- 
berg, and defeated the forces of the Imperialist Duke of 
Arschot at Sittard in neighboring Westphalia; while in June 
with the Netherlands government thus distracted Francis him­
self had forced entry into Hainault, occupied Landrecies,
21and for a time ravaged defenceless Luxemburg.
By now, however, the Imperialists had rallied under the 
energetic leadership of the emperor, who in July marched out 
of Italy to Bonn where he mustered a polyglot army of
2 0William, brother to Ann of Cleves and therefore former 
brother-in-law to Henry VIII, had actually occupied Gelders 
on the death of its last duke, Charles of Egmont, in 1538.
21Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, Nos. 117, 121, 125, 159,181; State Papers, IX, 512.
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Dutchmen, Germans, Burgundians, Italians, and Spaniards with
which towards the end of August he struck into the territories
22of the Duke of Cleves. Duren in Juliers was taken by storm 
on August 24, and in a terrifying display of summary justice 
the male defenders were put to the sword, the town itself be­
ing given over in plunder to the Spaniards and Italians who 
had distinguished themselves in the assault. This bloody ex­
ample brought the rebellious vassal to heel. Juliers was 
surrendered, and on September 7 the duke himself tendered his
humble submission to the emperor, renouncing all claim to Gel-
23ders as the primary condition of his pardon.
In the meantime Charles' English alliance had borne its 
first fruit, as in June, in the weeks immediately following 
the opening of the French offensive against the southern Neth­
erlands, Henry was induced, as the treaty required, to send a 
force of English auxiliaries to participate in the defence of 
the Low Countries. Command of the expedition which was raised 
entirely from retinues provided by private gentlemen was en­
trusted to Sir John Wallop, who as "chief captain" with some 
five thousand men departed from Calais on July 22 with in­
structions to employ his men as required by the government of
22The Itinerary of the Emperor Charles V, pp. 538-39;
L. & P ., XVIII, pt. 2, No. 73.
23L. & P., XVIII, pt. 2, Nos. 86, 97, 126, 143, 162, 168.
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24Mary of Hungary.
It was originally hoped by Henry that Wallop might be 
used, as had been contemplated in 1542, in seizing Montreuil 
or Boulogne. However, the rapid build-up of French reserves 
in the Boulonnais and the danger to Brussels caused by Fran­
cis* irruption into Hainault compelled Mary to utilize Wal­
lop's not inconsiderable talents in the more practical busi­
ness of expelling the French from her lands. Landrecies in 
southern Hainualt was her especial concern. An otherwise in­
significant dot on the map until captured and fortified by 
the French in the last days of June, it was seen as the key 
to the control of the whole province and an entrance through 
which Francis could strike at Artois and possibly even Brus­
sels. It was therefore to the siege of that town that the 
English auxiliaries were sent, but in the almost nineteen 
weeks they labored in the company of soldiers from every cor­
ner of the Hapsburg empire nothing of consequence was accom­
plished.
Not even the appearance of Charles, fresh from his tri­
umph over the Duke of Cleves, could effect the reduction of 
the fortress. On October 29 when Francis approached his be­
leaguered prize in order of battle the siege was lifted thus 
allowing the French to resupply the town with victuals and a
^State Papers, IX, 440.
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25fresh garrison. Following this, as neither commander was
willing to risk a full engagement, the two sides retired to
winter quarters, and on November 11 amid assurances that they
had acquitted themselves well, the English took their leave
26of the emperor and headed back to Calais, their sole conso­
lation being that they had gained some badly needed exposure 
to military methods they could hardly have obtained elsewhere: 
"I promise your Majesty," wrote Wallop on departing: Landre- 
cies, "that in all the wars I have been in, I have not seen 
such another time for youth to learn . . . especially since 
the emperor's coming, who brought with him horsemen and foot
of all nations, so as your Majesty's men here might learn and
27choose what fashion they liked best."
This revealing statement, coming as it did from one of
28Henry's most expert soldiers, contained within it the thinly
25L. & P ., XVIII, pt. 2, Nos. 291, 321.
26Ibid., Nos. 354, 384.
27George F. Nott, The Works of Henry Howard, Earl of 
Surrey and of Sir Thomas Wyatt the Eider (2 vols., London: 
Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1815-1816) , I, lix, n. 
Hereinafter cited as The Works of Henry Howard.
2 8Sir John Wallop was one of but a handful of Henrician 
Englishmen who could qualify as a professional soldier, as 
most of his career was spent on active duty. His military 
experience is presumed to have begun in 1511 when it is sup­
posed he was sent as part of an English expedition to the 
Low Countries to assist the Regent, Margaret of Savoy, in 
suppressing a revolt in Gelders. Knighted for his services 
he was next employed as a captain at sea in Henry VIII*s 
first French war, after which between 1516 and 1518 he fought
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veiled admission that Englishmen had in fact a great deal to 
learn about the ways of war and the manner of waging it.
Since this was the case, and as there were few about the king 
who were likely to dispute Wallop's knowledge in such matters, 
it was felt that before the English leader withdrew from the 
Netherlands he should attempt to secure from among the hun­
dreds of foreign captains with whom he daily came in contact
the names of a few who might on Henry's crossing the Channel
29be willing to join the English in their attack upon France.
Accordingly, Wallop began to take notes. From Landre-
cies, just before the lifting of the siege, he informed Sir
William Paget, Henry's late ambassador in Paris and one of
30the king1s two Principal secretaries, that he knew of forty 
or fifty Albanians who could be used to augment the squadron
as a gentleman-volunteer in the army of Manuel I of Portugal 
against the Moors in North Africa. On his return to England 
he was posted for three years in Ireland and in 1522 and 1523 
distinguished himself under Surrey and Suffolk in France. 
Apparently a man of considerable experience in fortifications 
and in leading men, he was created High Marshal of Calais in 
1524, elevated to the lieutenancy of that town in 1530, and 
finally raised to the captaincy of Guisnes in 1541. For com­
manding the English forces before Landrecies he was elected 
Knight of the Garter on Christmas eve, 1543. William Arthur 
Jobson Archbold, "Sir John Wallop," Dictionary of National 
Biography, ed. Sir Leslie Stephens and Sir Sidney Lee (22 vols. 
and suppls., London: Oxford University Press, 1949- ), XX
609-12. Hereinafter cited as D. N. B.
29L. £  P., XVIII, pt. 2, No. 385.
30The other was Sir Thomas Wriothesley, who was succeeded 
in that office by Sir William Petre on the former's elevation 
to the post of Lord Chancellor on May 3, 1544.
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of Northern horse stationed at Guisnes; to Henry he wrote 
from Douai that he had the names of "divers chiefs" of infan­
try and cavalry, Spaniards, Germans, and Italians; while on 
November 8 he was ordered by the Privy Council to consult 
with the best captains of Cleves "to learn how the emperor 
was served by them." Though the latter instructions arrived 
after the disbandment of the Imperial army Wallop anticipated 
them, having, as he wrote in reply, previously "practiced 
with them" through his intermediary, the Netherlands Count of 
Buren, who besides promising an unlimited supply of Cleve­
lander cavalry offered of his own retinues "horsemen, footmen, 
gunners for mortars, drumslades and fifers, as many as the 
king shall need." There was no end of mercenary applicants: 
Joergen van Lesken and Borges van Moncke, residents of Gotten 
in Germany, each proffered between three and four hundred 
horse; the Saxon Count of Mansfeld promised five thousand 
foot; while out of Italy, Alexandro Gonzaga, bastard son of
the Duke of Mantua, offered on two months' notice four thou-
31sand infantry and three hundred mounted arquebusiers.
Such declarations of intent were gratifying, particularly 
as it was now certain that the combined assault on France 
would take place sometime in the new year. The details had 
yet to be hammered out, but on December 10, as Wallop
31L. &.P., XVIII, pt. 2, Nos. 310, 384-85.
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settled back in at Guisnes for the winter, Don Ferrante Gon- 
zaga, the Imperial Viceroy of Sicily, was sent from Brussels 
by the emperor with full authority "to conclude all things 
pertaining thereto."32
A firm timetable for the invasion and a plan of action 
were Charles' primary concerns, the more so as Henry's deep­
ening rift with the Scots suggested to his cynical mind a 
weakening of the king's resolution towards their precontracted 
enterprise. Scotland the emperor felt would ruin everything, 
if Henry was in fact intent upon having it. But the king was 
not. For the sake of honor besmirched by the broken treaties 
of Greenwich and for the security of the northern frontier, 
the border wars might continue; however, the greater glory 
was to be had in France. Therefore, when Don Ferrante ap­
peared at Hampton Court about Christmas it took less than a 
week to dispel the emperor's doubts and devise a new compact 
by which France might best be undone.
By the articles signed on the last day of the year, Henry 
and Charles pledged to commence their war against the common 
enemy no later than June 20 with separate armies increased in 
strength from their original twenty-nine thousand to forty-two 
thousand, including on the English side the Imperial auxilia­
ries promised in February and as many mercenaries from the
32Ibid., Nos. 457, 485.
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33emperor's territories as Henry chose to hire. But as for 
objectives, other than the defeat of Prance none were clearly 
stated. Both princes were to strike in the general direction 
of Paris, the emperor through Champagne and the English by 
such passage across Picardy as seemed least defensible. How­
ever, each commander reserved the right, on Henry's insistance, 
to alter his course as strategy, availability of supplies, 
and the disposition of the enemy dictated. At face value 
this could be taken as an indication of prudent generalship, 
but unfortunately, as events would prove, it was nothing less 
than another demonstration of the gargantuan monarch's wilful 
appetite. Henry would have his few yards of France at mini­
mum risk to himself and his army. For by voting himself a 
free hand at a time when he knew his ally must pursue a fight 
already begun, he had arrogated unto himself the right of de­
ciding his own objectives, and these in all likelihood never 
included Paris. The throne of France, more so than the crown 
of Scotland, was beyond his reach. Of this reality Henry was 
doubtless aware, so that when it came to the point, as a man 
who "attempted nothing which he did not bring to a successful 
conclusion," he would settle for much less, leaving Charles 
to shift for himself, but employing Imperial soldiers to at­
tain his end.
3^Ibid., No. 526. See also No. 525 (1), (3). See p. 154.
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What Henry would eventually settle for was a minor ex­
tension of his Pale in France. The fortified town of Boulogne, 
a fishing port located a mere twenty-two miles from Calais, 
was his goal, though for fear the emperor would withdraw his 
support if the truth were out that objective remained the se­
cret of the king alone until the very eve of his departure 
for the campaign. In the interim,every effort was made to 
give the Imperialists no cause for reproach. Plans for carry­
ing through the invasion were implemented immediately, begin­
ning at the first of the year with an attempt to assess costs. 
The sum of £250,000 was the figure arrived at, but as Henry 
could lay his hands on barely half that amount and was not 
prepared at present to "molest his loving subjects for money 
unless thereto coacted," commissions were issued in March and 
April authorizing the sale of various royal properties in Eng­
land and I r e l a n d . A s  provisions, guns, ships, and munitions 
were collected, other extra-Parliamentary means were resorted 
to, as for example the sale of wards and manumission for bond­
men, and loans were also required because of the added expense 
of outfitting Hertford's expedition against the Scots. In mid- 
May, about the time of the earl's triumphal return to Berwick, 
Stephen Vaughan, one of Henry's principal factors in the Low 
Countries, was commissioned to negotiate for £20,000 a month
34L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 278 (4), (5), (67), 443 (7).
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35with the German and Italian bankers of Antwerp.
As to the raising of the English forces which Henry 
would lead into France, it had long been decided that the bulk 
of the troops were to be provided not by the militia, which 
was to be held in readiness for the defence of the realm, but 
by the private retinues of England1s lords and gentlemen.
O g"Special” musters had been ordered in the spring of 1543
following the successful negotiation of the preliminary treaty
37with the emperor. The crown was therefore possessed of con­
siderable information about the military power of its magnates 
and knew precisely which could serve and how many retainers 
each could provide. In the muster rolls prepared from the cer' 
tificates returned in 1543, the exact number of English effec­
tives drafted for "voyage into France" was 32,389: 9,978 for
the vanguard under Norfolk; 12,847 for the middle or king's 
ward; and 9,564 for the rearguard under the Lord Privy Seal,
3Walter C. Richardson, Stephen Vaughan, Financial Agent 
of Henry VIII {Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1953), pp. 47-48.
3 6"General" musters and "special"musters were the normal 
means in early Tudor England by which the government inquired 
into the military preparedness of the kingdom. "By means of 
the former . . . the crown attempted to ascertain the strength 
of the militia in every shire; by means of the latter it at­
tempted to ascertain the 'power' of every gentlemen of stand­
ing in the land.1 Goring, "The Military Obligations of the 
English People, 1511-1558," pp. 85, 268.
37L. &P., XVIII, pt. 1, NOS. 53, 342.
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38Sir John Russell. Allowing for a few last-minute withdraw­
als because of sickness, death, or changes in assignments, 
Henry was under obligation to find six thousand mercenaries. 
That sum combined with the amount of the English effectives 
and the auxiliaries volunteered by Charles would raise the 
army royal to the treaty strength of forty-two thousand.
The quest for mercenaries had begun in earnest the past 
November in the emperor's camp at Landrecies. Wallop had sup 
plied many names, but it was apparent from the first that 
there would be difficulties in recruiting. The Italians were 
felt to be untrustworthy; others, presumably like the Saxon 
Count of Mansfeld, were "too distant;" while the few free 
lances willing to bargain could not be made to accept the 
terms. Typical of the latter was one Gymynck, the master of 
Gymnyhe Castle near Cologne. Advanced a pension of 200 
crowns on the expectation he would raise a thousand horse,
38Ibid., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 274 (p. 159), 275 (2), 276. 
These figures do not include the hordes of brewers, bakers, 
millers, carters, masons, smiths, tentmakers and other such 
workmen necessary for military provisioning and maintenance. 
One estimate of the number of non-combatants alone required 
for the victualling of the king's battle listed two chief 
masters of victuals, two clerks, eight sellers of bread, six­
teen sellers of drink, sixteen butchers, thirty conductors 
and "watchers" of victuals, sixteen herdsmen and drovers of 
cattle, 480 carters for 240 wagons, three coopers, three cart- 
wrights, three smiths, and twenty common laborers, not to 
mention one hundred millers, one hundred brewers, and one 
hundred bakers, plus their various helpers, totalling in all 
1,372 persons. Another estimate gives as the number of Eng­
lish non-combatants attached to the whole army 2,328. (P. R. 
O.) S. P. 1/184, ff. 56-62.
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39he absconded with the money and refused to serve.
A more flagrant case of larceny involved the landsknecht 
leader, Christopher von Landenberg, described in one of his 
fulsome missives to the English government as "from the side 
of Landenberg near Schramberg" in Baden.4  ̂ Commended to 
Henry by the emperor himself, he received from the king's 
own hand the commission of "colonel" with authority to pro­
vide a thousand cavalrymen for the main battle and four thou­
sand infantrymen to be divided between the van and the rear.4  ̂
The colonel's letter of articles stipulated that his forces 
be ready at Maastricht by May 26. Consequently, well in ad­
vance of that date Henry appointed as special commissaries 
Stephen Vaughan and Thomas Chamberlain,42 two skilled media­
tors and experts in finance, to oversee their muster and ex­
pedite their rapid transit through the Low Countries.
The commissioners left England on March 12, arriving
39L. & P ., XVIII, pt. 2, No. 385; XIX, pt. 1, No. 188.
40(P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/185, f. 187.
41L. & P ., XVIII, pt. 2, NOS. 479-80, 488; XIX, pt. 1, 
No. 653. Chapuys in the Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 
267, describes the composition of the horsemen as follows: 
two hundred men-at-arms, three hundred arquebusiers, and 
five hundred lancers.
420n the careers of these two prominent public servants 
consult Richardson, Stephen Vaughan, Financial Agent of 
Henry VIII, Chap,- V and passim.
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with layovers at Bruges and La Noye at Antwerp on the twenty- 
third. Here they parted company. Chamberlain remained be­
hind to arrange for supplies and the exchange of English cur­
rency for additional foreign troops, while Vaughan rode off 
to Speyer where Landenberg awaited receipt of the conduct
money his recruits would demand before setting out for 
43Calais. Vaughan had been warned to expect the worse, Lan­
denberg having "failed the emperor six weeks the last summer" 
in Juliers, so that what transpired was not totally unexpected.
The trip to Speyer was completed on the last day of 
March. At the interview held on April 1 with the colonel's 
interpreter present to explain the meaning, the condottiere 
balked during the review of the articles contained in his
contract. He had, he asserted, been deceived as regards the
44valuation of the florin which at 20 stuivers of Brabant or 
2s. 6d. sterling "was less than the emperor gave in these 
presents to his own subjects." To be well served the English 
must pay no less than the emperor which by the month for
43L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1, NOS. 245-46.
44This was not the English florin of the value of 2s. 
but the Flemish florin or philipus guilder which brought at 
the rate of exchange current in March, 1544, about 3s. 1 l/2d. 
sterling. State Papers, IX, 621. Six months or so later the 
philip or guilder, as the Flemish florin is variously desig­
nated in English documents, had risen in value to 3s. 2d. It 
is cited as having the same value on April 21, 1546. Cf. (B.
M.) Add. MS . 5753, ff. 179b, 190, 191. It was the normal 
money of account on which soldiers' rates of pay were calcu­
lated.
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footman was four florins or 25 stuivers of 12s. 6d. sterling.^ 
The price of hiring four-horse wagons proved another sticking 
point. These carriages, one assigned to every twelve cavalry­
men for the conveyance of their baggage and implements of war, 
had been promised at a charge of 24 kreutzers or Is. a day.
But Landenberg, "because he understood not the French tongue" 
and claimed ignorance "in the things he did in England," de­
manded again the emperor's price which in this case was 2s.
6d. the day.
To Vaughan's further discomfiture a final argument was 
raised. When read the article specifying the mustering place, 
the colonel begged to be excused, as Charles had ordered him 
to collect his men at Cologne and would in no wise permit any 
muster to be made around Maastricht. The Englishmen could 
only marvel at these variances and upbraided the officer for 
having no better weighed his obligations before concluding the 
bargain; but as nothing was likely to be gained by recrimina­
tions, Landenberg was excused with a request to reconsider
46and to let Vaughan know his mind within the next day or two.
At their next meeting on April 3 things were somewhat
^This rate had been verified by Dr. Nicholas Wotton, 
Henry's regular ambassador in Germany, on March 19, almost 
two weeks before Vaughan's arrival in Speyer. See State 
Papers, IX, 621.
^^Vaughan's first contact with Landenberg is described 
in full in (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/185, ff. 182-83.
better resolved. The English Council, in advance of Vaughan's 
departure from Antwerp, had been advertised of the likelihood 
of trouble by Henry's resident ambassador in Germany, Dr. 
Nicholas Wotton, and authorization had been posted to Speyer 
that if Landenberg would not be content with the florin of 20 
stuivers he should have what the emperor paid. While Vaughan 
had been in possession of this information at the previous con­
ference, like the faithful steward he was, he had tried to 
safeguard his sovereign's treasure by holding to the colonel's 
original engagement. However, as the mercenary was set upon 
the higher wages, it was agreed with a certain amount of re­
lief on both sides that he should have them, Landenberg re­
ceiving shortly thereafter on Easter Sunday in Frankfurt 
16,000 florins in conduct money for his soldiers and the em­
peror's permission to gather his men at Aachen before pro­
ceeding to Aire in Artois where Henry planned a general mus-
A * 7ter of the bulk of his free lances on June 20.
The matter it seemed was settled, though in truth the 
problem of satisfying that imperious war-lord had just begun. 
Landenberg kept tryst at Aachen, bringing his companies thence 
on May 24, though the arrival of Ralph Vane and Richard Wynde- 
bank, the two commissioners sent to deal with him on this
^(P. R. O.) S. P. 1/185, f. 187 contains Landenberg's 
acknowledgement of the receipt of this money. See also L.
& P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 328. (p. 216), 349.
261
occasion, was delayed by rain until the twenty-ninth. The
Englishmen found him intractable, promising his adherents
"mountains of gold" and demanding, besides a full month’s
wages, entertainment for an additional four hundred horsemen
48that had followed him out of High Germany. Henry was in­
censed as well could be expected. Landenberg's band repre­
sented almost one-eighth of his invasion force, the forward 
elements of which were already in Calais, and the date fixed 
for the start of the campaign was three weeks away; but in 
these straits there seemed no other recourse but to compro­
mise.
Vane and Wyndebank were accordingly charged by the Coun­
cil to humor the troublemaker and in a gesture of goodwill 
retain half of the excess horsemen. But regrettably each con­
cession brought new demands. Landenberg had gone beyond his 
bargain once and intended the same again, as on June 12 four 
of his captains were sent to England to discuss certain 
"weighty matters," including immediate disbursement of the 
first month's wages and allowance for seventeen hundred "dead-
pays" over and above the one thousand granted by the second 
49compact. It was a calculated move on the part of an
48L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 618, 623.
4^The term "dead-pay," more familiar in Elizabeth's 
reign than in the early Tudor period, had several meanings.
It could be a legitimate pension awarded to a retired or
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experienced extortioner, for even as his paladins embarked in 
England, before Henry had a chance to study the remedy,, further 
pecuniary difficulties were being raised in Aachen concerning 
men-at-arms, wagons, and messengers. It was another "evil 
journey." Amid these wild men Vane and Wyndebank feared for 
their very lives, while Landenberg flaunted his power, boast­
ing that "he had been bold in his days to displease an emperor 
and a king of the Romans" and now would not hesitate . to do 
the same to a king of England.^
Such outrageous talk was hardly tempered to suit a man 
of Henry's violent capacity, and as it reached his ears be­
fore the leave-taking of the colonel's emissaries from London, 
the king resolved to wash his hands of him; but to show the 
world that the fault was not his own he agreed that at Landen­
berg 's release his band should have an extra month's pay "at
disabled veteran, or an illegal pay drawn in the name of a
dead man, usually by the deceased's commanding officer. In
this case,however, "dead-pay" is synonymous with "double-pay," 
as in the German sense of "doppelsoldner," "arquebusier" in 
modern translation, but in origin a "soldier who received 
double-pay" either because of his rank or experience. Such 
double-pays were offered by recruiting officers to attract 
at lease a core of the most experienced fighters. Landen­
berg' s first articles had provided for sixty dead-pays per 
ensign, but in consideration of the colonel's reputation,
"and to have picked men," Henry in the second compact "con­
descended to raise from sixty to one hundred dead-pays . . . 
which is the largest entertainment that the emperor now gives."
L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 623, 689, 728-29.
50Ibid., No. 648.
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51the emperor's rate of one hundred dead-pays in an ensign."
This verdict was announced to the landsknecht envoys by 
the Council on June 18 and forthwith relayed to the commis­
sioners in the camp of the Germans, who two days earlier, 
having eaten up the countryside around Aachen, suddenly re­
moved to Liege where such was their spoliation and thievery 
that in the judgement of the Queen of Hungary the occupation
of the neighborhood by an invading army would have been infi-
52nitely more desirable. Moreover, the plight of Vane and 
Wyndeband was desperate. Threats and abuse were daily show­
ered upon them for their alleged illiberality. For fear they 
would be waylaid and their money taken from them, the English­
men refused to accompany Landenberg to Liege and instead 
sought safety in nearby Maastricht where the king's instruc­
tions regarding the acquittance of the mercenaries reached 
them.
In pursuance of their orders a gentleman of Liege was 
sent to the German leader to inform him of his discharge, 
while on the twenty-first with an armed guard begged from the 
magistrates of Maastricht in the small hours of the morning 
they fled to Diest in Brabant. From thence a short time 
later, Vane travelling in advance to report their proceedings
51Ibid., No. 728.
52Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 128.
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to the regent in Brussels, both, made their escape to Antwerp
by the end of the month. In all they had paid out 29,000
crowns on Landenberg which sum, if added to the 16,000 florins
53advanced him in Speyer, came to £9,266. But for what? Not 
a single day's service had been performed, whereas at Brus­
sels and the Imperial court the claims of the plundered inhab­
itants of Liege for compensation for their ravaged goods 
created ill-feeling towards the English allies for several 
months to come: "no affair," complained the queen regent,
"had given us so much trouble as this one of Landenberg's 
54men." Though unwilling "to inculpate any of the parties," 
there being faults on both sides, the present trouble sprang, 
she felt, "from some misunderstanding or other on the part 
of [Henry's] commissaries, owing no doubt to their being in­
sufficiently acquainted with the manner of dealing with re­
cruits from Upper Germany, who are in the habit of asking 
first unreasonable prices for their services and, if they 
find that the contractors are inexperienced in affairs of 
that sort, making most excessive and preposterous demands." 
Much could be said for the regent's point of view,
53The crowns here in question were Flemish crowns valued 
in February, 1546, at 38 stuivers or 4s 8d sterling. See 
L. &. P., XXI, pt. 1, No. 254. For the satisfaction of the 
second month's pay and the remainder of the first, Vane and 
Wyndebank estimated on July 16 that Landenberg was owed an 
additional 41,426 crowns. Ibid., XIX, pt. 1, No. 926.
^Spanish Calendar, VII, Nos. 143, 159.
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except that the Imperialist authorities were only minimally 
better equipped for dealing with such brigands. The last 
act in this sordid drama was staged in the first weeks of 
July when already the English army, in a masking movement 
preparatory to its assault on Boulogne, was beseiging Mon- 
treuil. On the fifth, in a letter to Chapuys, Charles admit­
ted that since every effort had failed to induce Henry to re­
tain Landenberg there was no other cure but that his delin­
quent vassal be taken into his own service. Otherwise there 
would be no end to the colonel's mischief in the Low Countries,
or worse, being disappointed of a liberal paymaster he would
55cross over to the French. This latter course which might
well have been contemplated was eventually prevented, as on
August 11, Landenberg appeared in the emperor's camp at
56Saint Dizier at the head of 2,492 High German foot.
Perfidy it seemed had its own rewards, but the case of 
the predaceous colonel was scarcely an isolated one. On March 
6 , 1544, contemporaneous with the appointments of Chamberlain 
and Vaughan as commissioners of the musters, Nicholas Wotton, 
the ambassador with the emperor, was engaged to retain a
55Ibid., No. 144.
C £ t ^ tLot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Francaises, 
p. 99. The Itinerary of the Emperor Charles V, p. 547, 
though it does not mention Landenberg, states that "On the 
eleventh the Imperial camp was reinforced by the arrival of 
six thousand Germans."
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57thousand horse to replace the hand withheld by Gymynck. 
Resident at the time in Speyer where the Imperial Diet was 
considering what military aid, if any, should be granted the 
emperor, Wotton was required to inaugurate his search by mak­
ing inquiry of Baron Heideck, the same who had been approached
58by Sir Thomas Seymour on a similar errand in 1542. Heideck, 
however, had other commitments. As a lord from the Imperial 
electorate of Brandenburg, he would have to fight for the em­
peror, so Wotton, as a last resort and in compliance with his
59directives, was obliged to apply directly to Charles.
The business was quickly concluded. On April 4 the sub­
ject was broached to the Imperial minister, Nicholas Perrenot, 
Sieur de Granvelle, and on the seventh word was brought that 
the emperor had nominated one of his own pensioners, Hans von 
Sickingen, son of the famous Franz von Sickingen, late friend
of Martin Luther and scourge of every paymaster along the
6 0Rhine until his death in 1523. With Jean de Lyere, Charles' 
muster-master, acting as interpreter a preliminary meeting 
was held that same evening at Wotton*s lodgings to discuss
57Above, pp. 256-57; also p.‘ 266,*' L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1,:
No. 188.
c oAbove, p. 232.
59L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 168, 392 (p. 258).
^9Ibid., No. 312. For notices on the elder Sickingen, 
one of the most legendary of the landsknecht commanders, con­
sult Blau, Die deutschen Landsknechts, pp. 95-97 and' passim.
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what amounted to Sickingen's impositions which he had care­
fully drawn up in advance.
Since he would act as colonel and would be chiefly re­
sponsible for the recruitment of the horsemen, he demanded as*
his retainer 10,000 guilders on the spot, a salary of 200
guilders a month for his lieutenant, which was exactly double
the rate allowed in the Imperial army, and 500 guilders for
himself, a mere quarter more than was normally issued to
ordinary colonels. Further, as special warranty against the
defalcation of these extortionate sums, he demanded to have
an Imperial city or one of the German banking houses bound
6Xin surety by the English for the payment of his men. Wot­
ton was mortified, answering that if Sickingen "had any good 
knowledge of his master, Henry,” he would not ask for so un­
reasonable a pledge. It was unfortunate, but, countered the 
war chief, the Sickingens were well acquainted with potentates. 
At his father's death he and his brother had been cheated of 
certain monies owed by princes whom their father had served,
and for this reason no Sickingen served any lord, "not even 
62the Palsgrave whose subject he was, without such
®^The Imperial cities of Nuremberg, Ulm, Augsburg, Frank­
furt, and Cologne were specifically mentioned, along with the 
South German mercantile empires of the Fuggers and Welsers 
whose principal and original seat of power was Augsburg.
62Frederick II, Elector-Palatine of the Rhine.
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63assurance." At this point the dragoman, De Lyere, inter­
rupted to ask what town or company had been given as security 
when he served the French king, to which Sickingen in a reply 
hardly geared to endear him to the proud Tudor in London re­
torted that Francis "did ever pay truly."
As the colonel refused to moderate his conditions, the 
conversation was broken off, Wotton promising to forward his 
articles and the discussion on them to Henry. The ambassador 
plainly disliked the man whose face he described as "so red 
and fiery and garnished with rubies as it may well appear 
that his mother never taught him to water his wine." His in­
tention was to find another captain, one who would "serve 
without this assurance of towns," particularly since "to pre­
vent grudging" the emperor aimed to have his men and Henry's 
foreigners at the same wages. Albeit, before he could act he 
was hopelessly compromised by Charles. On his own authority, 
but in Henry's name, the emperor pledged the securities that 
Sickingen desired with the Welsers, Fuggers, and various mer­
chants to the effect that the colonel's horsemen would "be 
regularly paid from their arrival until they quit the English 
service." Charles excused his impolitic presumption on the 
grounds of expediency. If his dear uncle did not act immedi­
ately, he reasoned, then either the best gentlemen would be
« L .  & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 312 (pp. 197-99) contains 
Wotton's full account of his deliberations with Sickingen.
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64taken up or Henry entirely deprived of much, needed cavalry.
The king and his Council thought otherwise. There were, 
as Henry told Chapuys on April 21, plenty of other German cap­
tains willing to serve if only the emperor would permit them, 
and one who had been contracted was even then on his way to 
enlist 450 horsemen in Maastricht. As for Sickingen, in 
Henry's humble opinion it was he and not the colonel who 
needed assurances. There were reports which had reached the 
Council that that officer had been deliberately overlooked by 
Charles' recruiters in March because he was not the expert^ 
enced soldier he pretended to be. Moreover, Henry complained, 
Sickingen had once served King Francis "and done other unrea­
sonable acts." Chapuys was to inform the emperor that he 
would not employ his colonel, adding between his teeth "and 
with evident signs of resentment" that he would rather for­
feit what had already been paid on account than continue the 
negotiations further.66
The amount involved was considerable, 10,000 florins or 
£1564 10s Od. It had been wrung from the reluctant Wotton 
by Charles, who subsequent to the minister's consultation
fi 4Spanish calendar, VII, No. 64.
The captain here in question was Thomas Lightmaker, 
a merchant-turned-mercenary. See below, pp. 271-74. Also 
p. 269.
^Spanish Calendar, VII, Nos. 72-73; L. & P., XIX, pt.
1, No. 360.
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with Sickingen had applied such pressure that the hapless am­
bassador had gone through with the man. The sum represented 
a retainer which if not backed by the required pledges guar­
anteeing regular pay was to remain in Sickingen*s possession 
"and to his profit without his being obliged to do any service 
at all."67
It was hardly an equitable arrangement, and the Council 
lost no time in berating Wotton for his lapse in judgement.
The wretched man was enjoined to ask that the money be re­
turned, but naturally on making inquiry his answer was that 
it had already been spent. Afraid,therefore, that it might 
fall personally upon him to make restitution he wailed out 
his plea for forgiveness: while he would not excuse himselff
he had been importuned by the emperor and through inexperience 
had been used for an evil purpose. Nonetheless, "as God 
hears no man's petition sooner than theirs who trust to his 
goodness for mercy," so also would he trust Henry "(who in 
his supreme dignity most resembles God in this world)." In 
the face of so contrite and truckling an entreaty the king 
was content to let the matter pass. Wotton was absolved, 
and the business of Sickingen, who like Landenberg was
67Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 64. The retainer was paid 
in two installments of 2,000 and 8,000 florins, the last be­
ing brought from Frankfurt to Speyer by Vaughan on April 16 
and turned over to Sickingen on the day following. Cf. Ibid, 
and No. 66; L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 347.
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68retained by the Imperialists, was forgotten.
It was obviously in Charles' best interests to try to 
foist or even force upon the English those truculent free 
lances whom he distrusted himself and who, if denied employ­
ment on the one side, had no trouble in finding it on the 
other. However,from the perspective of the Council in London 
it was daily becoming more obvious that the invasion schedule 
worked out in March would not be met. It was Henry's plan 
that his foreign captains would have their men ready at Aire 
by June 20 for an eastward march through Artois and into the 
Pale, there to join the English van and rear which were to 
await their coming at Guisnes or the French town of Licques 
on the verge of the Boulonnais.^  Unhappily the misprision 
of Sickingen and Landenberg had thrown everything into confu­
sion. April was now drawing to a close, but as six thousand 
mercenaries still had to be found somewhere, and the emperor 
in Henry's mind had been guilty of nonfeasance, the king be­
gan immediately to seek out captains on his own.
Among the first approached was the Dutchman, Thomas 
Lightmaker, who at the height of the Sickingen controversy 
was retained to bring 450 horsemen out of Maastricht in
68*i-S XIX, pt. 1, No. 555; pt. 2, No. 199. Sickin­
gen was commissioned to raise five ensigns of foot.
69Ibid., pt. 1, Nos. 271 (4), 349, 380, 399, 690.
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Limburg. Little is known of him except that he had been a
merchant, a London-based agent of the German financial house
of Stillar, who on the bankruptcy of his employers turned to
70trafficking in mercenaries. The saga of what might very 
well have been his first commission is one of the most tortu­
ous and revealing of the war in that it demonstrates that the 
dilemmas encountered in obtaining troops were not always faced 
by those rulers for whose armies they were recruited.
Lightmaker must have left England shortly before the ar­
rival from Speyer of Wotton's letter of April 9 in which the 
diplomatist informed Henry that for the mustering of free 
lances the Imperialists had declared Maastricht off-limits, 
the reason being that, as it lay close to Juliers within the
late territories of the Duke of Cleves, it had already "been
71too much oppressed with soldiers" in the fighting in 1543.
How or when the apprentice-captain learned of this ban is not 
known, for he is next heard of in a note composed on June 12 
in Brussels and sent to the Duke of Norfolk, commander of the 
foreward in the Pale. Its authors were Thomas Palmer, Edward 
Vaughan, and Thomas Chamberlain, the three commissaries
7^Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 147. L. £ P ., XIX, pt. 1, 
No. 866 (p. 540) renders a somewhat different translation of 
this letter from Chapuys to Charles V. Lightmaker is called 
"a merchant of the Stillars here, who since his bankruptcy 
has meddled in war."
71L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 312.
appointed in May to enroll the Dutchman's band. From its
contents one can gather that Lightmaker had just failed in
his appointment to bring his men to Utrecht and was not likely
to make the muster at Aire on the twentieth. But why he had
failed to rendezvous is made painfully clear in a series of
communiques exchanged between him, the commissioners, and the 
73Council.
He had ranged far in his search for men through the Bish­
opric of Utrecht and the North German territories of the 
Schmalkaldic League, both of which areas were in a high state 
of religious and political agitation. In the former province, 
his passage had been slowed by the Catholic authorities who 
believed he had come to assist the "naughty sect" of Anabap­
tists entrenched there, while in the adjacent lands of the 
Lutheran confederation the Protestant lords had closed the 
gates of their towns against him, supposing him to be a par­
tisan of the Catholic duke, Henry of Brunswick-WolfenbUttel,
Ibid., No. 582 (2) contains the names of all "the com­
missioners which take the musters of the Almains." This 
author has been unable to further identify either Palmer or 
Edward Vaughan. The former may have been a relative of Sir 
John Palmer (d. 1553), a native of Sussex who in a long ca­
reer as a soldier held many posts in the Calais Pale and who 
in 1545 was made captain of the tower known as the "Old Man" 
in Boulogne. If there was a relationship between Edward 
Vaughan and the more famous Stephen Vaughan, I have failed 
to establish it.
^Ibid., Nos. 752-53, 823. See also Spanish Calendar, 
VII, No. 151 (p. 250).
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who was then levying war in an unsuccessful bid to win back 
the duchy from which the League had driven him in 1542. But 
despite this nettlesome treatment Lightmaker did not fail in 
his obligation to the English. Though he. came late he 
brought with him a sturdy band of five hundred " swart reiters," 
lancers and arquebusiers, among them Dutchmen like himself, 
Westphalians, and Danes.74 They were at 1 s Hertogenbosch in 
northern Brabant on July 30, and within the next week in com­
pliance with Lightmaker1s original orders they were prested in
haste to join the Duke of Suffolk, lieutenant-general with the
75main battle, and the king before Boulogne.
By far the largest single contingent of free lances ob­
tained by Henry after the failure of Landenberg and Sickingen 
in 1544 was the nearly three thousand-man force brought by 
Maximilian d'Ysselstein, Count of Buren. His story is of par­
ticular interest in that he alone of the score or more for­
eigners who led troops for Henry in the first phase of the 
French war enjoyed the distinction of being at one and the 
same time both a mercenary and an auxiliary, an ambivalent 
status that happily is quite easy to explain: Buren, on the
one hand, was the general appointed at Henry's request to
74L. &. p ., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 823 (p. 515), 925, 1018.
7^Ibid., No. 753. For a transcription of Lightmaker1s 
capitularies reproduced from (B. M.) Lands. MSS. 155, ff.
356-58 see Appendix. Also see below, pp. 284-85,
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command the four thousand auxiliaries pledged by the emperor; 
on the other, by separate indentures negotiated at various 
times, the count consented for the usual pecuniary consider­
ations to furnish a supplemental force of mercenaries.
Henry's enthusiasm for Buren can positively be said to 
have begun with Wallop's letters from Landrecies in 1543. It 
will be remembered that among the variety of exotic captains
approached by the English officer in the course of that af-
76fray, Buren had been the most encouraging. He not only had
promised mercenaries in bountiful supply, but had himself ex-
77pressed a desire to lead them. It was therefore for these 
reasons that Henry applied for his services as the leader of 
the auxiliaries during Gonzaga's Christmas embassy to Hamp­
ton Court. The matter was quickly decided, the emperor al­
lowing that for the speedier commencement of their common en­
terprise, although he had anticipated using the lord of Buren
himself, he was content to give him with two thousand horse-
78men and two thousand landsknechts to the king.
^Above, p;. 251.
77L. _& P . , XIII, pt. 2, No. 384.
7ftSpanish Calendar, VII, No. 22. When the question of 
Buren's service was first broached in the Imperial court, 
the emperor was advised to lend the general only on condi­
tion that both he and his men be paid by Henry. Afraid how­
ever that the English would ally themselves with France if 
he failed in his obligations to the king, Charles refused 
to press the point.
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It was a few weeks later in January/ 1544, that Henry
through Wotton contacted Buren on the feasibility of adding
to his detachment two thousand mercenary foot whom the king
hoped could be raised from among the same bands that had
79served him at Landrecies. Why the English sovereign felt 
it necessary to hire these adscititious forces is a puzzle, 
unless by some mysterious prescience he had divined the im­
pending cozenage of Landenberg and Sickingen? or more likely, 
to a monarch who "bet only on a sure thing," with an eye 
perhaps already on Boulogne, Henry was simply seeking to set 
by some extra insurance.^ Regardless, for whatever reason 
the king wanted the mercenaries, Buren was only too happy to 
provide them, and in March, while Stephen Vaughan made his 
way to seek out Landenberg in Speyer, Thomas Chamberlain
opened debate with the general in Antwerp on the subject of 
81wages.
On Henry's directions Chamberlain tried but failed to 
set the same terms with Buren as those that were understood
79L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1, No. 89.
"smith, Henry VIII, The Mask of Royalty, p. 205.
®^(P. R. O.) S. P. 1/183, f. 205 is a corrected draft 
of the king's instructions to his commissaries. According 
to the directives it was Chamberlain who should have gone 
to Speyer and Vaughan who should have remained behind to 
deal with Buren. Cf. Richardson, Stephen Vaughan, Financial 
Agent of Henry VIII, p. 47.
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to have been fixed with Landenberg. The count agreed to be 
bound like the German in every particular except as concerning 
the valuation of the florin wherein he felt that Landenberg 
was abused. It was impossible, he said, to hire good soldiers 
for anything less than the emperor's rate or 4 florins of 25 
stuivers a month. Chamberlain demurred. He had to consult 
his superiors in London, so the affair was arrested— but only 
momentarily; for on April 8 , barely two weeks after the sus­
pension of the talks, a contract was arbitrated in Brussels 
by which Buren agreed to a lower computation of the florin on 
condition that Landenberg would serve at the same price. If 
the German would not, then Buren1s two thousand infantrymen 
were to have "4 philips per month at 25 pattars in Brabantine 
currency for each philip" or such pay as the emperor would 
allow the auxiliary foot which Buren would also have under 
his leading.®2
The Dutch commander's frank dealings and willingness to 
serve pleased Henry to the extent that, even though in the 
end Charles' "solde" of 12s. 6d. the month had to be dis­
bursed, a second contract was conferred upon Buren which, 
issued in April for five hundred cavalrymen and modified in 
June, eventually netted Henry 706 "fighting horse," 18
8 2 (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/185, art. 4. The "articles and 
agreement passed between the Count of Buren and Thomas 
Chamberlain" are reproduced in full in Appendix F.
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officers, 37 messengers, 208 cart horses, and various wagons 
at a monthly rate of £1,774 13s. 9d.8  ̂ The men were mainly 
Burgundians recruited in the Netherlands to make up in part 
the critical loss of cavalry caused by the defections of 
Sickingen and Landenberg. They proved somewhat of a disap­
pointment in that not all were men-at-arms. Many came
equipped as demilancers and others, in the fashion then pop-
84ular m  Germany, as pistoleers. But all were taken, and 
in the second week of July, having arrived too late for the
O  Cgeneral muster at Aire, they were reviewed by the English
(P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/191, ff. 34-35, gives the total 
number of horse and foot which served under Ysselstein "at 
the king's majesty*s solde.11 Wages were computed in karolus 
guilders, silver coins struck for the Netherlands by Char­
les V about 1540 at the rate of 2s. 6d. sterling per karolus. 
Every "fighting" horseman was paid 15 guilders per month, 
while messengers and cart horses were alloted 7. For refer­
ences to the second contract and its ammendations see L. £
P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 399, 410, 580, 667, 752, 811.
84L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 667.
85It is not clear if this assembly was ever held. To 
ease the strain on the Netherlands government Buren*s force, 
which numbered near seven thousand mercenaries and auxilia­
ries of all arms, was collected in widely separated areas.
The infantry was gathered in the Lordship of Mechlin, the 
cavalry in extreme northern Brabant around * s Hertogenbosch 
and Grave. On June 3 Sir Thomas Palmer, muster-master to 
the foreigners in Henry's pay, reported that at a recent 
view of the footmen furnished at both the king and the em­
peror's charge "above a thousand men" were lacking, and it 
was not until the fifteenth that these vacancies were filled. 
The major part of the concourse had now descended upon Saint 
Omer within ten miles of Aire, but here it may have remained 
another six or eight days awaiting the non-arrival of Buren's
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commissaries at Saint Qmer and marched off immediately to join 
the mercenary foot and the Imperial auxiliaries who in their 
blue and red livery had preceded them to Montreuil on July 4.
A quick check of the mercenaries so far accounted for 
yields the sum of 3,224. These in brief were the five hun­
dred Danish, Westphalian, and Dutch Reiters of Thomas Light­
maker, the 724 Burgundian cavalrymen and officers of Maximil­
ian d* Ysselstein, and the latter*s two thousand landsknecht 
86footmen, roughly half of the number of free lances that 
would eventually participate in the taking of Boulogne and 
the unavailing siege of Montreuil. The remaining mercenaries- 
-in round figures, three thousand— were acquired from divers 
sources in the frenetic months of July, August, and September
Burgundian mercenaries, who did not appear in Saint Omer un­
til sometime after July 2. Ibid., Nos. 610, 687, 710, 830.
Q gIt is difficult to determine the origin of this band, 
but probably it contained a high percentage of veterans from 
the Dutch provinces of Friesland, Groningen, and Overyssel, 
and the adjacent district of Westphalia. Buren was governor 
of the provinces and was accustomed to leading troops from 
that region. By his own admission he distrusted Germans, 
being loath, as he said, to serve among men he did not know. 
To prove the point, in March when he was informed by the 
queen regent that the auxiliary foot he was to conduct for 
the king of England were to be provided him out of Germany, 
he successfully petitioned the emperor that he be allowed to 
recruit them himself from among the Dutch and Westphalian 
retinues which had served him at Landrecies. But whatever 
the origin of the mercenaries they were preponderantly pike— 
men and made a brave show when paraded in Mechlin before 
Sir Thomas Palmer on June 1. L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 245, 
308 (p. 195), 392, 465.
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at the very height of operations,: some entering service within 
mere days of the surrender of Boulogne. Their eleventh-hour 
conscription can in most cases be tied directly to the be­
lated rescission of Landenberg's contract in the final days 
of July when, with the French and Imperialists still recruit­
ing, choice soldiers were hard to find.
On the default of the Badener colonel's forces, Henry's 
first impulse was to cover the loss with Englishmen, Sickin­
gen 's dereliction had already cost him valuable time, and it 
was the opinion of his advisers that it was too late "for re­
cruiting elsewhere." Wisely, however, the king overruled him­
self. His subjects had not been keeping abreast of military 
developments, and his army of bows and bills was not likely 
to impress the French. What he needed most was men-at-arms, 
pikemen, and arquebusiers. Unable to secure them in suffi­
cient quantity in England he turned once again to find them
on the Continent, knowing full well his quest meant further 
87delay and that upon their acceptance or rejection of his
87Both the English and the Imperialist armies were sup­
posed to be fully mustered and ready for action in France 
by June 20. Howevei; in discussion with Chapuys on June 16 
concerning the Landenberg debacle Henry intimated that he 
could not cross to Calais until July 8 . Spanish Calendar,
VII, No. 124. The king in fact embarked for that port on 
July 14. It is obvious to this writer that the pettifoggery 
and naked avarice of both Landenberg and Sickingen, who be­
tween them had they been less obstreperous could have en­
joyed a near monopoly of the English monarch's patronage of 
mercenaries, played the major part in Henry's late depar­
ture for the war.
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offers hung possibly the difference between victory and de­
feat.
Henry's immediate concern was for the main-battle of 
his army royal. This was the division from which he would 
personally command; yet except for the five hundred foreign 
horsemen of Thomas Lightmaker every mercenary thus far re­
tained was assigned to the van and the rear. Drastic action 
was called for. The Imperialists had been campaigning in
Q QLuxemburg since May, and with a foreknowledge born of bit­
ter experience Henry knew that he must strike soon if he were 
to achieve his moment of glory. For if Charles were defeated 
or decided on peace before his forces could gain a lead on 
the preoccupied French his chances of success were slight.
In a volte-face made necessary by the exigencies of the 
hour, a conciliatory approach was made in the last week of 
June to Landerberg's horsemen, who still lingered near Liege 
with the colonel's infantry, claiming full remittance for 
the months of May and June plus, as was customary in conti­
nental armies, their Abzug or "severance pay," a sum designed
89to cover expenses on their return home. Henry had no
S^Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran- 
^aises, pp. 88-91.
89In the war of 1544-46 infantrymen and virtually all 
light cavalry troops were allowed an Abzug of two weeks pay, 
while men-at-arms and demilancers received a full month's 
severance. Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 131. Note (P. R. 0.)
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thought of rehiring Landenberg, who at any rate with his 
landsknechts had been offered employment by the emperor.
That man, said the king in conversation with Chapuys, had 
been insolent and had openly defied his commissioners, intro­
ducing thereby "such bad custom" as might be followed in the 
future. The horsemen on the other hand, albeit certain had 
pursued Vane as far as Brussels, and Wyndebank had to be res­
cued from forty or fifty in Diest, had ever shown themselves 
more conformable and "affectionate." These,therefore^would 
be accorded every consideration and paid their arrears if
they would ride immediately to aid the king and his middle-
90ward "in the present wars with France."
It took four weeks of deliberations and the good of­
fices. of Mary of Hungary, who volunteered Hugo de Souastre, 
chief lieutenant of her guard of archers, as mediator; but 
eventually on or about July 13 an understanding was reached 
and five companies of High German heavy cavalry decamped 
from Liege and by leisurely degrees arrived at Boulogne, 
where at Henry's headquarters on the north side of the town 
they were mustered with two other German squadrons and an
S. P. 1/185, art. 16, for Buren's two thousand mercenary 
foot, and ibid., 1/203, f. 16, for the fifteen hundred men- 
at-arms recruited by Reiffenberg in 1545.
9°L. & p ., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 776 (p. 475), 788, 793, 
934; Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 128 (p. 210).
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91ensign of mounted arquebusiers on Thursday,. August 21.
Positive identification of the captains and the respec­
tive strength of at least seven of these eight bands can be 
fixed by careful collation of certain folios in Additional 
Manuscript 5753 with various entries in the official diary of 
the Boulogne expedition and the Letters and Papers. The five
High German captains and their numbers tell off as follows:'
92Ittelwolf van Goetenberg, Lord of Itter, 470; Hillemar van
Quernem, 127; Christopher van Pressburg, 415; Otto, Count of
Ritberg, 41; and Hans van Winsigenroot, whose surname sounds
93suspiciously Dutch, 321. As regards the other German units, 
they were under the pilotage of Albert Bischof, one of the 
countless foreign "servants” of the king, and Philip van 
Heurde, a Westphalian inebriate whose genial dipsomania so 
moved Stephen Vaughan, whom the captain approached in Antwerp,
91L. &.P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 831, 833, 838-39, 887, 896, 
922, 926; Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120; (B. M.) Add. MS. 
5753, ff. 170-80, which consist of a series of receipts re­
ceived of the German horse soldiers who served the king at 
Boulogne. The diary, reproduced in Rymer, op. cit., states 
that the High German cavalry, although not mustered until 
August 21, came to the English camp on Tuesday, the nine­
teenth.
92There was a castle by this name in the Austrian Tyrol.
93L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 401.
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94that the English agent had recommended him to the king.
Neither of the latter bands were large. Bischof's showed
eighty-six "combatants on horseback" and two cuirassiers,
"Junker" Philip's, fifty. But, saving the two cuirassiers,
95every trooper was a man-at-arms.
The identity of the mounted arquebusiers is more proble­
matic, though it seems a safe assumption to presume them to 
be the five hundred "swart Reiters" of Thomas Lightmaker.
The diary of the campaign refers to them as "gunners" of 
which Lightmaker*s ensign contained a high percentage. Also, 
they are specifically said to have arrived in camp with 
Bischof and Heurde's contingents on August 13, thus signify­
ing , if they were Lightmaker's troops, that they had the bet­
ter, part of two weeks to cover the roughly 170 miles between 
their staging-area at *s Hertogenbosch and Boulogne. Finally, 
though the "gunners" are referred to as "Almains" in the diary, 
they are excluded from the inventory of "the king's German
soldiers," indicating perhaps the large concentration of Danes
96and Dutchmen among them. Whoever they were and from
940n Bischof's original offer to bring three hundred 
men to the king's service see (B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, ff. 
375-76. For Heurde's love of drink and his interview with 
Vaughan see L. ^ P ., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 1006-7.
95Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
96Above, p. 274-
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wherever they had come they were mustered along with the 
other seven units, and together these bands functioned as a 
bodyguard until the king's return to England on September 30 
and as a corps'-d* elite until the demobilization of the Ger-
i * * f  * K l i, «, ■ 1 'I, Il'S
97mans at Calais on October 10.
Excluding Buren's four thousand auxiliaries, the number 
of foreigners now stands at 4,736, but other free lances can 
be discerned, including for the first time a fair number of 
Latins, mainly arquebusiers on foot, among whom were the 
eighty-eight Italians of Giovanni de Salerno and the three 
Spanish companies of captains Alonzo Salablanca, Antonio 
Pompeo, and Alejandro Moreno.
Of these battle-hardened warriors the most interesting 
was Salerno. A professional soldier for twenty-four years, 
he had first offered himself to Henry in 1543, but as there 
was then “no occasion for war" he had been dismissed "with 
100 crowns reward" and license to cross to Flanders, intend­
ing, as he said, to return to Italy. He had, however, been 
arrested with his "base son" at Vilforde, between Mechlin 
and Brussels, and was detained there for fourteen months for 
fear he would go to King Francis whom the elder Salerno had
97Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120? L, £ , XIX, pt, 2,
No. 105. The date and place of the demohiXization can be 
gathered from the copies of the pay receipts retained by 
the English paymasters. CB, M.) Add. MSS, 5753, ff. 170, 
173, 174, 176, 193, 195, 197.
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98served in the past. It was while in ward to the provost
of Vilforde that the captain's plight became known to Stephen
Vaughan, who had made his acquaintance in London and had
heard him boast of his familiarity with the fortifications
99of both Montreuil and Boulogne.
Vaughan visited the prisoner in mid-August with a view 
towards ascertaining the depth of his knowledge. It was re­
markably profound. Salerno "could not tell how Boulogne was 
now fortified, but when he was last there it was very strong' 
and only 'saultable between the Calais Gate and a bulwark on 
the right of that gate as one goes towards Calais." As for 
Montreuil, when last there, "being brought by Monsieur de 
Vend6me^0^ to view the strength thereof," Salerno had 
"pointed out that the great bulwark beside the Abbeville Gate 
which looked wonderfully strong was really the weakest part 
of the town; but he knew not if it had been mended since."
The captain further advised of the danger to the king's army 
from "Therouanne, Ardres, and other towns." For the escort 
of supplies which came mainly from Calais and St. Omer he 
suggested mounted hackbutters, but not Germans, since in his
QQ
£l- XIX' 2 ' No- 9 7■
99Ibid., and No. 67. Vaughan was by this time engaged 
almost completely as a financial factor, attempting to raise 
Henry's credit in the Antwerp bourse.
10®Anthony de Bourbon, Duke of VendSme, was Lieutenant 
of Picardy and also father of the future king of France,
Henry IV.
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opinion "their great and heavy horses" were of small worth 
except in set battles.
Having heard such tantalizing tidbits, Vaughan hastened 
the information to Henry on August 16 with Salerno's offer of 
service and an entreaty that the king intercede with the Neth­
erlands government on his b e h a l f . T h e  Italian's release
was secured on September 2, twelve days before the fall of 
102Boulogne. Whether the captaxn was present at the capture 
of the town is sadly impossible to determine, but the fort­
ress was breached by mining at precisely the point he had in­
dicated it could be, that is at "the northeast corner of the
103upper town," between the Porte de Calars and the castle.
The chances are good that Salerno was not present since on 
his liberation from Vilforde he would have been faced immed­
iately with the task of recruiting his men. However, shortly 
after the occupation of Boulogne which began on the fourteenth
101L. &P-, XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 96-97.
1 Q2Ibid., No. 177.
R. Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor Military Engineer 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 64-65. Mining opera­
tions and other engineering aspects of the sieges of Bou­
logne and Montreuil were directed by another Italian, Giro­
lamo da Treviso [above, p. 31]. Assisted by Cornish sappers 
Girolamo exploded his mine under Boulogne Castle on Septem­
ber 1 1 , but he was killed the same afternoon during an un­
successful attack against the broken wall. L. & P ., XIX, 
pt. 2, No. 216.
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he was attached to the permanent garrison and was still serv­
ing there in February, 1546, but with the elevated rank of 
104colonel.
Considerably less can be discerned about the Spanish
captains, Salablanca, Pompeo, and Moreno. It is possible
that they were sponsored by Beltran de la Cueva, Duke of
Albuquerque, the "ceremonious" grandee assigned by the em-
105peror to Henry's general staff: but there is no question
that they preceded the duke to France and had seen several 
weeks of action before the main-battle and Albuquerque were 
properly entrenched before Boulogne. One of the captains, 
in all probability Salablanca, was transferred with his com­
pany of one hundred gunners to the main-battle on August 11, 
and ultimately on the collapse of the siege of Montreuil on
August 26 all of the Spaniards came to Boulogne and joined
106Salerno's Italians as part of the regular garrison.
104L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 799; (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/214
f. 177.
105Bowles, Henry VIII, p. 270. For additional refer­
ence to the life of Albuquerque see Manuel Fernandez Alvarez, 
La Espana del Emperador Carlos V (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe,
1966), pp. 446, 524, 535, 839, 840, where he is variously 
mentioned as Viceroy of Aragon (1528), Viceroy of Navarre 
(1553), and Captain-General of Navarre. He died in 1559.
106Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120. In an "Estimate of 
wages due at Boulogne," drawn up in December, 1544, Salerno 
and his eighty-eight men are listed as "within the high town 
and castle" which were then in the keeping of Henry*s
289
Of the mercenaries still to be uncovered three bands
alone remain, two of which converged on the king's camp in
the Boulonnais on Tuesday, August 12. The smaller of these
was a one hundred-man company of Clevelander horse led by
none other than Thomas Lightmaker, who for persevering in
the fulfillment of his earlier assignment appears to have
been rewarded with a second contract about the time of the
107departure of his swart reiters from 's Hertogenbosch.
The larger contingent was that of Stephen and Nicholas Tap-
horen, a father and son team, and consisted of between four
1 08and five hundred infantry arquebusiers. Paid at the nor­
mal rate of four philips a month they were mustered by John 
Dymock, another of the English agents in the Low Countries, 
at Eekloo near Bruges on August 5 and sent soon thereafter
lieutenant, Viscount, Lisle. The Spaniards were in the 
lower town. Moreno's company numbered 176; Pompeo's, 125; 
and Salablanca*s, 97, he himself being "yet prisoner" of 
the French. L. P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 799 (1), (2).
■^^Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
108Ibid., places their number at five hundred and iden­
tifies them as Flemings, but the elder Taphoren's letter of 
retainer cites the figure 406 and speaks of the men as Low 
Germans, that is to say, inhabitants of North Germany. L.
£ P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 1008 (1). One interesting detail 
about Nicholas, the son: he was already Clerk of the Mus­
ters of the High German cavalry. Rymer, oja. cit., pt. 2, 
123-24.
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109to the army at Boulogne.
The last contingent of mercenaries retained for the
first round of fighting was that belonging to Jacques Dittre,
110Sieur de Neville, who received £200 in prest for his five 
hundred Burgundian landsknechts from Sir Richard Southwell, 
Vice-treasurer of the Middle-ward, on September 7. Dittre1s 
ensign was dispatched to Montreuil where it was active in 
operations until disbanded in October. At that time its cap­
tain turned to espionage, arranging espials on the French for
111the English high command at Calais.
109L. & p., XIX, pt. 1, No. 1008 (1); pt. 2, No. 30.
The band was allowed 159 extra pays, that is to say that for 
406 men the captain drew 565 pays per month.
l-*-®Perhaps this surname should be rendered Neuville, as 
in Neuville-Saint-Vaast, a settlement located four miles 
north of Arras in Artois.
1 1:L(B. M.) Add. MSS. 5357, f. 172; L. & P., XIX, pt. 2 
Nos. 259, 381.
CHAPTER IX
THE ENTERPRISE OF BOULOGNE
So it was that God would not suffer these princes to 
agree . . .; and I have often heard . , . that when 
two princes jointly undertake the conquest of a king­
dom they never agree; for. each of them is always sus­
picious of being over-reached by his companion and 
evermore jealous of one another . . . .  For my part, 
I should more apprehend one great single enemy than 
two who would divide the cake between them . . . two 
nations do not easily agree, as you see here.
Montluc, Commentaries, p. 76.
At the very least, from June to October, 1544, 6,228 
1free lances fought for Henry VIII at the opening of the 
French war. This power, if combined with the strength of the 
Imperial auxiliaries and the numerical might of the English 
conscripts, gave Henry an army in excess of 42,500 effectives 
of which roughly one-quarter were foreigners. It was an im­
pressive array, the most formidable force ever gathered under 
the aegis of the old English monarchy.
By prior agreement with the emperor, Henry's native con­
tingents should have been in France by May; yet it was not un­
til that month that the first retinues, gathered in the south­
ern and central shires, began to move towards their ports of
Two thousand eight hundred thirty-six men-at-arms, 
mounted pistoleers, and light cavalry, plus 3,392 lands­
knechts, arquebusiers, and assorted infantrymen. Adding the 




embarkation. Most converged on Dover, the nearest gateway to 
the Continent, but every haven from Harwich in Essex to Win- 
chelsea in Sussex was utilized in a massive transport opera­
tion which lasted from early June through mid-July. Norfolk 
and the forward component of his "vaward" sailed from Dover 
on June 6 , Lord Russell and the rearguard between the eight­
eenth and the twentieth. Henry meanwhile delayed his depar­
ture until July 14, though the main body of the middle-ward,
2including the Duke of Suffolk passed to Calais by July 3.
The king's somniferous pace was unquestionably predi­
cated, in part at least, upon concern for his safety and com­
fort. Henry was fifty-three years old, grossly overweight,
prone to fevers and headaches, and suffered continuous and
3excruciating pain from varicose ulcers on both legs. But 
even without these maladies a prince, even one of "royal cour­
age," was not expected to make undue haste; nor was he ex­
pected to risk his life: it was not until the end of June
that the major part of Buren's force left Saint Omer for Mon­
treuil, and it was the second week in July before his Burgun­
dians put in their appearance. By the same token Lightmaker's
2Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English People, 
1511-1558," p. 269; Oman, The Art' of War in the Sixteenth Cen­
tury, p. 339; L. &. P ., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 654, 819; Rymer, 
Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 119.
3Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 484-86.
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horsemen were known to be behind schedule; negotiations were 
still in progress with the High Germans at Liege; and Bischof, 
Heurde, and the Taphorensr all of them captains assigned to 
the king's battle, were at this juncture struggling to re­
cruit their units and bring them through to Boulogne.
As for Henry's comfort, despite the careful planning 
and fantastic expenditure the commissariat had failed to live 
up to expectations. The Imperialists also had failed to keep 
their word as regards supplying the English with transport 
and victuals. "Plain writing" had begun on Norfolk's land­
ing at Calais, for it was clear there was "marvellous scar­
city" of nearly everything on which the army would run.
There was no fodder for animals nor carriages for ordnance. 
Dray horses were either too few or too weak. Flemish sutlers 
were selling bread, the smallest loaves, at 6d., and beer, 
which with bread formed the chief staple of the sixteenth- 
century soldier's diet, fetched 11s. a barrel, and that "two
or three gallons short," barely "better than beer at three
4farthings the gallon in London."
In the interval, while the generals awaited the arrival 
of their foreign allies and the advent of their king, there 
was another and more important problem to be wrestled with:
4L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 654, 694, 709, 741, 746 
(P. 456), 763, 795; Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Boulogne 
and Paris," pp. 53, 67.
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no one, not even Suffolk, Henry's second-in-command, was cer­
tain of how to proceed. . The main objective was still unde­
fined, and when Norfolk made inquiry on June 16 on how he 
should employ himself till Henry's coming his disconcerting 
answer was that he could occupy himself as he pleased either 
in besieging Montreuil, or if, for lack of Buren's horsemen,
that was "not convenient," he could use his time "in assaying
5it upon Ardres."
This reply was received on the twentieth on which date
Russell's rearward completed its detrainment in Calais and
marched out to join Norfolk at Beaulieu just south of Guisnes
in the Boulonnais. Henry now had more than twenty thousand
troops in France; but without a plan or the chaperonage of
their mercenary and auxiliary allies his subordinates wisely
hung back, refusing to commit themselves unilaterally to a
course for which if miscarried they would be held accountable.
Instead, they opened discussion with Adrien de Croy and Buren,
who both rode down with a small company of Imperialists from
Saint Omer to Alembon on June 26, and there, now that the
guilt could be shared, Norfolk and Russell agreed to besiege 
6Montreuil. This objective having been resolved Buren
5 (B. M.) Harl. MSS. 6,989, ff. 121-22.
6L. & P ., ..XIX, pt. 1, No.- 786. De Croy, Grand Master of 
Flanders (above, p. 148), acted as chief liaison officer be­
tween the English army and the Imperial court in Brussels.
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returned to Saint Qmer to collect the Dutch, Belgian and Ger­
man force which he would personally lead as a separate command
during operations, bringing them forward to link with the Eng-
7lish army before Montreuil on July 4.
The town, sitting on a high plateau on the south bank of 
the River Canche, was troublesome to approach and strongly gar­
risoned. Prom intelligence gathered by their own scouts and 
from De Croy the English generals learned that its governor, 
Oudart de Biez, Deputy-Lieutenant of Picardy and a Marshal of 
France, had thrown his field army of "Bolognians, Italians, 
and Picards" inside, so that its compliment of defenders was
g
at least six thousand. De Biez had also been fortifying for 
weeks, and up-river around Hesdin the Duke of Vend6me was be­
lieved to be lurking with five hundred lances and ten thousand 
infantry, preparing to move either in support of the belea­
guered marshal or to contest the main-battle1s advance on Bou­
logne. In any event Montreuil would be hard to get, in fact, 
as it proved, impossible; for the upwards of twenty-eight thou­
sand men who were committed to its taking proved incapable of 
laying more than a half-siege, the allied commanders settling 
down before the south and east quarters of the town. It was, 
as Norfolk and Russell both lamented, a strange investiture:
7L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 836.
g
Ibid.; Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, 
p. 340.
"Two gates are left open and a third might be used by night?"
or again, "the town cannot be won, for men and victuals go at 
9pleasure."
No satisfactory reason for this totally unorthodox be­
havior can be extracted from official accounts. The Imperi­
alists remained silent on the subject, while Norfolk and Rus­
sell, in all likelihood eager to protect their own hides, laid 
everything at their allies' doorstep. It was on De Croy and 
Buren's advice that Montreuil had been invested so; neither 
one nor the other of those captains would "consent to divide 
the siege?" nor could the gates be blockaded since the for­
eigners would "in no wise lie in any quarter but near unto us."
Somehow these excuses ring hollow. What they do not in­
dicate is that Buren and De Croy, though concurring in the de­
cision to attack Montreuil, had done so only because neither 
Norfolk nor Russell had shown any enthusiasm for their plan 
which was to march directly towards Paris and juncture with 
the emperor. Buren's feeling was that if five or six thou­
sand defenders were put into Montreuil, as they were by De 
Biez, it would be difficult to take; De Croy argued that the 
place should have been by-passed; and both Imperialists
9L. &. P. , XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 909, 1005.
10Ibid., Nos. 795, 909.
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11agreed that "it was a pity to delay going over the Somme."
In addition, what neither Norfolk nor Russell admit was the 
intense rivalry between them, the desire of Russell to lead 
the van and the duke's concern lest the Privy Seal out-gen­
eral him. These things are learned from Elis Gruffyd, the
garrulous Welsh veteran of the campaign and a non-commis-
12sioned officer in Norfolk's ward. Twice on the march from 
Beaulieu there were heated words because Lord Russell pre­
sumed to pitch his tents "in front of the duke," and at the 
commencement of the bombardment of Montreuil each claimed
1 Othe honor of the opening barrage for his own artillery.
But a further and more apposite consideration was that while 
Norfolk made no attempt to encircle the town with his own 
substantial forces, when Russell volunteered to do the job 
himself his superior forbade him on the grounds that it was 
H too dangerous."14
Clearly, there is more to be considered here than the im­
puted faint-heartedness of the mercenaries and auxiliaries. 
Gruffyd, who rarely hides his dislike of foreigners, no­
where suggests in his account of the siege that Buren's
1LIbid., Nos. 700, 758, 806.
12Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
p. 47.
13Ibid., pp. 52, 53-54.
14L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 919.
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contingents acted dishonorably. On the contrary, he reserves 
his barbs for the unsoldierly conduct of the English, whose 
officers permitted black marketeering in food and drink and 
whose camp discipline was so lax that "the guts of every kind 
of animal" slaughtered by the butchers of "which daily died" 
were left within the host to putrify "for want of anyone to 
bury them."^
Touching the lackadaisical envelopment of Montreuil, 
Gruffyd tenders the opinion tha!t sixty thousand men were not 
sufficient to surround it. "This," he says, "was partly be­
cause of the shortage of bread and drink," every morsel of 
which during the first month of the siege was regularly con­
veyed out of Saint Omer, more than twenty miles to the north. 
Such sorties took several days, and the presence of the French 
at Therouanne, between Montreuil and Saint Omer, necessitated 
the consignment of tens of hundreds of men, who might other­
wise have been employed in the siege, to the escort of the 
16victuallers.
^Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," 
pp. 56, 59, 94-95.
• I CIbid., pp. 53, 58. The danger from Therouanne was 
originally believed to have been circumvented by the con­
struction in England of portable ovens and breweries, but 
these, built on special wagons, made it only as far as Beau­
lieu before shaking apart. L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1, No. 654. 
According to Gruffyd, they were returned to Guisnes for re­
pair and from thence transported up the River Aa to Saint 
Omer.
This too would sound like rationalization if it did not 
come from Gruffyd. The Welshman agreed with Russell: it was
a "wild war" much to the king's dishonor and not likely to win 
him "one foot more than he had forty years past."^ It was 
July 7, while Suffolk and the main-battle lay encamped at Mar­
quise, before Henry divulged his real intention to his subor­
dinates. Boulogne, which as he later remarked to Chapuys was 
worth "ten Parises," was to be his target, though for the mo­
ment, and for the benefit of. the Imperialists, he insisted
18that his confidants keep that information secret. Buren 
and Be Croy, considering the rejection of their earlier ad­
vice, had probably long since guessed at the decision. Never­
theless, to paraphrase Gruffyd, "to put a good face on the 
matter," notwithstanding that the king did not intend them 
to capture Montreuil, he would keep them at the task so that 
he and his host might have their leisure "and sleep more eas-
19ily in their beds in the camp round Boulogne."
20As Professor Lacey Balwin Smith has been quick to note, 
it is one of the more unfathomable puzzles of the war as to 
precisely why Henry marked out Boulogne as his primary
1 7 Ii- kit'* x i x ' P t .  1 » N o * 8 1 7 •
1 ftIbid., No. 863; pt. 2, No. 355.
19Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
p. 69.
9ftSmith, Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty, p. 205.
objective.. The standard argument,, that the capture of Bou­
logne "would rob Prance of her nearest port to Scotland and
21strengthen England's grip on the Straits of Dover," is to­
tally untenable. For one thing,, as a port Boulogne was in­
ferior to Etaples, ten miles further to the south on the broad 
estuary of the Canche; and as for strengthening England's hand 
in Scotland, French supplies and troops could be as commodi- 
ously ferried by the western route from Norman and Breton
ports like Cherbourg, Brest, and Le Harve to Scottish ports
22like Ayr and Dumbarton. From the standpoxnt of strategy, 
Boulogne was a second-rate objective compared to Montreuil.
The latter place was by far the more important since it served 
as the chief marshaling ground for western Picardy, and if 
captured would have placed in serious jeopardy the entire 
French defence system from the Calais Pale to the Canche, in­
cluding those perennial thorns in Calesians* sides, Ardres, 
Therouanne, and Hesdin, as well as Boulogne.
Though the "why" of Henry's strategy was never explained 
it can by hypothesized. Boulogne was the safest trophy avail­
able to him. Less heavily defended than Montreuil, with
^Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 153.
22The eventual occupation of Boulogne had no effect in 
cutting off French aid to Scotland. As Smith, Henry VIII, 
the Mask of Royalty, p. 205, says, the amount of French as­
sistance to the Scots "increased during the period of Eng­
lish control (1544-50), and in the end [England's] defeat in 
Scotland led to her withdrawal from Boulogne."
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alternate routes of retreat, either overland to Calais or by 
ship to England, it was in fact the perfect prize for a bully­
ing king whose legs were so inflamed he was often carried 
about indoors in a sedan, who was so fat he was hoisted up
stairs by machines, and whose abundance of wives and lack of
23sons made him feel he was "not a man like others." More­
over, costs had gotten seriously out of hand. The price tag 
of £250,000 which the Lord Chancellor, Sir Thomas Wriothesley, 
and the secretary of State, Sir William Paget, had placed on 
the campaign had been sorely underestimated, and in June, as 
Chapuys prepared to leave England with the king, the ambassa­
dor could report that "at present" Henry did not have "too
24much money to dispose of." Boulogne therefore, in addition 
to being safer, would be cheaper to assay than Montreuil.
The royal debouchment for France began on the north bank 
of the Thames on Friday, June 11. Amid much pomp and circum­
stance Henry boarded his barge at Westminster Dock, travelled 
in state to Erith in Kent, and spent the night before contin­
uing to Gravesend. Here he left the river and took horse to
^Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p. 486; Spanish Calendar, IV, 
pt. 2, No. 1061 (p. 638).
^Above, p. 254; Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 144. The 
complicated business of financing the French war is treated 
in Dietz, English Government Finance, 1485-1558, Chap. XII 
and passing and in Richardson, Stephen Vaughan, Financial 
Agent of Henry VIII, Chaps. V and VI.
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Faversham. On the thirteenth he progressed to Forde, a coun­
try residence of the Archbishop of Canterbury. There he 
dined before proceeding to Dover, from whence on the fourteenth 
with the flag of Saint George at the masthead he passed to
Calais, landing at nine at night with his host in "liveries of
25red and yellow in the gallantest fashion could be."
All this while Suffolk, the king's lieutenant, having 
made things ready for Henry's reception, lay ensconced with 
the larger part of the main-battle at Marquise, nine miles 
down the Calais road towards Boulogne. On July 15 the duke,
Sir Anthony Browne, "and other noblemen" visited Henry and 
remained with him three days, inspecting the defences of 
Calais and checking equipment before marching forward. Much 
was amiss. Sterling money, which was the tender expected by 
English troops, was in high demand and short supply; "horse-
2 f!meat” was equally scarce; the "limoniers" brought from Eng­
land were too lean; and the wagons provided out of Flanders, 
"Instead of carrying the 3 0 cwt. or 40 cwt. apiece as had pre­
viously been agreed, . . . could scarcely carry 20 cwt.," and
27a much greater number was required. Add to these complaints
25Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt, 3, 119; Gruffyd, "The 'Enter­
prises' of Paris and Boulogne," p. 56.
^Shaft horses.
27L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 654, 911, 922. The contro­
versies with the Netherlands government over carts, draft 
animals, and victuals were endless. Queen Mary, in an
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the want of mercenary handgunners, pikemen, and heavy cavalry 
and Henry should have been beside himself; but he was not.
The king had geared himself up to win "a notable victory." 
Vaughan would find cash aplenty in Antwerp; a few more carts 
and shaft animals would be wheedled out of Mary; pasturage, 
if unavailable around Calais, would be found in the Boulonnais; 
mercenaries were bound to appear; and as long as the besiegers 
of Montreuil sustained their attack, no main French army was 
likely to impede his progress to Boulogne. Quite simply, by 
no lucky chance Henry had wagered on a relative ceftainty, 
and for that reason he was ebullient. Camp life agreed with 
him. He was up late and rose early, in better health appar­
ently than he had been for years. Still, it paid to be care­
ful.
The king was in no rush to meet the enemy. Comfortably
28lodged in the Exchequer of the Merchants Staple, Henry re­
mained in Calais until July 25 and did not actually put in
interview with Sir Edward Carne, Henry's resident envoy in 
Brussels, expostulated that she had already supplied "nigh 
two thousand" carriages for the English, "four times as many 
as the emperor had." As for foodstuffs, during the past two 
years fifty thousand men had lived off her country "which is 
so wasted that provision must now be made from Holland and 
Friesland."
280ne of the oldest of the English trading companies, the 
Merchants of the Staple dealt in raw wool, woolfells, and 
hides. Their chief mart or staple was fixed at Calais in 
1363. It was here that all buyers from North Europe were 
obliged to make their purchases.
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an appearance at Boulogne until the twenty-sixth.. Suffolk 
meanwhile made first contact with the foe while reconnoiter- 
ing on the eighteenth. A party of Frenchmen, hoping to dis­
courage him from coming too close to the town, sallied out to 
meet him but were repulsed, leaving him free to note the best 
places for attack. The duke completed his survey that after­
noon, returning to report to Henry that there was sufficient
soil for mining, welcome news, as Suffolk had believed the
29main works stood on solid rock. The siege was inaugurated 
the following day when the duke's pioneers began tunneling 
their trenches towards the castle.
Boulogne was by all accounts a sturdy stronghold. Oc­
cupying the summit and slopes of a ridge of hills which 
skirted the north bank of the Liane, it was actually two 
towns, the Haute Ville to the east on the highest eminence, 
and beneath it to the west the Basse Ville adjacent to the 
harbor. Both, connected by thick curtain walls of thirteenth- 
century construction and protected by an outer f aus'se-braye 
or lower earthen rampart, were strongly bastioned; but it
was the smaller high town with its dominant castle and
steep sloping sides on the southeastern, southern, and west­
ern approaches which commanded the area and would have to be
won if Boulogne were to become English, The only practical
« i ■< t  '* i  i - v -i ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ >
O Q Rymer,' Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 119;' L, &'P,, XIX, pt, 1, 
Nos, 863, 9Q3, ~  ^
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line of assault against the Haute Ville was therefore from 
the northeast "where the ground is more or less on a level
Oflwith the walls.,,J For the time being, however, the high town
was safe. Trenching was slow business, and the fausse-braye
in front of the castle would have to be taken if, as had been
decided, entrance was to be forced by mining. For the moment
Suffolk focused his attention on the more superable Basse
Ville with its lower walls and less precipitous gradient, and
on Monday morning, July 21, after an artillery barrage along
the eastern flank beyond the harbor, the place was taken by
31direct assault.
The exercise was strategically sound; it was likewise 
efficiently executed. But it was hardly an equal contest, as 
in all of Boulogne there were less than three thousand sol­
diers, among them a hundred men-at-arms, a thousand Picards, 
and a single company of Italian hackbuteers, the aggregate
under a young and inexperienced officer, Jacques de Cousy,
32Sieur de Vervins. Against them Suffolk had at least ten 
thousand, a number which at the coming of Henry and the
30Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 342.
31Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,” 
p. 57; L. P . , XIX, pt. 2, No. 424; Preface, xvii.
JALot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran-
^aises, p. 116; Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century,
p. 343. Vervins was the son-in-law of Marshal de Biez.
mercenaries would swell to over fourteen thousand.
On Tuesday, once the lower town had been cleared and suf­
ficient troops appointed to prevent a counter-stroke, Suffolk 
moved to the west upon the citadel's only outlying defence, 
"the Old Man," an ancient watchtower that stood a quarter of 
a mile from the Basse Ville near the sea on the cliff which 
formed the north bank of the Liane. Reputedly of Roman ori­
gin, it commanded the mouth of the river as well as the area
to the north along the coast which Suffolk had marked out for 
33Henry's camp. Its garrison of fifteen had held off several 
minor thrusts on the twenty-first, but they surrendered meekly 
when the duke dragged his first gun into place to batter them.
Henry was now chafing at the bit. The larger part of 
Boulogne had been taken without him, while within the crowded 
confines of Calais "the sickness," probably plague and dysen­
tery, was beginning to take its toll. He was anxious for the 
"good air" of which Suffolk had written him from the royal 
camp at Boulogne, air which would be that much more salubrious 
since it blew from a quarter well out of range of cannon
33L- E.'* XIX, pt. 1, No. 964. Caligula and Julius 
Caesar have variously been given credit for building the Old 
Man or the "Tour de 1'Ordre," as the French knew it.
^Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 119. The guns of the Old 
Man were also feared to command "the Advocate's House," the 
residence within Boulogne which Suffolk proposed to assign 
Henry on his later entry of state. L. & P . , XIX, pt. 1,
No. 946.
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35fire. The pusillanimous king would have bolted Calais on
the twenty-first, but as brave old Suffolk was too busy in
the Basse Ville which its -defenders had tried to burn before
escaping to the high town, Henry's field headquarters were
not made ready thereby delaying the princely evacuation un-
36til the twenty-fifth. And when the exodus from the Pale 
was made, though regal and grand, it was hardly befitting a 
conquering hero; for Henry rode not at the head of his troops 
but tamely in their midst, being met by horsemen "all the
ways" until his camp itself was reached on Saturday, the
• 37twenty-sixth.
At Boulogne Suffolk had done well, though no impression 
had yet been made on the Haute Ville. A mound for artillery 
had been raised to the level of the walls beyond the fausse- 
braye at the northeast corner beside the castle, and two 
other batteries were ordered thrown up on each flank of the 
mound, one along the eastern side near the Porte de Montreuil, 
another towards the west and the Porte de Calais. It was
35In pitching the king's camp Suffolk was instructed to 
first secure or destroy the Old Man and to note "how far the 
shot of the town may reach." L. £  P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 946, 
964.
36Ibid., pt. 2, Preface, xvi. Henry VIII had a morbid 
and excessive fear of the plague. See Smith, Henry VIII, 
the Mask of Royalty, p. 229.
37Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
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dangerous work, and it took its toll in lives, particularly
among the sappers, many of them Cornish and Devonshire men
brought from Montreuil where they had been unsuccessfully try-
38ing to mine for weeks. But Suffolk kept them at the task,
while Henry, again well out of harm’s way, hovered to the
south in the least exposed position "well furnished for the
39relief of all and prevention of rescues" by the enemy.
Emplacements for the guns were completed by August 2, 
and on Sunday, the third, the artillery, part of a siege- 
train of over 250 pieces, began its barrage of the Haute 
Ville in earnest. Huge "plums" of round shot, some weighing 
in excess of sixty pounds, were directed at the curtain 
around the castle, while incendiary "apples" fired from mor­
tars rained death on the town and its terrified citizenry. 
These latter were shells, the first ever employed by an Eng­
lish army, and were the invention of two of Henry's foreign 
armaments-makers, Peter Baude^ 0 and Peter of Cologne, whom 
the king had lured from the emperor's service in 154 3.
33Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
P. 58.
39L. £ P ., XIX, pt. 1, No. 1003. Suffolk, the most 
revered of Henry's commanders after Norfolk, was then enter­
ing his sixtieth year. In the field, according to the Lord 
Admiral, Viscount Lisle, he demonstrated remarkable energy 
and courage, enforcing all "to be hardy" and going as far in 
the trenches "as any gunner." Ibid., No. 949.
40Above, p. 31.
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Hollow shot of cast iron filled with explosives which were
detonated by burning match, many were fired from Suffolk's
own battery in which the chief mortarman was a Frenchman,
. 41Bernardme de Valois.
For two weeks a furious bombardment was maintained, but
though the curtain was weakened no actual breach was made,
and the fausse-braye outside the ramparts was still in enemy
hands. Henry was sorely displeased, for as the Council with
42the king had written his queen he had anticipated in the
face of Buren's warnings a rapid conquest. Nevertheless, on
the eighteenth he ordered that another battery be prepared,
at the same time sending into England for additional men and 
43guns.
It was during the second week of the bombardment and the
41Pope, Guns, p. 6 8; Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120;
Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," p. 57;
Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 351; L. £
P., XIX pt. 2, No. 526 (f. 26). The hiring of alien gunners 
was relatively common in the early Tudor period. There were 
eleven German gunners at Newcastle in 1514 and upwards of 
thirty foreigners employed in the Tower in 1536. Wyatt, 
"Aliens," pp. 139-40.
42Catherine Parr, Regent of England in her husband's 
absence, was the sixth and last of Henry's wives. Thirty-one 
and twice widowed at the time of her marriage to the king in 
July, 1543, she outlived Henry and took as her fourth spouse 
Thomas Seymour, Baron of Sudeley. She died in September, 1548, 
shortly after the birth of a daughter, her only child.
43L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 35, 105.
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relative lull which followed that the larger part of the free 
lances meant for the main-battle appeared, beginning on Tues­
day, August 12, with the Taphorens* five hundred "voetknechten 
busschutten" and Lightmaker's "Clevoit" cavalry. Over the 
next week they drifted in: the "three ensigns of Almains
well horsed," "the captain of the Spaniards," and finally on 
the nineteenth the High Germans from Liege, who with the other
German horse "were well allowed" and personally mustered by
44the king on Thursday, August 21.
As is noted in the Introduction of this study, one of 
the sad misfortunes is that among the extensive collections 
of military papers for the sixteenth century there is no ac­
count of how the foreigners performed for the Tudors either 
at Boulogne or in any other engagements. The historian is 
always left to speculate. Henry, in a letter written to 
Queen Catherine shortly after his mercenaries had had their 
baptism of fire, speaks harshly of them: such as he sent
against the ditch between the f au s se-braye and the castle
did "no good where any danger is," the Frenchmen being "much
45manfuller" than either Burgundians of Flemings. Still, here 
is proof that the free lances fought where the action was hot­
test, and it is perchance suggestive of their value that the
44Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120. 
45Ibid., pt. 2, 199.
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first meaningful headway against the Haute Ville was made
after their arrival.
On September 1 "without any loss of men" an assault
swept the French from a long section of the f aus'se-braye from
behind which the besiegers began to cut several mines towards
the castle, the ramparts beside it, and a salient to the south-
46east called the Fleming's Tower. The army was now so close 
to the walls that there was as much danger from flying stone 
as from the ordnance within, though on September 2 a frontal 
attack on the castle and the curtain below was driven back 
with heavy casualties. The "men in the' braye broke open cer­
tain doors but found much resistance of men, hailshot, and 
ramparts within of stone and earth, so that they could not 
enter, and at the breach of the castle the enemy cast down
great abundance of fire and stones, so that our men were fain
47to recoil, many of them burnt and hurt at both places."
September 4 brought further disappointment, for though 
the mine under the Fleming's Tower was-sprung, "scaking and 
tearing" the bastion, it failed to go down. The charges be­
neath the castle were ;exploded with better results a week 
later. A sizeable gap was torn in the curtain, but three 
separate assaults miscarried in one of which Girolamo, the
46Xbrid. , pt. 3, 12Qt21. 
471-bid., pt. 3, 121.
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Italian engineer, was slain. A few lodgements, probably man-
48ned by the Spanish and German arguebusiers, were established 
in the broken wall, but no access to the Haute Ville could be 
secured.
Up to this moment the high town had held out for fifty- 
five days with no relief of any kind and no hope of deliver­
ance. Picardy and the Boulonnais, save for VendSme's force 
concentrated now around Therouanne to prevent the free pass­
age of supplies to Montreuil, was virtually devoid of French 
men of war since King Francis had assembled his troops beyond 
Paris to confront the greater threat of the emperor's army in 
Champagne. Meanwhile,within the high town of Boulogne not a 
house was left whole; munition was near depletion, and with 
the most experienced officer, Philip Corse, captain of the 
Italian hackbuteers, dead, slain on the eleventh by a burst
49of artillery, Vervins, the governor, decided to capitulate.
Against the wishes of the civilian population which was 
perhaps fearful of abuse at the hands of the victors, two 
French officers, the Lords of Saint-Blimont and Freumeselles,
A RArquebusiers, particularly those from southern Europe, 
were unexcelled in fighting from covered positions.
^ G a b r i e l  Daniel, The History of France from the Time 
the French Monarchy was Established in Gaul~ t o the Death of 
Lewis the Fourteenth (5 vols., London: G. Strahan, 1726),
III, 376. Hereinafter cited as The History of France.
Gabriel makes the claim that the management of the defence 
of Boulogne had been placed in Corse's hands.
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were sent to Henry to treat for terms on the afternoon of the
twelfth. The king proved magnanimous as he was anxious to
take possession. All within the Haute Ville were guaranteed
their lives and could depart peaceably if they would deliver
up the citadel with its artillery and supplies. Everything
was arranged on the thirteenth, and on the day following, the
king providing wagons and. an escort to transport the baggage
of the vanquished chiefs, the survivors of the siege evacuated
50the upper town for Abbeville. The downcast soldiers led the
retreat, preceding the nearly two thousand civilians "who were
in great sadness, anger, and affliction" and of whom many were
to die of exposure in the cold and damp which accompanied them
51in the.ir journey. But a sadder end was reserved for Vervins, 
the young commander of Boulogne. Having endured for eight 
weeks a siege which even the king of France had expected to 
last no more than six, and having withstood an almost constant
^Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," 
p. 75; L. & P ., XIX, pt. 2, No. 236.
^ H a l l ’s Chronicle, p. 862, gives the number of the gar­
rison to march out of Boulogne as follows: 67 horse, 1,563 
footmen, 800 arquebusiers, and 87 wounded. Ignoring civilian 
casualties, several hundred of the defenders must have been 
killed, but Philip the Corsican is the only one of note to be 
recorded. No estimate of the English dead is given, but the 
number if anything must have been greater. Of the foreigners 
on Henry's side who met violent ends, besides Girolamo, only 
two are mentioned, both Spaniards who were hanged for leav­
ing their posts at Montreuil to hunt for treasure around 
Boulogne. Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
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cannonade in which it is estimated that over one hundred thou­
sand rounds of heavy shot were fired against his encircled 
faubourg, he was arrested almost as soon as he reached his
own lines, tried for cowardice, and eventually beheaded in
52the reign of Henry II.
Now that the English king had his trophy and had proven 
himself "a noble and valiant conqueror," he made haste to 
establish ownership of his prize. Physical control of Bou­
logne had of late been much on his mind, his anxiety prompted
by the knowledge that for weeks Imperialist mediators had been
53talking of peace with the king of France. Possession being 
nine-tenths of the law it was to Henry's advantage that his 
forces assume occupancy before the emperor agreed to terms. 
Otherwise, if they did not and Charles drew off his substan­
tial assistance in men and provisions, Vervins might be en­
couraged to fight on in the hope of relief which was almost
Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran­
chises, p. 117. An informant with Francis wrote that Vervins, 
whose good name was restored by Henry III in 1575, fired 
140,000 rounds from his artillery.
53Peace feelers had been sent out by Francis to both the 
English and the Imperialist camps in an almost constant 
stream. For three weeks or more Henry's Council had been en­
tertaining a French delegation at Hardelot Castle and has re­
jected the offer of Ardres and an indemnity for raising the 
siege. Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," 
p. 72. The emperor meanwhile had begun to seriously consider 
a different set of French proposals on August 29 after a four- 
hour conference with Claude d'Annebaut, Admiral of France, at 
Saint Venay in Champagne. The Itinerary of the Emperor Char­
les V, p. 547.
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sure to come. Therefore, on September 14 Suffolk was sent in­
to Boulogne to receive its keys and set up English polity be-
54fore Vervins withdrew. Somewhat ironically Henry postponed
his own entry into the town until the eighteenth, the day on
which, unknown to him, the emperor signed the Peace of Crepy.
The war had been an immense disappointment for Charles.
Though a force under his general, Ferrante Gonzaga, had
starved the French out of Luxemburg in May, invaded Champagne,
and began the preliminary investiture of Saint Dizier on June
7, it was not until July 6 that the emperor himself took to
the field. As with Henry, there were difficulties in.finding
troops, the more so as Buren, Landenberg, and the Prince of
55Orange recruited in too close proximity. In June, Landen­
berg caused near mutiny in Orange1s camp by spreading abroad 
the false report that Henry paid more than Charles, while
around Strasburg, French agents lured away landsknechts about
56as fast as the Imperial commissioners enrolled them. Re­
cruitment however was the least vexing of the emperor's pro­
blems. The quotas fixed by the treaty with England were
^Hall's Chronicle, p. 862.
55 /Lot, Recherches sur les Effectxfs des Armees Fran-
tjaises, p. 89.
56Ibid., pp. 89-90; L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 682.
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57finally met and probably exceeded; but a lack-lustre cam­
paign, an insufficient commissariat, and the stubborn defence 
of Saint Dizier were quandaries that could not be coped with.
When Charles left Metz on July 6 he had hopes of a rapid 
triumph. In accord with his commitment to Henry he marched 
straight on the Marne, intending to follow its valley to 
Paris, but Champagne which had been burned and cleared of
5everything of value proved incapable of maintaining his army. 
This necessitated the capture of some strongholds to secure 
the supply trains which followed, and as Gonzaga was already 
before Saint Dizier, Charles determined the place should be 
taken: it was a repeat of Henry VIII's Boulogne Campaign.
No better garrisoned or provided than the object of 
Henry's desire, the town held out for sixty days, during which
S^Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran- 
caises, p. 1 0 0, makes the claim that the Imperial array con­
tained only thirty-five thousand. However, the sources he 
accepts in arriving at that figure are no more reliable than 
those he rejects. On June 29, Chapuys, in trying to persuade 
Henry to rehire Landenberg, used the argument that, while 
Charles was willing to take the colonel into his service, the 
emperor "already had too many men," more in fact than he 
wanted. Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 138. If this was the 
case, Charles then, like Henry, invaded France with more than 
forty-two thousand.
5 8Prudencio de Sandoval, The History of Charles the Vth, 
Emperor and King of Spain,- trans. Captain John Stevens (Lon­
don: Printed for R. Smith, 1703), p. 369.
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59period well over a thousand attackers were slain. Equally
depressing was the fact that its capture accomplished nothing,
for having taken and reinforced it Charles found his rear
blocked and no way to get either provisions or money by the
60road he had opened up from Metz. Unable to retreat from 
fear of famine he pushed on down the Marne, scouring fields 
and attacking towns, not for military advantage, but to se­
cure food, his men a horde rather than an army, "inobedient
61and mutinous from lack of victuals and payment.” Only the 
least defensible places were attempted. Jalons and Chalons 
because of their strong detachments were avoided; Epernay 
with its full granaries was surprised; Chateau-Thierry made 
no resistance; but on siezing La Ferte-sous-Jouarre on Sep­
tember 8 Charles turned north on Soissons, arriving there on
The siege began in earnest on June 19, the garrison 
surrendering on August 17. As at Boulogne, the walls of Saint 
Dizier were breached, but no forcible entry was made. Among 
the Imperial casualties was the Prince of Orange, mortally 
wounded on July 14, and in a later assault into the breach 
over seven hundred of the besiegers died. Ibid.; Lot, 
Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Francises, p. 93.
^^Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran- 
gaises, p. 1 0 1.
•̂*~Ibid., pp. 109-10. Charles owed his soldiers a month's 
wages, but because of the effective guerilla tactics of the 
French light horse and exceptionally wet weather it was im­
possible to bring through the pay wagons from Lorraine. See 
Wotton's despatches to Henry VIII, L. & P ., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 
267-68.
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62September 10. With Paris less than two days away the em­
peror had taken the road to the Low Countries, forsaking the 
French capital because peace talks had begun with Francis,
Charles' decision to cut his losses and run is perfectly 
understandable. The overlong siege of Saint Dizier, the in­
effectuality of the logistical experts, and indiscipline had
broken his army's morale, and should it have come to a pitched
63battle the odds, it was feared, favored the French. :in in­
forming Henry that the Treaty of Crepy had been signed the 
emperor's excuse was that he had been constrained to make 
peace because his ally, so far from joining in the descent on 
Paris, had hung back in Picardy content to besiege two fortres­
ses only a few miles from Calais. It was a true enough accu­
sation, but in Henry's defence hardly fair, since every step 
of Charles' advance from Saint Dizier was in reality a re­
treat, a frantic series of forced marches designed to carry 
him into the Low Countries via the path of least resistance.
The English king had been inconsiderate and barely helpful in 
choosing to sit down before Boulogne, but the "enterprise of 
Paris" failed as much because the emperor undertook the .
6 2 /Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran-
yaises, p. 106.
®^Morale on the French side was perhaps only marginally 
better. Paris was in a panic, and Francis was as careful to 
avoid an all-out encounter as Charles. Ibid., pp. 102, 104, 
106.
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reduction of Saint Dizier.
Henry took the news of the Treaty of Crepy calmly, even
64"benignly," with no outward show of emotion. Charles, as 
part of a general pacification, endeavored to comprehend him 
in the treaty, the French offering large sums of money by way 
of pensions, arrears, and indemnity for the return of Boulogne; 
but Henry would not be included. Any other pretensions he 
would willingly give up— the throne of France, Ardres, the 
County of Guisnes— everything that is except the recently ac­
quired proof of his manliness, the concrete evidence that in 
the noble art of making war he had outmatched his compeers,
the king of France and the Holy Roman emperor, neither of
6 5whom won anything but peace. But Henry's initial coolness
& P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 281; Spanish Calendar, VII,
No. 215.
®^This was not exactly the case. By the Treaty of Crepy, 
Charles and Francis agreed to return all conquests made since 
the Truce of Nice of 1538. The emperor renounced all claims 
on Burgundy, while Francis on his part relinquished his to 
Naples, Flanders, and Artois. Charles also assented to the 
marriage of Francis' second son, the Duke of Orleans, to 
either his daughter with the Netherlands, or one of his 
neices with the Duchy of Milan, the emperor reserving the 
right of deciding which of these unions should take place.
More dangerously, by a secret signed at Meudon on September 
19, Francis agreed to "declare himself the enemy of the king 
of England" should Henry "wish to quarrel or make war upon 
the emperor" and "to aid in the reformation of schism in the 
Church." L. & P ., XIX, pt. 2, No. 260. The duke of Orleans 
died before either marriage could take place, and fortunately 
for Henry's peace of mind the "secret Treaty of Crepy" was 
never divulged.
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soon evaporated, as word arrived by way of Chapuys and the
departing French negotiators at Hardelot, that the dauphin
and an army braced with mercenaries dismissed from Charles'
6 6service was moving on the Boulonnais.
On the English side the military outlook was grim. Their 
forces were divided, and the larger part, still covering Henry 
from Montreuil, were in dreadful condition, their camp a pest­
hole of filth and carrion. No trenches could be dug for lack 
of tools or guns fired for lack of powder; there was no bread, 
or beer, or forage; men ate horseflesh and much worse; while 
in every billet dysentery reaped a deadly toll, more than 
seven hundred of Buren's horsemen alone dying from that cause. 
But Henry's worry was neither Montreuil nor its pathetic as­
sailants; it was his own safety and that of Boulogne which 
troubled him. His Germans and Netherlanders were under no 
obligation to serve him beyond Saint Michael's day, Septem­
ber 29, and technically all of his foreigners if subjects of 
the emperor could retire at any time since, as their master
was at peace with France, they could no longer legally bear
67arms against her.
^ Spanish Calendar, VII, No, 213.
67L. & P., XIX, pt. 2f Nos. 178, 237,, 244, 248, 259;
Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs' des Armees Frangaises, pp. 
107-08. Buren's men were reported on September 17 to be 
dying at the average rate of more than twenty per day^.
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Henry's first impulse was to run; yet, though his depar­
ture had been planned for some time, summary escape was impos­
sible. The flotilla scheduled to escort him to England was 
late in arriving, and the way to Calais was blocked by plague, 
a far less discriminating opponent than the dauphin. Under 
the circumstances the only option was to call in reinforce­
ments; so to that effect the van and rear of Norfolk and Rus­
sell were ordered on the twenty-fifth to fall back at once on 
68
Boulogne.
The resulting retiral from Montreuil was a harrowing af­
fair, made more so by the emperor's punctillious reminder to 
Buren that his mercenaries and auxiliaries could remain in 
Tudor service no longer than the twenty-ninth. This gave the 
English four days in which to utilize the foreigners in their 
retreat, and the precipitate speed with which the camp was 
struck gives a fair indication of how afraid the English com­
manders were of making the eighteen-mile trek to Henry's camp 
without them. To reduce the baggage train and have beasts 
enough to draw the artillery, mills, bakehouses, tents, and 
pavilionsi some worth £100, were burned where they stood; 
the untransportable wounded, the sick, and infirm were aban­
doned to the French; and in an unreasoned outburst of anger
68spanish Calendar, VII, No. 211 (pp. 270-71); L. & P.,
XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 258-59, 307.
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the Duke of Norfolk in his impotence and frustration lashed 
out at Buren and the Imperialists as the sole authors of his 
discomfiture. It was the emperor, the count was told, who 
r,had betrayed and sold the men of England," the duke's impli­
cation clearly being that he fully expected Buren to leave 
him to face the dauphin alone. It was a strained moment, 
but the Netherlands general let it pass; he could not, he 
replied, hinder his master from making treaties any more than 
Norfolk could hinder Henry from doing the same; but as for 
himself and the men at his command, they would maintain Eng­
land's quarrel with France until Norfolk's divisons reached
69the safety of their own lines. This was a magnificent ges­
ture, more typical perhaps of a Dutch gentleman than a mercen­
ary. Nonetheless, the promise was kept, and with Buren's men 
in support the siege of Montreuil was lifted on the morning 
of September 28. A path was beaten to Etaples where the host 
spent the night before firing the town and next day continued 
to Neufchitel, some three French leagues from Boulogne. Here, 
with an English column marching in relief, Buren took his 
leave, striking off to the north and east towards Artois, his 
honor intact but doubtless feeling that his martial efforts 
had been poorly expended in a useless exercise, the which had
69Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
pp. 81-82.
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never been meant to succeed.
Back in Boulogne, Henry's earlier unease had subsided. 
The dauphin's advance was not as rapid as anticipated; the 
Imperial mercenaries within his own command gave every indi­
cation of remaining in service; and "the agreeable intelli­
gence," that Norfolk, "unmolested," had effected his retreat 
and was already close by revived the king's confidence. 
Equally comforting to the timorous monarch was the presence
outside the harbor of the squadron of warships that would 
71take him home. The vessels, among them at least three pro­
vided by the Netherlands, had begun arriving on the twenty- 
seventh; but by then Henry felt brave enough to postpone his 
sailing until the thirtieth when, after the troops had come 
up from Montreuil and Suffolk, Norfolk, and Russell had been 
instructed in how to defend the king's "pieces and country" 
in France, he was rowed to his flagship and carried to Dover
 ̂ See the letter of September 3 to Charles, L. & P . , XIX, 
pt. 2, No. 181 (p. 99), in which the Imperial agents at Bou­
logne express the view that Henry, as he had told them in the 
past, "has no other intention . . . than to win [Boulogne] 
which . . .  is much more important to him than Paris." The 
king was not averse to siezing Montreuil, but only if it 
could be taken easily. However, even if Montreuil did fall, 
Chapuys was convinced that Henry would never try to keep it. 
Rather he would use it "to make better conditions" at the 
peace which was then in the offing.
^Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran­
chises, p. 118; Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 218.
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72the same afternoon.
Henry's direct participation in the war was at an end; 
after his own fashion the bluff Tudor had waged his last cam­
paign. He had been in Prance, including his layover in Calais, 
for precisely seventy-nine days and at the fighting front for 
sixty-seven. During that period he was probably never once 
within gunshot of the enemy lines or ever remotely in danger. 
Now as the dauphin approached, with a real opportunity to de­
monstrate that his prowess in battle ranked as high as his 
other accomplishments, "he took his way from his tents to 
the sea shore," persuaded that he could make away with honor
in that he had gained his "enterprise of Boulogne" and that
73Francis "was not coming m  person" to reclaim it. Suffolk, 
Norfolk, and Russell were left behind as surrogates to defend 
Boulogne and the Pale against a reported fifty thousand en­
emy horse and foot with an army much thinned by casualties, 
sickness, and the recall of Buren's mercenaries and auxilia­
ries. It had been neatly arranged: the English lords would
^2Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 213; Gruffyd, "The 'Enter­
prises' of Paris and Boulogne," p. 77. That Henry's naval 
escort anchored off Boulogne and not in the haven was due to 
the fact that the harbor was unusable by ocean going vessels 
except at high tide.
*7 "lGruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
p. 77; L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 318.
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receive full blame for any disasters that might befall, their 
king the lion's share of the glory if the dauphin were turned 
back.
CHAPTER X
IN THE MIDST OF LIONS;
THE SEARCH FOR MERCENARIES AND THE RETURN TO WAR
They are now in the hands of no reasonable men, but in 
the cruel handling of a most cruel and wicked sort; God, 
which helped Daniel in the midst of lions, deliver them 
out of the hands of so wicked a people.
Vaughan to the Council, Nov. 8 , 1545. L. 1* P., XX, 
pt. 2, No. 756.
Though Henry's removal to England was rapid, it was not 
so hasty as to prevent him from devising a plan which hope­
fully would avert the recapture of Boulogne. It was simple 
enough, requiring little more than the concentration of all 
available forces in and around the occupied city to resist 
the expected onslaught of the French.
Precisely how large the English army was is not known, 
but even in its weakened state it was considerable, well in 
excess of twenty thousand. Within Boulogne itself Henry had 
placed John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, as governor of the town 
and seneschal of the Boulonnais.^ Under him was a garrison 
of better than two thousand effectives and several hundred 
pioneers, these drawn in the main from the original occupying 
force of Suffolk, who with the residue of the middle ward
■ T̂he full roster of Henry's military and civilian ap­
pointments can be found in (B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, f. 269.
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held the king's former camp by the sea. South of the town
across the Liane lay the camps of Russell and Norfolk, the
former at Outreau, a hamlet on the left bank just east of
Boulogne haven, the latter at Le Portel, a village by the
sea. Between them, the unsuccessful assailants of Montreuil
could muster nearly thirteen thousand, though plague and dys-
2entery reduced their ranks daily.
Of the numbers of foreigners left in Tudor service, it 
is impossible to be exact. There were of course no auxilia­
ries, these having marched out of the war with Buren and his 
mercenaries at Neuf chattel on September 29; but in spite of 
those losses there was as yet a large body of free lances 
left. In fact, as best as can be determined, when Henry 
sailed for home every foreign unit which had been present at 
the surrender of Boulogne was still in wages, and, the emper­
or's ban to the contary, each was being urged to extend its 
enlistment. What inducements were offered have not been re­
corded, but it is abundantly clear that the king took his 
leave in the full expectation that his terms would be ac­
cepted. Unfortunately, in this presumption Henry was sorely 
disappointed, for within a week of his landfall at Dover, 
as he carefully picked his way through Kent to avoid the
2Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,’1
p. 84? L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, NO. 297.
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contagion which had preceded him from France, the stunning
news arrived that the bulk of his free lances had abandoned
him, and that unnerved by their exodus his own commanders
had disobeyed orders by leading the greater part of his army
3away from Boulogne to Calais.
What triggered the withdrawal of Henry's soldiers of
fortune is not specifically mentioned, but it was certainly
not the Imperial edict forbidding the bearing of arms against
France. Such bans were ineffective, as Charles indirectly
admitted in conversation with Wotton at Cambray on September
24: no subject of his, he assured the ambassador, would be
allowed to take service in France; those who did would be
4punished as rebels. Obviously, there would have been no 
need for a penalty if it were not expected that there would 
be violators of the law, as in fact there were, "a few var- 
lets," to use the emperor's words, "that could not be stop­
ped. "
Henry's mercenaries it seems left the Boulonnais for 
considerations more basic than fear of Imperial retribution. 
In brief, their living conditions had become intolerable, 
due mainly to the fact that the campaign in which they had
3L. ji P ., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 347, 352-54. For mention of
the plague which forced the evacuation of Queen Katherine 
Parr from London, see ibid., Nos. 246, 258.
4Ibid., No. 374.
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fought was one of the wettest on record. From beginning to
end, the struggle had been punctuated by tempestuous storms
and driving rains which had brought in their wake pestilence
and death. As at Montreuil, the mortality rate at Boulogne
was staggering, not only among the free lances, most of whom
were cavalrymen, but among their precious mounts as well.
Gruffyd, who came to Boulogne with Norfolk, paints a grim
picture of a sodden, barren land devoid of shelter, an almost
grassless sea of mud in which there was nothing to feed the
horses except a little mouldering pulse which the animals re-
5fused and therefore died from lack of nourishment.
There had been since before Henry’s departure some indi­
cation of mercenary discontentment, but nothing to suggest an 
imminent pull-out. In the week following the surrender of 
Boulogne, one German in a fit of ill-humor had wounded an 
Englishman in the throat, and another in a fray with certain 
Irishmen had run his opponent through the breast with a boar 
spear. Such incidents, though serious, were normal and even 
expected in armies as heterogeneous as Henry’s. Tempers were 
bound to flare on occasion when warlike men of divers nations 
were thrown together, and when the English captain on the 
spot demanded and received amends from his German
5Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
p. 85.
330
counterparts,6 the matter was dropped in consideration, no 
doubt, of the genuine hope that the mercenaries, however 
irascible, would heed the king's plea to remain. That hope 
was dashed on October 1 when, in the wake of a successful 
action fought against the advanced guard of the dauphin's 
army, morale among the Germans and Netherlanders collapsed 
completely.
To get at the enemy who suddenly appeared between 
Outreau and Le Portel, the mercenaries and Suffolk's English 
forces had forded the Liane. Soaked to the skin and exposed 
to a freezing wind, they had kept to the field all afternoon, 
recrossing the river only after Norfolk and Russell had re­
located their camps on the north bank round the Old Man.
Once back at Boulogne, "through extreme cold and wading the 
water," many fell sick, and when pressed to remain to defend 
the threatened city the foreigners "waxed very forward," de­
manded their release, and retired to Calais where on the
tenth of the month most drew their final weeks' wages before
7passing on to the Low Countries and home.
The tergiversation of the free lances sent a shock wave 
through the entire Tudor military establishment, and some­
thing close to panic gripped the high command. On Friday
6L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 263, 296.
7Ibid., Nos. 353, 402.
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morning, October 3, the very day on which the Germans and 
Netherlanders appear to have initiated their walk^out, Suf­
folk, Norfolk, and Russell ordered their forces to fall back 
on Calais, leaving behind what under the circumstances was 
a meager garrison of thirty-three hundred effectives to face
an almost certain French attack on the torn walls and unre-
8paired breaches of battered Boulogne.
The withdrawal from the Boulonnais was a chaotic flight.
Each man set his own pace, no one keeping order or posting
scouts to guard the way. Near Wimille, between Boulogne and
Marquise, a party of English gunners who strayed from the
main body were set upon and mauled by a roving band of French
horsemen. Once past Marquise, with three or four miles of
potentially hostile territory still to be negotiated, the
chiefs of staff fled with the artillery, and on reaching
Calais shut the gates of the town against the rest, so that
from lack of warmth and medical attention many of the common 
9soldiers died.
It was a thoroughly disgraceful episode, totally ignored 
in the official reports of Norfolk and the other generals.
In their letters to the king they employed the most incrediable 
logic to justify their withdrawal from Boulogne. All agreed
8rbid.-, No. 353.
9Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," 
pp. 85-86.
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that in their present state the Basse Ville and the adjacent 
harbor were indefensible and were likely to be burned in any 
assault. Defence-works, which Henry had ordered, were needed 
to strengthen these places, but in the considered opinion of 
the English leaders it was not the season to build. Winter 
was upon them, and fearing "great destruction of people" from 
the cold and damp, and professing to have intelligence of an 
attempt upon the Pale, they resolved to "leave Boulogne the
10better furnished" by retiring with the whole army to Calais.
How the threatened fortress could be "the better fur­
nished” by depriving it of the troops who were to have served 
as its main line of defence is difficult to comprehend. Nor­
folk argued that the retreat had conserved on victuals, that 
left on its own the Boulogne garrison had provisions enough 
to last four thousand men three months, whereas had the army 
remained it would have consumed in a single day as much as 
would otherwise have sufficed for seven.^ Xt was a point 
well taken, except that it ignored the important fact that 
most of the garrison1s supplies, including munitions, had 
been stored in the weaker lower town which by his own admis­
sion was likely to be overwhelmed if attacked.
Henry was in no mood for excuses invalid or otherwise.
10L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, NO. 353.
X1Ibid.
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and ignoring his own late shortcomings in the field, he 
roundly lambasted his commanders for their rank ineptitude 
and unsoldierly conduct. His affairs, as he berated them 
through his Council, were being "very loosely handled many 
ways." By their "light coming away from Boulogne" they had 
demonstrated that they were "too well minded to come home­
ward," while their "bolstering and unapparent reasons . . . 
inculk[ed] a feigned necessity to cloak and maintain faults 
too much apparent to indifferent eyes." To Norfolk, Suffolk, 
and Russell the king wrote a blistering reprimand on October 
8 . Their "ill-favored retreat," he lectured them, had
touched his honor, and to make restitution they must return 
12to Boulogne. It was a plain enough directive, but impos­
sible to execute, for by this time the dauphin had blocked 
the roads south with thirty thousand men. Moreover, as 
Henry's discomfitted generals ruefully explained, without 
the support of their now departed German and Netherlands 
horse there was no hope of fighting their way through, par­
ticularly since among the English disease had so debilitated 
the ranks that the sick and dying lay untended in the 
streets.^
In the meantime, as Henry raged and his army languished
12Ibid., Nos. 374, 383.
13Ibid., No. 402.
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in its impotence within the Pale, the dauphin, after diver­
sionary thrusts towards Haittmes and Guisnes, essayed the great 
undertaking of the winter, the ill-starred "Caraisade of Bou­
logne," ̂  whose failure saved not only the city, but perhaps 
as well the careers of those noble lords at Calais to whom 
had been entrusted its protection. The onslaught, when it 
came, was made by twenty-three companies of French and Ital­
ian infantry who attacked near midnight on October 9. Aided 
by the negligence of the English pickets and by what Gruffyd 
termed the "prodigious dark," the French, with the Italians 
in support, poured into the lower town from the west side 
through no fewer than four breaches, the lead units wearing 
white shirts over their battle dress to distinguish them 
from the foe. Superior in strength to the defenders, the 
assailants carried the Basse Ville in a rout. Hundreds of 
Englishmen were slain as they ran to, arms, and many in the 
garrison were made prisoners, among them perhaps Alonzo 
Salablanca, the captain of a Spanish company in the Old Man,
14The best accounts of the "camisade" or night attack 
were written on the French side by Blaize de Montluc, The 
Commentaries of Messire Blaize de Montluc, trans. Charles 
Cotton (London, 1674) , pp. 80-82 (hereinafter cited as 
Commentaries) , and Martin du Bellay, Memoires de Messire 
Martin du Bellay, Seigneur de Langey in Collection Univer- 
selle des Memoires Particullers Relatifs ik l'Histoire de 
France (66 vols.; London, 1785-91), XXI, 204-05 (hereinafter 
cited as Memoires) . On the English side, see Gruffyd, "The 
’Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," pp. 88-92.
335
who in December, though still carried in the musters, was
15listed as being yet a captive of the French.
There were on the occasion of the ''camisade11 fewer than
five hundred mercenaries on the English side at Boulogne; and
these, excepting a single band of 120 Netherlands horse re-
16tained at Calais, represented the only foreigners to con­
tinue in Tudor service following the walkout of the week pre­
ceding. Why these should have remained is a mystery, but to 
a man the Boulogne free lances were Latins, the Italian and 
Spanish arquebusiers of Salerno, Salablanca, Pompeo, and 
Moreno.
Of the companies which they formed, the smallest was the 
Italian. Posted within the main citadel that was the Haute 
Ville, its eighty-eight men escaped completely any direct con­
frontation with the French, whose depredations were confined
entirely to the lower town. It was the larger Spanish units
under Moreno in the Basse Ville and Salablanca and Pompeo in
15L. 6i P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 799 (2, iii) . How and when
Salablanca was released is unknown, but by the end of the 
summer of 1545 he was in Essex. In the beginning of Septem­
ber he was ordered to Calais as part of an army destined for 
the relief of Boulogne, the city having been subjected to 
steady French pressure since July. Ibid., XX, pt. 2, Nos.
271, 272, 345.
16Ibid., XIX, pt. 2, No. 402. These cavalrymen were 
seemingly under the command of the resourceful Thomas Light- 
maker.
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the Old Man that were exposed to the gravest danger, but save 
for the captured Salablanca no other mercenary victims of the 
"camisade" can be found.
As regards the Spaniards' role in resisting the enemy, 
they appear to have been as ineffective as their English com­
rades-in-arms. Being hackbutteers whose forte was fighting 
from the defensive behind obstructions, it seems natural to 
assume that they would have been stationed on the walls or 
even in the trenches beyond them. This would explain the 
seizure of Salablanca, for the Old Man, though subjected to 
assault, was never entered. In all likelihood, it was the 
Spaniards along with the English watch who were hurled aside 
in the initial rush; but in defence of the free lances, as 
can be verified in written accounts on both sides, the rain 
fell in such torrents throughout the night that along the
front where the French attacked no gun of any kind could be
^ 17 fired.
Given the ease with which entry was made into the lower 
town and the unpreparedness of its guardians, the "camisade" 
should have spelled total disaster for the English. However, 
on the brink of success the French through greed allowed 
victory to escape them. Confronted with the piles of
■^Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
p. 91; Du Bellay, Memoires, XXI, 204-05.
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provisions left by the Tudor army on its retreat to Calais, 
they began to pillage, ignoring the danger from the Haute 
Ville where the main English garrison prepared a counter­
attack. The French standards which were planted here and 
there about the lower town had not, according to one eye­
witness, as many as twenty men around them. Worse, the of­
ficers lost complete control over their soldiers, so that 
when the English charged down upon them the plunderers, with 
losses of upwards of six hundred, were forced out of the
18Basse Ville in less time than it had taken them to win it.
For the dauphin, who throughout the proceedings had re­
mained inactive in the hills beyond the Old Man with a re­
serve of six thousand Swiss, the sight of his stricken van 
as it struggled back to camp was unsettling. Casualties 
among his key personnel were critical: Jean de Tais, chief
captain of the raiders, was badly wounded, while the Sieur 
de Fouquerolles, leader of the French contingents, was dead. 
Nonetheless, had the prince had his way, the affair would 
have been recommenced, but for once conditions favored the 
English. Continued rains, low morale, and short rations 
forced a French retreat. Boulogne, for the time being, was 
left to its defenders, and the dauphin, after a weak feint 
towards Guisnes, fell back on Montreuil, from whence, after
1 flMontluc, Commentaries, pp. 81-82.
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19disbanding his army, he retired for the winter to Paris.
If Henry VIII took comfort in his good fortune, the les­
son of the "camisade" was not lost upon him. The lower town 
in its ruined state was indefensible, so on October 14, with 
the French still probing the Pale perimeter, emphatic instruc­
tions were issued from Westminster for the immediate rein­
forcement of his prize. Two thousand men were ordered to 
Boulogne from Calais, and the recruitment of mercenaries, in
particular any willing to forsake French wages, was encouraged,
20with the obvious view of learning the enemy's intention.
How many deserted for Henry's gold cannot be accuragely gaged,
but by the end of October several hundred, mainly Italians,
21succumbed to his overtures.
Even counting the free lances already in service, com­
pared to the multitudes hired for the summer fighting at Mon- 
treuil and Boulogne, the numbers retained in the winter of 
1544 were miniscule indeed. Perhaps, all told, by the end of 
the year Henry had a thousand mercenaries under arms, and it
19 ^Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran-
^aises, p. 119.
20L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No, 436.
21Ibid., Nos. 434, 454, 497. The only captain who can 
be identified was the Piedmontese condottiere, Bartholomew 
de C&res, a renegade from the dauphin's host, who volun­
teered himself, forty mounted arquebusiers, and three hun­
dred footmen "of the bravest of all the French army."
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is obvious, as well it should have been, that the dearth of 
foreign levies was cause for the gravest concern. The "carai- 
sade" of Boulogne had been a close run thing. More to the 
point, with that city and the entire Pale bidding fair to be 
subjected to further French aggression in the spring, the sea­
son was ripe, as Chancellor Wriothesley noted in a communique 
to Secretary Paget, "to meet the practices of the world in 
time." 22
Winter, then, while it brought in its wake the usual 
lull in hostilities, was a time of frenetic activity, espe­
cially on the diplomatic front, as the Henrician government, 
devoid of allies and naked to its enemy, strove to find new 
confederates and mercenaries in whatever quarters seemed most 
likely to produce them. In November serious consideration 
was given to the opening of negotiations with the Lutheran 
princes of Germany, with the Hanse towns along the Baltic, 
and with the kingdom of Denmark. It was, or so it momentar­
ily seemed, 1539 all over again. Protestant fears, no less 
than Henry's, had been revived by the Treaty of Crepy, whose 
subscribers even at this moment were being exhorted by the
common enemy, Rome, to unite in holy war against schismatics
23on both sides of the Channel. There were reports that
22Ibid., No. 614.
23Ibid., Nos. 677, 679, 700.
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certain of the Hanse towns had expressed a willingness to 
serve the English king on the sea; talk was heard of an al­
liance with the Schmalkaldic League; and two of the foremost 
Protestants, Frederick, the Elector-Palatine of the Rhine,
and Maurice, Duke of Saxony, went as far as to send servants
24offering troops for the war against France. Such overtures 
Henry found pleasing in the extreme, but the promise they 
held forth of unlimited quantities of mercenaries and auxil­
iaries evaporated with the spring. Fear of the emperor, 
internal jealousies, and personal ambition had weakened the 
Germans' resolve. The Hanse, as it transpired, provided
neither men nor ships; the Saxon Elector, John Frederick, who
25had succeeded his father as one of the joint commanders-in­
chief of the forces of the Schmalkaldic League, would not
deign to meet with Henry's envoys; while the Elector-Palatine
26and the Saxon duke were bribed into happy neutrality.
In retrospect, the loss of the Protestant alliance was
24Ibid., Nos. 508, 699, 746; XX, pt. 1, No. 90.
2^John, Elector of Saxony (d. 1532).
26L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 212; pt. 2, Nos. 67-69; A. H. 
Johnson, Europe in the Sixteenth Century, 1494-1598 (London: 
Rivingtons, 1898), pp. 222-23. Frederick the Elector-Pala­
tine was supported by Charles V in an unsuccessful bid to 
gain the throne of Denmark. On the other hand, Maurice of 
Saxony was lured into an alliance with the emperor in the 
hope of gaining electoral Saxony from his cousin, John Fre­
derick. The Electorate was in fact bestowed upon Maurice on 
the outbreak of the Schmalkaldic War in 1546.
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fortunate indeed. At best it only could have served to ir­
ritate the emperor, who far from craving a quarrel with Eng-
4land desired most to isolate the Lutherans that he might the
better chastise them. Likewise, such a compact would have
been useful to Henry solely in the event of an actual break
with Charles, but that was to be avoided. For sure, there
came a moment early in 1545 when rupture seemed imminent. An
awkward dispute arose concerning the impounding of certain
Flemish ships which had been caught trading with France, but
27the matter was amicably composed on April 6 . Meanwhile, a
scant week earlier, in answer to the Lutheran Landgrave of
Hesse, regarding his offer of ten thousand landsknechts and
two thousand horse, the Privy Council informed him that the
king intended to satisfy his requirements elsewhere, having
28more supplicants daily than he would need.
It was an exaggerated claim calculated to assuage Impe­
rial Catholic tempers, as with the Elector, John Frederick of 
Saxony, Landgrave Philip stood highest in authority among the 
princes of the Augsburg Confession. Henry did not have the 
mercenaries he needed, though by April his deficiency in that 
area was less keenly felt. Throughout the winter there had
2^Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 2; L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 
8-10, 494; {B. M.) Add. MS. 28,594, ff. 66-67b.
2 8State Papers, X, 239, 338, 379.
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been hirings. Most were nameless recruits, campaigners and 
deserters from the war of 1544. Many who can be identified 
were acquired in the Low Countries through contacts like the 
resident English factor, Stephen Vaughan, who secured employ­
ment in December for two adventurers, an Italian, Angelo
Mariano of Cremona, and a Spaniard, Antonio de Mora, veteran
29of the expeditionary force which had beseiged Montreuil.
Another captain with previous English experience was Ytell-
wolf von Gudenberg, the same Lord of Itter who had served
Henry at the capture of Boulogne. He and a fellow German,
Gottfried von Bocholt, were commissioned in January, each
entrusted with the raising of five hundred men-at-arms for 
30the wars.
January was an auspicious month for recruiting as it was 
a time of mass disbandments of the emperor's Spaniards in the 
Netherlands. Having been engaged for the defence of the Low 
Countries in 1544, they were at their discharge provided 
nine transports to convey them back to Spain. All of the 
vessels carrying several thousand of these men briefly put 
in at Rye where an offer of their services was sent to the 
king. The masters of the ships would not, however, wait upon 
an answer, but on making a second landfall at Falmouth six
29L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 715, 781, 787.
30Ibid., XX, pt. 1, No. 88 and below, p. 371.
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hundred came ashore and were placed under contract by one of
31the king's gentlemen ushers, Sir Philip Hoby. It was one 
of the largest, fastest, and apparently most amicable of 
such signings during the entire war.
The majority of the free lances obtained in 1545 and 
thereafter were not, however, so easily come by, for the Haps- 
burg emperor took his new found neutrality seriously. With 
the conclusion of the Treaty of Crepy, Charles made it a 
capital offence for any of his men of war to take employment 
with foreign princes, and in January of the new year he added 
some teeth to the measure by positively refusing safe-conducts 
through his lands for mercenaries Henry planned to recruit in 
Germany and in Italy. It was, as the Imperial Secretary, 
Granvelle, told Wotton, an importune season to ask for Ger­
mans, since the Grand Turk, Suleiman, was expected momentar­
ily to descend on Hungary, whereas Italians, with or without
safe-conducts, were certain to be set upon by the Germans and
32would only infect Englishmen "with their adominable vice.”
Such logic appeared fatuous to the Tudor king, who com­
plained loudly of the emperor's "discourtesies" and "inhuman­
ities." Germany, whether at war with the Infidel or not, had 
troops enough for many armies, while the morals of Italians
31L. & p ., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 59, 106, 326.
^ State Papers, X, 291.
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were of no consequence whatever given the fact that Henry had 
already commissioned four .including Angelo Mariano r to raise 
thirty companies— some foot and some horse— in the territories 
of the Venetians. The remaining, condottieri made an impres­
sive trio. One was a count, Bernardo di San Bonifacio of 
Verona, whom Henry through his intercession with the Imperial­
ists had saved from possible execution of 1543, Taken pris­
oner that year in Luxemberg while alledgedly "wearing sec­
retly" a French uniform, he had been incarcerated at Rippe- 
monde in the Low Countries until his release towards the end 
of August, 1544. After that date nothing else is heard of 
him until January, 1545, when he was cited by Chapuys as hav­
ing been recently retained to find troops for the English in 
33Venice.
The third captain involved in the Italian venture was
Filippo Pini of Lucca, erroneously identified in a letter to
34the emperor as the "Prince of Bucharest," while the fourth 
member of the quartet was Ludovico da l'Armi, whose misdeeds 
both in and out of English service make some of the most lu­
rid reading in all the annals of mercenary warfare. Born 
into the petty aristocracy of Bologna, the product of the
3^L. & P . , XVIII, pt, 2, No. 225; Spanish' 'Calendar,
VII, Nos. 198, 109; VIII, No. 2,
34Spanish Calendar, VXII, N o 2,
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marriage of Lord Gasparo da l'Armi and Lady Aurelia Campeggio, 
he had chosen the condottiere*s life after being outlawed 
from his native city for a homicide committed in his youth.
His first employment had been in France, where he became the 
familiar of the dauphin, who in 1541 had accorded him the 
honor of engineering the overthrow of the Imperialist-control­
led government of Sienna. However, Ludovico's intrigues were 
uncovered, and when he himself was apprehended while fleeing 
through the Florentine territories of the emperor's ally,
Duke Cosimo de' Medici, he volunteered such information as
saved his life and assured the rout of the French party in 
35Sienna.
In the wake of his arrest, all trace of Da l'Armi is 
lost for three years. When next he is found it was in Ger­
many, where in June, 1544, on the eve of the Boulogne cam­
paign, he was commended to Henry through the troublesome
36Badener, Landenberg, by the bishops of Augusburg and Trent.
In August he was a brief visitor at the siege of Boulogne, 
where by his disparaging remarks and pro-French bias he in­
curred the wrath of many an Englishman, including Sir William
35John Addington Symonds,' renaissance In Italy (2 vols. : 
New York: The Modern Library, h, d.) , ii', 708;: Venetian
Calendar, V, xxx.
36L.‘- & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 713 Cp. 442).
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37Paget, who considered him an upstart and more likely a spy. 
But if Henry ever doubted the man, the feeling soon passed.
By the end of the year he had secured Da l’Armi with his 
gold, accrediting him to the Venetian Republic as his colo­
nel at fifty crowns a month, with orders to recruit eight
captains who themselves were exhorted to entertain the most
38select men that they could find.
Surely, as that illustrious Victorian, Froude, pointed
out over a century ago, there was no stranger phenomenon of
the times than the high esteem of Henry VIII among younger 
39Italians. Their response to his call to arms was so over­
whelming that Edmund Harvel, the resident Tudor envoy in 
Venice, was kept hopping for months by the flood of suppli­
cants begging employment. Captains, he reported to Henry on 
March 1, resorted to him daily "as though all Italy were 
under your Majesty's empire and at [your] commandmant."^0 
There is no certain explanation for this attraction aside 
from the obvious reason that both king and condottieri had 
mutually supportive needs, Henry for fighting men, the free
37Ibid., pt. 2, Nos. 93, 117,
3^lbid., XX, pt. 1, No. 650 (1).
39James Anthone Froude,' History of England from' the 
Fall' of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth (12 vols. j New York: 
Scribner, 1870), IV, 415.
40L.- & P., XX, pt. 1, No, 292.
347
lances for work. Yet, perhaps there was something which the 
Italians found more alluring than English gold. It is just 
possible that among those who flocked to Henry's standard 
many were attracted by that monarch's hatred of Rome; for 
though it is hardly proof of their religious predilection a 
suspiciously high percentage of officers taken into wages 
came from noted hotbeds of Italian Protestantism. Cremona, 
the city in the Milanese which produced Angelo Mariano, was 
a center of Lutheran and Calvinist activity; Verona, on the 
Venetian mainland, from which sprang San Bonifacio, lay 
close to Vicenza which sheltered a large Anabaptist commun­
ity; while Plippo Pini's Lucca and Da l'Armi's Bologna har­
bored Protestants of many persuasions. All told, of the 
thirty captains hired by that foursome, nine can be posi­
tively identified as citizens of towns in which the reformed
41faith flourished; and it is perhaps only coincidental that 
one of the men most vigorously occupied in the enrollment of 
this force was Harvel's secretary, Baldassare Altieri, a
^Bartholomeo Moreni, Modena; Ludovico de Monte and 
Count Antonio Benilacgua, Verona; Bambino de Carpi, Ferrara; 
Battista Oliva, Mantua; Count Bonifacio Tresino, Vicenza; 
Lorenzo Carli,and a captain Ventura, Lucca; and one Captain 
Gramegna, Bologna. The names of all thirty captains can be 
gleaned from the following documents: Ibid., Nos. 650 (2),
751 (2). On the impact of the Reformation in Italy, consult 
Elton, ed., The Reformation, 1520-1559, Chap. VIII.
native of the Abruzzi and vociferous champion of Lutheranism.
For whatever reasons, recruitment in the Venetian Repub­
lic was a huge success. The four senior officers were al­
lowed three months1 wages in advance and commenced the en­
listment of troops in April, Da l'Armi establishing his head­
quarters in Venice, the others concentrating on the mainland
M  A
towns of Verona and Vicenza. How many rank and file were
44actually mustered has gone unmentzoned, but signings were 
heavy enough to alarm Francis I and his ally, Pope Paul III, 
both of whom feared an invasion of French-controlled Pied­
mont and the disruption of the Council of Trent, that chief
instrument of the Catholic Reformation which the pontiff had
45decreed should open that spring.
4^Elton, ed., The Reformation, 1520-1559, pp. 262-63.
^Venetian Calendar, Nos. 334, 337-38.
44One of Da l'Armi*s captains, Ludovico de Monte, writ­
ing to an agent of the Venetian government on July 29, 1545, 
projected that ten thousand foot and six hundred horse were 
to be raised by Henry and given to Charles II, the dispos­
sessed Duke of Savoy, for the recovery of "his territory of 
Piedmont." Ibid., No. 343. If such a course was actually 
planned, nothing came of it.
45The Council of Trent, after long delays, officially 
convened in December, 1545. In three great sessions last­
ing until 1563, it touched upon all aspects of religious 
life. It corrected many of the abuses in the Roman Church 
which had brought on the Reformation, clarified Catholic 
doctrine, and set the pattern for modern Catholicism.
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Paul, indeed, had immediate cause for concern, since
Trent, on the Italian side of the Alps, lay within easy
reach of every center where Henry1s condottieri were gather-
46ing. Moreover, Da l'Armi was his rebel, and in the pope's
view that desperado had been hired specifically to ensnare
none other than the English cardinal, Reginald Pole, who
with two fellow legates, Marcello Cervini and Giovanni de
Monte, had been ordered from Rome to convene the council in 
47March.
There is scant evidence on the English side, but enough
from other sources, to suggest that Pole's life was in truth
in danger. He alone of the legates arrived late in Trent,
reaching the city by a circuitous route in April, more than
a month behind his colleagues who were there at the appointed 
48time. In the interim, the pope applied to Da l'Armi for a 
safe-conduct, so that his hunted prelate could pass through 
Romagna in safety; but the document was refused, despite the 
arrest of Da l'Armi's father, who was briefly detained in
Bologna, from which Da l'Armi eminated, lay within the 
boundaries of the papal state of Romagna.
^L .  & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos, 6 8 6 , 743, 751. Its opening 
was delayecT By the Imperial Diet of Worms (December, 1544, to 
July, 1545) in which the emperor, for a final time before the 
outbreak of the Schmalkaldic War, sought to comprise his re­
ligious differences with the Lutherans.
: O■ Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 33
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Rome and later sent to Venice to urge his son to remove him-
49self from Tudor service. Pole ultimately arrived in Trent 
without incident, yet only after hiring his own band of cut­
throats in Bologna, wherein, he reported, men were continually
50kept by Ludovico.
That Henry in this instance had ordered the elimination 
of the ecclesiarch is certainly within the realm of possibil­
ity. Like Da l'Armi, Pole too was a traitor and an outcast, 
having been attained by the English Parliament in 1539 for a 
multitude of offenses, not the least of which was his author­
ship of that violent assault on Henry's sensibilities, Pro
Ecclesiasticae Unitatis Defensione. The cardinal, who in 
that manuscript compared his sovereign to the despots, Nero 
and Domitian, was dearly hated, and a number of attempts had 
previously been made to assassinate him. That he had escaped
Ibid.; L. s P., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 417, 425 (pp. 188-89), 
842. See also Venetian Calendar, V, Nos. 334-35.
50L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 602.
51This polemic, completed in Venice in 1536, had been in­
tended to turn the king's course from religious revolution to 
reconciliation with Rome, but its effect had been otherwise. 
Unsparing in its abuse and threatening in the extreme, it 
inveighed against Henry’s persecution of the Catholic faith­
ful and denounced him as a plunderer of his subjects. Its 
end result was to hasten the destruction of Pole's brother, 
Lord Montague, and his mother, the Countess of Salisbury, who 
were respectively executed in 1538 and 1541. Mackie, The 
Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558, pp. 396, 547-48.
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death at the hands of Henry's agents in the Netherlands in
521536, in Venice in 1538, and in Viterbo in 1540 is reason 
enough to suspect that Da l'Armi had been specially commis­
sioned to murder him; yet, by the same token it is abundantly 
clear that Henry’s main object in Italy was not the liquida­
tion of Pole but the acquisition of mercenaries for his on­
going war in the north. He had hired the captains, and by 
all accounts they could deliver the men. What remained to 
be done, but could not be accomplished, was the transmission 
of the troops to the English front.
As from the first, the chief impediment to the movement 
of the Italian free lances remained the lack of passports.
The logical path for them to have followed would have been 
overland through the Empire to the Netherlands and Calais, 
except that, as has been noted, the emperor would grant no 
license through his dominions to any soldiers whom it was the 
English government's plan to engage. Memories of Lander- 
berg's depredations around Liege still rankled in Imperialist 
minds from the previous year, and the best that Charles 
could suggest regarding the Italians in the Venetian terri­
tories was that Henry bring them by sea from the Mediterran- 
53ean. It seemed on the surface a reasonable alternative,
^James Gairdner, "Reginald Pole," D. N. B., XVI, 37-39.
^3Spanish Calendar, VIII, Nos. 8 , 15.
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54but it was not. Henry did not have the ships, and even if 
he had, the journey through the great inland sea, alive as it 
was with French galleys and Turkish corsairs was too hazardous 
to risk. The mercenaries from Venice were lost to him. Of 
the thousands that might have been activated, barely two hun­
dred were called to duty, Da l'Armi sending two companies of
55light horse, one to England and another to Guisnes, in July.
All the while, hope was held out that the emperor would change
his mind about the passports. But as he did not, with the
year far spent, Harvel was ordered in September to come to an
understanding with the principal officers: Da l'Armi, San
Bonifacio, Pini, and Mariano would continue to function as
English agents; their captains, however, were to be discharged
with the promise that next year, if needed, Henry would not
56refuse their services.
As will later appear, the English failure to bring the 
Italian companies from Venice was keenly felt, for militarily 
1545 was a busy year. Nonetheless, everything considered,
54Henry's navy, comprised of about fifty vessels, was 
needed in home waters to protect and supply Boulogne, to 
harass the Scots, and to defend against that constant danger, 
invasion from France. On the size of the navy, see William­
son, The Tudor Age, p. 447. See also, L. & P., XX, pt. 1,
No. lST"(p. 50).
55Venetian Calendar, V, No. 343; L. & P., XX, pt. 2,
Nos. 196, 997.
56L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 704.
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Henry had good luck in finding mercenaries. The build-up
t
through the spring, though slow, was constant. Free lances,
individually and in small bands, inobtrusively materialized,
most, -it would seem, at Calais, where in the last days of
February Secretary Paget reported so many had gathered that
they were beginning to cause the civic authorities there con- 
57cern. Musters were supervised by Sir George Broke, Lord 
Cobham, who as Deputy of Calais, and the king*s chief officer 
in the town had general responsibility for the issuance of
contracts, the administration of loyalty oaths to individual
58foreign captains, and the maintenance of discipline among
59the latters' men.
^ Ibid. , pt. 1, No. 257.
58See above, p. 97, n. 25,
^ T h e  disciplinary ordinances for mercenaries then in 
force in Calais and its immediate environs required:
"That the captain of a band will neither attempt 
nor practice in any way to fill or supply his band 
of soldiers with others having office under the King, 
our Lord, nor receive any soldier to be enrolled in 
his said band, without first having informed my 
Lord, the deputy . . ., under pain of [blank}.
That when musters are taken, no soldier answers for 
or in the name of another on pain of [blank].
That no Captain practices to supply his band at the 
musters with other soldiers who are not his own, in 
order to deceive the Commissioners [of the Musters] 
and for his own profit under pain of [blank].
The said soldiers will not fight with one another 
under pain of [blank].
The said soldiers will not sow any mutiny or fac­
tion among the band on pain of [blank].
No one will leave the outskirts of the camp for
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No accurate count of the mercenaries retained by Cobham 
in early 1545 can be provided for lack of particular informa­
tion. Nevertheless, some idea of their strength can be gath­
ered from the large numbers trans-shipped to England, where 
as winter ended another alarum had been sounded along the 
northern frontier. On February 27, an English force of five 
thousand returning from a raid in Teviotdale was ambushed by 
the Scots on Ancrum Moor. Fourteen hundred English soldiers 
were killed or captured, and their leaders, Sir Ralph Evers,
Warden of the Middle Marches, and Sir Brian Layton, Captain
60of Norham Castle, left dead on the field. The defeat in it­
self was serious enough, but compounding the disaster, and
the place where the band will be ordered to stay 
and serve, without having leave of the Captain.
No one will sound the alarm without the order of 
the Captain on pain of [blank].
When the band or some number thereof will be 
ordered to do some exploit or strike the enemy, 
they will do it without any contradiction or 
difficulty on pain of [blank].
That in all things convenient and lawful they be
obedient to the commands of the Captain, without
running counter thereto on pain of [blank].
That none leave or embrace practices with the 
enemy without the knowledge and command of those 
who will have oversight on pain of [blank]."
The preceding ordinances can be found in (P. R. O.) S. P. 
1/198, f. 50b.
**®A somewhat romanticized, but useful, account of this 
action is provided by Colin J. M. Martin, "Ancrum Moor: A
Day of Reckoning," The Scots Magazine, n. s. LXXXIII, No. 2
(May 1965), 146-52.
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thereby prompting the transfer of mercenaries from Calais, was
the intelligence that six thousand French auxiliaries might
be expected in Scotland in March, the vanguard of an army of
forty thousand which under the Duke of Guise would attempt
a landing on the northeast coast. ̂
Though the French attack would be postponed until the
summer and would be launched against the south coast, there
were no sages to divine the future at Westminster. Instead,
at the beginning of March the Council had to grapple with
the necessity of laying strong garrisons along the borders,
of hastening the completion of coastal fortifications, and
of providing an army for the defence of the northland. A
general levy of the northern counties produced a respectable
62array of 27,500 men, good troops with experience in border 
warfare. But, as it was Frenchmen as well as Scots that they 
were expected to repel, Henry made the decision to reinforce 
them with mercenaries.
The movement of free lances from Calais was begun in 
March, the first to be deployed being Spanish arquebusiers. 
Thirteen hundred under their colonel, Pedro de Gamboa, were
61State Papers, V, 412.
62The "schedule of the numbers appointed in every shire" 
is outlined in L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 555 (2).
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63collected at Dover and conveyed by sea to Newcastle, There­
after followed smaller bands, mainly cavalry, to the tune of 
nearly two thousand, German men-at-arms, Italian "hacque-
butiers of horseback," and Albanian stradiots, the first com-
64panies of which had been enlisted by Cobham in February.
All told, therefore, Henry's army to withstand the Frenchmen 
and the Scots showed a strength of thirty thousand, one- 
tenth of which, and that the strongest part, was comprised 
of foreigners.
Without doubt, the incorporation of these mercenaries 
into the army in the north represented something of an inno­
vation for Henry. His subjects had not seen the like since 
his father's reign, the last time free lances had tramped 
the roads of England in such numbers. Henry's use of them 
to defend the realm sprang certainly from his fear of the 
French. However, there existed another reason for their 
employment in England, namely the need to keep them active; 
for in France, where the war had temporarily wound down, 
boredom had so undermined their morale that they had taken 
to deserting and fighting among themselves.
6^Ibid., No. 435; State Papers, V, 439.
6 4 (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/198, f. 48; L. & P ., XX, pt. 1, No. 
513. Henry also contemplated sending four thousand lands­
knechts into the north of England, but he was unable to get 
them out of Germany.
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In Calais r in March, killings and woundings occurred on 
an almost daily basis, the market place being a favorite 
battleground of the mercenaries. Spaniards and Italians sur- 
passed all other nationals in mayhem, and as is confirmed by
Gruffyd, it was the former who most inclined towards deser-
65tion. Two Spanish captains, De Mora and Arze, fled into 
France with a hundred men and sixty new handguns on April 11; 
another, Juan de Haro, and twenty-five of his company was 
killed in a similar attempt; while mistrust of Spaniards at 
Boulogne caused the eventual transfer of three hundred to 
Tilbury and Dover.^
If there was a lesson to be learned from the trouble­
some behavior of these men of war, it was simply that idle­
ness among mercenaries bred mischief. New outlets were 
needed for their violent energy, but lamentably these were 
not presently available in the English north country, where, 
as the accretion of free lances continued, the immediate 
threat of invasion receded. French succours in Scotland did 
not arrive as early as anticipated, nor in the strength ex­
pected, and the projected landing of the Duke of Guise was
6^Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,"
pp. 15-18,
66L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos, 521, 532, 1024, 1071.
De Mora had been acquired by Stephen Vaughan in December,
1544. Above, p. 342.
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67shelved in favor of a larger demonstration in the Channel.
But that, too, would be delayed until July, so that once 
again Henry's "soldiers strangers" were provided time to 
amuse themselves with not always salubrious results.
Most of the free lances removed from Calais were posted 
to Northumberland, the majority being retained in small 
bands along the seaboard between the Tyne estuary and Ber­
wick. Problems with the commissariat forced many to live off 
the land, and in Newcastle, where the Spaniards were depos­
ited en masse on an unwilling citizenry, trouble brewed in­
stantly. On May 21, Robert Lewen, the mayor of the town,
catalogued his complaints in a letter to Cuthbert Tunstall,
fi 8Bishop of Durham. The Spaniards were rapacious; they paid 
for nothing. Lodgings, fuel, candles, salt, and victuals 
were gorged from their hosts, who quartered them in their 
own homes, without charge. Every creature comfort was de­
manded, including laundry service, so that the citizens on 
the verge of penury were fain to leave their houses. Only 
an emergency advance on the Spaniards' wages saved the situ­
ation. On May 26, Tunstall and his colleague, Sir Ralph Sad­
ler, High Treasurer of the Wars Against Scotland, paid out
6?Ibid., Nos. 767, 867, 906, 909; Spanish Calendar,
VIII, No. 49.
68L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 787.
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to Gamboa 1000 marks in prest "to avoid inconvenience be­
twixt the inhabitants and them which agree not the best."®®
It was a mild understatement, considering that in the streets
of Newcastle two of the king's subjects had already been
70butchered by Spanish hands.
Anarchism among the mercenaries in England never attained
the heights that had been reached in Calais. Still, the
events related above were no isolated incidents. A troop of
Clevelander horsemen, on their way north in June, touched off
a riot in Islington in Middlesex in which a member of the
town watch was killed; the same month, French spies were said
to be actively enticing the foreigners in Northumberland to
join with the Scots; and in July, in Newcastle, a "camp" or
duel between two Spaniards, one of whom in a quarrel had
struck the other in the face, was authorized by the Privy
Council to prevent even greater bloodshed among the partisans
71of each who had taken sides. The moral again was clear: 
no employer of mercenaries could afford them the luxury of in­
action. Peace, like nothing else, exposed their wickedness, 
and in war alone lay their redemption.
Where Henry's free lances were concerned, their salvation
69Ibid., No. 815.
7QIbid., No. 811.
71Ibid., Nos. 749, 770, 1000, 1068, 1085, 1315.
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lay with France. Against that nation they had been hired to 
fight in defence of Boulogne and the frontier against Scot­
land, but throughout the spring, after the unsettling fright 
on Ancrum Moor, no serious danger arose on either front. Of 
the war in France during the first five months of this year, 
little can be said. The marshal, Du Biez, and twelve thou­
sand men, while attempting to raise a bailey to command the 
mouth of the Liane, were surprised by Hertford near Le Portel 
and driven back on Montreuil. A short while later, the Eng­
lish garrisons at Guisnes and Hammes, raiding in the vicinity
72of Ardres, took the tower of Outings, and in May, Sir
Thomas Poynings, Lisle's replacement as Governor of Boulogne,
73occupied the castle of Hardelot.
Of the Scottish war during the same period, there is
much less to relate. There were no exploits of which to tell.
Not even the discovery that the French auxiliaries had landed
74at Dumbarton on May 31 caused Henry to stir, though Hertford,
7 9'The only full record of the siezure of Outings and the 
overthrow of Du Biez from the English side is provided by 
Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," pp. 2-4.
The information presented compares favorably with the French 
account supplied in Du Bellay, Memoires, XXI, 206.
73Poynings assumed his duties on January 31, at which 
time Lisle returned to England to resume his post as Lord 
Admiral. L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 121, 125 (30).
^ State Papers, V, 458, cites the number of Frenchmen 
at thirty-six hundred.
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then in Newcastle in his capacity as Lieutenant and Captain-
75General of the North, proposed the capture of Kelso to im­
pede any Scots advance on the borders. Had the plan materi­
alized, the mercenaries in Northumberland would have seen 
their first action, in anticipation of which Hertford held a 
view of his Spaniards in Newcastle and hurried off a request
to London for the horsemen of Cleves, detained by their trou-
76ble in Islington. Kelso, however, was spared. For short­
age of victuals, the enterprise was forborne, and the earl 
contented himself in the hope of carrying through an earlier
plan, that of invading Scotland in August when the harvest
77had been collected and was ripe for destruction.
Meanwhile, the true objective of French strategy had 
finally revealed itself. Francis I, having moved Henry to 
commit the larger portion of his mercenary strength to the 
defence of England, had resolved to isolate Boulogne. To do 
so, Francis proposed to gather a fleet powerful enough to com­
mand the Channel, blockade the southern ports, and detain 
Henry's troops in England. Towards these ends, he began to 
assemble his flotilla in March. Vessels and seamen were
75L. ji P., XX, pt. 1, No. 846 (2) . Hertford, who re­
placed Suffolk, Norfolk, and Russell in Calais at the begin­
ning of the year, was recalled to England in April.
7 6Ibid., Nos. 883, 890.
77State Papers, V, 451.
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pressed into service from Bordeaux to Brest. Six ships were 
sent from Scotland, but the larger part of the armada, includ­
ing carracks from Genoa and galleys Rome, was convoyed in May
78from the Mediterranean port of Marseilles. The whole, con­
sisting of 150 great sailing ships, twenty-five galleys, and 
sixty transports, was collected in July in the Norman havens 
of Havre de Grace, Eure, Harfleur, Hanfleur, and Dieppe with
ten thousand men to destroy Lisle's squadrons in Portsmouth
79and close the harbor of Boulogne.
Such specifics of French intentions, however, were not
available to Henry, who had little to rely on but hearsay
gathered from every diplomatic pouch and newsmonger he chose
to credit. The king could be certain that Francis meant to
recover Boulogne: Du Bie:z, after his earlier overthrow at
Le Portel, had returned with an army to the Liane to build
80an even larger fort. But, to the Tudor s greater conster­
nation, what could not be plumbed was the target of the expe­
dition into England. Rumor pointed alternatively to Scot­
land, Kent, the western counties, and Sussex as the likeliest 
places for the French diversion, so that as summer began, to
78Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 49; L. & P., XX, pt. 1,
No. 1073.
79Du Bellay, Memoires, XXI, 213-14.
80Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," p. 8.
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discourage a landing Henry was forced to mobilize the whole
power of the counties. Hertford, with his thirty thousand,
remained in Northumberland; the Duke of Norfolk and Lord
Russell, with equal forces, stood guard respectively in the
East and West; while the Duke of Suffolk, "with some horses
out of Almain," mustered a fourth army in Sussex, Kent, and 
81Hampshire.
Speculation regarding French purposes ended on July 18 
when their fleet entered the Solent. An attack by their gal­
leys on Portsmouth harbor in a calm sea on the nineteenth 
momentarily threatened disaster, and only the sudden rising 
of a seaward breeze averted the sinking of the English sail- 
powered squadrons within. With the wind against them, the
French retired to the Isle of Wight where their landing par-
82ties were rudely welcomed by its defenders. Three days of 
aimless skirmishing failed to establish a stable beachhead, 
and on the twenty-fourth Admiral Claude d'Annebaut, comman­
der of the invaders, drew his fleet off into the Channel, 
depositing on the French side on the last day of the month 
three thousand pioneers and four thousand soldiers to assist
81L. &. P., XX, pt. 1, No. 1078: State Papers, X, 468.
s^The fullest account of French operations is presented 
by Froude, History of England, IV, 389-400.
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83Du Biez m  shaping the land siege of Boulogne.
Two more weeks of naval demonstrations, including an 
indecisive action off Shoreham in Sussex, accomplished no­
thing further. The great effort which was to have rendered 
Boulogne indefensible by paralysing England ended ignomini- 
ously on the night of August 15 when, under cover of dark­
ness, on the eve of the morrow on which Lisle intended to re-
84engage, D'Annebaut withdrew under full sail for France.
Never, reported Lisle from his flagship, was there a journey
"so costly to France as this has been for so short a voyage,
35nor more shame spoken of amongst themselves." Yet, Eng­
land too had paid a price. D'Annebaut's month of desultory 
sailing had sufficiently distracted Henry as to allow Francis 
to reinforce his army before Boulogne. Word of the French 
build-up in the Boulonnais was sent to Henry on July 6 by 
Poynings, whose staff, in a report prepared for the Council 
in London, recited the garrison's troubles. Plague and the 
bloody flux, stemming from rotted herring supplied during 
Lent and the "corrupt loathsomeness of much barrelled beef,"
83L. & P., XX, pt. 1, NOS. 1263 (p. 628), 1332.
84 It was disease, however, and not Lisle's cannon from 
which the French so precipitously ran. At sea a month, with 
foul water and rancid stores, plague had broken out in the 
quarters below decks. See Froude, History of England, IV, 
399-400.
8^State Papers, I, 820.
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had reduced its numbers by almost three hundred. Men, there­
fore, were in short stock as were munitions, money, and
86fresh provisions. Of equal concern was the attitude of the
Italians in the high town, many of whom had taken offence at
87the appointment of Salerno to be their colonel. In the
end, to ease tensions, some, like the Spaniards, were sent
88from Boulogne into England to guard the south coast.
As if these problems were not enough, the French began
the construction of their fort at Outreau on July 7, and on
the thirteenth, from a vantage point nearer the harbor, their
gunners sunk a supply ship and drove away others which accom- 
89panied her. Poynings was hard pressed to retaliate. Vig­
orous sorties by his light horsemen enabled him to keep the
enemy off balance, but the sickness among his troops and the
dispersal of his mercenaries prevented him from attempting 
to oust the French from Outreau. There, by July 24, construc­
tion of the fort was so well in hand that the English com­
mander felt compelled to ask for reinforcements, five thou­
sand foot and two or three hundred horse, with which to
86L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 1122-23.
87Ibid., No. 796.
88Above, pp. 356-57.
88L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 1130; Spanish Calendar, VIII,
No. 95.
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90drive them off completely.
Had D 1Annebaut not held the Narrow Sea, Poynings' re­
quest would have been honored immediately. The Privy Coun­
cil, sitting in Portsmouth on July 30, commissioned Norfolk's
son, the Earl of Surrey, to lead five thousand infantrymen
91to Boulogne's relief. However, with the French fleet in 
the Dover Straits, the order was rescinded in favor of a 
more ambitious undertaking. Surrey's orders were counter­
manded on August 13, and word was sent to the Duke of Suf­
folk to prepare to cross the Channel with an army, the troops
to be drawn from the thirty-two thousand he commanded as
92Henry's lieutenant of the southern counties.
The aim was to implement the plan as soon as Lisle 
cleared the seas, for news from Boulogne indicated a need 
for haste. On the fifteenth, the day of the seafight at 
Shoreham, Poynings wrote that the French camp around Outreau 
now numbered twenty-one thousand effectives and twelve thou­
sand pioneers, adding that Francis in person was daily ex­
pected out of Abbeville or Montreuil with a supplementary 
force of landsknechts. Further information that for three
90L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 1146, 1160, 1179, 1187, 1197 
1200, 1264.
91Ibid.-, No. 1311.
92Ibid., Nos. 1078, 1081 (33); pt. 2, No. 117.
367
days past Poynings had heen forced to. bed with the bloody
flux was almost as discomforting. The governor trusted to
recover but did not; he died on August 18, leaving orders
for the management of Boulogne until his replacement could
93be had out of England.
The demise of Poynings, if it was a bitter blow, was 
nothing to the shock delivered to the Council on the twenty- 
second. On the evening of that day, as it sat at Woking in 
Surrey, word arrived that Suffolk had died in nearby Guil­
ford, the victim most likely of plague or fever contracted
from infected crews in Portsmouth where earlier he had been
94about the king's business. The duke's army was stayed; 
Surrey was appointed to Poynings' place at Boulogne, and for 
the moment, the hope of disrupting French operations was pin­
ned on a force of German mercenaries engaged to march through 
95France.
The free lances in question were those of the knight, 
Friedrich von Reiffenberg, a native of Sayn in the Westerwald
93State Papers, X, 569, 570, 572,
94L. & P ., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 238, 346, 368; XXI, pt. 1,
No. 131. See also, Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 
to 1550," p. 25. In Gruffyd's estimation, Suffolk, whom he 
describes as "the flower of the captains of the realm," and 
Poynings, referred to as "the best soldier under the king," 
were the most able commanders in Henry's army.
9-5Tbid. , Nos. 225, 496 (8).
96
near Koblenz. In June, having offered Henry twenty ensigns
of infantry and a thousand horse, he was summoned to England
for an interview, for which purpose Philip of Hesse, whose
vassal he was, provided him with letters of commendation and
the promise that the men to be raised might be gathered with-
97in his principality. Reiffenberg's audience with the king
was eminently successful. He was commissioned as a colonel,
and the number of his horse was increased to fifteen hundred
on the understanding that the whole body be mustered and
98
ready to march from Koblenz to Boulogne by August 20. July
24 found Reiffenberg in Antwerp. There, from the hands of
Henry's factor, Stephen Vaughan, the mercenary leader re-
99
ceived £5,500 Flemish in conduct money, a "jocdal" or 
Joachimsthaler for each of his eight thousand footmen, plus 
the usual half-month's pay for his horsemen, their wagons,
96For the highlights of Reiffenberg's career, see 
"Friedrich von Reiffenberg," Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 
ed. R. von Lilliencron, F. X. vo'n Wegele, and A. Bettleheim, 
et al.(56 vols.; Leipzig: Duncker and Humbolt, 1875-1912),
XXVII, 687-89.
97
E *  £  E *  f x x ' p f c * N o ‘ 9 4 7  *
9 8 (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/203, f. 138.
990n October 8 , 1545, by the rate of exchange then cur­
rent the English pound sterling brought 24s. 6d. on the Ant­
werp money market. L. & P.-, XX, pt..' 2, No. 552.
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11 and all other things."
After such a promising start, the operation soon disin­
tegrated. Ralph Vane, Thomas Chamberlain, Francis Hall, and 
Thomas Avery, the English commissioners appointed to oversee 
the musters of Reiffenberg's men, were delayed in Antwerp by 
the late arrival of the king's instructions. Problems in se­
curing safe conveyance for the better than 620,000 to be dis­
tributed among the Germans on the day of muster prevented 
their leaving Antwerp until the end of August, so that it was 
September 2 before they caught up with Reiffenberg in Cologne. 
There, in a long interview lasting until the morning of the 
third, the colonel agreed to march forward from "a place be­
yond the Rhine" on the eleventh, though the commissioners 
were doubtful that, as the contract stipulated, he could 
reach Boulogne in a fortnight, the more so, as at the conclu­
sion of their talk, Reiffenberg was summoned to consult with
loa­the Landgrave in Hesse.
The Englishmen's misgivings were soon realized. From 
Sayn, Reiffenberg reported as he rode into Hesse that three 
hundred of his horsemen and nearly one thousand foot had de­
serted, seduced by the Duke of Brunswick who had received
1 0 0 (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, f. 203. The Joachimsthaler, 
the original "dollar," was valued at something slightly less 
than 2s. 3d. sterling.
101L. &.P., XX, pt. 2, NO. 297.
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8,000 crowns from the French to "miscarry" the soldiers from
102the king of England. Hereafter, calamity followed calam­
ity in rapid succession. In mustering the landsknechts near 
Andernach between September 14 and the twenty-sixth, the com­
missioners found several ensigns under strength. Many of 
the soldiers lacked armor, for which Reiffenberg borrowed 
1,200 crowns and an additional 8,000 crowns to satisfy his 
people and reimburse the country folk for damage done in 
"gathering and eating their grapes."103 The horsemen pre­
sented problems of a different sort: their captains had
over-recruited by several hundred, the which, to preserve 
goodwill, the commissioners were compelled to enroll, "a
page for every twelve horses, besides a baggager or messen-
104ger as they had last year." But the gravest difficulties
were reserved for the march which began under changed orders 
at Andernach on September 26.
The accumulation of French reserves in eastern Picardy 
and an unreliable commissariat had persuaded the Privy Coun­
cil that a passage to Boulogne could not be forced over so 
long a distance without inviting Reiffenberg's destruction. 
New instructions were therefore communicated to the
102Ibid., Nos. 299, 300.
103Ibid., No. 437.
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commissioners on September 19 to the effect that the Germans 
should advance no further into France than Champagne, there 
to annoy the countryside in the hope of drawing the French 
from Outreau. It was an easier assignment, free of the haz­
ards .which the long journey across France would have entailed.
105Reiffenberg, on leaving Andernach, seemed pleased, but by 
this time, from what unfolded in the days ahead, it is ques­
tionable if he planned any honest exploit at all.
Though it had been decided to invade Champagne near 
M^zieres, a garrison town on the western fringe of the Arden­
nes, the commissioners were led off to the north and Aachen,
where Gottfried von Bocholt lay with seven hundred men-at-
106arms and an ensign of foot. On the way, Reiffenberg's
landsknecht companies were filled to the required eight thou-
107sand, and two additional ensigns were allowed the colonel,
so that the whole number of free lances intended for the irrup-
108tion into France exceeded thirteen thousand. Following
105Ibid., Nos. 403, 468.
106Ibid., Nos. 437, 509.
107These two ensigns were mustered with Bocholt1s foot­
men in Aachen on October 3. Ibid., No. 527.
108 In a long letter written by the commissioners to the 
Council on October 17, the German force is described as con­
taining 2,809 horsemen and 10,400 footmen, the monthly charge 
for the whole being 626,950 Flemish, "about 620,212 10s. 
sterling." Ibid., No. 605 (p. 279).
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Bocholt's musters on October 2 and third, the army proceeded 
to Vis^, a village on the Meuse within the Bishopric of Liege 
some four days' distance from the French frontier. Here, al­
most certainly with Reiffenberg's knowledge, the guides hired 
to lead the expedition were bribed, probably, as Gruffyd sug­
gests, by the gentry of Champagne, who, lacking sufficient
strength to guard their frontier, "raised a large sum in
109
crowns" to turn the Germans from their purpose.
For a week, after crossing the Meuse on the seventh, the 
mercenaries wandered aimlessly through Liege, "being led out 
of the straight way" to Florennes, a town below the Sambre 
near Dinant in Luxemburg some thirty miles from Mezieres. It 
proved to be Reiffenberg’s last stop. His men, having con­
sumed their victuals, their pay, and several thousand pounds 
in extra perquisites extorted from the hapless commissioners.
109Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," 
p. 37. There is some question as to who the malefactors were. 
The commissioners initially laid the blame on agents of the 
Bishop of Liege, who anticipated a repeat of the destruction 
caused by Landenberg in 1544. Later letters throw suspicion 
on the emperor and Philip of Hesse. Charles naturally desired 
to avoid giving offense to the French by allowing the mercen­
aries to pass through his countries. On the other hand, dur­
ing Reiffenberg's march to the Meuse the Landgrave was at­
tacked by the Duke of Brunswick and openly solicited the com­
missioners for the men at Rheinbach, on the road to Aachen, 
on September 28. Reports that French agents had infiltrated 
the ranks had, however, been circulating since September 4.
On the whole question, consult the following: L. £ P. , XX,
pt. 2, Nos. 299, 300, 468, .489, 679, 680 (1), 730, 954 (2), 
and Appendix, No. 43 (26).
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refused to move further unless guaranteed an additional 
month's wages. When, on instructions from Henry, it was re­
fused, the unfortunate Englishmen were threatened with irons, 
menaced with death, and finally dragged off in wagons, ob­
taining their release at Ciney in Liege only on November 10 
after full compliance with their jailers* d e m a n d s . A t  a 
cost of over L80,000, the journey which was to have saved 
Boulogne in August had accomplished nothing, while Reiffen- 
berg, his pockets filled double with that which he had 
squeezed from the English and accepted from the French, re­
turned to Hesse and thei service of the Landgrave.
Never, as Thomas Chamberlain complained, had a king's 
money been so evilly used, though Reiffenberg was not alone 
in his nonfeasance. Contemporaneous with Henry's efforts to 
raise levies in the Rhineland, John Dymock, another of the 
English factors in the Low Countries, was sent into North 
Germany, his instructions, to muster and obtain shipping in 
Bremen, Hamburg, or Lubeck for two thousand landsknechts re­
cruited by Peter, the Bastard of Gelders.112 Dymock left
110L. & P., XX, pt, 2, Nos, 587, 605, 636 (1), 680 (1), 
756, 766, 785; CB, M.) Add, MS, 5753, f, 55.
111 Lilliencron, Wegele, Bettleheim,' et al,, eds., 
Ailgemeine Deutsche Biographie, XXVIII, 687.
112 .I have been unable to positively identify this man, 
who appears to have been a prominent leader of mercenaries.
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Antwerp in the first week of July, but before he could reach 
Bremen the mercenaries, impatient at his coming, dispersed. 
Far worse was the decision of the city's governors. They 
could provide no ships, for the emperor had sworn them to neu­
trality, so that Dymock, being daily attended by a horde of
angry soldiers continually "crawing for money," made off to
113Hamburg, the men of war in close pursuit.
The Englishman's reception in Hamburg was no better and
the clamor of the landsknechts no less loud. At Lubeck which
Dymock reached on July 29, the truth revealed itself: the
114entire Hanse had pledged itself to the emperor. No pas­
sage for troops could be had by sea, and though consideration 
was given to sending the men overland to muster with Reiffen- 
berg's bands on the Rhine, that, too, proved impossible. The 
distance to be covered was great, and the whole country be­
tween was alive with enemies, soldiers of the fiercely Catho­
lic Henry of Brunswick, who had initiated a war for the re­
covery of his duchy from the hands of the Schmalkaldic
He may have been the son of Charles of Egmont, last Duke of 
Gelderland, who on dying without legitimate issue in 1538 
left his lands to the Duke of Cleves.




Dymock, whose mission for all good purpose ended in 
Lubeck, returned to Hamburg. He remained there for a month 
on Paget's request, supplying intelligence and living by his 
wits to escape assassination by the Bastard of Gelders, whose 
ravenous landsknechts descended on the unhappy Duchy of West­
phalia. Twice Dymock was apprehended by certain of the sol­
diers sent to solicit funds, and, as he wrote, had he not 
"wrought wisely" would have remained a prisoner "or cost the 
King 18,000 crowns for his release." He would not, he con­
fided in a letter to Ralph Vane, have another such assignment 
for £5,000. "I have been fain," he continued, "to ride with 
forty, thirty, or twenty horsemen at the least, and at this
present hour the lords of Hamburg warn me that there is wait
1X6laid for me in divers places." Vane, having suffered simi­
lar indignities at Landenberg's hands, could readily sympa­
thize, being even then entered upon a new time of troubles 
with Reiffenberg. But of the correspondents, Dymock was the
•̂ •̂ Ibid., No. 342. One of Brunswick's captains was 
Christopher van Pressburg, the same who had fought for Henry 
VIII at Boulogne. This conflict, which cost the English 
king the services of Peter van Gelders, ended with Brunswick's 
capture by the Landgrave of Hesse in October, 1545. For 
particulars see Karl Brandi, The Emperor Charles V, trans.
C. V. Wedgewood (London: Jonathan Cape, 1965), p. 538.
116L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 274.
117luckier by far. He was recalled from Hamburg in August;
Vane's travail, and that of his fellow commissioners, was pro­
longed until November.
^ ^ Ibid. , No. 598. Dymock left Hamburg on October 2.
CHAPTER XI
ALL NATIONS UNDER THE SUN:
THE DEFENCE OF BOULOGNE AND WAR IN SCOTLAND
. . . there were so many depraved, brutish soldiers 
from all nations under the sun— Welsh, English,
Cornish, Irish, Manx, Scots, Spaniards, Gascons, 
Portingals, Italians, Arbannoises, Greeks, Turks,
Tartars, Almains, Germans, Burgundians, Flemings, 
who had come there . . .  to have a good time under 
the king of England, who by nature was too hospit­
able to foreigners.
Elis Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 154 5 
to 1550," pp. 14-15.
Thus far in 1545, circumstances had cheated Henry VIII 
of the services of copious numbers of mercenaries. The em­
peror, because of his policy of non-involvement in the 
Anglo-French war, had forced the demobilization of Da l'Armi's 
Italians. The same monarch's power over the Hanse and the 
Duke of Brunswick's attempt to be revenged upon the Lutherans 
cost the Tudor king the support of Peter van Gelders. And 
lastly, Reiffenberg's duplicity deprived Henry of the largest 
single contingent of free lances it was ever his privilege to 
raise. In these miscarriages, by rough estimate as many as 
twenty-six thousand mercenaries may have been involved. The 
Veronese, Ludovico da Monte, one of the eight captains in 
Da l'Armi's personal following, had anticipated the conscrip­
tion of 10,600 of his countrymen; Reiffenberg's command,
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excluding pioneers, at the time of its defection totalled
13,209; while the Bastard of Gelders' force was reputed at
one point to have contained as many as three thousand.^
Despite these enormous losses which were never made up,
Henry was hardly bereft of foreign troops, though, as his
contract with Reiffenberg stands witness, there were fewer at
Boulogne than he cared to admit. Even so, and allowing for
the Spaniards and Italians who had been removed to England in 
2the spring, over the summer the number of free lances within 
the fortress noticeably increased. The schedule of the sol­
diers and laborers prepared in August for the Council on Poyn­
ings ' death reveals that 737 of the 6,920 effectives were for-
3eigners, most of them deserters out of France, as were the
102 Albanian horsemen and the French company of one Byons,
"a Provencal born, who entered the King's service from being 
,.4a prisoner.'
Larger numbers of mercenaries lay within the Pale, for 
which, unfortunately, no similar schedules are available; but
^Above, pp. 373 ff,
2Above, pp. 357 r .365,
3L. & P., pt. 2, No. 200 (3).
4Ibid., No. 200 (1). Byons, captain of a French galley 
taken off Boulogne, died on August 26, a victim apparently 
of the plague.
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the garrisons there, before D 'Annebaut's blockade, were at
the lowest fifteen thousand- At Guisnes, Hammes, and Calais,
soldiers of all manner of nations had gathered. Some, like
the Spanish light cavalryman, Alfonso Padillo, were sent out
of England, while others, the Albanian, George Moszia di
Napoli, and the Italian, Lodovico Morescotto, among them, came
5from France or through the Low Countries. To Guisnes in 
August, once the French fleet had left the Channel, two hun­
dred Germans and three hundred Spaniards were sent to join an
already considerable garrison of Englishmen, Albanians, and
6Italians, some of the latter provided by Da l'Armi, who de­
spite the loss of his own command continued in his role as 
Henry's envoy-extraordinaire in Venice. Calais, in the same 
season, was home to many foreign units whose officers, if 
their tastes matched those of the English captains, lived 
well.
The latter, by Gruffyd1s account, "took things as mer­
rily as the heart of man could desire." They ate and drank 
of the best, spent their leisure in cards and dice, "each 
one with his oaths, blasphemous in the mouths of people who
5{B. M.) Harl. MS. 2S3, ff. 246, 321; John Roche Dasent, 
Acts of the Privy Council of England. New Series. (32 vols.; 
London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1890-1907), 1, 169. Here­
inafter cited as Acts of the Privy Council.
®(B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, f. 313; Dasent, Acts of the 
Privy Council, 1, 234.
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called themselves Christians, and plenty of shameless whores 
on whom they spent all their own money." Gruffyd's estimate 
of all officers, English or otherwise, was low. Their only 
object was to return home wealthy, "if by no other way, then 
on the wages of their men," who "were compelled to lie in the 
low country" outside the town "where there was great shortage
*7of bread and drink."
In England, meanwhile, the numbers of mercenaries had 
swelled to proportions thus far unheard of in Henry's reign. 
In May and June, the crush of free lances in the southern 
and eastern ports was such that Henry was at a loss as to how 
they might be employed. "My lord," ran a typical letter pen­
ned on the king's behalf to Cobham at Calais, "after most 
hearty commendations I have received your lordship's letter 
in the commendation of John Baptista de Beni da Gobi, and mar­
vel not a little forasmuch as you have been the occasion of 
the sending hither of so many [free lances] as are already 
come over, with the which we are here all wearied." If any 
more, the writer continues, are sent to England, "we will not
gfail hereafter to send as fast back to you again."
That letter of June 6 had its counterpart in another 
sent to Cobham on July 12:
^Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550, p. 27.
8 (B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, f. 305.
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After my right hearty commendations . . . the 
same shall understand that the King's Majesty, hath 
received my lordship's letters and advisements 
which his Highness taketh in very thankful part.
And where his Majesty perceiveth that my Lord Poyn­
ings hath by his letters required you to stay 
there such horsemen as shall arrive to serve his 
Majesty, his highness being pleased therewith prays 
your Lordship to do the same and with the advice of 
my Lord Grey* and others of the council [at Calais] 
to employ them in his Majesty's service there until 
you shall be advertised when his Majesty shall fur­
ther determine, and to place them for the time as 
you shall think convenient, praying you to adver­
tise the names of horsemen which be already arrived, 
and likewise to continue the same as they shall
from time to time arrive accordingly.10
The names of many of the mercenaries retained in England 
appear in the financial account of Sir Thomas Chaloner, a 
Clerk of the Privy Council, employed in the summer of 1545 
as a courier of funds to various persons, "strangers and 
others," engaged for Hertford's army in the north. In May 
and June, he dispensed prests, conduct money, or wages to no 
fewer than ten units,^ Albanian, Clevelander, German, Ital­
ian, and Spanish. Some consisted of no more than a captain 
and two or three followers, as, for example, the bands sup­
plied by the Italians, Nicholas Tooso and Antonio de Sancta
®Lord William Grey of Wilton, commander of Guisnes. 
1 0 (B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, f. 317.
^ T h a t  is the number which, from the dates supplied in 
the manuscript, can be positively identified as having come 
into England in the late spring of early summer of 1545. 
There were almost certainly others.
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Cecilia, each of whom were taken into wages on May 1 with 
three horsemen apiece.^ A few soldiers, like the Spaniards, 
Don Andreas Cacillo and Pedro Michaele, were enlisted individ­
ually; but larger contingents, with full compliments of of­
ficers, were not unusual, the most formidable being the three
companies of German lancers brought over from Calais by Cap-
13tains Matthew Lightmaker, Peter Hoen, and Vollard van der
Lughe. Hoen's squadron, which on June 12 attained a strength
of nearly two hundred, had attached to it a lieutenant, a
standard-bearer, three file leaders, a musterclerk, a quarter-
14master, two furriers, and a trumpeter.
Chaloner's entries reveal something of stradiot organi­
zation. In the two Albanian squadrons paid by him for the 
period ending May 30, a primitive chain of command not unlike 
that which existed in English companies can be detected.
Three officers are mentioned: a captain; his assistant, a
(P. r. o.) E 351/43, mems. 4, 6. This document, com­
prised of thirteen menbranes, covers the period from May,
1545, until February, 1550, during which time Chaloner was 
active in supplying mercenaries with funds. It contains a 
wealth of information and would of its own warrant a sepa­
rate study.
13Matthew Lightmaker was the brother of Thomas, who was 
still in wages at Calais.
1 4 (P. R. 0.) E 351/43, mem. 8 .
PLEASE NOTE:




15"petty-captain" or lieutenant; and under him an ensign.
By way of contrast, the ultimate in military organization
was provided by the infantry company of the Italian captain,
16Muscovito, whose 160-man unit showed a lieutenant, alfiere,
sergeant, seven caporalles, musterclerk, two quartermasters,
17three drumers, and a fifer.
Altogether, that summer perhaps a thousand mercenaries
were financially serviced by Chaloner, whose funds, amounting
to thousands of pounds, were received from the hands of the
various Treasurers of the Augmentations, First Fruits and
18Tenths, Exchequer, and Mint. Henry, therefore, at this
juncture had in England between two and three thousand free
lances; for Hertford had at least an equal amount in North- 
19umberland, and several hundred Italians and Spaniards lay
15Ibid., mem. 7. These officers respectively were paid 
at the rate of B15, £7 10s., and £6 6s. per month. The ordi­
nary trooper received 50s. The two captains were Theodore 
Luchisi and Antonio Stesino, the latter being the first of 
that nation recorded in English service. (P. R. 0.) S. P. 
1/198, f. 48. Both had come from Calais, Luchisi with 
forty-seven horsemen, Stesino with fifty-two.
16An ensign or standard-bearer.
1 7 (P. R. 0.) E 351/43, mem. 4.
1 8On the functions of these insitutions, the principal 
governmental agencies in Henry's reign for the collection 
and administration of royal revenues, see Glossary.
19Gamboa's Spanish "regiment" contained about eight hun­
dred men.
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in garrisons in Essex and Kent.
The campaign in southern Scotland, as always, was brief 
and bloody. In two weeks of raiding and burning, the dis­
honor of Ancrum Moor was expunged with a vengence. Having 
drawn his "strangers" towards the border, Hertford advanced 
through Roxburgh on Kelso, which town was reached in Septem­
ber 9. His Spanish arquebusiers drew his praise for their 
assault upon the abbey which, with the rest of the town, 
was taken after a bitterly contested fire-fight on the tenth. 
In the days following, Melrose, Dryburgh, their abbeys, and 
near a score of lesser settlements were incinerated, so that 
Hertford could write that, excepting his own late journey to
Edinburgh, as much hurt had not been done in Scotland for a
20hundred years.
From Kelso, the army moved unopposed on Jedburgh. On 
the sixteenth, while Hertford razed that town and the country 
around, fifteen hundred light horsemen, the Albanian contin­
gents assuredly among them, carried the conflagration six or 
seven miles further. That same afternoon, with their supplies
dwindling, the raiders turned back towards Northumberland,
21burning their way through the Merse until they came to
20L.\& P., XX, pt. 2,. Nos. 169, 205, 216, 308, 317, 359.
2-*-The Merse was the "march" or southern borderland of 
the Scottish county of Berwick.
•t
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Norham. There, on English ground, on September 23, the army 
was dissolved. The damage that had been inflicted on the 
Scots was now, in Hertford's judgement, twice that which had 
been accomplished in 1544; for as the conquering earl had an­
ticipated, his attack had coincided with the end of the Scot­
tish harvest. Assuredly, he informed London, "there is burnt 
a wonderful deal of corn . . . for they had done much of 
their harvest" which his soldiers had found "in stacks about 
their houses or had it lying in shocks in the field." Scot­
land's eastern marches, he was sure, had been wasted; the
22
nation was powerless to molest England.
It only remained to cement the victory by making some 
"good exploit" in the Scottish west marches, through which 
Henry felt his beaten foe might seek to enter England. Ac­
cordingly, Hertford arranged the siezure of Carlaverock Cas­
tle, property of Lord Robert Maxwell, prisoner in England 
since his capture at Solway Moss in 1542. The fortress, 
which stood at the mouth of the River Nith, was within easy 
reach of Dumfries, the likeliest stronghold from which any 
Scottish offensive might originate. Though there are no re­
cords of the enterprise, Carlaverock was taken, delivered,
22L. & P ., XX, pt. 2,. Nos. 323,-328, 400. Hertford, in 
his dispatches to the Council, boasted of destroying no 
fewer than seven monasteries and over 240 villages and towns. 
His record of the places "brent, razed, and cast down" is 
calendared in Ibid., No. 456.
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it would seem, to Lord Maxwell/ who for the purpose was re-
23
leased on bond from his cell in Pomfret.
Once in this assured Scot's hands, an English garrison 
was almost certainly placed within Carlaverock, and immedi­
ately the castle was besieged. From this result, some thought 
was given to raising an expedition for its relief. Gamboa, 
who with his Spaniards had returned to Newcastle, was peti­
tioned to provide two hundred mounted hackbutters; but as the 
weather turned foul, and the castle stood "in a great strength
of creeks and moss," the whole idea was discarded, and Car-
24laverock was retaken on November 2.
Another plan involving Hertford's free lances was devised
25soon after by Sir Thomas Wharton, Warden of Henry's western 
marches. About this enterprise nothing is known, except that 
for an exploit to be done in Scotland a thousand northern 
"prickers" and Gamboa's two hundred cavalrymen were ordered 
to be in Carlisle by November 20. Besides the Spanish horse 
soldiers, Gamboa was asked as well for the whole power of his 
infantry which had increased to over one thousand, while at 
the Privy Council's request, Bishop Tunstall was instructed 
to send back to the borders the Clevelander and German
2^Ibid., Preface, xxii-iii.
24Ibid.# xiii-iv; Nos. 685, 700.
25Wharton, in the same capacity, had commanded the Eng­
lish borderers at Solway Moss.
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men-at-arms, who were to have been lodged for the winter in
. , 26 York.
Perhaps, like the aborted march on Carlaverock, Wharton's 
mission was set aside; but if some feat was attempted, it was 
accomplished by December, at the beginning of which month, 
with the onset of winter, the mercenaries were placed in gar­
risons, three hundred Clevelanders at Norham and Wark, the 
bulk of the Spaniards at Berwick and Carlisle, with some few
27at Alnwick, Workworth, Bamburgh, and the "villages abowtes."
However, not all the free lances remained in the north. Some
like the Albanians and certain other horsemen, were dispatched
"homeward" after Hertford's return from the Merse. This, too,
was the fate of the Italian companies of Muscovito and Mor-
gante Mansron, who "for the avoiding of his further clamors,"
was advanced £25 by Chaloner in partial payment of a greater
28sum he claimed as due.
By this late date, as well from the changed situation in 
France as from Hertford's disbandments, mercenary strength in 
England had fallen considerably. Boulogne, after some
^Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council, I, 269-70.
9*7
‘Ibid., 269-70. The majority of the German men-at-arms 
were likewise retained in the north, but precisely where I 
have been unable to ascertain. See ibid., 298.
28Ibid., 262, 279; L. & P., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 572, 621;
E 351/43, mem. 9.
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heart-stopping moments, had survived the French offensive
which had been sprung in earnest in September with a bold
attack upon the Terre d'Oye, the low and boggy plash-land
which, within the Pale, lay between Calais and Gravelines.
The object of the assault was three-fold: to surprise
Guisnes, destroy whatever supplies lay stored in the Pale,
and prevent the reinforcement of Boulogne from Calais.
The raid, led by Du Biez, was meticulously planned.
Entering the land of Oye through the unprotected frontier
with the Netherlands, the French, with twenty thousand men,
broke suddenly into the Calesian parish of Olderwick, whose
English defenders in their confusion were slain almost to a
man. Near the township of Oye, along the downs from Calais,
Lord Cobham offered battle, Du Biez having "pitched a strong
camp" there on the twenty-first, his footmen flanked on
either side by cavalry, a hackbutter between each horseman
and a large body of Dutch curassiers "trained in the use of
29guns and lances." To oppose this array Cobham mustered 
eight thousand Englishmen, among them "many callow boys" and 
"senseless" captains, twenty-five hundred foreign horse
^Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," 
pp. 29-31. Gruffyd misdates this campaign, placing it a 
month later in October.
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soldiers, and more than six thousand mercenary footmen.
The fight, as described by Gruffyd, was opened by the
English, whose "prickers" rode out to skirmish and to attempt
to lure the enemy into breaking ranks; but as the tactic
failed, the English heavy cavalry were called upon to charge.
What happened next is dramatically told by Gruffydj
As soon as the English advanced and some of them 
broke their lances they expected the foreign horse­
men to support them, but they did not move a foot, 
so the English had to retreat. As soon as the 
footmen saw the horsemen doing nothing but stands 
ing in order, although the light horsemen were 
running back from the French, who were trampling 
the earth and looking daggers at the footmen, they 
began to move back, each one getting in the way of 
the other, the horsemen pushing the footmen into 
the ditches, and the footmen doing the same to the 
horsemen. By this time night was falling, and the 
English army returned to Calais, leaving the French 
to do what they would . . . .31
The battle of Oye, fought on September 21, showed Henry’s 
mercenaries for yet another time in a bad light. Nonetheless, 
Gruffyd*s harshest criticisms were reserved for his English 
superiors and the French, the former for their timidity in 
refusing to counterattack, the latter for their caution in 
failing to follow up their victory. Had, in fact, the French 
advanced on Calais, they would have found it defenceless; 
for Cobham and his council had shut themselves safe within,
30ibid., p. 31. Gruffyd identifies them as "Saxons, 
Cleves, Almains, and Italians,"
31Ibid.
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leaving his spiritless army spread in total disarray over
32more than a mile of^alesian countryside. The French, mean­
while, after a few more days of burning at their leisure, re­
tired to Le Portel, soaked by rains which, by rendering their 
cavalry useless, had deprived them of their major objective, . 
Guisnes.
It was left to Cobham to report to Henry the damage done 
in Oye. By the governor's account, contrived at, says 
Gruffyd, "by means of letters" to his friends on the Council, 
he persuaded the king "that not more than a hundred English­
men had been killed as against more than two hundred French," 
and that Du Biez "had not done more than a thousand marks 
worth of damage. This was one of the worse lies the Council 
ever made the king believe," for the damage to the Pale was
extensive. By Gruffyd's reckoning, which in general terms
33bears close resemblence to the French version, three 
Calesian parishes had been razed, along with five hundred 
dwellings, and "seven farms, the poorest of which was worth 
&7,000." In addition, the English had lost uncounted hun­
dreds of dead, whose bodies, by the Welshman's grim report, 
lay unburied "with dogs and wolves and birds gnawing them for
32Ibid., pp. 32-33.
33See Du Bellay, Memoires, pp. 252 ff.
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34six weeks,-”
An interesting letter composed a week after the battle
at Oye seems to substantiate Gruffyd1s charges against Cobham,
Its authors were Italians, five captains whom the Deputy pre-
vailed upon to write to the Council on his behalf, explaining
the reasons for his defeat and alluding to the little '‘hurt”
35done by Du Biez. The whole blame for the overthrow was 
thrust by these correspondents, who themselves had partici— 
pated in the fight, upon the Clevelanders, who, they alleged, 
had triggered the retreat by fleeing to Calais when called 
upon to succour Cobham's infantry. It is a plausible story, 
except that the writers themselves were cavalrymen, attached 
to the company of gentlemen provided by Ludovico da l'Armi; 
and it was the entire body of foreign horsemen which Gruffyd 
accused of disobedience. If the Welshman's evidence is ac­
cepted at face value, what likely happened here was a double 
cover-up, the Italians concealing Cobham's guilt which favor 
was returned in kind.
That the deputy should have chosen men of that nation to 
aid him in this subterfuge is, again, explained by Gruffyd.
34Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," 
pp. 30, 35—36.
35L. & T ., XX, pt. 2, No. 464, The names of the cap­
tains were aF follows; Hyppolito Pallavicino, Piacenza; 
Bartholomew Morehi, Modena; Antonio Gramegna, Bologna; Jacomo 
de Zabarelli; and Alisandro Marengo.
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Earlier in his chronicle, when reporting the wild doings of
the mercenaries in the spring, he flatly states that of all
the foreigners in Cobham's service none were more in favor
36than the Italians. If this, then, was the case, and if the 
Clevelanders were not alone in their waywardness, it is not 
too highly fetched to assume that to clear themselves of 
wrongdoing, which they did in their letter, the Italians 
would have been more than willing to retain their commander's 
good will be writing in his defence. Besides, as Gruffyd 
further reveals, the Italians at Calais had additional incen­
tive to protect their honor, since it had been one of their
nation, a certain Bartholomew, who had spied out the way for
. . . 37 Du Biez's entry into Oye.
Whatever the real cause of the disaster in the Pale, it
was the Clevelanders, or at least a part of them, who paid
for the defeat. On October 8 , following an investigation by
3®Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," 
p. 15.
37Ibid., 25-27, 28-29. The Bartholomew here in question 
is almost certainly Bartholomew de Ceres (or Kers), a Pied­
montese captain, who served at Guisnes during the winter of 
1544 and was later, in the summer of 154 5, transferred to 
some post within the March of Oye. That he was under suspic- 
iom by the Council at Calais and that he deserted to the 
French can be gleaned from the following notices: Dasent, 
Acts of the Privy Council, I, 171-72, 198, 204-05, 216;
L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 296, 567. He was slain "to avenge 
thei honor of the Italian soldiers" early in 1546 at Lyons by 
four Florentine gentlemen who had lately served Henry in the 
same theater.
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the Council at Calais, the Privy Council from Windsor ordered
the cashiering of Thomas Lightmaker and his band. It proved
an easier injunction to issue than to execute, since there
erupted the inevitable dispute over severance pay. Light-
38maker, who had contracted for five hundred horsemen, had 
provided more, and the "overplusage" at their dismissal de­
manded an Abzug of fifty days. The amount was considered 
exhorbidant by the English, whose answer to the Dutch cap­
tain was that, even had his men come from the farthest corner 
of Germany, they could return in much less time. But the 
Clevelanders stuck to their price until, during the second
week of November, the Privy Council authorized Cobham to
39offer them forty days for their Abzug. This was apparently
the sum agreed upon, as hereafter they are heard from no more.
At Boulogne, meanwhile, French plans which had held out
such promise for success in August had gone miserably awry.
Francis I had proposed a grand campaign: it was to have been
he in person who led the attack on the Terre d ’Oye, he who
held the Calais marches in subjection, while a smaller force
40from Outreau starved out the English in Boulogne. But bad
*50'*°0ne hundred of these men-at-arms had been sent over to 
Hertford in Northumberland.
3 9 (B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, f. 332.
40Du Bellay, Mempires/ XXI, 210.
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luck and plague had forced the king to resign his command to 
Du Biez, for at Forest Montier, a hunting lodge to which Fran­
cis advanced to be nearer his army at Outreau, his son, the 
Duke of Orleans, was siezed by a pestilential fever and died.
This young prince's death, which occurred on September 
8 , rendered useless the main clauses of the Treaty of Crepy, 
drove Francis from the field in grief and terror of conta­
gion, and left Du Biez to carry on as best he could a war 
which neither side, it was now apparent, was likely to win.
The marshal's success in the Terre d'Oye was easily offset 
by the inadequacy of his arrangements at Outreau. His fort, 
built to the specifications of an Italian engineer, Antonio 
Melloni, was so far distant from Boulogne that Paget, who 
viewed it from the English lines in December, assured his 
fellow Secretary of State, Sir William Petre, that it could 
do "no hurt in the world." The stronghold showed proudly, 
wrote Paget, but from his vantage on the battlements of 
Boulogne, he could scarcely determine a white horse from a
black, and Outreau's guns were "only troublesome for the 
41noise."
Fort d'Outreau suffered a graver disadvantage; it was 
too small. Intended to house a permanent garrison of be­
tween three thousand and four thousand, it was when completed
_  _
L.: £  P., XX, pt. 2, No. 919.
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barely able to hold five hundred. Mellon! had paced off the
42wrong measurements. Still, Outreau could not entirely be 
scoffed at. Its gunners were not wholly ineffective, as is 
proved by the rash of stone defence-works that were thrown up 
around Boulogne to protect the harbor and the Basse Ville's 
southern exposure which lay directly in the Frenchmen's line 
of fire. In July, Henry's engineer, John Rogers, began con­
struction of the Citadel, a stone bulwark in the southwest
corner of the town to which was attached a pier to shield
43ships in the haven. On September 8 , just as Surrey entered
upon his brief tenure as Governor of Boulogne, resolution was
taken in the Council for the building of jetty or mole to
cover the above mentioned pier which, when finally completed
was described as sufficient even at high tide to "defend all
of the ships entering the port in such a way that the French
44gunfire is unable to harm them."
Surrey's appointment, coinciding as it did with Du Biez's 
preparations for his descent into the Terre d'Oye, was marked 
by a sharp increase in hostile contact. The young earl, a 
soldier and a poet, did not lack courage, but he was "a
42Du Bellay, Memoires, XXI, 240-42.
43L. & P ., XX, pt. 1, No. 1160.
44Ibid., pt. 2, No. 323; Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor 
Military Engineer, pp. 70-71.
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dangerous neurotic," swollen with an over-high regard of. his
own martial abilities, a dangerous war-hawk who had gained
the king's ear only because wiser councils were at last in-
45dining towards peace. The cost of the war was stupendous. 
"This year and last," lamented Wriothesley to the Council 
on September 14, "the king has spent about £1,300,000, his 
subsidy and benevolence ministering scant £300,000; and the 
lands [from the dissolution of the monasteries] being con­
sumed and the plate of the realm molten and coined, I lament 
the danger of the time to come." A new loan had been made 
in Flanders; the scarcity of corn had driven up wheat to 20s. 
a quarter, and yet, bemoaned the Chancellor, "you write to 
me 'Still pay, pay, prepare for this and for that.*" "1 am 
at my wit's end," Wriothesley wrote again in November, "how 
to shift for the next three months:" £24,000 alone was 
owed at Boulogne; £11,000 had been dispatched to the garrison 
against Scotland; the Augmentations had not the wherewithal 
to pay the Italian brokerage firm of Bonvisi; the coffers 
of First Fruits and Tenths were nearly empty; the Exchequer
could not release any more funds until February; and the
46Court of General Surveyors was in such financial straits
45For a brief and lucid assessment of Surrey, see Smith,
Henry Vllly- the Mask of Royalty, pp. 243-45.
46Glossary.
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that when its creditors had been satisfied no more than
47£5,000 or £6,000 was expected.
Norfolk and the chiefs of the Council were aching for
peace, but were afraid to press for it. Hot-bloods like 
Surrey were, for the moment, in vogue with the grossly pos­
turing king, who lectured Chapuys' replacement as Imperial
ambassador, Francis van der Delft, on the virtue of honor 
among sovereigns, and bluntly informed the new envoy that
s ince he had won Boulogne at sword's point he meant to keep 
48it. Norfolk, who knew too well from experience how quickly
Ihis sovereign's favor might be lost, tried to caution his son.
Writing Surrey in late September, the old Duke rebuked the
earl for animating "the King too much for the keeping of
Boulogne," adding the warning that "who so doth at length
49shall get small thank." It was an omen which the younger
50Howard in his pride ignored. No amount of fatherly scolding 
could turn Surrey from his purpose. The bellicose earl 
played Belisarius to Henry's Justinian, the aging monarch vi­
cariously basking in the sometimes foolish feats of his
47L. £ P . ,  XX, pt. 2, Nos. 366, 769.
4^Spanish calendar, VIII, No. 140 (p. 251).
4®Nott). The Works of Henry Howard, I, 178. Van der 
Delft, who had joined Chapuys at Boulogne during the siege in 
1544, came :to England in January, 1545.
50See L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 738.
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lieutenant,^ who delighted the king by inviting him to
Boulogne to see "the willingness of his men" and how easy it
52was to set the French on the run.
A different face, however, was revealed in defeat.
Early in the new year, Surrey met with a reverse that was to 
loom large in his fall from grace and eventual ruin. On Jan­
uary 7, 1546, a French convoy laden with provisions from Mon- 
treuil and escorted by five thousand landsknechts was set upon 
by the earl and a smaller contingent as it approached Outreau. 
The English horse, in a magnificent charge, drove the French 
cavalry back on the carriages of which ninety were destroyed; 
but the English and :italian foot, commanded by Surrey, pan­
icked by the superior numbers or fire power of their adversar-. 
ies, abandoned the field. Strategically, the action was a 
success in that the resupplying of Outreau had been prevented.
Yet, by the chivalric standards of the age, it was an utter
53disaster: twenty-two English gentlemen died along with
four Italian captains, and a number of standards were taken.
^Surrey was reported to the Council by an Italian cap­
tain, Giovanni Thomaso, for recklessly exposing himself to 
French gunfire, for which offence the ;earl was reprimanded 
by the king. Ibid.
^Nott, The Works of Henry Howard, I, 181.
53This is the figure given by Gruffyd, "Boulogne and 
Calais from 1545 to 1550,". pp. 41-42. L. & P., XXI, pt. 1,
No. 33, gives the smaller number of fourteen.
\
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In his agitation, Surrey called on his surviving officers
54"to stick their swords through his guts" to end his shame, 
though any feelings of personal responsibility soon passed. 
That night, within the safety of Boulogne, courts-martial were 
held, and next morning a captain and two or three of the rank- 
and-file who had returned from the carnage were hanged, "more 
for telling the truth . . . than .'for anything they had done 
against the king." It had been Surrey in his "unreasoning 
bravery" who had caused the overthrow by attempting the impos­
sible. His footmen, many of them inexperienced recruits who 
had been fed on stale rations and driven to the fight with 
beatings and curses, had been outnumbered by the Germans 
nearly three to one. But rank had its privilege. Unwilling 
to admit to any fault, Surrey made the wretched common sol­
diers his scapegoats: "We assure your Majesty," he wrote
through his council to the king, "there was no default in the 
rulers, nor lack of courage to be given them, but a humor 
that sometime reigneth in Englishmen."
While this excuse was momentarily accepted, news of the 
reverse was not well received by Henry. Paget could write, 
as he did to Surrey on the eighteenth, that the king, his
54Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,"
p. 42.
55State Papers, XI, 3.'
majesty, "like a prince of wisdom," knew that whosoever
5 6played at games of chance "must sometimes lose." Yet, such 
was Henry's concern for the safety of Boulogne that, even be­
fore the Principal Secretary's soothing words had been penned, 
order had been taken to dispatch Hertford across the Channel 
to assess the real extent of the damage and to send with him
certain of Gamboa's Spaniards to make up, at least in part,
57for the casualties suffered on the seventh. Surrey would 
be superseded by Hertford in March; he was arrested for trea­
son in December; and on January 19, 1547, having been found 
guilty, he was executed.
Surrey did not die for his disgrace at Boulogne, but
rather for pride. Specifically, he dared to quarter his own
58arms with those of Edward the Confessor, thereby flaunting
for all to see a claim to the throne equal, if not superior,
to that of the Tudors themselves. This is not the place to
list the sins of the house of Howard; they are better examined 
59elsewhere. But what had driven the unstable earl to such
56L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, No. 81.
^Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council, I, 314; Spanish 
Calendar, VIII, No. 186.
^Anglo-Saxon king of England (1042-1066) from whom the 
Howards claimed descent.
59Froude, History of Erigland, IV, 465-7.7, gives.. a de­
tailed account. See also, Smith, Henry' VIII, the Mask of 
Royalty, pp. 442 ff.
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mad action was in part his unreasoned hatred of Hertford, with
whom he had been competing for some years for Henry's favor
and whom in addition he viewed as a parvenu, a commoner raised
to the nobility through the union of the king to his third
60queen, Hertford's sister, Jane Seymour.
Jealous of his rival, Surrey returned to England in a 
choler of spite and malice. Unable and unwilling to curb his 
tongue, he publicly slandered many about the court. In an ef­
fort to supplant Hertford in Henry's eyes, he stooped so low
SIas to suggest to his sister, the widowed Duchess of Richmond,
that she offer herself as royal concubine. Harsh words and
open threats against Hertford netted him a few weeks of close
62confinement in Windsor Castle in July, but worst of all,
63Surrey privately projected the death of the krng. In con­
versation with his friend, George Blagge, a gentlemen of the
Edward Seymour was created Viscount Beauchamp in June, 
1536, a week after the royal marriage. A year later, on the 
birth of his nephew, the future Edward VI, he was made Earl 
of Hertford.
^Mary Howard had been the wife of Henry Fitzroy, the 
king's illegitamate son by his mistress, Elizabeth Blount. 
Born in 1519, the boy had been vested with the Dukedom of 
Richmond in 1525.
Nott,. The Works of Henry Howard, I, lxxxvii-viii.
®^To "imagine" the king's, death was in itself treason, 
as defined in the act of 1534. 26 Henry VIII, c. 13;' Stat­
utes of the Realm, III, 508-09.
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Privy Chamber, the earl gave it as his considered opinion 
that should Henry die Norfolk, his father, was the "meetest" 
man to control the regency'.
It was the younger Howard's heraldic presumption, how­
ever, which brought him to grief. Unable to win back the 
king's affection or wean the monarch from his growing depend­
ence upon Hertford, the artless Surrey in his pique resorted 
to the childish act of emblazoning the escutcheons of his 
palace with the leopards of England and the arms of the 
saintly King Edward.65 Cast into the Tower on December 12, 
he was tried at the Guildhall on January 13 and beheaded six 
days later on Tower Hill.
In returning to the French war which by this late date 
had officially ended some six months before, there is much to 
relate, especially as effecting the employment of mercenaries. 
The winter in France of 1545/6, except for Surrey's zealous
efforts to beat the enemy single-handed, had witnessed a num-
66ber of "cassings," usual in armies of that age and in that 
season when large-scale military operations were most diffi­
cult to carry out. Within the Pale, which after Du Biez's
For several of the more damaging depositions against 
Surrey, see L. & P., XXI, pt. 2, No. 555 (pp. 283-89).
65Ibid., (7, i, ii).
^®The word used in the sense of "to pay off" or "cashier."
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escapade soon returned to normal, the cashierings began in
November with the dismissal of Lightmaker*s Clevelanders who,
as was noted above, would have been discharged earlier but
for the dispute over their last month's wages. Certain of
the Italian's band provided out of the Venetian Republic by
Ludovico da I'Armi and stationed at Guisnes were released at
the same time, and on December 2 the Council in England au~
thorized the abrogation of the services of one "Joste Clautz,
67Almain," and his ensign of four hundred landsknechts.
On the whole, however, the termination of contracts, 
both within the Pale and at Boulogne, was kept to a minimum. 
If anything, the numbers of foreigners under arms in the Eng­
lish garrisons in France increased, for Du Biez's raid had
./
had a chastening effect. Besides, as experience was begin­
ning to teach, it was cheaper to keep mercenaries through 
the winter than to release them and seek to hire replace­
ments in the spring. This, at any rate, was Paget's observa­
tion; if, he explained to the Council in December, "the King 
will next year use no Italian horsemen, it were well to cass 
them, which- cost B523 monthly? but, if he will use Italian 
horsemen, it is to be considered that the enemies will begin 
to stir in March, and the men must have one month-'s wages
6 7 CB, M.) Harl. MS. 283, f. 207; Dasent, Acts off the 
Privy- Council, r, 279.
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for their departure home and six weeks' wages for their re-
turn to service."
New recruits appeared everywhere, at Calais, in the Pale,
and at Boulogne, the latter establishment attracting Albanians
in such quantity that it was deemed necessary to appoint one
of their number, the "Cavalier" Thomaso Bua, as their colonel.
One hundred Spanish horsemen, recruited by Gamboa in Flanders,
were placed in Calais, while another company, under Gamboa.'s
70subordinate, Carlos de Navarro, were allowed at Boulogne. 
Italians, too, figured prominently in the hirings. On Febru­
ary 21, Amerigo Antenori received appointment "to serve above 
Mark in the Marches of Calais" with two hundred of his country­
men, and Surrey's Italian colonel, Giovanni de Salerno, was ■
permitted several new captains to make up, no doubt, for the
71four who had fallen in the engagement on January 7.
68L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 997.
6 Q ^Bua, a stradiot emigre who resided in the Venetian
Republic, was possibly of Greek extraction. He is mentioned
as being a colonel as early as January 20, 1547, though his
commission was not signed until sometime in February. Dasent,
Acts of the Privy Council, I, 318; L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, No.
301 (45). Sathas, Documents1 inedits, IV, lix, gives him the
name of Thomas l'Argien, signifying the area of Greece from
which he supposedly eminated, and describes his as the leader
of "550 Peloponnesians."
70Dasent, Acts of the Privy. Council, I, 326; L. & P.,
XXI, pt. 1, No. 205.
7Ispanlsh Calendar,: VIII, No. 184.
Most of the increase in France among Henry's free lances
came not, however, from new signings, but through transfers
from England. The French and Scottish threats having been
effectively dealt with, and the Council's intelligence al-
72ready pointing towards a spring attack on Boulogne, the 
larger part of those men of war shuttled into the kingdom 
from Calais in 1545 were sent back, their reassignment timed 
to coincide with Hertford's appointment as the king's Lieu­
tenant and Commander-in-Chief of the army and armada sent in 
March "in the parts beyond the sea."73 Hertford's main force 
of five thousand or six thousand Englishmen crossed to Calais 
on March 22. Already, the general had been preceded by the 
bulk of the mercenaries that had served under him in North­
umberland. Two Albanian captains, Antonio Stesino and Nicho­
las Cresia, survivors of the winter "cassings" in England, 
were admitted in January with fifty horsemen apiece to Bua's 
command at Boulogne. In the same month, Cobham received five 
hundred Clevelanders out of Dover, while in February the
Mayor of Newcastle provided shipping bound also for the Pale
74for fifteen hundred of Gamboa's footmen.
Some idea of the total strength of the land forces under
72L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 250, 262.
73Ibid., Nos. 431, 4 49; Spanish' Calendar, VIII, No. 223. 
7^Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council, I, 315, 316, 322.
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Hertford in France is provided by Paget. In a letter to
Christopher Mont drafted a month before the earl's departure,
the Principal Secretary divulged that Seymour's effectives
75would amount to thirty thousand: sixteen thousand English­
men, two thousand Spaniards, two thousand Italians, four
7 6thousand unidentified horsemen, and six thousand German
landsknechts, who even then, as Paget was writing, were being
levied in Low Germany by their leader, a native of Saxony and
77denizen Hamburg, Colonel Conrad Pennink.
Paget's estimate of the size of Pennink's regiment was
exaggerated by a half. The commission, which this highly
respected old war-chief had been extended at Hampton Court on
January 23, called for the raising of three thousand rather
78than six thousand landsknechts, the mustering of whom was
?5State Papers, X, 60. Though it is by no means clear, 
Paget's figure would seem to have been meant to include as 
well the soldiers in the garrisons at Calais, Hammes,
Guisnes, and Boulogne.
76Definitely among them were many foreigners, as for 
example Bua's Albanians, Gamboa's mounted arquebusiers, the 
German men-at-arms transferred from England, and the Italian 
troopers of Ludovica da I'Armi.
7 7For notices on this man's career, see .the unsigned 
article, "Der Oberst Cort Pennink,tr Zeitschrift des Vereines 
fur hamburgische Geschichte, V (1886)'," 32 V45V Hereinafter 
cited as "Obersf Cort Pennink."
& P,, XXI, pt, 1, No. 112 Cl, 21. For the original 
contract, see CP. R. 0,1 S. P. 1/213, ff, 151-52, which gives 
the number to be raised as four thousand,
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completed within, of all places, the cloistered confines of
the convent of Elten near Emmerich on the Rhine in the final
days of March. Surprisingly, though the men were staunch
Lutherans, no outrages were committed. If anything, the
landsknechts' conduct was exemplary. The Mother Superior
was made a gift of 200 gelders; smaller gifts of money were
made to the incredulous peasants who lived about the nunnery;
79and no untoward incidents of any kind were reported. Henry 
VIII had found a foreign officer whom he could trust implic­
itly; but equally amazing was the assistance tendered by the 
Imperialists, who with a minimum of foot-dragging allowed the 
soldiers to pass through the Low Countries.
The emperor’s change in heart stemmed, naturally, from 
a change in his politics. The death of the Duke of Orleans,
whose marriage to an Imperial princess was to have cemented
, 80the Treaty of Crepy, absolved Charles from all obligations
L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 473, 474, 531, 533. The ex­
act number of men, "elect personages and old landsknechts, 
armed and weaponed accordingly as it is convenanted," was 
given by the English Commissioners of the Musters as 2,9 83. 
The commissioners in this instance were John Brende of 
Beccles in Suffolk, and John Brigandine, step-son of Lord 
Edward North, Chancellor of the Court of Augmentations.
Both were experienced in military affairs, Brende as a plan­
ner and surveyor of fortifications, Brigandine as ari officer 
and veteran of the Scottish raids in 1545. This author is 
indebted for much of this information to Professor S. T. 
Bindoff and his staff on the History of Parliament Trust.
^^Above, p. 319, n. 80.
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to placate the French. He had lost a potential son-in-law, 
but from the Hapsburg point of view it "was no bad thing for 
him." The Netherlands were left intact, and there was no 
longer any doubt that Milan would go to Spain. More immedi­
ately, the declining state of the French king's health, the 
exhausted condition of the latter's kingdom, together with 
the burden of the war against England, insured the emperor of 
a free hand in seeking to solve the problem which had 
weighed most heavily on his own mind the past few years.
Charles had resolved to fight the Lutherans. He was to begin
81seriously to marshal his forces in June. In the interim, 
it was to his advantage to cater to Henry VIII. By weaning 
the English king from the Protestants and by allowing him the 
services of a known sympathizer of the Schmalkaldic cause 
like Conrad Pennink, Charles was simply strengthening his own 
hand in a struggle in which the odds against him were already 
considerable.
Pennink's landsknechts repaired through Holland and Zee­
land to Sluys and from thence along the sands to Calais, which
82the first contingents reached on April 14. Their
SlBrandi, The Emperor Charles V, pp. 545, 547-48. The 
War of the Schmalkaldic League (1546-1555) began on the night 
of July 5 when the Lutheran contingents raised in Swabia moved 
on the Imperial forces at Nesselwang and Fussen.
82L. & P., XXI, pt. 1,‘ Nos. 569-71, 599.
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assignment was to assist Hertford in the construction of a 
new fort within the Boulonnais at Ambleteuse. This place, 
situated about six miles north of Boulogne on the coast of 
the Pas de Calais, had been viewed by the English general 
during his earlier visit in January and was occupied, appar­
ently without violence, sometime in February or March to pre­
serve overland communications between Boulogne and Calais
and to deter the French from building a similar stronghold
83at neighboring Marquise.
Hertford advanced to Ambleteuse on March 30 with some
seven thousand men, of which number about twenty-six hun-
84dred were mercenaries. That figure was soon increased by 
the dispatch from Boulogne of the larger part of the foreign­
ers there, and the percentage of free lances in this English
army was further enhanced by the arrival at Ambleteuse of
85Pennink's three thousand on April 18. The immediate
83Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 215. From this letter 
dated March 18, Ambleteuse would already appear to have been 
in English hands.
®^Gamboa's fifteen hundred Spaniards; the five hundred 
Clevelanders of Hoen and Van der Lughe; five hundred Italians 
under Captains Amerigo Antenori, Francisco Agello and Fran­
cisco Tiberio of Calabria; and the one hundred stradiots of 
Stesino and Cresia. L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 356, 416, 612, 
(B. M.) Add. MS. 5753, ff. 190-91.
85L. & P., XXI, pt. 1,’ Nos. .438 (1, 2), 481, 494, 614 
(ii), Most of Salerno's command of nearly seven hundred infan­
trymen and the larger part of Bua's stradiots were assigned 
to Hertford.
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objective, that of forestalling the erection of a French 
fort at Marquise, was quickly obtained, the enemy failing to 
reinforce the town before Hertford's departure from Calais. 
Some thought was given to an attack on staples, but as the 
place was strongly defended the attempt was forborne. A 
"camisade" by the Spaniards on Ardres was next considered. 
However, that too was ruled out because there were no ladders 
to scale the ditches and for fear of heavy casualties. Fi­
nally, it was agreed to hasten the construction of the new 
camp at Ambleteuse, and that having made it tenable, remove 
with the larger part of the army to Boulogneberg, an unforti­
fied observation post lying a few miles east of Boulogne atop 
Mont Lambert. From this eminence, which would provide the 
English an excellent view of French activity, Hertford hoped 
to lend some protection to the north bank of the Liane and, 
moreover, to the foragers from Boulogne, who were dependent
upon the surrounding woods and pastures to supplement their
8 6not always adequate supplies coming in by sea.
The move to Boulogneberg was undertaken with some speed 
on May 23. With French troops massing at Saint Etienne 
across the river from that outpost, Hertford advanced from 
Ambleteuse with a thousand Englishmen, an equal number of 
Spaniards, Pennink's landsknechts, and the foreign horsemen
86Ibid., Nos. 892, 893, 1016.
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"save the scout." Joined enroute by two thousand footmen and 
the cavalry from Boulogne, the English general marched to 
Mont Lambert, drove back the enemy who had approached to 
within skirmishing distance, and appointed John Rogers, Sur­
veyor of the Works at Boulogne since September, 1544, to be­
gin the construction of some defensible structure at Boulogne-
87berg. Pennink, his Germans, the Clevelander horse, and six
8 Bhundred Englishmen were left behind under Lord William Grey,
who on the morning of the following day, assisted by forty
Albanians of Bua's band, laid an ambush for a troop of the
Duke of Vend6me's cavalry.
To Henry's delight, the action was wholly successful.
At a cost of one or two footmen, some forty or fifty of Ven-
dome's knights were captured, about one hundred men and horses
were slain, and Boulogneberg, which the French had hoped to
89occupy themselves, was secured. The king expressed his 
thanks for the victory in a letter to Hertford on May 26, but 
at the same time bade his captains in the Boulonnais to avoid 
any further exploits which might hinder negotiations for
87Ibid., Nos. 892, 893; Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor 
Military Engineer, p. 55.
88His appointment as Governor of Boulogne and the 
Boulonnais had become effective on April 9. L. & P ., XXI, 
pt. 1, No. 716 (10).
89Ibid. , Nos. 907., 90a.
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90peace which were now on the brink of conclusion. A formal 
treaty was actually concluded at Camp, between Guisnes and 
Ardres, on June 7, not because either side had gained an ad­
vantage, but because the two countries, their decrepit mon- 
archs, and abused taxpayers were exhausted. Just as impor­
tant, Henry and Francis had found a face-saving stratagem 
that preserved the honor of both.
The main provisions of the Treaty of Camp allowed in 
theory that Francis owned Boulogne, but that in consideration 
of Henry's conquest the city, with that part of the Boulon­
nais immediately north of the port, should remain in English 
possession for eight years, at the end of which time on the
payment of an indemnity of 2,000,000 crowns Boulogne and the
91occupied territory should be returned to French hands.
Scotland too was comprehended in the agreement. England
would not make war on her neighbor unless the Scots broke
the peace, in which case Francis, as Henry's re-found "good
92brother," should "take part against them."
Outwardly, the Treaty of Camp was greeted with great 
enthusiasm on both sides. Henry, within days of the signing,
90Ibid., No. 927.
91Two modern copies of the treaty, misdated July 17, 
are to be found in (B. M.) Harl. MS. 1064, f. 116b and (B.
M.) Lansd. MS. 141, ,£. 141.
92 (B. M.) Add. MS. 9835, f. 18.
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stood as godfather by proxy to Francis' granddaughter, and
D'Annebaut, when he came to London to witness the ratifica-
93tion of the peace, received a tumultuous welcome. Pri­
vately, however, away from the public's gaze, considerable 
tensions remained. Reductions in the numbers of garrison 
troops in the Boulonnais and the Pale began almost immedi- 1 
ately. Sir Edward Carne, Henry's ambassador in the Low 
Countries, was instructed on June 13 to commence negotiations 
to procure passage through the emperor's lands for the dis­
charged mercenaries, whose demobilization was initiated dur-
94ing the third week of the month.
Their retiral was attended with a minimum of inconven­
ience. Though there was some delay for lack of ready funds, 
the money was quickly gathered and the free lances were 
sent on their way, most of the captains receiving special 
letters of commendation from Hertford at Ambleteuse, except
for Salerno, whose service in the earl's estimation, had left
95much to be desired. Only one problem marred the foreigners' 
withdrawal, Pennink's three thousand, being notorious
^ State Papers, XI, 227-28; Hail1s Chronicle, p. 867.
94State Papers, XI, 217, 222; Spanish Calendar, VIII,
No. 278.
Q C * £•t XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 1122, 1382 (15-26). Henry 
authorized a commendatory letter for Salerno anyway, plus an 
annuity.
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partisans of Lutheranism, dared not return to the Baltic
through the Netherlands. The way was blocked by the Count
of Buren, who under orders from the emperor was mobilizing
the Catholic forces of that region for the Schmalkaldic War.
Henry's former Albanian, Italian and Spanish charges were in
fact welcomed by the count; many hundreds were recruited;
but Pennink's bands, who assuredly would have been cut to
pieces, had to be ferried to England from whence they were
96transported by sea to Hamburg towards the end of July.
96Ibid., Nos. 1070 (4), 1109, 1282, 1438.
EPILOGUE
Although this peace pleased both the English 
and the French nations, yet surely both mistrusted 
the continuance of the same . . . for the French­
men still longed for Boulogne, and the Englishmen 
minded not to give it over.
Hail1s Chronicle, p. 867.
The Peace of Camp, if it ended a war, did not terminate 
hostilities. Violence among the parties continued, on a 
lesser scale in France and with renewed vigor in Scotland, 
until March 29, 1550. On that date, the government of Henry 
VIII's successor,^ Edward VI, accepted the Treaty of Boulogne 
agreeing for the sum of 400,000 crowns to surrender immedi­
ately all title to that city and the Boulonnais and to with­
draw its troops from Scotland, which unfortunate land had 
been invaded again in 1547.
The pact made at Camp had taken effect only for a mo­
ment. By July 17, 1546, the day on which that peace was rat­
ified in London, Henry VIII barely had six months to live.
A month earlier, in the midst of the withdrawal of his mer­
cenaries, he had given specific instructions for the reduc­
tion of his English effectives in the territories ceded to 
him by the French. For all the Boulonnais, including
■̂ Hehry. VIII died on Friday, January 28, 1547.
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2Boulogne, Boulogneberg, Ambleteuse, and Blackness, a mere
32,160 English soldiers were appointed with less than fif­
teen hundred free lances to sustain them. "Extraordinary 
garrisons," that is to say, garrisons above the normal compli­
ment, were retained only within the Pale at Guisnes, Hammes,
4and the principal bulwarks within the Terre d'Oye.
Overnight, in response to the evacuation of the French
army before Boulogne, Henry's forces in France declined by
better than two-thirds, from a high of some thirty thousand,
which is where the figure had stood in March, to considerably
less than ten thousand, all of them in quarters in widely
separated posts and the vast majority of them Englishmen,
part-time soldiers whose lack of military demeanor was
5matched only by their desire to be home. The few foreigners
remaining in service were Italians and Spaniards. The former
6four or five hundred under five captains, were stationed in
A new fort on Cap Gris-Nez begun by Hertford a few days
before the signing of the Treaty of Camp. See L. & P., XXI, 
pt. 1, Nos. 927, 960.
3Ibid., No. 1092 (2).
4Ibid.
5 On the poor quality of the English common soldier, see 
Gruff yd, "Boulogne and Calais, from 1545 to 1550,” pp. 23^24, 
31, 41-42.
^Piero Giovanni Luti, Paolo Serdo, Thomaso Deferencia, 
Giovanni Domingo Calabroza, and Nicolo Demoyena.
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Boulogne, the latter, about one thousand strong under Colonel
Gamboa, at Ambleteuse. Why these were kept is not exactly
clear, except that the Spaniards were in disfavor with the
emperor, who threatened to send into Hungary those in Buren1s
7army, who against his ban had taken wages from Henry. It
was perhaps for the same reason tha/t the Italians remained;
for at least one of the captains, Piero Giovanni Luti, hailed
from a state, the Republic of Siena, in which there existed
strong anti-imperialist sentiment.
Be that as it may, the more probable rationale for the
retention of the mercenaries was suspicion of the French.
That it was high is made manifest in a remarkable document
drawn up in August, 1546, by William Paget in which the gifted
Principal Secretary sought to project the diplomatic dangers
8his nation then faced. The pope is ranked as an obvious en­
emy, the emperor, because of his ties to the papacy, as an 
uncertain friend. But heading the list of foes is France,
which country, Paget reasoned, would soon be moved by motives
9of revenge to retake Boulogne. The diplomatist knew his 
business well.
7L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, No. 1301.
8 (B. M.) Cotton MSS. Titus B., ii, 47, ff. 79-81.
9Strangely, Paget made no mention of Scotland, against 
whom Henry at that moment was considering war.
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Even as Henry's minister wrote, the cycle which would 
lead to war began again. On August 29, Lord Grey informed 
Paget that the French, in defiance of the Treaty of Camp, had 
begun another fort, Chatillon, at the entrance to Boulogne 
haven, directly across the water from the Old Man.'*'0 Pro­
tests were lodged in Paris, and on the night of September 5,
on direct command from Henry himself, Grey ordered a raid on
11the diggings and the new works were razed. The French re- 
joindsr was a call to arms. Montreuil and other garrisons on 
the frontier against the English were placed on alert, while 
on Henry's part his forces in the Boulonnais were strength­
ened. Hertford, at home since July, was recommissioned to 
cross the sea as the king's Lieutenant-General; the thousand 
pioneers at Boulogne were bolstered by the dispatch of five 
hundred more; and seven thousand troops were embarked at 
Dover and on the Thames for immediate transportation to the 
imperiled city.^
The demonstration of force temporarily averted a crisis. 
Before Hertford's sailing, the French, who had resumed their 
occupation of Chatillon and made it defensible, abandoned 
their position, referring the whole matter of fortifications
10L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 1524, 1530.
State Papers, XI, 289.
12L. & P ., XXI, pt. 2, Nos. 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 128, 140.
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to a commission to determine what might be permitted under
13 14the treaty. Chatillon, to Henry1 s. relief, was disallowed;
but for the remainder of his reign incident piled upon inci­
dent, culminating in the breach of the articles of peace by 
the English themselves. In the first weeks of the new year, 
as the headstrong Tudor monarch's life ran out, Grey's pio­
neers collected material on the French side of the Liane 
which was used in the spring of 1547 for the construction of 
a new jetty across from Boulogne haven. Ostensibly, this 
fresh outwork was to control the tides within the harbor, but
in reality it was designed as a fort to protect English ship-
15ping and provide a first line of defence against Outreau. 
Despite rancorous objections from Paris, the English persisted. 
The Dunette, as the structure was dubbed, was built, thereby 
providing justification to the French to begin anew the bas­
tion at Chatillon.
What part the Latin mercenaries played in these proceed­
ings or how they were deployed is left unsaid. The Italians 
most surely remained at Boulogne, while some few of the Span­
iards provided a diversion in the summer of 1546 by enlivening
13Ibid. , Nos. 131, 157; State Papers, XI, 319.
14L.' & P., XXI, pt. 2,. No. 330 (2).
^3Ibict. , No. 715; Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor Military 
Engineer, pp. 71-72, 106.
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the celebrations attendant upon the christening- of the French
princess, Elizabeth, when one of their company, Julian
16 .Romero, fought a duel before the French king at Fontaine­
bleau. Romero's opponent was a fellow countryman, Antonio de 
Mora, the same who, with part of his men and sixty new hand-
17guns, had fled from the Pale to join Du Biez in April, 1545.
At the heart of the quarrel was De Mora's desertion, it being
considered treason, even among mercenaries, for a soldier
18under contract to change sides during a campaign. Some­
where, after the Peace of Camp, the traitor and Romero had 
met; Julian issued the challenge; and De Mora, accepting it, 
arranged through Francis that the combat be fought according 
to the law of arms in the lists at Fontainebleau.
For the occasion, the English Spaniard was outfitted 
with the aid of "a thousand broad angels," a gift from Henry, 
and having "put himself in order" he travelled into France 
in the company of Gamboa, Captains Cristobal Diaz, Pedro
19Negro, "and divers other Spanish knights and gentlemen."
•^See below, Appendix D.
17Above, p . 357.
18Several instances of this type of mercenary honor could 
be cited. Thomaso Bua, the Albanian colonel at Boulogne and 
Ambleteuse, was siezed on his return to Italy in September and 
executed in Turin for having left the French service for Henry. 
L. & P., XXI, pt. 2, Nos. 163, 457.
19This at least according to Hume, ed., Chronicle of King
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The fight, which took place on July 15 and which Julian won, 
proved highly profitable, not only to the victor but to his
companions as well. Lifetime annuities were awarded to all
20 . . .  the Spanish captains, Gamboa, as colonel, receiving no less -
21than £250 and in January, 1547, denization and the grant,
"for his services in the King's wars,” of the lordship, manor,
22and advowson of the rectory of Stanmer in Middlesex.
Henry VIII, p. 128. This fascinating but totally untrust­
worthy account of events contains much confusing information 
on the role of Spanish mercenaries in Tudor service which, 
like much else in the work, does not bear out when compared 
with other sources. Romero’s "camp" and its aftermath are 
fully described, pp. 128-31. For other references, consult 
Charles Wriothesley, A Chronicle of England during the Reigns 
of the Tudors, ed. William Douglas Hamilton (2 vols,; London: 
The Camden Society, Nos. XI and XX, 1875-77), I, 173-74; L. & 
P., XXI, pt. 2, Nos. 1184, 1216, 1232, 2357, 1259, 1298; 
Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council, I, 501.
onL. & P., XXI, pt. 2, No. 332 (14, 17, 19, 20, 21).
The captains received as follows: Pedro Negro, £100; Cristo­
bal Diaz, £100; Alonso de Villa Sirga, £100; Ludovico de 
Nogera, £100; and Julian Romero, £150, who previously, if the 
anonymous Spanish chronicler is to be believed, received of 
the French king a golden chain "which weighed more than 
seven hundred crowns,1' a tunic "stamped with gold that was 
worth more than the King’s chain," and numerous lesser gifts 
from the French nobility.
21This term implies that Gamboa became a naturalized 
Englishman with all the privileges of a citizen excepting 
those of inheritance and the right to hold public office.
22L. £ P., XXI, pt. 2, No. 771 (5, 34). The property 
with its appurtenances included over 276 acres of land, a 
number of closes, two "horse-mills," and a windmill, plus 
"all the messuages, etc., in St. Sepulchre's parish in the 
suburbs of London and in Westham, Middlesex."
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As always, to the lucky few the mercenary life paid
handsome dividends. On the whole, however, for the ordinary
soldier of fortune the way of the free lance provided no
more than a living and not infrequently much less. Death in
the field or from disease were common rewards for those who
followed the wars, and if these natural hazards were overcome,
debilitating injuries and crippling poverty forever loomed as
possibilities. The latter fates struck at more than a few of
Henry's mercenaries. Giovanni Potito, Albanian, Diego Romero
Spaniard, and Antonio de Milanino de Parma, Italian, to name
but a few, were all part of the carnage of the Scottish wars.
Maimed in the hands or the legs, they received no accolades,
no annuities or grants of land, but rather a few paltry shil-
23lings and passports out of the country. Demetrio de Milano, 
"sore impoverished by his service" and himself imprisoned for 
a time in Scotland, pocketed no more than £12 10s. for his 
pains, while Artillio Siciliano and Antonio Greco, "poor sol­
diers," for "their conduct homeward" were awarded between
24them the princely sum of £5.
Mercenaries, of course, were paid considerably higher
25wages than were national conscripts. The average English
2 3 (P. R. O.) S. P. 351/43, mems. 9, 11.
24Ibid., mem. 11.
25The entire area of mercenary financing is ripe for 
further investigation.
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infantryman in Henry's reign drew 6d. per day as compared to 
the foreigner's 8d. The disparity was greater where cavalry­
men were concerned. "A horsemen with 9d. a day, if his 
horse is killed, cannot buy another," raged Paget, "and see­
ing a stranger get £3 a month and he but 20s. his heart is
9 gkilled." It was a legitimate enough argument, but only on 
the surface. The English cavalryman might have been every 
bit as brave as his German, Spanish, Italian, or Albanian 
comrades, but the former, to point out but one discrepancy in 
Paget's logic, did not have the foreigners' overhead. The 
mercenary, whether mounted or on foot, had to be fully equip­
ped before his final muster. "Firstly," begins the initial 
article of Reiffenberg's unfulfilled contract, " . . .  lancers 
will be armed with their head gear, with vizors, helmits and
salades, throat pieces, axes, vambraces, corselets, breeches
27and tassets covering the knees, and with long gauntlets." 
There was probably not one English gentleman in a hundred .0. 
who owned such equipment and even fewer who could afford the 
upkeep of the six or eight destriers which some of the German 
knights brought with them.
Reiffenberg's contract is as specific again on the har­
ness required of his mounted arquebusiers. These also were
26L.: & P., XXI, pt. 1, No. 691.
2 7 (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/203, f. 15.
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expected to be "well furnished," providers of their own "am­
munition, breeches, axe, sleeves of mail, gorgets, gauntlets,
i , 28corselets, and good head gear, with a swynspetts and a gun."
29Considering early Tudor legislation against firearms, there 
were proportionately likely as few of the English commonality 
who could outfit themselves with arquebuses as there were Tu­
dor gentlemen who could pass muster as authentic men-at-arms. 
Besides the armor, the weapons, the war horses, and the
like which foreign soldiers had to pay for out of their own 
30pockets, there was also the matter of military experience.
No amount of money could be placed on that commodity, and in 
the final analysis it was that experience which all employers 
of foreigners sought to profit from. How much, the reader 
might legitimately ask, did the military expertise of Europe*s 
continental legions benefit the earliest Tudors? And the 
truthful answer must be that it is quantifiably impossible to 
say. Nowhere is there categorical proof that foreigners, 
whether mercenaries, auxiliaries, or combinations of both,
2^Ibid. I have been unable to trace the meaning of 
swynspetts.
29Above, p. 128 (n. 34).
30The Statute of Winchester notwithstanding, English sol­
diers received free of charge in most instances equipment 
which they failed to bring, to themusters. Cruickshank, Army 
Royal, p. 77. Whatever the English recruit did not receive, 
he was expected to return to the government in reasonable 
condition on his demobilization.
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turned the tide in any campaign or for that matter in any
single action in either the reign of Henry VII or Henry. VIII.
Mercenaries were blamed for the loss inflicted in Cobham's
31Calesians at Oye in 1545, and for that they rightly re­
ceived some censure. Harsh words and faint praise were in 
fact the normal lot reserved for foreign men of war through­
out the Tudor period. They were faithless "knaves," "wild 
beasts," "consumers of princes treasure," "Runaways in the 
very Conflicts, and Spoilers of the Country," 'imported with 
loss" from "far off."32
Every charge made in the foregoing collage is easily 
substantiated. What Henrician employed in the thankless 
business of procuring foreign soldiers for his country's 
wars did not cringe before the rapacity of a Sickingen, the 
infidelity of a Reiffenberg, or the potential for mindless 
mayhem that lurked beneath the surface of all recruitment 
proceedings? "I pray God," wrote Thomas Chamberlain from
his prison in Florennes Abbey in October, 1545, "his Majesty
33never need more this nation, but send us perpetual peace."
31Above, p. 390.
32The agglomeration of quotes was gleaned from the fol­
lowing sources: (B. M.) Add. MS. 5753, f. 155: (B. M.) Harl.
MS. 444, f. 121; L. 6 P., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 536, 750.
3'3L.: & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 681, See also, ibid., No. 656.
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How many Tudor emissaries,, commissioners, moneychangers, and 
paymasters must have echoed that disconsolate invocation.
Yet, how would the Tudors have fared without their 
foreigners? It has not been demonstrated anywhere in this 
work that alien soldiers won so much as a single battle.
Still, it seems to this author, based solely on the sheer 
numbers in which they were hired, that mercenaries and, when 
available, auxiliaries formed the backbone of virtually every 
major force worthy of the name of army which the English gov­
ernment raised between 1485 and 1547. Employed initially, 
after the accession of Henry VII, almost exclusively for the 
wars in France, they became by the end of Henry VIII's reign 
both at home and abroad the mainstay of the early Tudor mili­
tary establishment.
Auxiliaries were never used much in England. Except for 
those who fought for the Earl of Richmond at Bosworth Field 
and the few supplied to the pretenders, Lambert Simnel and 
Perkin Warbeck, they were always utilized in France. Auxili­
aries, the last appearing under Buren at Montreuil, were of 
the foreign contingents certainly the most highly prized by 
the Tudor sovereigns, if only because they were provided by 
England's allies free of charge. For this reason, auxiliaries 
were also the most difficult troops .to obtain. The wages of 
a landsknecht colonel amounted to 400 guilders a month; his
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34lieutenant drew 100 guilders. Two thousand German footmen
and five hundred Burgundian cavalry cost 24,000 florins or
about £3000 a month; the pay of an Italian hackbutter on
horseback was anywhere from Is. to Is. 8d. per day; while
the charge by the month of fifteen hundred Spanish infantry-
35men, including officers, was £1,585. No government, not 
even the mighty Hapsburg conglomerate, could long sustain ex­
penses of this nature.
Emperor Maximilian I successfully pled poverty when ap­
proached on the subject of auxiliaries for Henry VIII1s first
French war in 1513. The Burgundian and landsknecht levies sup-
36
plied the English on that occasion were paid for by Henry.
And in 1544, on the eve of the second Tudor's last French
undertaking, the Imperialists tried briefly through Chapuys
to persuade Henry to assume the cost of Buren's auxiliaries,
giving up only for fear that if the emperor failed in his
commitment Henry would ally himself with Francis and thus con-
37ceivably bring defeat upon the Hapsburgs.
^ State .P a p e r s IX, 648.
35L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 773; XX, pt. 1, No. 883; (P.
R. O.) E 351743, mem. 5.
O £Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, The Life and Reign of 
King Henry VIIT; Together with A General History of those 
Times (London: 1741) , pp.-' 27, 38; Cruickshank, Army Royal,
p. 32.
^Spanish Calendar, VII, Nos. 22, 41 (p. 56).
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In two of Henry's three continental campaigns, those of
1523 and 1544, auxiliaries served as his armies' chief prop.
After the Peace of Crepy, which deprived England of military
allies, that nation was forced into exclusive dependence upon
mercenaries, who for the first time in many years came to be
38used almost routinely within the kingdom itself for defence
against the possibility of cross-Channel invasion, as in the
summer of 1545, and for the continued punishment of the Scots.
Though the question of mercenary utilization after the death
of Henry VIII has been left untouched, cursory investigation
bears out Professor Jordan's contention that their employment
in Britain, against Englishmen as well as Scots, increased in
39the rergn of Edward VI.
Where Scotland is concerned, more free lances were being
sought for an attempt upon that northern land at the very mo-
40ment the old king lay dying. When the assault was finally 
launched in September, 1547, the English army contained an
O O Probably not since the reigns of Stephen, King John and 
Henry III in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had mercen­
aries been brought into England in such numbers. Henry Hallam, 
View of the State of Europe During the Middle Ages (2 vols.; 
London: John Murray, 1818), I, .220-21; Henry Ellis, ed.,
Hoiinshed*s Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland (6 
vols.; London: G. Woodfall, 1807-08), II, 80, 324, 374.
^ Jordon, Edward V I , the Young King, pp. 466-67 (n. 2).
40L. & P., XXI, pt. 2, No. 444 (p. 210).
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unknown, but fairly high, proportion of mercenaries. Accom­
panying the force which was led by Edward Seymour, Lord Pro­
tector and recently created Duke of Somerset, was Pedro de
Gamboa, who led a troop of two hundred mounted arguebusiers,
41at least three of his infantry captains, and a reasonable
sprinkling of Italians, the chief company of which was a body
of heavy horse under an Italian colonel. Count Malatesta 
42Baglione.
The destruction of the Scottish army at Pinkie on Sep­
tember 10 gave the English temporary control of southeastern 
Scotland. Leith, the port-city of Edinburgh, was burned. 
Inchcolm and Blackness, astride the Firth of Forth, Broughty 
Castle at the mouth of the Tay, Roxburgh and Home in the east­
ern lowlands, and, above all, Haddington in East Lothian were 
occupied by mixed garrisons of Englishmen and mercenaries and 
held until the summer of 1549. But in Edward's reign, it was 
in England proper that the most notable use of free lances 
displayed itself.
In the two risings, the Western or "Prayer Book" Rebel­
lion and Kett's Rebellion, which rocked the realm in 1549 and
^Cristobal Diaz, Pedro Negro, and Alonso de Villa Sirga, 
all of whom were knighted for their part in the expedition.
^Patten, The Expedition into1 Scotland, pp. 78, 123, 135, 
150; Oman,: The Art of War in: the Sixteenth Century, p. 359.
Sir John Siriythe, Certain Discourses Military, ed. J. R. Hale 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 19 64), 95.
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brought disaster to the king's uncle, the Duke of Somerset,
thousands of mercenaries, the majority of them veterans of
the Scottish war, were used. The names of many of the cap-
43tains are preserved in the Public Record Office. Italians,
Germans, Spaniards, and Albanians figured prominently in the
suppression of the "Prayer Book" insurgents, the Italian
horse and foot of Captains Jacques Jermigny and Paolo Baptista
Spinola particularly distinguishing themselves in that cam- 
44paign. In Kett's Rebellion, brutally crushed by the Earl 
45of Warwick at Norwich and Dussindale in Norfolk in August, 
1549, it was the turn of the German landsknechts to excel. 
Twelve hundred or fourteen hundred under Conrad Pennink, 
lured back to England from Hamburg in 1548, carried much of 
the fighting, ably assisted by motley bands of Italians and 
Spaniards, among the latter being the light horse contingents
See especially, (P. R. 0.) E 351/43, mems. 1-13, and 
(P. R. 0.) E 101 531/39, mems. 103. Both of these documents, 
covering between them the years 1545 and 1551, deal almost 
excusively with payments made to mercenaries who served in 
England.
^Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," >
p. 62. The Welshman renders Jermigny's name as Dgermayn and 
calls him a Spaniard. Jordon, The Chronicle and Political 
Papers of King Edward V I , p. 14; Sir John Smythe, Certain 
Discourses Military, p. 96; (P. R. O.) E 351/43, mems. 3, 4, 
5, "7, 10,: 11.
^Formerly John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, who was granted 
the earldom on February 17, 1547.
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46of Gamboa and Carlos de Guavarra. Germans, the ensign of
47Clayne van Buren and 420 horsemen led by an Englishman,
Henry Hartford, were retained to guard the Court and the king
in the summer of 1549; while at the surrender of Boulogne
which was returned to the French in 1550, of the foreigners
who made up the larger part of the garrison, Germans, again,
48were in the majority.
The relinquishment of Boulogne, bringing as it did peace 
with France and Scotland, allowed for a sharp lowering in mil­
itary expenditure. Immediate savings were realized in the 
rapid "cassing" of free lances. The greater part were dis­
missed, but John Dudley, who as the Duke of Northumberland 
had succeeded Somerset as head of the Council on the restora­
tion of public order in 1549, retained eight hundred foreign­
ers to police six counties where chronic disaffection had 
been rampant since the close of Henry’s reign. Two hundred 
each were placed in Essex and Sussex, and the remaining four
4 6Smith, Certain Discourses Military, p. 98. The names 
of the seven captains serving under Pennick are given in (P.
R. 0.) E. 101 531/39, mem. 3. For Gamboa and Guavarra, see 
(P. R. 0.) E 351/43, mem. 13.
47No relation to the Dutchman, Maximilian, Court of Buren. 
For notices of Clayne, who also served under Warwick at the 
time of the Kett uprising and in Calais, see (P. R. O.) E 101 
531/39, mems. lb, 2a, 3a; (P. R. 0.) E 351/43, mems. 12, 13.
48J. Payne Collier, ed., Trevelyan Papers (3 pts.; Lon­
don: Camden Society, Nos. LXVII and LXXXIV, 1857-63) p. 2, 32.
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hundred were equally distributed in Dorset, Hampshire, Kent,
49and Suffolk. This aberrant use of mercenaries, unheard of 
since the days of the early Plantagenets, was not liked by 
Englishmen; but from Northumberland's point of view it seemed 
necessary. His regime was unpopular, and as the late distur­
bances in the West Country and Norfolk had shown, local levies,
with opinions at variance with those of the government in '
50whose name they were raised, could not be relied upon.
In 1552, however, with England's financial reserve de­
pleted, further cuts in military strength were called for. 
Garrisons in Ireland, Berwick, and Guisnes were pared; some 
coastal defences were abandoned; ships of the line were de­
commissioned; and the mercenaries, untoward luxuries in an
51administration faced with penury, were disbanded. This 
diminuation in power proved an evil portent for Northumber­
land, for on Edward's demise in 1553, when the duke attempted 
to usurp the throne in the name of Lady Jane Grey, his English 
levies melted away, leaving him naked and unprotected from
the vengeance that followed swiftly on the accession of
49Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council, III, 81; John 
Strype, Ecclesiastical Memorials . . . oj[ the Church of Eng­
land {3 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1822), II, pt. 1
459-61.
50Jordan, Edward VI, the Young King, p. 465.
Jordan, ed., The Chronicle and Political Papers of 
King Edward VI, pp. 123-24, 147, 176, 177; Wernham, Before 
the Armada, p. 202.
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52of Queen Mary, It is intriguing .to speculate on how dif­
ferent English history might have been had Northumberland had 
a force of mercenaries to fall back on.' Why he, a believer 
in mercenary arms, did not provide against the contingency 
of mass popular support for Edward's successor by gathering 
round him foreign pikes and arquebuses remains something of a 
mystery. Perhaps, as Oman suggests, it was a defect in the 
man himself: "he was so unscrupulous . . , that he had for­
gotten that others might have scruples.
In Mary's brief reign, English reliance on foreign troops 
fell off drastically as part and parcel of the austerity pro­
gram inherited from her predecessor. Pew free lances, if
54any at all, were employed in England. Gottfried von 
Bocholt, whose units had been amalgamated with those of the
^ The story of Northumberland's unsuccessful machina­
tions to retain his power by depriving Mary, Edward's lawful 
heir, of her crown is ably told by W. K. Jordan, Edward VI: 
The Threshold of Power (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1970), Chap. XIV.
53Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 369.
54The majority of the names which this author has uncov­
ered were those of a handful of veterans of the campaigns of 
Henry VIII and Edward VI, who wrote from abroad begging the 
continuance of the pensions which these defunct sovereigns 
had awarded them. Robert Lemon and M. A. E. Green, eds., 
Calendar of' State' Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reigns 
Of Edward VI, Mary,Elizabeth,- 1547—1580 (London: H. M. Sta­
tionery Office, 1856), pp. 85, 87. Hereinafter cited as 
Calendar 'of State Papers (Domestic) , Edward VI/ Mary, Eliza­
beth.
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55despicable Reiffenberg at Aacheri in October,, 1545, offered
himself with four thousand landsknechts and one thousand
hoarse for service against the Scots, but there is no evidence
56that his overture was accepted. Only in the Calais Pale
were alien conscripts employed, all of them auxiliaries; but
not before 1557 when, as a by-product of the queen*s illi-.ad-
57vised marriage to Philip II of Spain, the nation was drawn 
unwillingly into war with France.
In that short-lived struggle, which among contemporaries 
redounded as much to Mary's infamy as her burning of reli*- 
gious dissenters, England was thoroughly abused by her selfish 
Spanish ally. Philip, after receiving assistance from the 
English fleet and using five thousand English auxiliaries to 
win the French town of Saint Quentin, refused to reciprocate. 
To preserve the commercial interests of his Netherlands' pro­
vinces, he refrained from declaring war on the Scots; but far 
worse, he diverted to his own use munitions, arms, and three 
thousand German landsknechts acquired for the defence of his
C Owife and her northern border.
55Below, p. 371.
56Calendar of State Papers, (Domestic) Edward VI, Mary 
Elizabeth, pp.~ 85, 103".
57The nuptials were celebrated on July 25, 1554, at 
Winchester in Hampshire.
58The landsknechts were under the command of the 
German colonel, Wilhelm Wallerthum, who had received
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Philip's callous indifference to. English needs revealed 
itself also in the fall of Calais. That city and the entire 
Pale came under French attack on January 1, 1558, from an 
army of twenty-five thousand. To oppose it, Lord Thomas Went­
worth, the Deputy of Calais, had on hand a force of about two 
thousand: five hundred men within the main town and its out­
lying strongholds, plus two hundred or three hundred armed 
citizens; twelve hundred or so effectives at Guisnes; and but 
a handful of defenders at Hammes. On the English side, de­
spite the presence of substantial Spanish troops around Grave- 
lines, the only auxiliaries supplied were four infantry com­
panies at Calais and but one ensign of arquebusiers, Span-
59iards and Burgundians, at Guisnes. The conquest was
a pension and a knighthood for his part in the French and Scot­
tish wars by Edward VI. Calendar of State Papers (Domestic) 
Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth*,' I,' 85, 103; William B. Turnbull, 
ed. Calendar of State Papers,' Foreign Series, of the Reign of 
Mary (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1861), pp. 372, 376,
384, 385-86, 387, 388. Hereinafter cited as Calendar of 
State Papers (Foreign), Mary.
59Two hundred arquebusiers sent out by Philip from Grave- 
lines for Calais were driven back on or about January 5 by 
French reiters. As for the ensign at Guisnes, it was com­
prised of but five hundred men, fifty Spaniards under Cris­
tobal de Mountdragon and the remaining Burgundians under an 
officer named Dieffkie. It fought ferociously in defence of 
Mary Bulwark, an isolated tower detached from the castle.
Most of the Spaniards and a high percentage of the Burgundians, 
including Dieffkie, were killed. For several eye-witness 
accounts of the capture of the Pale, see the intriguing col­
lection gathered in Pollard, ed., Tudor Tracts ,-' 1532-1588, 
pp. 289-330.
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effected in three weeks. Calais fell in six days; Guisnes 
capitulated on January 20; while two days later, the garri­
son at Hammes retired in secret to Gravelines.
This rapid collapse of England's last outposts in France 
had lasting military significance. The loss of the Pale, for 
one thing, ended England's quest for empire on the Continent; 
but of more pertinent significance where this study is con­
cerned, the crushing defeat substantiates the thesis that 
without the supportive crutch of large-scale foreign recruit­
ment early Tudor armies were incapable of effective effort in 
those contests which matched them against anything but their 
island foes. English writers of the sixteenth century, argued 
that Calais could have been saved had the Marian government 
been less negligent in reinforcing the garrisons there or in 
putting to sea the navy which at the time of the assault had 
been laid up for the winter.^0 This was nothing but chauvin­
istic tripe. Calais was doomed to fall as had Boulogne be­
fore it. England's continental possessions were isolated by 
what, for that age, was a wide expanse of water. They were 
dependent for supplies and reinforcements out of England on 
uncertain winds and contrary weather. While they remained in 
Tudor hands, great reliance for their maintenance and
60See, for example, George Ferrers,’ The Winning of Calais 
by the French in Pollard, ed,. Tudor Tracts, 1532-1588, pp. 
290, 294..
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protection was placed on the cooperation of the Empire. When
Paget, in 1549, failed to persuade Charles V to take the field
61on England’s behalf, Boulogne was lost, and Philip II's ve-
62nality insured the capture of the Pale.
The moral, therefore, seems clear. Without massive in­
fusions of foreign manpower, early Tudor armies courted dis­
aster in their continental wars. In every fight waged out­
side of British waters, those armies were outrivaled by the 
superior numbers, training, and technology of their opponents. 
Mercenaries and auxiliaries were almost unheard of in Eliza­
beth' s reign. But, then, Elizabeth was not a warlike queen. 
The forces which she raised for foreign service to aid the 
Huguenots in France and the Dutch in their war of independ­
ence were instruments of policy rather than engines of con-? 
quest. At home, her government, like those of the earlier Tu­
dors, never created a standing army; but unlike others of her 
house, Elizabeth never aspired to military glory.
^Jordan, Edward VI., the Young Kingf pp, 302, 3Q4,
fi 9 It was said by some that the English defenders of the 
Pale consistently refused aid from the Spanish king, since 
”in many English minds there was a rooted suspicion that 
Philip wanted not so much to help, as to help himself to 
Calais." H, M. F. Prescott,’ Mary Tudor (New York: The Mac­
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MAXIMILIAN, COUNT OF BUREN
Maximilian von Egmont, Count of Buren and Leerdam, Lord 
of Ysselstein, Sint Maartensdyk, Grave, and the region of 
Ruyck, was the only son of Floris d'Ysselstein from whom, on 
the latter's death in 1539, he inherited the foregoing digni­
ties. It was while his father still lived that Maximilian 
gained his first martial laurels when, in the spring of 1537, 
he repulsed a sudden French attack upon Arras. That same 
year, as an officer in his father's army, he distinguished 
himself by storming the fortress of Saint-Pol near Dunkirk, 
in which action he saved the life of the French captain, Mar­
tin du Bellay, author of the famous Memoires, who was taken 
by his landsknechts.
In 1540, as a reward for his gallant service, Maximilian 
was made Governor of Friesland and shortly thereafter a 
knight of the Golden Fleece. Other honors quickly followed. 
The provinces of Groningen and Oberyssel were placed under 
his jurisdiction, but as always with power came responsibil­
ity. On the outbreak of Emperor Charles' war with France in 
1542, the defence of the northern Netherlands was given over 
to Buren, and later in the year he cooperated with Philibert 
of Chalons, the Prince of Orange, in reoccupying Luxemburg 
which had been overrun by the Duke of Orleans.
In 1543, Maximilian participated in the emperor's
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campaign against the Duke of Cleves. During the subsequent
siege ;of Landrecies, he made the acquaintance of Sir John
1Wallop, captain of the English auxiliaries, and tried with­
out effect to draw the relieving army of Francis I into bat­
tle. His activities in 1544 as commander of the Imperialist
contingents before Montreuil and recruiter of mercenaries
2for Henry VIII have previously been noted. English service 
did little for his reputation. His talents, perhaps because 
they were not fully appreciated or because, as the Imperial­
ists suspected, Henry never intended that Montreuil should
3be taken, were never fully utilized. But in 1546, in the 
opening phase of the Schmalkaldic War, he established himself 
as one of the most valuable commanders in the Catholic camp.
Commissioned that summer to prepare the Netherlands 
against the possibility of attack from the Protestant leagu­
ers, he was suddenly called with thirteen thousand troops to 
march in August to the relief of the emperor, who was caught 
unprepared by the Landgrave of Hesse in Bavaria. Buren*s 
fulfillment of his charge was one of the great feats of the 
war. In the face of formidable odds, he led his army un­
scathed through better than two hundred miles of hostile
^Above, p. , 247.
2Above, pp. 274-79, 292, 297 ff.
3Above, pp. 322-23 and n. 70.
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territory, effecting in the process a night crossing of the 
Rhine at Bingen and the capture of the fortress of Walluf in 
Hesse, all under the fretful gaze of fifteen thousand Protest­
ants commanded, among others, by Henry VIII1s old nemesis, 
Friedrich von Reiffenberg. Buren's juncture with the emperor 
near Ingolstadt on September 15 swelled the Imperialist ranks 
to over sixty thousand,, robbed the Lutherans of their origi­
nal confidence, and permitted Charles V over the next two 
months to stamp his complete authority on South Germany.
As a final service to the Empire, Buren sieged Boxberg, 
Darmstadt, and Frankfurt. Confined to bed by a severe ill­
ness in Bonn, he returned to the Netherlands early in 1547
and died towards the end of the next year, having taken no
4further part in the fighting.
"The bulk of the information contained in this sketch 
was drawn from Paul Kannengeiser, Karl V und Maximilian 
Egmont, Graf von Buren. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichts des 
schmalkald'ischen Krieges (Freiburg and Leipzig: Akademische
Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1895), pp. 1-10. 
Buren's physician during his last illness was none other than 
Andreas Vesalius. The count's only child and heir, Anna, be­
came the first wife of William of Orange, who as William the 






The sinister career of Ludovico da l'Armi, after his en­
gagement by Henry VIII, is easily followed in both the Letters 
and Papers and the Venetian Calendar■ His intrigues, felonies, 
and homicides remained the scandal of the Republic of Venice 
until justice was served him in 1547.
1Precisely why Da lTArmi and the other captains hired 
with him were retained is open to question. That they busied 
themselves in the spring of 1545 in raising troops for Eng-r 
land's war with Prance is a certainty, but how, after those 
forces were denied passage through the Empire, the officers 
were meant to be employed is another matter. A rumor which 
became current in Italy in May, 1545, that Da l'Armi and his 
confederates might in the name of the English king attempt
2some enterprise in Piedmont on behalf of Charles II of Savoy
3appears to have had some basis in fact, Luigi Gonzaga, Lord 
of Castiglione and kinsman to the Gonzaga dukes of Mantua, 
was offered at about the same time the generalship of all of 
Henry's forces in Italy. Unfortunately, the danger of
•^Angelo Mariano, Count Bernardo di San Bonifacio, and 
Filippo Pini. See above, pp. 343 ff.
2Savoy was lost to the French in 1537, The dutchy was 




offending the emperor, who feared the French might think him 
behind the scheme, forced the abandonment of the plan in' 
October.4
In the meantime, Da l'Armi ran afoul of the authorities 
in Venice. On August 7, he and a band of his ruffians as­
saulted the night watch, wounding one of the officers, and on 
the twelfth fresh news from Treviso indicated that three of
his men had entered that town and inflicted grievous wounds
5on one Count Curio Bua. The gravity of the crimes left the 
Venetian government no choice. Da l'Armi and fourteen of his 
followers were expelled from the republic. Harvel, without 
Henry’s commission, was powerless to act on his behalf, and 
the felon left Italy.
This might have ended the matter but for the English war 
in France. Da l'Armi, again for reasons not entirely clear, 
was still important in Henry's plans. On August 31, Ludovico 
surfaced in Brussels where, in an audience with the Venetian 
ambassador, Bernardo Navagiero, he sought the diplomat's in­
tercession with the Doge. The attack upon the Signory!s
4L. £ P., XX, pt. 1, No. 751 (1); pt, 2, No. 193; Vene­
tian Calendar, V, No. 343; State Papers, X, 646-47.
cVenetian Calendar, V, Nos. 344-48, Bua, quite possibly 
a relative of that Albanian colonel, Thomaso, who fought for 
Henry in the Boulonnais, was scarred about the face, a mark 
of infamy, for accepting money to serve the Tudor king but 
refusing to do so.
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officials, he asserted, had been a mistake. He had many
powerful enemies, and mistaking the night watch in the dark
for some of them, "he could not do otherwise than he did."
As for the scarring of Bua, Da l'Armi pled his honor: " . . .
a person who had taken money to come and serve the King of
England and then failed to do so deserved greater punishment
than what he had received, and for this the Signory ought not
to evince resentment, both out of respect for the King, and
for the Doge himself, who being a sovereign should dissemble
this case to prove how much it displeased him that Princes
6should be wronged by private individuals."
The matter was soon concluded in Da I'Armi's favor. Per­
sonal intervention by Lord Chancellor Wriothesley, Principal 
Secretary Paget, and Henry himself secured the condottiere a
reprieve and a safe conduct, awarded December 9, for five
7 8years. Ludovico, armed with letters for the thirteen year-
old Duke of Mantua, Francesco Gonzaga, returned to Italy
early in 1546. The letters were delivered in April, but the
duchess, the duke's mother, refused to grant an interview.
Rumors were again flying that Da l'Armi was seeking men for
6Ibid., No. 356.
7rbid., Nos. 367, 370; L. & P., XX, pt, 2, Nos, 491, 964.
®These, if they could be discovered, would throw consid­
erable light on what it was that Henry had in mind.
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an invasion of Piedmont; and on advice from the Imperial 
Chancellor/ Granvelle, the duchess declined the English sov­
ereign's request for troops/ "not purposing," as she put it, 
to draw on herself or her son "the enmity of any Christian 
Powers." Moreover, she continued, proclamations had been
issued of late forbidding her subjects to enter the service 
9of others.
The signing of the Treaty of Camp in June negated Ludo­
vico's commission, and the death of Henry VIII in January, 
1547, assured the mercenary colonel of a fate which had pur­
sued him since his youth.^ On November 3, 1546, the Vene­
tians outlawed one of their own noblemen, Ser Maphio Bernardo 
on the charge of treasonous dealings with Prance. On the six­
teenth of that month Ser Maphio, a fugitive in Ravenna, was 
murdered, and upon investigation the murderers were discov­
ered to be none other than the paid assassins of Ludovico da 
l'Armi. Further inquiry revealed that the victim and Ludo­
vico had been collaborators, that each shared secrets that
11might have been a danger to the other. If captured and tor­
tured, Ser Maphio might have implicated his accessory in
& P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos, 596, 674, Venetian' Calendar,
V, Nos, 377, 381, 385, 387, 390,
Above, pp. 344-45,
^ Venetian Calendar,. V, Nos, 413, 424, 431.
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treacheries against England and Venice,
Da l'Armi was arrested and examined. Released briefly
on his own recognizance, he fled to Milan where, on February
6 , 1547, at the court of the Imperial Governor, Don Ferrante
Gonzaga, he was siezed and placed in custody. Though he
sought help from England and from the emperor, none was forth'
coming. He was successfully extradicted to Venice in April,
found guilty, and publicly beheaded between two columns on
12
the mole fronting the sea on Saturday, May 14.





One of the most honored and highly valued of Tudor mer­
cenary commanders was the Madrilenian, Pedro de Gamboa, the 
soldier who holds the distinction of being the first to serve 
in England proper with the rank of colonel.1 His appearance 
in London in March, 1545, coinciding as it did with the dis­
bandment en masse of Charles V's Spaniards in the Nether-
2lands suggests that Gamboa entered English service direct 
from a stint with the emperor's forces in that part of Eu­
rope, though there is no evidence to prove that he was among 
the bands of his countrymen earlier prested at Falmouth.
There is no question but that he served in the Imperial 
army during the French war in 1544. A Spanish despatch rela­
tive to the siege of Saint Dizier lists him among the casual­
ties. He had been "shot near the thigh bone, almost touch­
ing on the genitals," a wound which rendered him partially
3crippled for life. His appointment in March, 1545, as 
maestre de campo or colonel of all the Spaniards in English 
service was not universally popular. It caused "no lack of
1Above, p. 132 (n. 41) .
2Above, p. 342.
3Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 163, Gruffyd, "Boulogne and 
Calais from 1545 to 1550," p. 16, describes him as being 
small in stature and lame, "one leg being shorter than the 




envy and malice" among his subordinates, particularly at 
Calais, where the attempted flight of Juan de Haro and the
4desertion of Antonio de Mora were attributed directly to it.
Regardless of that enmity which sprang as much from his 
5origins as from the 150 ducats a month he received in wages, 
Gamboa's service pleased his masters. Diligent and unafraid, 
he proved his worth many times over in recruiting troops, . 
which he seems to have had little trouble in finding, and in 
leading them in battle. Edward Seymour, under whom he served 
almost constantly, had great faith in him, as witnessed in 
the winter of 1545 when Gamboa and his Spaniards were hot 
only retained— at a time when other mercenaries were being 
dismissed— but left in some of the most forward positions 
against the Scots. ** It was Gamboa also whom Seymour took 
with him to France to survey the damage done by Surrey's over-
7throw in January, 1546, and at Ambleteuse in May the English 
general's trust was fully confirmed when, on a threatened
4Hume, ed., Chronicle of King Henry VIII, p. 124;
Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais' from 1545 to 1550," pp. 15-18.
5Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," pp. 
15-16, says of the colonel that "two or three times" he had 
been Captain General under the emperor, adding somewhat fece- 
tiously that he was "a man of great rank in the realm of 
Spain, where there was not a mound, a hill or mountain which 
was not blood relation to Captain Gamboa."




stir fay some of Pennink's landsknechts for an additional
month's wages, the Spaniard rallied his men to Seymour's, de-
8fence and thereby averted a mutiny.
For these and other services, Gamboa was knighted, Henry
himself performing the honors at York Place near Whitehall
gsome months before his final illness. But, perhaps, his 
greatest reward was the grant of denization and the subse- 
quent gift of the lordship of Stanmer. Technically, since 
denization was a form of citizenship, Gamboa became an Eng­
lishman and in the process lost his free-lance status. In 
practice, however, it was as "Colonel of the King's Span­
iards" that he continued to serve the new government of Ed­
ward VI. Likewise, when in the field he continued to lead 
foreigners, as at the battle of Pinkie in 1547 and the siege 
of Haddington in 1548. And he always drew a mercenary colo­
nel's wages.
Gamboa might have led a long and happy life in England.
QJohn Stowe, Annales, or A General Chronicle of England 
. . . Continued and Augmented . . . bŷ  Edmund Howes, Gent. 
(London: Richard Meighen, 1631) p. 591; L. £  P ., XXI,'pt. 1
No. 864. Pennink himself did much to res¥ore order and six
of his men were hanged.
gWilliam A. Shaw, The Knights of England. A Complete 
Record from Earliest Times to the Present Day (2 vols.; 
London: Sherratt and Hughes, 1906), II, 58. For a list of
other mercenaries receiving knighthoods, see Appendix E.
•^Above, p. 422.
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His religious predilections, if in fact he had any, did not
disturb his Edwardian paymaster's, and under the Catholic,
Mary, who was partial to Spaniards, he would probably have
found favor. Unfortunately, he did not live that long. On
January 19, 1550, while walking near his London home in Saint
Sepulchre's parish, Gamboa and his friend, Alonzo de Villa
Sirga were waylaid and murdered by four of their countrymen.
At the root of this deed was some quarrel which had developed
11
during the war against the Scots, The chief assailant was
Carlos de Guavara with whom Gamboa had rode at Pinkie. He
and his accomplices were rounded up by William, now Lord,
Paget in Smithfield, and at their arraignment on January 23
they were condemned, their execution by hanging following on
12the twenty-fourth.
11Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," 
pp. 77-78,
12Wriothesley, A Chronicle of England during the Reigns 
of the Tudors , II, 31-32'. ' ' The’ author provides the chilling 
detail’ that on the way to Smithfield, where the sentence was 
exacted, Carlos de Guavara "had his right hand stricken off 
on the cart wheel with an axe by the executioner," Those who 
died with him were his kinsman, Balthazar de Guavara, Miguel 





Though he earned his reputation in later years, the most 
bloodthirsty and noteworthy of all the mercenary captains to 
serve the early Tudors was Julian Romero. Born in humble 
circumstances in the village of Huelamo in the Serrania de 
Cuenca, he was, in a career which spanned over forty years, 
to advance through the ranks to become, as one of his contem­
poraries phrased it, "commander-in-chief of great enterprises
Romero's early history is only dimly known. When still
a boy, in the winter of 1534, he enlisted as a common footman
in an expedition against the Moors in North Africa, and for
\
the next ten years drifted unnoticed through Charles V ’s 
several wars in Tunis, Italy, Flanders, and in France, In 
1545, he was one of the Spaniards to come ashore at Falmouth. 
Enrolled as a captain in Gamboa's regiment, he was posted to 
Newcastle, saw action against the Scots under Hertford, whom 
he accompanied to Ambleteuse, and was attached .to the garri­
son there at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Camp.
•^Cabrera de Cordova, quoted by M. A. S. Hume, "Julian 
Romero-— Swashbuckler," in The Year After the Armada and other 
Historical Studies (Reprint; London and Port Washington, N. Y 
Kennikat Press, 1970), p. 121. All of the information con­
tained in this sketch, unless otherwise noted, is taken from 
this source, pp. 73-121,
2Above, pp. 342-43.
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Following his successful duel with the traitor, De Mora,
at Fontainebleau, he returned to London, where his excessive
3extravegence led to his arrest for a debt of 200 ducats. He 
was saved from jail by Gamboa, who made the money good, but 
shortly thereafter he was hauled before the Council for loose 
talk about Henry VIII*s religious innovations. In this in­
stance, he was saved from dismissal and punishment by Secre­
tary Paget's intercession.
It was not long after these events that Henry VIII died, 
and on Seymour's invasion of Scotland in the autumn of 1547, 
Julian went north with Gamboa. His bravery at Pinkie, ac­
cording to the unknown author of the Chronicle of Henry VIII,
4earned him a knighthood; he participated in the relief of 
Haddington in August, 1548; and was captured along with Pedro 
Negro sometime before the peace of 1550, perhaps while serv­
ing at Broughty Castle, near Dundee.
Romero's captivity could not have been long. On the out­
break of Charles V's war with Henry II of France in 1551, he 
answered his sovereign's call to the colors. As commander of 
the castle of Dinant in Namur in 1554, he was obliged to
3Charges were pressed by a Milanese merchant, Baptista
Baron.
4This author has been unable to substantiate this claim.
5 CP. R. 0 .) E 351/43, mem, 1 0 ,
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surrender to the French, but for his gallant defence of that 
stronghold he and his unit were allowed the honors of war, 
being permitted to depart "without loss of goods, . . . their
g
swords by their side." He was now a recognized leader, fast 
becoming, as the contemporary Spanish historian, Sandoval, 
assessed him, one of the foremost soldiers of his day. He 
distinguished himself at the storming of Saint Quentin in 
1557, while ten years later, as colonel-in-chief of Philip II*s 
Regiment of Sicily, he accompanied Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, 
Duke of Alva, as part of the Spanish army of ten thousand 
sent into the Low Countries to suppress the revolt of the 
Dutch. As Alva's henchman, Romero "was marked out now con­
spicuously as one of the most unscrupulous of [his] officers," 
a man "who could be depended upon in any emergency, . . .  fa­
natically loyal to his sovereign and the faith for which he 
was fighting."
7When the English adventurer, Thomas Stucley, entered 
Spanish employment in 1569, Philip II promised him five thou­
sand troops under Julian for the invasion of Ireland. How­
ever, the scheme was scrapped, and Romero continued to serve 
in the Netherlands, where he presided over some of the most 
brutal episodes in all the sad history of the Eighty Years'
Calendar of State Papers (Foreign), Mary, No, 222,
^A. F. Pollard, "Thomas Stucley," D. N. B., XIX, 123-26.
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War. He and six hundred of. his arquebusiers massacred the
citizens of the Flemish town of Naarderi in November, 1572;
8on the fall of Haarlem, during the siege of whxch he lost an 
eye, his troops similarly were allowed to get out of hand; 
and on his authority, on the capture of the fort of Mansendus 
in Holland, the throats of six hundred of its defenders were 
cut.
Even greater atrocities followed in the wake of Don Juan 
of Austria's appointment as Governor of the Netherlands in 
1576. The Spanish soldiery in the still loyal southern pro­
vinces, unpaid in nearly two yeairs, ran amuck to indemnify 
themselves. Romero's troops, attacked as rebels at Lier by 
the largely Belgian forces of the Council of State, turned on 
their tormentors and routed them, carrying the slaughter, in­
cluding that of innocent bystanders, to the gates of Louvain 
itself. Immediately thereafter, having joined forces with 
other mutinous units from Breda, Maastricht, and the Spanish 
garrisons along the Schelde, Romero descended on weakly de­
fended Antwerp.
This city, the greatest port and richest commercial cen­
ter in the West, was reduced within a matter of hours to a 
charnel house in the terrible "Spanish Fury" of November 4, 
1576. In the course of this and the two days following,
8July, 1573.
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eight thousand men, women, and children were murdered,
6 ,000,000 ducats worth of property was plundered, and for his
part in the pillage Romero and his fellow officers received
high praise: "They deserve well of his Majesty." wrote the
Spanish politician, Jerome Rodas, "for the services they
9have rendered in this great victory."
The upshot of the "Spanish Fury" was the "Pacification
of Ghent," a shortlived, but nevertheless important, alliance
between the Catholic provinces of the southern Netherlands
and the militantly Protestant provinces of the north.^ This
temporary agreement, unifying as it did the military power
of the whole Netherlands against the oppression of Spain,
forced by negotiation the withdrawal of the entire Spanish
11Army of Flanders from the Low Countries in April, 1577.
9The classic account of the "Spanish Fury" in English 
is rendered by John Lothrop Motley, The Rise of the Dutch 
Republic (3 vols.; New York: Harper and Brothers, Publish­
ers, 1883), III, 104 ff. According to one Spanish estimate 
consulted by Motley, twenty-five hundred victims were des­
patched with the sword, while double that number were burned 
alive or drowned.
10The "Pacification of Ghent," provoked by the "Spanish 
Fury," held the Netherlands together until 1579. In that 
year, the allegiance of the southern provinces was won back 
by Spain through the Treaty of Arras. The Protestant pro­
vinces continued the fight for freedom under the articles of 
the Union of Utrecht, declaring themselves independent of 
Spanish control in 1581.
^Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road,
1567-1659, p. 236.
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Romero was posted to Italy. But on the outbreak of fresh 
fighting in July, he was ordered with an army of six thousand 
to return to the scene of his earlier crimes. As he set out 
on his march from Cremona, he fell from his horse, dead, He 
had served two kings of Spain for better than forty years.
In that time, he had lost an arm, a leg, one eye and an ear. 
As his reward, he had been appointed general of his last com^- 
mand.^
1 2This according to Hume, "Julian Romero— Swashbuckler," 
pp. 76, 120. However, Parker,: The Army of Flanders and the 
Spanish R o a d 1567-1659, p. 118, states categorically that 
Romero never rose above the rank of colonel.
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A LIST OF MERCENARY KNIGHTS AND THE DATES OF THEIR CREATION
1. Pedro de Gamboa, York Place, 4-546.
2. Julian Romero, after the battle of Pinkie, September, 
1547,
3. Lord Waldeck, a German captain, "in the^camp beside Rox-^ 
burgh in Scotland," September 28, 1547.
44. Pedro Negro, Roxburgh, September 28, 1547,
55. Cristobal Diaz, Roxburgh, September 28, 1547,
6 . Alonzo de Villa Sirga, Roxburgh, September 28, 1547,^
7. Jean de Barteville, a French deserter, Berwick, September 
or October, 1547.'
8
8 . Paolo Baptista Spxnola, 1549.
99. Conrad Pennink, 1549 or 1550,
■^Shaw, The Knights of England, II, 58.
2This only oiy the authority of Hume, "Julian Romero—  
Swashbuckler," p. 90.
3Shaw, The Knights of England, II, 61.
4Ibid., 62, to be compared with Patten, The Expedition 
into Scotland, p. 150.
5Patten, The Expedition into Scotland, p. 150.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., p. 151, to be compared with Shaw, The Knights' of 
England, II, 62.
gShaw,: The Knights of England, II, 64.
9Ibid.-, 65.
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10.. Wilhelm Wallerthum, ."for service in the French and Scot­
tish wars."10
The date of Wallerthum's. creation is unknown, but the 
award was made sometime during the reign of Edward VI, See 
Calendar of state Papers (Domestic), Edward VI, Mary, Eliza­
beth, IT 85. Such creations appear to have stopped with 
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PRELIMINARY ARTICIES AND AGREEMENT 
PASSED BETWEEN THE COUNT OF BUREN AND THOMAS CHAMBERLAIN1
Hereinafter ensue the articles and agreement passed be­
tween the Count of Buren and Thomas Chamberlain on the part 
of His Majesty the King of England, according to which the 
said Count has promised His Majesty the King of England to 
bring two thousand footmen.
Item: The Count of Buren says and promises to bring up to
two thousand footmen, well disciplined and equipped for war 
with all officers and appurtenances. And that for each en­
sign there will be so many pikemen, halberdiers, and small 
shot up to the number of four hundred man, of which there 
will be fifty lor] sixty more or less harquebusiers in each, 
up to thirty halberdiers, and the rest pikemen.
Item: The Count of Buren promises to be ready at Bois-
le-duc [i.e. 's Hertogenbosch] or thereabouts with his foot­
men to take the musters on 14 May next.
Item: His Majesty agrees to give the Count of Buren for
the conduct of each foot soldier from his home to the town of 
Bois-le-duc aforesaid or thereabouts where the musters will 
be taken by His Majesty's Commissioners a Karolus florin, 
each of which is understood to be worth 20 pattars in
•̂(P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/185, ff. 142-43.
Brabantine currency, , besides 100 Karolus Florins for each 
ensign, with which each of the said footmen will be satisfied 
without demanding further entertainment or wages for their 
coming.
Item: His Majesty agrees to pay to each footman after the
musters 4 florins per month for his wages. And the said 
Count of Buren promises that the said footmen will serve His 
Majesty for the said pay on condition that a captain Chris­
topher de Landerberch [i.e. Landenberg], may serve His Majesty 
for the same. And in case the said Landerberch will not take 
part with His Majesty, promises (to serve him) AT THE SAID 
rate of 4 Karolus florins per month. [Mutilated] he will pay 
the Count of Buren and his footmen 4 Philipus per month, at 
25 pattars in Brabantine currency for each Philipus, or such
pay as the Emperor will give to his footmen, which the said
3Count of Buren will lead in his pay to serve the King. And 
to the captains, lieutenants, and other officers contained 
in the articles hereafter mentioned, such number of florins 
as is declared in the said articles.
Item: The said Count of Buren promises that His Majesty will
not be charged with double pay for more than sixty in each
2The valuation of the pattar, which was of the same 
worth as the stuiver, had to be raised. Above, p. 277.




ensign of foot, one carrying the other without including 
the pay of captains, lieutenants, and other officers in the 
articles hereafter mentioned.
Item: The said Count of Buren promises that His Majesty
will not be charged to pay the wages for battle or assault,
if the battle be not joined or if he be speedily beaten by
the enemy, or if siege be laid and attack made by battery and
the assault given. And that no others will receive this pay
other than those who will be at the battle and will give the 
5assault.
Item: It is agreed that the wages of footmen, their captains,
lieutenants, and other officers will be paid in a certain 
number of florins per month. It is understood that each 
month contains thirty days, and each florin is worth 20 stun­
ers Brabantine, which 20 stuners are each worth 2 soulx 
[sous?] six pence sterling. And that the florins which will 
be sent for the conduct of the foot soldiers will be of the 
same value aforesaid.
Item: The Count of Buren promises that the aforesaid foot­
men will be held to serve and will serve His Majesty well
4On double pays, see above, p. 261, n. 49.
5Assault pay was a type of bonus awarded landsknechts 
when, and if, they carried their objective in pitched battle. 
This author had found no indication that it was ever allowed 
by the early Tudors which is not unusual, since the majority 
of engagements in which landsknechts were used consisted of 
siege operations.
and loyally without fraud, feint, or ill device during the 
term of six months. And will swear, the said men of war, 
both foot and mounted, to be loyal to His Majesty against all 
his enemies and ill-wishers, except the Emperor and the Holy 
Empire.
Item: The said Count of Buren promises that the said men of
war will be held to serve the King, marching against His ene­
mies and showing themselves valiant and joining with the ene­
my, doing and using extreme vigor and cruelty against the in­
vader if they can, as far as to make them submit to the author­
ity of His Majesty.
Item: Mons. de Buren promises that the said men of war will
keep the day and night watch as they will be commanded to by 
the Lieutenant-General of the Army, without being able to 
contradict what they are ordered.
Item: Mons. de Buren promises that the said men of war— foot­
men, will not contradict what they will be commanded both as 
to the skirmish, as in battle, assault, or other combat what­
soever. And in case of battle or assault, His Majesty pro­
mises to give a month's pay besides what is said in the pre­
vious article.
Item: Mons. de Buren promises that the said men of war and
the principal officers will be held and charged according to 
their oath to uphold and maintain justice to both great and 
small, so that no inconveniences may fall out to the
prejudice of His Majesty's army.
Item: Mons. de Buren promises that if His Majesty entertains
the said footmen as aforesaid, they may be held and charged 
to serve His Majesty for so much or so little time as will 
seem good to him.
Item: After, the said men of war will be paid and enter­
tained the length of time that they will serve His Majesty 
without fraud or ill design from month to month, as is afore­
mentioned, in mustering, as is customary.
Item: His Majesty will order how they will take the oath.
Item: Should it happen that His Majesty would like to give
leave to the Germans, the custom is to pay them by the half 
month for their return, and those who serve longer, His Ma­
jesty will have regard to favor them more than the others, 
according to his pleasure.
Item: If florins, pattars, and stuners are not current in
France of [if] the said men of war will find themselves out­
side of Flanders country, Mons. de Buren and his men of war 
will be content and held to receive their pay in angelots, 
ducats, escus sloters [?] and demi-scoters [?], and all 
other kinds of money current in England and France and else­
where and at the rates and values they now have.
Made at Brussels, 8 April, 1544.
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THE CAPITULATIONS OP THOMAS LIGHTMAKER1
First, the said Lightmaker shall be bound to bring to 
the King's Majesty's service five hundred men of war, well 
trained and equipped for the wars as shall appertain, among 
whom he shall have 350 lances, and of them 150 arquebusiers, 
the which men of war carrying lances shall be armed with 
their habilments of the head with vizzards and salades on. 
Item: The arquebusiers shall likewise have good arquebuses,
well equipped with all manner of munition thereunto per­
taining.
Item: The said captains of one hundred horses shall have
for every horse passing the musters 1 philip by the month. 
Item: Every horseman passing the musters shall have 12
philips by the month, the philip amounting to twenty-five 
patars of Flanders or the value which makes in sterling money 
3s 2d.
Item: The standard bearer shall have besides the wages of
his own person 24 philips by the month.
1 (B. M.) Lansd. 155, ff. 356-58. This is a copy of the 
original capitulations written in an eighteen century hand. 
Though the transcriber writes that these articles "seem to 
have been made to Matthew Lightmaker," Thomas' brother, he 
assigns them to the year 1544. Matthew did not enter Eng­
lish service until 1545. The articles could in fact be 
Matthew's, but no matter, since all contracts followed a 
similar form.
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Item: Every man of arms having eight horses belonging unto
him to have a cuirassier, and for him he shall have by the
month besides the wages of his own person 12 philips.
Item: The said cuirassier shall be armed from the top to
the foot.
Item: To every twelve horses they shall be bound to have one
waggon drawn with four good horses with their appurtenances 
and shall have for the said waggon by the month 23 philips. 
Item: They shall not put any horse of war passed the musters
into the waggon, and if any there be with all attrapped, the 
Masters of the same horses shall be punished with the con­
fiscation of the said horses and of their wages for one 
whole month.
Item: To every twelve horses passed the musters shall be
allowed one horse for baggage with 12 phs. by the month.
Item: To the said five hundred horses shall be allowed two
Scribners, two furriers, two trumpets, five marshals, one 
surgeon with 12 phs. by the month.
Item: Every horse that shall tarry before the enemies after
the musters made they shall be paid for every horse 30 phs. 
Item: They shall be bound to serve thirty days for a month,
and their services shall begin the day of the musters.
Item: They shall be paid monthly, and their money and vict­
uals shall be delivered unto them according to the value and 
not otherwise.
Item: Though they be not paid within eight days more or less
after the pay day, they shall be content to do all things 
nonetheless as become them in like case as if they had re­
ceived their wages before hand.
Item: They shall swear to serve the King's Majesty three
months and as long as shall please his Majesty to have them 
at the said sold, so it be signified unto them before the 
three months expire.
Item: They shall have from the coming from their own houses,
every horseman to the place of the musters, for a day and a 
night’23 kreuzers or the value, and for every waggon drawn 
as aforesaid passing the musters 48 kreuzers for their ex­
pence for a day and a night, and they shall be bound to go 
three leagues of Almain a day, and the fifth they may rest 
themselves.
Item: When we shall have done with them, they shall have
licence to depart in a convenient place and shall have a 
months' wages for their return.
Item: None shall go to any skirmish, booty or pillage, or
against the enemies without consent of the General or his 
Ritmaster, and in case any do the contrary, whatsoever shall 
happen of them, they shall stand to their hurt and yet never­
theless be punished as shall be thought reasonable.
Item: All Dukes, Earls, Captains, Generals, head officers
of the king, and of the King's blood shall be reserved to the
King's Majesty's use, saving that his Majesty shall depart 
somewhat liberally with their takers [?J ; so that they shall 
be in reason contented. All other prisoners shall be theirs 
that shall take them, and they shall ransom them at their 
liberty: saving that they shall not be sent away without con­
sent of the General or Ritmaster.
Item: None shall make [mutiny] , strife, or debate in any
wise, but if any do any such or other undue thing, he shall 
be punished as shall be thought reasonable. And the Ritmas-
ter shall have power to put him out of wages, saving that the
Ritmaster shall give knowledge to the Clerk of the musters to 
appoint him that shall depart the day of his departure and to 
appoint a day when the said Ritmaster shall take another in 
his place.
Item: The King's Majesty shall pay them being come from
their houses for three months, although they be-licensed to 
depart before the said three months expired.
Item: That none shall use any falsehood, craft, or subtlety
at the musters upon pain of confiscation of his wages as 
shall be thought reasonable.
Item: The King's Majesty shall have all such towns, villages,
castles, fortresses, artillery, and all manner munition
found in the same as they shall win at any time.
Item: They shall observe all letters of passport or safe con­
duct granted by the King's Majesty or his General.
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Item: They shall do no displeasure in any wise, neither to
the merchants. Victuallers, or such as shall bring any muni­
tion or victuals, or any such thing to the Camp, nor to the 
Waggoners.
Item: They shall serve the King's Majesty against all manner
of persons, saving the holy Empire.
Item: Such as have any old strifes or debates shall in no
wise revenge themselves during the wars unless the Ritmaster 
can friendly appease them upon pain to be punished.
Item: The sick soldiers shall be paid as others, saving that
they shall be visited soon by the Clerk of the musters, and 
the horse and harness of the sick shall be brought to the 
musters without.
Item: The said men of war shall in nowise do any displeasure
to the King's Majesty's countries, or the countries of his 
Majesty’s friends or confederates, but shall be bound to pay 
for all things honestly, upon pain to be punished as reason 
requireth.
Item: They shall not use to swear any great or 'enorme'
oaths upon pain to be punished.
Item: They shall be bound to keep their Ward and Watch as
shall be unto them commanded by the General without contra- . 
diction.
Item; They shall muster as often as the King's Majesty shall 
command them.
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Item: Every fifty horse shall have a Ritmaster who shall
have above the wages of his person 25 phs.
Item: The Ritmasters shall have a Lieutenant who shall have
40 phs. by the month.
Item: They shall have two head officers of Master of the
2Watch and a Master of the quarter [?] , every of them 40 phs. 
by the month.
Item: Lightmaker shall have to maintain his table 100 phs.
by the month.
Item: The said Ritmaster, Captain, and men of war shall be
bound to serve the King's Majesty without offending to the 
contrary, upon pain of punishment as the Ritmaster shall 
think reasonable. And if the said Ritmaster shall not pun­
ish them, then the Marshal of the King's Majesty's army see 
them punished as shall be thought meet.
Item: As soon as the said number of Horsemen shall come into
the King's Majesty's countries, they shall straight ways pass 
the musters and be paid a months' wages before hand.
And to the intent these articles be firm and stable, it shall 
be subscribed and sealed accordingly.
2It seems likely that this term should be rendered as 
" quartermaster.1
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HENRY VXII^S LETTER OF RETAINER TO FRIEDRICH VON REIFFENBERG
SPECIFYING THE COMPOSITION OF HIS FIFTEEN HUNDRED MEN OF ARMS■ 
THEIR PAY, AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE1
Henry, by the grace of God, King of England, France and 
Ireland, Defender of the Faith, and on earth, supreme head of 
the church of England and Ireland; to all who may see or hear 
these presents.
Be it known that we have committed- and retained, and by 
these commit and retain, our dear and beloved, the Lord 
Friedrich of Reiffenberg, to serve us as captain and to bring 
us for our service fifteen hundred men-at-arms, of war, and 
of service, well mounted and disciplined and equipped as good 
and honest men of war. And upon such treatment, agreement, 
and articles as follow, the which articles we wish to have 
observed and maintained without contravention in any way, 
Promising to hold firm and fixed all that we promise them in 
every form and way, as is contained in the following arti­
cles. Firstly, that the said captain will be held to bring 
to our service fifteen hundred men of war, well armed and 
mounted as is meet, with good servants, of which there will 
be for each ensign of five hundred horsemen, 350 lances and 
150 harquebusiers, the which lancers will be armed with
■̂(P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, ff. 15-19.
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their head gear, with visors, helmits and salades, throat 
pieces, axe, vambraces, corselets, breeches and tassets cov­
ering the knees, and with long gauntlets.
Item: The harquebusiers likewise well furnished with all
ammunition, breeches, axe, sleeves of mail, gorgets, gaunt-
2lets, corselets, and good head gear, with a swynspetts and 
a gun.
Item: To the captain of the fifteen hundred horsemen will be
given for each horse passing muster a florin per month.
Item: For each horseman passing muster, twelve Philipus
florins per month will be given, each philipus containing 25 
Flanders patars of the value thereof.
Item: The standard bearer will be given beyond the wages of
his person 25 Philips per month.
Item: Every man-at-arms with eight horses belonging to him
will be able to have a cuirassier and will be paid 12 Philips 
beyond the pay of his person, and the said cuirassier will be 
armed from head to foot in everything appertaining to a man 
of arms.
Item: For every twelfth horse there will be a wagon with
four good horses and their good furnishings and well equipped. 
24 Philips will be paid per month for those wagons.
Item: No war horse passing muster will be put in harness in
2I have been unable to find the meaning of this term.
the wagonIsj, and if it should happen that one or more horses 
be harnessed, the masters of them will be punished with con-^ 
fiscation of the said horses and [loss] of a whole month's 
pay.
Item: For every twelve horses passing muster, a baggage
horse or carrier will be maintained at 12 Philips per month. 
Item: For the said fifteen hundred horses, six clerks, six
furriers, six trumpets, fifteen farriers, and three surgeons 
will be maintained at 12 Philips per month.
Item: For every horse slain by the enemy after muster, we
will pay 30 Philips apiece.
Item: The said men of war will be held to serve us for
thirty days a month.
Item: The service of the horsemen will begin on the day of
muster.
Item: They will be paid from month to month, and the money
and victuals will be given and administered to them according 
to their worth and in no other way.
Item: If payment of silver is delayed by a week, more or
less, the men of war will have patience, and notwithstanding, 
do all that good and loyal men of war should and ought to do, 
and they will be charged to become neither more nor less 
slack than if they had received their month's pay on the [day 
due] .
Item: They will swear to serve us for three months and after
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the said three months for so long as it may please us for the 
same pay and treatment, each time informing them before the 
said months expire.
Item: We will give the said men of war for the journey from
their home to the place of muster six batz by day and night. 
And they will be held to advance four German leagues by day 
and to rest the fifth.
Item: When we shall have nothing more for the ;said men of
war to do, we will disband them at some suitable place and 
give them a month's pay for their Return.
Item: None will proceed to go on skirmish or against the en­
emy or for booty or pillage without the consent of the cap­
tain-general or of his Ritmaster, and if anyone does the con­
trary, all that he may carry off will be sold without recom- 
pence, and [he] will be chastised and punished according to 
what is rightly thought reasonable.
Item: All dukes, counts, captains, generals, sovereigns,
high officers of the King or of royal blood will be assigned 
to us or to our captain-general, except that we will make 
some compensation to those who will have taken them, so that 
he will have reason to be content. All other prisoners will 
be given to those who will take them or will have the means to 
ransom them at their pleasure, except that they will not be 
returned without the consent of the captain-general and 
their Ritmaster.
Item; None will proceed to make any mutiny, question or argu­
ment in any way, and if anyone does the contrary [or] chooses 
to be unreasonable, he will be punished according to what is 
deemed right and reasonable, and the Ritmaster will have power 
to dismiss him, except that the said Ritmaster will inform the 
commissioners and the clerk of the musters thereof to sign the 
date of the dismissal of the said dismissed, and thus to sign 
the day when the said Ritmaster may take someone else in his 
place.
Item: None will proceed to make or cause to be made any de­
ception, falsity or sly practice in the musters upon confisca­
tion of all his pay and punishment as is rightly deemed rea­
sonable.
Item: All acquisitions from towns, chateaux, marches or vil­
lages of artillery and all war munitions will fall to us.
[Item:] The said men of war will be held to observe all re­
prieves, safeguards, and passports given by us, our captain- 
general, and Marshal of the camp.
Item: None will proceed to do any displeasure to the corps
[?] or to the sutlers or to those who conduct ammunition, 
victuals or merchandise, nor to any wagon drivers thereof. 
Item: The said men will be held to serve us against all our
enemies, excepting only the Holy Empire.
Item: All those who will have old quarrels or disputes may
not avenge themselves, but must allow them to rest during
497
our war, if the Ritmaster cannot reconcile them, on pain of 
being * Roue,1
Item: All invalids will be paid as other men of war, except
that they will be viewed and visited by the clerk of the mus­
ters, and the horses of the said sick and their harness will 
be brought to the muster without any ill device.
Item: The said men of war will not proceed to do any damage
to our country nor to the countries of our friends and allies 
and will be held to pay in all honesty, on pain of being cor­
rected and punished according to what is deemed reasonable. 
Item: The said men of war will not proceed in any way to
blaspheme or take in vain the blessed name of God the creator 
or any great lewd oaths on pain of being punished according 
to what the Ritmaster will deem right.
Item: The said men will be held to stand watch by day and
night as they will be commanded by the lieutenant-general of 
our army, without being able to contradict.
Item: The said men of war will be held to permit the musters
to be held so much and so often as it may please us.
Item: For every fifty horse a Ritmaster will be maintained,
who will have for his person beyond the pay of his corps, 25 
Philips per month.
Item: The said Ritmaster will have a lieutenant maintained
for every five hundred horse at 60 Philips per month.
Item: For every 150 horse six other officers will be
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maintained, that is to sayf three master of the watch, and 
three quartermasters, each maintained at 40 Philips per month. 
Item: To the said Captain Friedrich, 300 Philips per month
will be given for his board.
Item: We want to have observed and maintained all our right
institutions and proclamations regarding the levying of the 
war, without anything being done to the contrary, on pain of 
being punished as the Ritmaster and officers deem to be rea­
sonable, and if the said Ritmaster by negligence does not 
punish the said transgressions as reason demands, then they 
will be punished by our Grand Marshal of the camp according 
as justice rightly deems reasonable.
Item: The said captain and men of war will be held and >
charged to be unable to demand of us or our commissioners 
other treatment, pay or anything else, if not contained in 
the present letter of retainer and compact with the captain, 
made and contained in this letter.
Item: And in order to hold firm and fixed what we have pro­
mised in this present letter of retainer, and as we want to 
have the contents of these presents observed and maintained, 
we have signed these with our hand and here affixed our seal. 
Item: Each horseman in the service of His Majesty will have
four month's soldiering in hand and at the place of muster 
will receive, each according to his journey from home thereto, 
to be paid from month to month.
GLOSSARY
Abzug; literallydeparture; severance pay.
Albanians (Albanois, Albanoys): name given to the mercenary
Albanian and Greek light horsemen who served in all the 
armies of Western Europe in the sixteenth century.
Argoulets: French light cavalry troops believed to have been
raised and organized by Louis XII in imitation of the 
Albanian stradiots.
Arquebus (harquebus, hagbush, hackbut): term applied to a
variety of handguns of varying caliber, weight, and 
length in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries; 
prototype of the modern rifle.
Arquebus proof: term used to describe armor which had been
specially reinforced to protect the wearer against small 
arms fire.
Assagai: a two-handed lance with a steel point at both ends;
the distinctive weapon of the Albanian stradiot in the 
early sixteenth century.
Augmentations, Court of: a prerogative court created by stat­
ute in 1535 to administer the lands, wealth, and etc. of 
dissolved religious houses; merged with the Court of Gen­
eral Surveyors in 1547, it was abolished in 1554 and its 
functions transferred to the Exchequer.
Bard: any of various defensive pieces of armor for a horse.
Battle: the traditional units into which English armies were
divided in the late Middle Ages and early sixteenth cen­
tury; synonymous with "ward," as in fore-ward, middle- 
ward, and rear-ward.
Bend-leather: the thickest, strongest leather; acquired from
the back and flank of cured hides, it was used in harness- 
making and for the soles of shoes.
Bowyer: a maker and/or seller of bows.
Bravo: Italian slang expression with the English meaning of
"bully," "ruffian," "tough;" a man of violent habits.
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Burgonet: a type of casque or steel headgear for the use of
infantrymen; a helmit with a visor so fitted to the gorget 
or neck piece that the head could be turned without expos­
ing the neck.
Butt: a target shot at by bowmen and handgunners; used in
practice.
Camisade: a surprise attack usually launched under cover of
darkness.
Camp: beside its usual meaning of the lodgement of an army,
the word was employed in Tudor England to indicate a duel 
or honor always fought, apparently, under the ritualistic 
laws of war.
Caparison: a covering— sometimes decorative, sometimes pro­
tective— for a horse.
Cask: an archaic and alternate spelling of "casque," a steel
helmit of which there were many styles; also occasionally 
used in the sense of "case," as in "a case of pistols."
Cass: pay off, discharge, cashier.
Chamfron (chanfron): the headpiece of a horse's bard.
Colonel: originally the cabo de colonella, the head of a col­
umn; the chief officer of a regiment; the title did not 
come into use in English armies until Elizabeth's reign.
Corselet (corslet): an armored covering for the body, as dis­
tinct from the limbs.
Crupper: the leather hoop passing under a horses tail and
fastened to the saddle to keep it from slipping forward.
Cuirass: a piece of armor for the protection of the body be­
tween the neck and waist; more particularly, one consist­
ing of a coupled breastplate and backpiece.
Cuirassier: a mounted soldier wearing a cuirass; specifically,
in the early sixteenth century one of the heaviest types 
of light cavalrymen outfitted with a cuirass and armed 
with a lance and a handgun or handguns.
Cuisses: armor for the protection of the front part of the
thighs.
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Custrel: from the Old French, coustillier, a squire, esquire
of the body, servant to a man-at-arms. The French word 
is retained in the modern word,' coutilli'er, a can opener.
Dead-pay: though this term has several meanings, it was used
in early Tudor times in the sense of "double-pay;" extra 
pay awarded to officers or to particularly experienced 
soldiers from the rank-and-file.
Demilance: the light, short lance employed by demilancers,
the heaviest type of English light cavalry in the early 
sixteenth century; also, a light horseman armed with a 
demilance.
Destrier: a war horse or charger; the mount of a man-at-arms.
Drumslade: a drum or drummer.
Ensign: a military or naval standard; a flag; the officer
assigned to carry the ensign; a standard bearer; and also 
the body of men who served under a particular banner, as 
for example "an ensign of infantry."
Exchequer: in theory this department of state functioned as
the royal treasury, though in practice it was only one of 
many treasuries during the early Tudor period dealing 
with the income and expenditure of the crown's ordinary 
and extraordinary revenue. See below, First Fruits and 
Tenths, and above, Augmentations.
Farrier: one who shoes horses; the officer in a cavalry troop
entrusted with the care of the horses.
Fausse-brav: literally, a false hill; an artificial mount
thrown up in front of a rampart.
First Fruits and Tenths, Court of: court established by Henry
VIII in 1540 to administer the revenues accruing to the 
crown through the appropriation by the state of the "first 
fruits" (or annates) and tenths formerly paid to the pope. 
"First Fruits" consisted of a part of a year's income of 
a benefice paid to Rome by bishops on appointment; tenths, 
in theory one-tenth of the annual profit of every church 
living in the realm, had been collected since the twelfth 
century for the recovery of the Holy Land. A chief com­
petitor of the Exchequer, the prerogative Court of First 
Fruits and Tenths was heavily drawn on for revenue to 
support Henry VIII's last French war.
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Furrier; the officer charged with securing and arranging ac­
commodations for his unit.
Gauntlet: a glove usually made of leather but covered with
steel plates worn as part of the battle dress of a man- 
at-arms.
Genitour: the name applied to the light horsemen of Spain.
Glaive: a variation of the halberd; a type of bill.
Gorget; neck piece; an armored collar; a piece of armor to 
protect the neck.
Great horse: destrier; charger; mount of a man-at-arms.
Great Italian Wars: a term current among military historians
used to describe the series of campaigns waged between 
France and Spain for control of the Italian peninsula. 
Initiated by Charles VIII's invasion of Italy in 1494, 
they continued until the signing of the Peace of Cateau- 
Cambresis in 1559.
Greaves: Armor for the .legs below the knee.
Hackbut (hagbut): an arquebus.
Halberd: a combination of spear and battle-axe, consisting
of a sharp-edged blade ending in a point and a spear-head 
mounted on an eight-foot shaft.
Halberdier: a soldier armed with a halberd.
Jinetes: see above, genitour.
Lieutenant: in Tudor England the term retained the medieval
meaning of deputy or substitute for a higher officer un­
til well into the reign of Elizabeth; in continental 
armies, however, the term was used to designate the of­
ficer next in rank below a captain.
Limonier (limoneer, lymoner): a draft horse; a horse which
is attached to the shafts of a wagon.
Match: a wick so prepared that it is not easily extinguished;
used for firing cannon and other gunpowder weapons.
Matchlock: a type of gun equipped with a lock in which match
is placed for igniting the powder.
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Mint; located in the Tower of London with various branches 
throughout the realm, it supervised the coining of money 
in England, Its revenues were drawn on heavily for the 
wars.
Northern horse; English light cavalrymen recruited from the 
northern counties against Scotland.
Pezetaeri: a type of hoplite or heavily armed infantryman
popular in ancient Greece and Macedonia. Armed with thir­
teen foot-long sarissas or spears, they were among the 
earliest forerunners of the Swiss Gebirgsknechten and the 
German Landsknechte.
Pioneer: sapper; one of a body of foot soldiers employed pri­
marily as laborers to dig trenches, erect fortifications, 
repair roads, build bridges, and etc.
Plashland: marshland.
Pouldrons (pauldrons): a shoulder-plate; a piece of armor de­
signed to protect the shoulder.
"Pricker:" a light horseman, as for example a Northern horse­
man, employed as a skirmisher or scout; one who "pricks" 
either his horse with his spur or his opponent with his 
lance.
Regiment: employed in early Tudor England in the medieval
sense of the authority enjoyed by an officer over his men; 
on the Continent, the term had earlier come to mean a 
fairly large body of troops forming a definite unit within 
an army.
Reiter (rutter): literally, a rider; a German or Dutch cav­
alryman, particularly a cuirassier armed with lance and 
pistol; a pistoleer.
Salade (sallet): a light, globular helmit, with or without
a visor, and without a crest, the lower part curving out­
ward at the neck.
Scimitar: a short, curved single-edged sword popular among
Orientals, especially Turks and Persians; a favorite side- 
arm of the Albanian stradiot.
Seneschal: steward.
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Sergeant: in Tudor England the word was employed with the i
meaning of servant or attendant; in continental armies 
of the period, the title was applied to the chief non" 
commissioned assistant to the captain of a company.
Standard: synonymous with ensign; a body of men; a flag; an
officer entrusted with the keeping of the standard;: a 
standard bearer.
Stoned horse: a stallion; an uncastrated horse.
Stradiot: name applied to the Albanian light cavalrymen of
the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
Tasses: A series of articulated and overlapping metal plates
descending from the corselet which form a sort of kilt of 
armor to protect the thighs and lower part of the trunk.
Vambrace: defensive armor for the forearm.
Ward: see battle; one of the principal divisions into which
Tudor armies were divided.
Wheel-lock: a form of gun-lock in which the powder was ig­
nited by the friction of a small, spring-wound wheel 
against a piece of iron pyrites.
Zweihander: a slath or slashing sword; an immense, two-handed
sword some five feet or longer in length.
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